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ABSTRACT 
This is a comparative study of the English and Chilean tortious liability for economic 
harm caused between business competitors as developed by case-law and legal 
scholarship, including aspects of American, French and Spanish laws as influences on 
the English and Chilean regimes. The title, somewhat redundantly, alludes to the 
"intentional" economic torts to contrast them with the tort of negligence which is 
outside this research. The main argument is that this kind of liability should reflect the 
balance between claimants' interests and defendants' liberty to compete. Merely 
suffering economic harm does not entitle a competitor to compensation: liability must 
further be restricted through a mental element more stringent than ordinary 
carelessness (including a certain form of intention and, by extension, recklessness or 
gross negligence) and unlawful means (comprising the violation of the claimant's 
;("-right or protected interest). It is maintained that in the novel problem-area in Chile 
relating to harm between traders, the principle of liability for culpa should be 
qualified congruently with competition freedom, and that a suitable method for this 
purpose consists of requiring a mental element rather than mere fault (negligence). It 
is argued that English law offers an invaluable experience for Chilean jurists and 
courts of enforcing economic-tort liability moderately, refraining from undermining 
business competition which is essentially a statutory matter. The thesis analyses the 
English modem common-law economic torts and statutory competition torts, 
assessing their roles and impact on commercial competition. It also criticises the 
Chilean law of delict, both generally and specifically in relation to unfair practices 
and antitrust conduct, suggesting that liability is subjected to intention because 
damage is a side-effect of legitimate competition and rivals owe no duty of care to 
one another. 
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1. Overview 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
This thesis analyses and discusses the functions that tort law can and should fulfil 
vis-a-vis pure economic harm caused between business competitors. It describes 
the criteria and ways whereby English and Chilean courts and jurists respectively 
use the laws of torts and delict to tackle this phenomenon from preventive, 
compensatory, punitive and restitutionary angles. It explains the results achieved 
in both systems, while exploring and criticising the reasons for the differences or 
similarities between their techniques and outcomes. Since Chilean law is less 
developed in this area, the thesis attempts in particular to draw lessons from the 
English experience concerning the manner in which Chilean courts and legal 
scholars could approach fact-situations corresponding to those embodied in the 
economic torts and competition torts and that can realistically be introduced in 
Chile, thus refraining from irrationally transplanting foreign methods. 
The main argument of this dissertation is that tortious liability for pure 
pecuniary damage inflicted between commercial rivals should reflect the balance 
between the victims' right to be fully compensated for their losses and the 
wrongdoers' liberty to compete. It will be suggested that this goal can be 
accomplished if tortious liability is restricted consistently with the essence of 
competition through the requirement of a mental element more stringent than 
ordinary negligence (that is, the intention to harm or to produce other similar 
effects depending on the circumstances) or at least gross negligence (as the civil 
counterpart of criminal recklessness). There are alternative ways of controlling 
this kind of liability at a later stage of tort proceedings which can attain results 
comparable to the solution I propose, particularly the use of causation to treat pure 
economic loss as uncertain and/or as too remote a consequence of the defendant's 
act. Nevertheless this technique is rooted in fault-based liability whereas 
competitors do not owe duties of care to one another. Rivals should not be 
labelled "victims" for merely suffering economic harm carelessly caused by their 
opponents. In tum, intention and wrongfulness are formal categories which in 
CM48RiDGE 
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English law have proved relatively successful for converting tort law into a 
discrete instrument for redressing pure economic loss arising from business 
rivalry in specific situations, while the regulation of competition is predominantly 
a legislative function. English law conveys solutions which merit attention in 
Chile, where harm between commercial competitors is a new niche of tort law 
which needs an appropriate method of administering the principle of liability for 
culpa congruently with competition freedom. 
This thesis offers a critical analysis of the English law of torts and Chilean 
extra-contractual civil liability for harm flowing from business competition, as 
opposed to labour competition. Without seeking to give any complete account of 
the theme, the thesis encompasses the foundational case-law, the main theoretical 
propositions and further judicial and academic developments. It attempts to 
comment on and to discuss the major principles, court decisions and legal 
doctrines involved. The thesis emphasises the core policy arguments involved, 
whether economic, social, political, moral-philosophical, historical, constitutional, 
justice-based, utilitarian or consequentialist. 1 It explains how the relevant cases 
have been decided or, particularly in Chile where the case-law on the topic is still 
inchoate, might be handled. 
2. Scholarly debate 
As will be seen in the thesis, several leading Anglo-American jurists have 
proposed different ways of systematising the untidy economic torts. At the end of 
the nineteenth century Pollock2 and Holmes3 advanced the principle of liability 
for intentionally caused (economic) harm unless justified:4 the "prima facie tort 
theory". Much later, Weir championed a rule of liability for intentionally inflicted 
harm by impermissible (unlawful) means, widely defined as those which 
tortfeasors are not at liberty to use.5 Subsequently, Heydon advocated the prima 
facie tort as an adaptable procedure for tackling novel forms of excessive 
1 Here "policy" connotes the extra-legal goals pursued by the law, whereas "principle" concerns 
the bases upon which a legal system (and its specific rules) is built. 
2 Pollock (1887), (1890) passim. 
3 Holmes (1894) passim. 
4 
"Justifications" negate wrongful conduct, while "excuses" oust liability for lack of control over 
one's mind (e.g., insanity and infancy): Epstein (1975) 409-410; Cane (2002) 90. 
5 Weir (1964) passim. 
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commercial misconduct deferent to competitive freedom. 6 Conversely, Cane relies 
on a narrowly conceived mental element alongside the employment of wrongful 
means as requisite for managing tort liability for damage caused between business 
adversaries in accordance with the freedom to compete.7 Analogously, Sales and 
Stilitz promoted a rule of liability for intentionally and wrongfully caused 
economic harm unless justified by policy reasons. They suggested that the mental 
ingredient comprises the defendant's intention to injure the claimant (as an end or 
as a means to another end), while the unlawful means cover all those which 
wrongdoers are not at liberty to apply despite not being autonomously actionable 
8 
as torts. In tum, from the 1980s Carty has endeavoured to organise the economic 
torts around a common notion of wrongful means, emphasising that these torts 
make a limited contribution to the control of abusive competitive practices as 
compared with Parliament's overriding role. 9 
Notwithstanding these efforts, there 1s a continuous discussion on 
alternative approaches to the economic torts. To take a very recent example in 
point, Deakin and Randall have suggested that these torts should be analysed from 
a practical perspective. The economic torts, they postulate, aid to conserve 'the 
integrity of the competitive process', safeguarding claimants' interests in 
business, trade or employment ( concerning both commercial and industrial 
struggle) against the direct interference with (and aimed at) such interests by 
defendants; unless it is justified, inter alia, by the furtherance of economic self-
interest or the exercise of pre-existing contractual rights. 10 Moreover, judges have 
called for intensifying the academic study of the economic torts, particularly to 
shed light on whether the latter should merely accord redress for harm arising 
from excessive competitive misbehaviour or perform the more ambitious function 
of determining legally correct or fair commercial conduct. 11 The landmark case of 
OBG v. Allan, Douglas v. Hello! & Mainstream v. foung ("0BG") 12 showed 
6 Heydon ( 1978) passim. 
7 Cane ( 1996), (2000a) passim. 
8 Sales/Stilitz (1999) passim. 
9 Carty (1988), (2001), (2008) passim. 
'
0 Deakin/Randall (2009) passim. 
11 Arden (2005) 2, 20. 
. 
12 [2008) 1 AC. 1, HL. 
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notoriously discrepant opinions about the function that one concrete economic tort 
should play.13 This illustrates the relentless tension pervading this area. 
Within this context, the thesis explains the economic torts as specific 
causes of action which cannot be encapsulated in a single principle because their 
constituent parts vary significantly between one another. Thus, the economic torts 
reflect the common law' s piecemeal framework and illustrate that the fragmented 
forms of action remain alive. These torts protect different interests, in diverse 
ways (for instance, through injunctions to prevent unfair practices or 
compensation for harm already inflicted), against distinct sorts of wrongful 
conduct. The serious, perhaps insurmountable, difficulty in synthesising the 
economic torts does not inhibit from attempting to demonstrate that tortious 
liability actually fulfils, and normatively should perform, moderate though 
important preventive, compensatory, punitive and even restitutionary tasks as 
regards harm between business competitors. The economic torts discharge a 
circumscribed role, as they trigger liability provided that wrongdoers act with 
some form of intention, use wrongful means or meet both requirements . 
The thesis also analyses the competition torts as an independent category. 
It argues that these torts and the economic torts fulfil separate though 
complementary needs due to their distinct origins, goals and elements. The 
competition torts are statutory; constitute the chief private-law way of enforcing 
, 'competition law; and basically offer compensation for harm arising from 
anticompetitive conduct regardless of the defendant's fault or intention. The 
economic torts are created by courts; serve to repair and prevent damage derived 
from unfair or even antitrust practices; and presuppose a specified intention 
related to a given result or to conduct itself. Nonetheless, I will show that both 
categories disclose the narrow mission that case-law ascribes to tort law in the 
regulation of commercial strife. 
I shall argue that civil systems such as the Chilean should grasp that the 
law of delict can clash with the overarching competition freedom if liability is 
enforced without any qualification. I shall suggest that the Chilean economy has 
reached such a level of complexity that tort law needs to recognise the specificity 
13 For Lord Hoffmann, the tort of unlawful interference with business merely helps to punish 
commercial misconduct. In Lord Nicholls' view, it should be deployed against all types of abusive 
practices: [2008] l AC. 1, at [1 52-155]-[162]. 
12 
of business competition and approach the topic by refining the generic concept of 
culpa. Chilean tort law could become a more consistent legal body if courts 
restricted the principle of neminem laedere deploying a technique closer to the 
English economic torts, specifically requiring an intentional element. Competitors 
should not be held liable for negligently caused economic harm even if the claims 
are eventually rejected on the ground of damage being regarded as uncertain 
and/or too indirect a consequence of the defendant's act. 
Apart from a monograph, 1
4 
some journal articles, 15 brief references to the 
French liability for interference with contract in textbooks16 and a recent major 
tort treatise which introduces the economic torts using Anglo-American, German 
and French sources, 
17 tortious liability for harm between competitors remains 
underdeveloped in Chilean legal doctrine, and the relevant case-law is 
negligible. 
18 Yet recent legislation suggests the increasing social relevance of the 
proper management of damage inflicted among business competitors, as it 
enshrines the right to compensation for harm arising from anticompetitive and 
unfair practices. 19 
The thesis partially seeks to fill these gaps. Further, the use of the common 
law as a model is novel among Chilean private-law scholars, who habitually rely 
on European continental systems, especially the French and Spanish. Anglo-
American ideas can enrich this line of research, illuminating the peculiarities of 
the conflict between trade competitors for whose solution an unqualified fault 
tenet is not the best response. 
14 Gonzalez ( 1995) passim. 
:: Banfi: (2006), (2007) passim; Bustamante/Urrutia (2007) passim. 
17 
Alessandri (1 943) 62-63; Lopez (1986) 262ff, (1998) 365. 
Barros (2006) passim. 
:: See below Chapter VII, sections II_, III and IV, pp.235ff, pp.245ff and pp.25lff, respectively. 
Law 19911/2003 (DFL 1/2005), 1.e., the Chilean Competition Act 2003 ("CHCA"), and Law 
20169/2007, i.e., the Chilean Unfair Competition Act 2007 ("UCA"). 
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3. Structural differences, practical similarity 
The English law of torts handles harm between trade competitors through the 
common-law economic torts and the statutory competition torts. The thesis 
focuses on the foundational cases20 and covers eight economic torts: 
• inducing breach of contract (the "Lumley-tort"), by which the defendant 
knowingly and intentionally entices the promisor into breaking her 
contract with the promisee who is thereby injured;21 
• causing economic loss by using unlawful means, 22 alternatively called 
"three-party unlawful interference with another's business or trade", 23 
"intentional-harm tort"24 or, more concisely, "unlawful-interference tort". 
The defendant uses wrongful means against a third party (independently 
actionable as torts by the latter had she been damaged) with the intention 
to harm (as an end or as a means) the claimant, who is actually injured; 
• conspiracy to injure (simple conspiracy): two or more persons, without 
using wrongful means, act in concert with the predominant intention to 
harm, and indeed harm, the claimant;25 
• unlawful means conspiracy, through which the conspirators use wrongful 
means with the intention (even secondary) to injure, and do injure, the 
claimant;26 
• three-party intimidation. The defendant, with the intention (not necessarily 
principal) to harm the claimant in her economic interests, coercively 
threatens a third party with committing an unlawful conduct against her, 
20 I.e., Mogul Steamship Co. Ltd. v. McGregor, Gow & Co. (1888) L.R. 21 Q.B.D. 544, (1889) 
L.R. 23 Q.B.D. 598 , CA, [1892] A.C. 25, HL ("Mogul"); Bradford Corporation v. Pickles [1895] 
A.C. 587, HL ("Pickles"); and Allen v. Flood [1895] 2 Q.B. 21, CA, [1898] A.C. I, HL ("Allen"). 
21 Lumley v. Gye (1853) 118 E.R. 749, Q.B. ("Lumley") . 
22 OBG [2008] I A.C. 1, at [6], Lord Hoffmann. 
23 Ibid, at [141 ], Lord Nicholls (highlighting the protected interest). See: Carty (1988) passim; 
Simpson (2007) 470-471. 
24 Sales/Stilitz (1999) 411 (stressing the mental element). 
25 Quinn v. Leathem [1901] A.C. 495, HL ("Quinn"); Sorrell v. Smith [1925] A.C. 700, HL 
("Sorrell"); Crofter Handwoven Harris Tweed Co Ltd v. Veitch [1942] A.C. 435, HL ("Crofter"). 
26 Lonrho Ltd v. Shell Petroleum Co Ltd (No.2) [1982] A.C. 173, HL ("Lonrho") ; Lonrho Plc v. 
Al-Fayed (No.I) [1992] l A.C. 448, HL ("Fayed"); Revenue and Customs Commissioners v. Total 
Network SL [2008] l A.C. 1174, HL ("Total"). 
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unless she acts or refrains from acting to the claimant's detriment. The 
third party yields to the threat, thus the claimant ending up injured;27 
• deceit (fraud), whereby the defendant makes a false representation 
intending that the claimant should act on it and knowing that the statement 
is untrue, without believing in its reality or being recklessly indifferent to 
its veracity or falsity. 28 Deceit will succinctly be contrasted against 
liability for negligent misstatements.29 Deceit is limited to two-party cases 
which rarely involve competitors and is superseded by the tort of 
negligence and specific statutes;30 
• 
• 
malicious (injurious) falsehood. The defendant, knowing or being 
recklessly indifferent to the untruth of his declaration, communicates to 
third parties written or oral lies about the claimant's business, calculated to 
harm the claimant who is consequently injured;31 
passing-off, whereby the defendant passes his goods/services as if they 
were those of the claimant. 32 
For their part, the competition torts entail liability for damages flowing 
from the infringement of articles 81 and 82 of the European Community ("EC") 
Treaty of Rome 1957 and Chapter I (Prohibition: Restrictive Agreements) and 
Chapter II (Prohibition: Abuse of Dominant Position) of the Competition Act 
1998, as amended by the Enterprise Act 2002. The terms "antitrust" or 
"anticompetitive" will be used interchangeably to indicate conduct in breach of 
competition (antitrust) law: (i) agreements between undertakings, decisions by 
associations of undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade and 
have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of 
competition; arid, (ii) the abuse of a dominant position in the relevant market. 
Expressions like "unfair competition" and "unfair practices" signal behaviour 
contrary to the good commercial customs, the subject-.matter of an independent 
27 
Rookes v. Barnard [1964] A.C. 1129, HL ("Rookes"). Whether the threat to break a contract 
constitutes the tort of "two-party intimidation" is controversial: see below Chapter III, section 
1.2.5, pp.93-94. 
18 . 
- Pasley v. Freeman (1789) 3 T.R. 51, K.B.D. ("Pasley"); Derry v. Peek (1889) LR 14 App.Cas. 
337, HL ("Derry"). 
29 
Hedley Byrne & Co. Ltd. v. Heller & Partners Ltd. [1964] A.C. 465, HL ("Hedley Byrne"). 
30 
E.g., the Trade Descriptions Act 1968; the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. See: 
Heydon (1978) 87, Carty (2001) 134, 146ff. 
31 Ratcliffe v. Evans [1892] 2 Q.B. 524, CA ("Ratcli"""e") 527 Bowen LJ 32 . ':)JI ' ' • 
· · Reddaway v. Banham [1896] A.C. 199, HL ("Reddaway") . 
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legal field called "unfair competition law", which English tort law mainly 
combats through passing-off and malicious falsehood. 
In tum, civil liability implies the defendant's obligation to compensate for 
the claimant's losses for breach of contract ( contractual liability) or the 
infringement of the duty not to harm others (alterum non/neminem laedere), the 
latter amounting to a wrongful act that triggers extra-contractual (delictual) 
liability.33 In Chile, extra-contractual liability is based on the general principle of 
culpa which strictly speaking means negligence (fault) but broadly understood 
covers intention (dolo). This principle is enshrined in the Chilean Civil Code of 
1855 ("CHCC"),34 thus mirroring the French Civil (Napoleonic) Code of 1804.
35 
Novel problems as about the economic torts are tackled through the overall 
canon of culpa. Conversely, the common law is reluctant to synthesise its 
piecemeal contents. Rather, it is inductively constructed to handle new social 
needs with a modest degree of theorisation. English tort law is arranged around 
actions, remedies and unlawfulness. Responsabilite civile is harm-oriented, less 
complex and more coherent. 36 English torts evolve incrementally and are 
subordinate to statutes in the control of social conduct. This fact, together with 
institutional and cultural factors, explains why tort litigation is in Britain less 
voluminous (and perhaps less important) than in America.37 
Nevertheless, civil courts must also solve disputes inductively. The 
divergence is that they infer the rules from legislation, whereas English courts 
must abide by stare decisis. 38 French and Chilean case-law is not binding but 
merely influential upon lower courts whose decisions can be quashed when they 
are entirely rooted in precedents. Yet, extra-contractual liability is admittedly 
judge-made law. Courts specify the general clauses and react to social changes 
33 I.e., responsabilidad extracontratual or responsabilidad aquiliana, the latter term derived fro~ 
the Lex Aquilia which did not require culpa but unlawful act (iniuria) and harm: Tapia 
( [ 1941 ]/2006) 20; Alessandri (1943) 106-107. 
. 
34 • Anyone who has committed a delict or quasi-delict which has caused. damage to ~nother 1s 
bound to compensate for it, without prejudice to any penalty the law may 1mp_ose on hm~ for the 
delict or quasi-delict' (article 2314 CHCC); 'As a general rule, all da_mage which can be imputed 
to another' s malice or negligence shall be repaired by that person' (article 2329 CHCC) . . . 
35 Particularly, article 1382: 'any human act whatever which causes damage to anoth_er ob!1~es him 
by whose fault it occurred to make reparation'. Similarly, article 1902 of the Spamsh C1v1l Code ("SCC") provides: 'a person who, by action or omission, causes damage to another by fault or 
negligence, must repair the damage caused'. 
36 Markesinis (1977) 122-123; Limpens/Kruithof/Meinertzhagen-Limpens (1980) 3ff; 
Zweigert/Kotz (1998) 621ff; Whittaker (2008a) 365. 
37 Atiyah ( 1987) 1043-44; Markesinis (1990) 240ff. 
38 Goodhart (1930) 175, 191 ; Lawson (1953) 65. 
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quicker than statutes. 39 Eventually, just like English and French courts, Chilean 
judges must decide cases having primary regard to the peculiar fact-situations 
they encounter. 
4. Methodological issues 
The thesis undertakes comparative research concerning the manner whereby the 
English law of torts and the Chilean law of delict really handle and should 
(prescriptively) deal with the situation of commercial competitors injuring each 
other. Notwithstanding the formal differences separating the common law from 
the Chilean civilian system, I shall suggest that in neither can negligence be 
deemed a sound underpinning of tortious liability. Trade adversaries owe each 
other no duty of care and, moreover, often strive to gain market share at the 
expense of identifiable competitors. The English economic and competition torts 
will be taken as the paradigm from which Chilean judges and scholars can find the 
explicit affirmation of the liberty to compete to which they in fact suscribe and 
learn to enforce the law of delict in harmony with that value. This implies a re-
interpretation of the general principle of culpa to reach coherence within the law 
rather than adopting specific causes of action. 
The thesis entails a critical assessment of English classic and modem legal 
doctrine on the economic and competition torts, particularly the aforesaid attempts 
to construct general rules,40 along with examining the Chilean treatment of civil 
liability for pecuniary harm. I will concentrate on the major issues of legal policy 
and scholarly writing, selecting the principal and pertinent case-law and theories. 
Unlawfulness and intention will be examined as workable constraints and 
contrasted with fault and strict liability. The comparison stresses the rational 
structure by which cases have been decided and might be resolved in the future , 
above all in Chile where the subject-matter is fresh. Particularly relevant are the 
questions relating to the role that tort law does and should perform vis-a-vis pure 
economic harm between business rivals in line with freedom of competition; the 
search for coherence within the economic torts; the English courts' technical and 
political approach to liability for harm inflicted between trade competitors as 
39 
40 
Rogers (2006) 51 ff; Van Dam (2006) 8ff, I I 9ff; Boyron (2008) 25ff; Whittaker (2008a) 362. 
See above paragraph 2, pp.1 Off. 
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opposed to industrial contenders and their impact on the consistency within the 
case-law; the significance of unlawfulness and intention as formal devices to 
restrict liability; the justification for strict liability as regards unfair practices 
(passing-off) and antitrust conduct (competition torts); the current status of the 
Chilean tortious liability related to similar fact-situations ; and the criteria and 
issues emerging from the common law which might help to develop the Chilean 
law in this field as well as to determine the extent to which courts should involve 
themselves in regulating business competition. 
However, one possible shortcoming of this research is that it compares the 
parent English legal system with Chilean law, which is affiliate to the parent 
French regime. Thus, the thesis departs from a significant functionalist hallmark.
41 
My linguistic limitations prevented me from thoroughly analysing French and 
German jurisdictions. Yet, I make continuous reference to French and Spanish 
legal regimes as influences on Chilean law. I also study relevant aspects of 
American law, given its similarity to English law and impact upon Chilean 
competition laws, which may render it a more straightforward comparison than 
the French and Spanish jurisdictions. 
Another apparent limitation concerns the diverse levels of social , 
economic and technological development between the UK and Chile. It is usually 
, argued that societies with similar degrees of economic and technological growth 
present similar pattern cases.42 Thus, the equivalent socio-economic contexts and 
values such as free competition in which English and French systems operate 
explain that contrasting tort regimes often confront similar misconduct through 
comparable remedies, as the Lumley-tort and the French liability for wrongful 
interference with another's contract illustrate. 43 Even so, systems with disparate 
levels of industrialisation can also face analogous problems. Chilean economic 
regulation resembles that governing highly evolved market-oriented countries: 
Chilean competition laws prohibit and punish the same antitrust misbehaviour 
than American and European legislations. Despite the different intensities of 
economic, social and legal development between Chile and Britain, Chilean case-
4 1 Zweigert/Kotz (1 998) 41. 
42 Wagner (2006) 1004. 
43 Palmer (1992) 297ff; Whittaker (2008a) 336, 367ff. 
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law on tortious liability for antitrust conduct and unfair practices, although still 
embryonic, is growing in quantity and sophistication. 
Three decades ago Chilean tort litigation was undeveloped: victims 
associated life ' s misfortunes with bad luck or inevitable events before blaming 
others; the costs and evidentiary obstacles alongside the teaching of obsolete 
doctrines discouraged the bringing of tort claims; and the legal rules were slowly 
d . d d' 44 mo ern1se accor mg to new needs. Nowadays Chilean tort law tackles the 
same kind of harmful activities as those affecting the first world and insurance has 
enhanced. So, the currently incipient Chilean case-law on the economic torts and 
competition torts offers the historic opportunity to search for examples in English 
law worth emulating in Chile. Additionally, I am not assuming any hypothesis of 
similitude or difference as regards the results accomplished by English and 
Chilean laws concerning the economic torts and competition torts. 45 I will 
however endeavour to stress factual issues over fas;ades46 without overlooking the 
methods deployed and the outcomes achieved by each of them.47 
Finally, this investigation cannot but briefly speculate about whether tort 
law gives a sound response to the social need for regulating harm among 
competitors. This research is not empirical but concentrates on the formal primary 
and secondary legal sources: case-law, legislation and scholarship. The 
descriptive and cultural formants48 exceed the scope of this dissertation and my 
competence. I have not examined English and Chilean tort systems as expressions 
of diverse cultures (as Legrand championed) nor have I considered the meta-legal 
or sociological implications of the economic and competition torts. This thesis can 
best contribute to the current debate on the theme by academics and judges, 
particularly in Chile, if it confines itself to the formal principles, rules and 
sources, leaving to the specialists the assessment of the extra-legal consequences. 
:: Tune (1974) 3.ff, 57; Do~fnguez: (1 967) 918-919, (1 989) 108-109. 
Th~ pre~umpt1on of equivalent outcomes in: Zweigert/Kotz (1998) 39. Yet, functionalism can 
spothg?t differences_: ~ ic~~els (2006) passim. The aims of the research and the systems compared 16etermme whether s1m!lant1es and/or contrasts are underlined: Dannemann (2006) 41 8-419. Bussani/Palmer (2003) 122-123 159. ~ . , 
As proposed by Zwe1gert/Kotz (1998) 67ff. 
48 
Sacco (1991 ) passim'. distinguishing three kinds of legal formants : the formal sources (case-law, 
statutes an.d legal doct~me) through which a legal system solves specific problems; the descriptive 
formants, 1.e., the motives why lawyers feel bound by the answers arising from those sources; and 
the meta-legal (cultural) formants, i.e., the policy and economic reasons which determine the 
solutions offered by the formal sources. 
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5. Framework 
In light of the above, a valid way of structuring and analysing the economic and 
competition torts from a comparative standpoint is to assess first the chief modem 
English authorities and legal doctrine which have treated this problem-area from 
the mid-nineteenth century onwards. I shall therefore split the material into the 
common-law economic torts and the statutory competition torts . After evaluating 
the principal aspects of both types of torts I will examine the status of the Chilean 
law of delict, particularly as regards business opponents. The thesis is divided into 
eight chapters, the last of which contains the main conclusions and proposals of 
this research. 
Chapter II scrutinises the English law of torts as a set of specific causes 
of action which lack a single governing canon and serve compensatory, deterrent, 
punitive and even restitutionary purposes. The economic torts are part of this 
scheme and are the main exception to the general refusal of compensation for pure 
economic harm, which is very occasionally recoverable through the · tort of 
negligence. Since pure pecuniary loss is the type of damage usually flowing from 
legitimate competition, potential victims must prove a recognised economic tort to 
secure redress. Broadly speaking, the economic torts require that the defendant 
acts with a certain intention, whether directed to conduct or to a detrimental 
' effect, and wrongful means, save for conspiracy to injure and malicious falsehood. 
English law rejects an all-inclusive intentional tort such as the abuse of rights and 
the prima facie tort theories . 
Chapter III evaluates the cardinal aspects of the economic torts developed 
in England from mid-nineteenth century. Whereas the control of trade competition 
has largely belonged to statutes, the economic torts being limited to repress 
extreme misbehaviour, courts have intensively regulated labour competition by 
creating and extending old and new economic torts, a move relentlessly 
counterbalanced through statutory immunities. The principal contention is that 
English case-law opted for safeguarding the commercial rivals' financial interests 
and balancing the claimant's right to compensation against the tortfeasor' s 
competitive freedom through particular torts which require a ce1tain intention and 
wrongful means, discarding any far-reaching standard of intentionally caused 
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damage. Nevertheless , the theoretical debate between the relative appropriateness 
of having specific torts or a generic intentional tort has not finished. 
Chapter IV assesses the torts of passing-off and malicious falsehood as 
the central, although discrete devices by which English tort law deters and 
compensates for pecuniary damage stem~ing from unfair competitive conduct. 
These torts uncover the common law's unwillingness to regulate commercial 
competition beyond abnormal, intentional and wrongful misbehaviour. This 
chapter also shows that passing-off is rooted in deliberate conduct which aims at 
injuring known competitors. In practice, however, passing-off triggers strict 
liability for outcomes, thus dispensing the claimant from proving the defendant's 
intention to harm. 
Chapter V analyses the competition torts which aid to deter antitrust 
conduct and chiefly to compensate for damages consequently sustained by 
individual victims, especially competitors. Antitrust tort liability is complex. It is 
based on deliberate conduct, the object or effect of which is to cause detriment to 
consumers, competitors and markets at large, even though antitrust conduct is 
often meant to harm recognisable rivals . Yet, liability for damage is strict. The 
claimant need not prove that the defendant intended to harm her but only that she 
suffered determined losses as a consequence of the defendant's act. Furthermore, 
the defendant's intention to injure the claimant is presumed from harm and 
causation. A prime reason for this mixed regime is that it is a statutory creation 
designed to supplement the enforcement of antitrust law by the competition 
authorities. However, proving damage and causation is hard and in itself a useful 
manner of restricting liability. Moreover, the formal differences between the 
competition torts and the economic torts do not necessarily generate inconsistent 
results. Both categories are to be applied by courts circumspectly to protect 
competitive freedom. Tort liability has a restricted role to play in commercial 
battle whether it originates in the common law or in statute. 
Chapter VI, after explaining the basic rules governing Chilean law of 
delict, underlines the importance of balancing the principle of full compensation 
for culpably caused harm against the right to compete. The fundamental 
proposition is that carelessly inflicted pure economic loss is a side-effect intrinsic 
to lawful competition. Accordingly, liability for this kind of damage -must be 
qualified through the defendant's intention to harm the claimant or the 
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defendant's gross negligence, as opposed to ordinary fault, if it is to be 
implemented coherently with the liberty to compete and with the structure of 
competition. Chilean courts are familiar with other methods for limiting 
negligence-based liability which are widely used in France, namely, the treatment 
of pure economic loss as uncertain damage or as too remote a consequence of the 
defendant's act. yet, these techniques presuppose the existence of duties of care 
amongst business contenders whereas the converse is true. 
Chapter VII analyses Chilean tortious liability for anticompetitive 
conduct as well as for unfair practices. This chapter, like the preceding one, 
proposes the restriction of tortious liability through a procedure both compatible 
with the nature of competition (involving foreseeable and accidental damage) and 
with the competition constitutional policy. In other words, the principle of culpa 
ought to be qualified through the requirement of the defendant's intention to harm 
the claimant or to cause the breach of contract, or at the very least gross 
negligence. Neither negligence nor strict liability is adequate to balance the 
clashing interests of rivals who necessarily harm one another as a foreseeable 
side-effect of their legitimate activity. 
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CHAPTER II 
AN INSIGHT INTO THE ECONOMIC TORTS 
This chapter evaluates the general theory of economic-tort liability in trade 
competition, explaining fundamental aspects which have affected the 
development of English tort law. Most of the concepts, principles and problems 
analysed here impact upon the Chilean law of delict, as this is still a rudimentary 
means of regulating commercial competition. 
The economic torts lack a common rationale and have different 
ingredients. They mainly provide compensation for harm but can also serve 
deterrence, punishment, vindication and even restitution. English law generally 
rejects compensation for negligently caused pure economic loss (the 
"exclusionary rule"). I will argue that, as regards commercial rivals, the main 
reason for non-recovery rests on this harm being a foreseeable and inevitable side-
effect of legitimate competition: business opponents owe no duty not to injure 
carelessly one another. Moreover, English law denies liability for intentionally 
occasioned financial harm ( encapsulated in the prima facie tort theory and the 
strongest version of the abuse of rights doctrine). Accordingly, at common law 
defeated competitors can only seek redress through the specific economic torts 
which presuppose a certain kind of intention (related to a particular effect or, as in 
passing-off, to the conduct itself) and wrongful means (save for simple conspiracy 
and malicious falsehood) . Otherwise traders can harm each other as part of their 
liberty to compete. The economic torts allow courts to distinguish damage 
concomitant of lawful competition from harm deliberately inflicted through 
abusive or unfair practices. 
Section I briefly describes and criticises the untidy framework of tort law 
(indeed, the law of "torts"). Section II assesses tort law's principal compensatory 
function, although underscoring deterrence, retribution and restitution as 
important, supplementary goals to be performed through exemplary damages, 
since the economic torts enable injurers to profit at their victims ' expense. Section 
III evaluates the various technical, consequentialist and policy grounds for the 
exclusionary rule, attempting to link them to the harm trade rivals do one another. 
. Section IV examines the basic constituents of the economic torts and supports 
23 
them as independent categories which fulfil important albeit narrow functions vis-
a-vis damage caused between commercial competitors. Section V summarises the 
central implications for the next chapters. 
I. Structure 
1. Miscellaneous torts without an all-inclusive principle 
Following scholars as Weinrib 49 and Postema 50 I understand tort law as an 
autonomous private-law discipline, composed of substantive and procedural rules, 
which governs the bilateral relationship between wrongdoers and victims by 
imposing liability for harm. I see tort law basically (though not exclusively) 
shaped from inside, rooted in corrective justice, policy and consequentialist bases. 
Tort law, I believe, is primarily concerned with repairing the losses inflicted by 
tortfeasors on victims. 
I support two different theories of corrective justice: Weinrib' s "formalist" 
notion of corrective justice, as intrinsic to tort law; 51 and Coleman's "mixed" 
conception of corrective justice as a social practice that imposes the duty to repair 
losses flowing from wrongs (invasion of rights) and from wrongdoing 
' (unjustifiable interference with legitimate interests).52 As O'Connell says, while 
Weinrib analyses the structure of corrective justice without endorsing a particular 
morality, Coleman takes a functionalist approach with normative content 
incorporating some formalist elements. 53 However, I am also aware about 
Aristotelian corrective justice which is to restore the balance set by distributive 
justice, so that liability serves to shift losses from victims to wrongdoers without 
rectifying wrongful harm, as it indeed never disappears. 
54 Conversely, I am 
sceptical about the adequacy of tort law to achieve purely distributional or 
extrinsic goals, like welfare maximisation, as Law and Economics postulates, 
albeit I acknowledge the usefulness of some of its criteria. 
49 Weinrib (1995) passim. 
50 Postema (2001) 1-2. 
51 Weinrib (1995) passim. 
52 Coleman (1992) passim. 
53 O'Connell (1997) 1718ft. 
54 Fletcher (1993) 1667ft. 
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I apprehend that tort law lacks a unifying principle, comprising a plethora 
of particular and gradually constructed wrongs, each of which has its own 
elements and protects distinct interests through diverse remedies . 55 Although 
abolished, the forms of actions have persistently influenced tort scholarship and 
legal practice:
56 litigants must still indicate the facts and torts to seek judicial 
redress. 
57 Specifically, from the foundational economic-tort cases onwards 58 
English courts have dismissed a comprehensive tenet, allowed the infliction of 
damage if no wrongful means are employed (save for conspiracy to injure59 and 
malicious falsehood)60 and denied liability outside the established economic torts. 
The harm arising from the exercise of the liberty to compete is generally justified: 
damnum absque (sine) iniuria. 
The traditional academic discussion can be divided into two main currents. 
On one side, Clerk and Lindsell thought it unrealistic to substitute all-embracing 
principles for the particular torts. Unless the defendant used unlawful means 
embodied in a concrete tort, the infliction of damage was justified by competition. 
Thus, the law detached itself from morality and permitted advancing one's 
interests at another's expense. 61 Similarly, Salmond proposed a principle of no-
liability, given the numerous exceptions justifying the causation of harm, unless 
the defendant's conduct fitted into a specific tort. 62 Subsequently, Williams 
argued that liability was discretionarily and incrementally imposed in novel 
situations,
63 
while more recent scholars have noticed that the common law solved 
tort disputes as they arise without adopting any pre-conception. 64 On the other 
side, Pollock championed the prima facie tort theory, that is, liability for 
intentionally caused economic harm unless justified, a key justification for 
damage being what he called "the common right to compete". Nevertheless, he 
55 
Kingdom_ of Spain v. Christie, Manson & Woods Ltd. [1986] ·1 W.L.R 1120, Ch.D., 1129, 
Bro_wne-W1lkmson V.C.; Stone (1950) passim; Rudden (1992) passim; Heuston/Buckley (1996) 1; 
Weir (2006) 16. 
56 
'.T?e forms of action we have buried, but they still rule us from their graves': Maitland (1965) 2; 
;;"Ilhams/Hepple (1982) 31ff; Rogers (1994) lff; Zweigert/Kotz (1998) 605. . 
58 Letang v. Cooper [1965] 1 Q.B. 232, CA ("Letang"), 242-243, Diplock LJ; Rogers (2006) 56. 
59 
Mogul [1892] AC. 25, Pickles [1895] AC. 587, Allen [1898] AC. I. 
Quinn [1901] AC. 495 . 
60 Ratcliffe [1892] 2 Q.B. 524. 
61 Clerk/Lindsell (1889) 3. 
62 
63 Salmond: (1907) 7, 429-430; (1937) 510. See also: Stallybrass (1936) 17; Goodhart (1938) 6. Williams ( 1939) passim. 
:~~~risi (1992) 58ff; Heuston/Buckley (1996) 14, 16; Fleming (1998) 7-8, 17-18; Rodger (2006) 
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admitted that the central case-law simply acknowledged an incoherent and 
heterogeneous collection of specific torts and remedies.65 Analogously, Winfield 
advocated a principle of liability for unjustifiable harm qualified by evidentiary 
and policy considerations, particularly the damage derived from exercising the 
freedom to compete or the right of property. 66 Therefore, whereas the "classic" 
British jurists argued whether there should be a general principle affirming or 
rejecting liability for harm caused between commercial rivals, case-law has only 
recognised specific and different economic torts. 
2. Organising criteria 
Traditionally, the law of torts has been treated as a catalogue of diverse causes of 
action which resist any unification, rather like the inventory of criminal 
offences. 67 As Waddams suggests, the complex interaction between the facts, 
sources (case-law, statutes and equity), institutions (torts, contracts, property and 
restitution) and policy issues which forge private law urges for an inductive 
approximation.68 Successful attempts at synthesis are confined to the "neighbour 
principle" in negligence; 69 and even this pillar of moral responsibility for the 
avoidable consequences of deliberate acts 70 is severely restricted with respect to 
, pure economic loss.71 Tort law adapts to changing social needs without embracing 
immutable formulas.72 Classifications are welcomed for practical purposes before 
scientific order.73 
It is a customary view that the common law evolves from experience 
instead of strict rationality, striving for but never reaching consistency.
74 Judicial 
65 Pollock (1887) vi, 21 -22, 129ff. See also: Landon (1951) 16-17, 40ff, 237ff. 
66 Winfield: (1927) passim, (1931) 32ff, (1937) 1-2, 15ff. 
67 Rudden (1992) 120ff. 
68 Waddams (2003) vi, 12ff. 
69 Donoghue v. Stevenson [1932] AC. 562, HL, 580, Lord Atkin. 
70 Tune (1972) passim. 
71 
'[l]t is not ... a sensible application of what Lord Atkin was saying for a Judge to be invited on 
the facts of any particular case to say whether or not there was "proximity" between the plaintiff 
and the defendant. That would be a misuse of a general conception and it is not the way in which 
English law develops ': Hedley Byrne [1964] AC. 465 , 524, Lord Devlin. See: Edelman/Davies 
(2007) 1197; Whittaker (2008a) 360. 
72 Heuston/Buckley (1996) 38-39. 
73 Smith (1916) 420. 
74 Holmes (1881) 1, 36. 
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reasoning is intuitive and persuasive rather than logical. 75 But that the law is 
inconsistent (court decisions conflicting with each other) or incoherent (cases 
being incomprehensible under a common principle) 76 seems problematic. The 
incremental protection through distinct torts of both different and identical 
interests generates inconsistencies unfamiliar to systems constructed from the 
abstract to the concrete. Thus, trespass to the person safeguards victims' bodily 
integrity against wrongdoers' deliberate interference without need for harm 
' 
whereas negligence protects this interest if damage is proved. 77 Yet, the 
contradiction is only apparent given their dissimilar functions: trespass vindicates 
rights, negligence compensates for damage. 78 Diverse rules may have different 
justifications, thereby explaining the distinction between intentional and negligent 
torts.
79 
Hence, conduct-based torts, such as negligence, cohabit with rights-based 
torts, like trespass, which triggers strict liability in a double sense: it is actionable 
per se, for the sole invasion of the claimant's proprietary interest without 
requiring the victim's injury; and the defendant's fault or intention to harm the 
· · · · · 
80 
v1ct1m 1s 1mmatenal. As has been suggested, trespass mirrors the criminal law's 
influence: the defendant is strictly liable because he tried to exercise dominance 
over the victim by encroaching on her rights. 81 However, this conduct can involve 
the intentional infliction of pecuniary harm embodied in the economic ·torts. 82 
Concretely, the economic torts themselves exhibit notorious 
inconsistencies. Unlawfulness, a salient feature of them (Allen), 83 is excluded 
from conspiracy to injure which just requires that the defendants predominantly 
intend to harm the claimant (Quinn). 84 This contradiction is so evident that Lord 
Halsbury had to say that the law 'is not always logical at all'. 85 Likewise, the 
breadth of wrongfulness varies considerably from tort to tort: three-party 
intentional-harm tort comprises independently unlawful means (OBG) 86 unlike 
75 Guest (1961) passim; MacCormick (1978) 40. 
76 I am using MacCormick's terminology: (1978) lO 1 ff. 
77 Lucy (2007) 215 ff. 
78 Weir(1998) 108ff. 
79 Williams (1951) 138. · 
80 
Smith (1916) 248; Cane (1997) passim; Ibbetson (1999) 185; Edelman/Davies (2007) l 188ff. 81 Fletcher (1993) 1672, 1677-78. 
82 Epstein: (1975)passim, (1983) 1368-69 1381 
83 ' ' [1898] AC. 1. 
84 [1901] AC. 495. 
. 
85 Ibid, 506. 
86 [2008] 1 AC. 1. 
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/"-
unlawful means conspiracy (Total). 87 Moreover, the economic torts contain 
different kinds of intention which prevent a common explanation. A word of 
warning must be said to understand this. As will be explained,
88 
intention mainly 
concerns the consequences of an action rather than the conduct itself. Cane refers 
to "deliberate conduct" (as opposed to inadvertent behaviour) to indicate 
situations where intention relates to the commission of a given act, whereas he 
applies the term "intentional conduct" to signal the intention aimed at causing a 
certain consequence, typically harming the victim. Cane accordingly argues that 
trespass to land is not "intentional": it can be committed without the intention to 
invade another's property, even ignoring that the land belonged to the claimant.
89 
Yet, here I employ the denominations "intentional conduct" and "deliberate 
conduct" as synonymous, meaning that the action itself is intentionally (neither 
negligently nor accidentally) perpetrated. This use also suggests that passing-off 
and the competition torts hang on deliberate conduct (the invasion of another's 
property in goodwill or anticompetitive behaviour, respectively) but trigger 
outcome-based strict liability (regardless of the defendant's fault or mental 
element).9° Conversely, the other economic torts contain an intention to produce 
an effect which varies between the economic torts. Wrongful means conspiracy, 
intimidation and unlawful interference with business presuppose the defendant's 
intention, preponderant or not, to harm the claimant. Simple conspiracy entails the 
defendants' predominant intention to injure the victim. In Lumley the inducer 
knew or was recklessly indifferent to the claimant's contract, intending to procure 
its breach. In deceit the fraudster knew or was reckless to the falsity of his 
statement intending that the claimant relies on it. Finally, in malicious falsehood 
the wrongdoer knew or was reckless to the untruth of his declaration and 
calculated to harm the claimant. 
In tum, Cane analyses tort law around the diverse types of wrong conduct, 
protected interests and sanctions. Accordingly, he examines the individual causes 
of action which shield the economic interests from certain conduct through 
particular remedies. For him, tort law clings to the correlative relationship 
between victim and tortfeasor. Still, rather than comparing the rights and duties as 
87 [2008] 1 AC. 1174. 
88 See below section IV.3.2, p.60. 
89 Cane (1997) 32-33 . 
90 See below: Chapter IV, section II.1.3, pp.143ff; and Chapter V, section IV .1, pp. l 75ff. 
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such (as Weinrib does) Cane contrasts the position of the parties. Tort law 
comprises a social and ethical institution which imputes personal responsibility 
for conduct by striking a complex balance between responsibility and freedom as 
well as between litigants' interests. It safeguards claimants' rights but values 
wrongdoers' liberty to act. This liberty, therefore, operates as a defence and 
justification defining the scope of liability. 91 
Alternatively, tort law can be structured around the kinds of rights 
(legitimate interests) invaded or the defendant's fault or intention. Thus, Stevens 
defines tort law as the wrongdoer's secondary obligation to rectify the violation of 
the victim's primary right. 92 Birks had earlier argued that civil wrongs (torts) 
consisted of the defendant's breach of a legal duty owed to the claimant. He said 
that torts trigger a secondary (remedial) obligation whose content is determined 
by the law as a matter of policy responding to external factors. Therefore, 
although compensation for damage is often tort law's paramount aim, remedial 
tort law can serve other purposes: deterrence, restitution, punishment and 
vindication of rights. For Birks neither harm nor blameworthiness is essential to 
tortious liability. Trespass is actionable whenever the defendant invades the 
claimant's protected interest despite the victim being unharmed. 93 Likewise, the 
law can impose strict liability, as happens with trespass. Furthermore, the 
objective standard of care has been said to conceal strict liability.94 For example, 
Coleman argues that fault liability actually excludes fault: the wrongdoer's lack of 
culpability is not a defence, whereas the law focuses on the fault in the "doing", 
that is, the breach of the objective duty of care. 95 Conversely, for Fletcher the 
failure to meet the standard of reasonable care is a social judgment which entails 
culpability. 96 
Nonetheless, as Waddams emphasises, to incur liability for the economic 
harm caused to another person the defendant must act intentionally and 
wrongfully, namely, violating the victim's legitimate interest. Indeed courts 
usually infer from the defendant's wrongful conduct the claimant's legitimate 
9 1 C 
92 
ane: (1996) 6ff, (1997) passim, (2006) 33-34. 
Stevens (2007) passim. 
9
~ Birks (1995) passim. Likewis_e, Descheemaeker [(2009) l 7ff] defines wrong as the violation of a 
nght by the breach of a correlative duty without requiring harm 
94 Williams (1951) 160. · 
95 Coleman (1992) 219-220. 
96 Fletcher (1993) 1665, 1672. 
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interest, for example, to run a business.97 Moreover, Stevens notes that the leading 
economic-tort cases denied liability because the damage did not arise from the 
infringement of any right of the victim: damnum sine iniuria.
98 
Similarly, Benson 
argues that inducers are liable under Lumley for interfering with claimants' (quasi-
proprietary) contractual rights, exercisable against anyone who attempts to invade 
them without their owners' consent. 99 As Koziol indicates, liability for 
intentionally caused economic loss hinges on wrongfulness, understood as the 
infringement of claimants' rights. 100 Therefore, under the rights-based model 
liability for economic harm requires the defendant's fault or intention and the 
violation of the claimant's right. 
. h 101 I h'nk . Without necessarily defending Hohfeld's theory of ng ts, t 1 it 
illuminates some difficulties the rights-based paradigm may encounter. This is 
particularly so in the economic torts, which provided Hohfeld himself with useful 
material for discussion. For Hohfeld, commercial rivals had a liberty ("privilege") 
to compete rather than a "right-claim" imposing a correlative a duty upon third 
parties not to interfere with such right. Hohfeld perceived that judges often and 
mistakenly inferred a claim-right from a liberty, as he thought Lord Lindley had 
done when stating in Quinn that: 
'[The claimant] ... was at liberty to earn his own living in his own way, 
provided he did not violate some special law prohibiting him from so 
doing, and ... did not infringe the rights of other people. This liberty 
involved the liberty to deal with other persons ... This liberty is a right 
recognised by law; its correlative is the general duty of every one not to 
prevent the free exercise of this liberty, except so far as his own liberty of 
action may justify him in so doing' .102 
Thus, the liberty to undertake a business imposes no duty at all upon third 
parties, although policy and justice could require that a claim-right is recognised 
in order to protect that liberty. Yet, as Simmonds explains, Lord Lindley was 
educated in the Kantian tradition, so he correctly understood that rights rendered a 
conduct permissible (as the expression of a liberty) and inviolable (imposing a 
97 Waddams (2003) 41, 56. 
98 Stevens: (2007) 22ff, (2009) 633-634, 639. 
99 Benson (1995) 429, 456-457. 
10° Koziol (2006) 881 , 893-894. 
101 Hohfeld (1913) passim. See also: Freeman (2001) 355ft. 
102 [1901] A.C. 495 , 534. See: Hohfeld (1913) 36. 
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duty not to interfere with it upon others, its infringement being wrongful). 
Conversely, for Hohfeld a liberty (permissibility) lacked any correlative duty 
whatsoever (inviolability), unlike a claim-right. What matters, as Simmonds 
suggests, is that in Quinn Lord Lindley strove for protecting the economic 
freedom on policy and justice principles, thereby conferring a claim-right upon 
the claimant and finding that the defendants had infringed their correlative duty 
not to invade such right. Quinn concerned a conflict between the liberties of 
claimant and defendant which had to be balanced considering their substance. 103 
Comparably, Deakin and Randall postulate that the leading economic-tort cases 
rightly decided that the business interests must be safeguarded from certain types 
of illegitimate interference. Although from a Hohfeldian perspective there is 
arguably no "right" to engage in a business, there are other ways of defining 
· h 104 . ng ts. Therefore, English courts shield the liberty to compete but only from 
conduct which falls within a given economic tort. 
Another radical interpretation, currently defended by Descheemaeker, 
argues for a consolidated law of wrongs, which are defined as the breach of a duty 
correlative to a right and comprise common-law wrongs (torts), equitable wrongs 
and statutory wrongs. He claims that a coherent synthesis is essential to achieve 
legal certainty and justice. The traditional study of torts around the causes of 
action is chaotic. Likewise, the rights-based model can neither explain the tort of 
negligence which has invaded zones formerly occupied by specific torts, nor 
easily identify the distinct interests protected by one or more torts. Consequently, 
the law of wrongs should rest on the tripartite division between negligence, 
intention and strict liability. The coexistence of fault-rooted and rights-based 
approaches has determined inconsistent decisions and policies on the same fact-
situations. To avoid this Descheemaeker proposes adopting the fault-based model 
while using the rights-based scheme only as an ancillary·criterion.105 
103 Simmonds (1998) l68ff. 
104 Deakin/Randall (2009) 529 534 
105 ' . Descheemaeker (2009) passim. 
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3. Observations 
To implement a single explanation for so many different torts is a daunting 
enterprise, even if the endeavour is reduced to the economic torts . If any principle 
can be drawn from the foregoing it is one that denies liability beyond the 
established torts. The economic torts by and large involve wrongful acts as settled 
in Allen, the great exception and contradiction being the entirely intentional tort of 
simple conspiracy instituted in Quinn. Nonetheless, as will be seen in Chapter III, 
Allen and Quinn involved labour conflicts and were mainly influenced by political 
factors rather than by a technical choice between a casuistic approach (fragmented 
torts including wrongful means) and a principle of liability for intentionally 
caused harm. 
Trade competitors can m principle harm one another without risking 
tortious liability: they exercise the freedom to compete which involves no duty 
incumbent upon their rivals not to interfere with such liberty. This damage does 
not arise from any tort because neither a legal duty is broken nor a right violated: 
'one supermarket may set out to capture the business of another and ruin the 
latter's owners, but if there is no duty not to compete - or not to compete in the 
chosen mode or with the chosen purpose - there can be no legal wrong' .
106 As 
' suggested elsewhere, 107 rnerel y suffering damage is insufficient to ascribe liability 
if the harm sterns from the exercise of the wrongdoer's freedom to act or to 
abstain from acting. The absence of a right not to sustain economic loss leads to 
denying any principle of liability for negligently or intentionally caused pure 
pecuniary harm, that is, unrelated to the infringement of victims' personal or 
proprietary right. 108 Commercial rivals are not and should not be accountable for 
injuring each other out of competing. The liberty to compete justifies the infliction 
of harm unless intentionally and wrongfully committed. 
I endorse Descheernaeker' s view that a "right" is narrower than an 
"interest": it is that part of an interest which the law protects from interference 
through an action, thus recognising a right not to be injured by particular wrongful 
106 Birks (1995) 37. 
107 Wright (1939) 248; Benson (1995) 427; Weinrib (2005) 158; Stevens (2007) 20-21, 42. 
108 See below n.171 and accompanying text. 
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acts. 
109 
The intentional element is an important qualification to the general 
rejection of liability for carelessly caused economic loss. Yet, wrongfulness 
signals the violation by the defendant of her duty not to invade the victim's 
correlative right. This obviously presupposes that victims possess a claim-right to 
safeguard their liberty to compete, as the landmark economic-tort decisions did. 
Thus, inducing the breach of contract entails liability as the defendant encroaches 
upon the claimant's contractual right. The inducer's freedom to compete (to offer 
better dealings to contract-breakers) yields to the prornisee's contractual right. 
However, the concept of wrongfulness extends beyond the breach of common-law 
duties, including the infringement of duties established by statute, such as the 
competition laws the violation of which embodies antitrust conduct that roots the 
competition torts . Consequently, tortious liability hinges on wrongfulness partly 
because entrepreneurs have the liberty (not the claim-right) to carry out economic 
activities and compete. Hence Coleman argues that the harm experienced by trade 
opponents driven out of the market is justified despite affecting their legitimate 
interests (not rights); unless the damage flows from wrongful behaviour, for 
instance, unfair practices.
110 Put differently, I understand that if competitors had 
an authentically "Hohfeldian" right to trade the sole interference with it would 
trigger strict liability. This seems to occur with passing-off which invades the 
claimant's proprietary right to goodwill and entails outcome-based strict liability 
(regardless of the defendant's fault/intention), although the conduct is deliberate. 
That apart, the competition torts too cause outcome-based strict liability for 
reasons concerning their statutory origin, yet they are grounded on antitrust 
conduct which is also deliberate. Conversely, absolute strict liability (that is, for 
barely harming competitors) would make commercial life impossible. Business 
adversaries have a legitimate interest in defeating one another. This is protected 
through the economic torts which comprise wrongful means ( except for simple 
conspiracy and malicious falsehood) and certain intent. Tort disputes between 
competitors revolve about weighing their conflicting liberties. Rivals lack any 
right not to be harmed. 
The rights-based model does not work in all the economic torts, some of 
which trigger liability despite the claimant lacking a right distinguishable from her 
· 109 
· Descheemaeker (2009) 28. 
11
° Coleman (1992) 275ff, 330ff. 
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liberty to compete. Thus, for Stevens himself the three-party unlawful-
interference tort is troublesome, given the absence of a right to trade. 
111 Likewise, 
Neyers has said that this tort instantiates damnum sine iniuria: the claimant can 
recover damages for conduct that infringed no right whatsoever of hers, only a 
third party's right. This tort cannot rest on the infringement of the claimant's 
"right to trade" which (following Hohfeld) does not exist. 112 In my view the torts 
of unlawful means conspiracy and intimidation pose equivalent problem: they 
entail liability despite not violating any "right". Although the notion of right is 
debatable and in practice courts have shielded competition freedom against 
unlawful interference as a matter of justice and policy, in torts other than Lumley 
and passing-off (which protect contractual and proprietary rights, respectively) 
liability hinges on wrongful conduct rather than on the infringement of vested 
rights. A position contingent on the tort involved seems inevitable, rigid 
paradigms becoming untenable. It is not necessary to force the concept of right 
but realise that courts prioritise the claimant's interest in business over the 
defendant's liberty to compete inasmuch as the defendant's conduct matches with 
a known economic tort. 
Despite these problems, Stevens maintains that tort law is in disarray: 
courts use a rights-based model or a loss-based criterion (liability for intentionally 
or negligently caused harm) depending on the tort under consideration. He 
advocates a unitary rights-based approach, thereby helping courts to circumvent 
the policy issues entangled by the loss-based paradigm, particularly when 
determining whether the harm was justified. 113 Nonetheless, however salutary the 
adoption of an exclusive rights-based scheme for the purpose of systematising tort 
law, I think it is unrealistic to remove the too-well established differences between 
the named torts, let alone to suggest that courts could or should stop evaluating 
the policy inquiries which have always nurtured case-law. An inflexible 
conception can start as a normative proposition about how tort law should be read 
but end up misstating the actual law. I thus agree with Cane in this: the rights-
model does not depict the current panorama of tort law; it can hardly be deemed 
the best explanation of tort law as compared with the loss-model which has never 
111 Stevens (2007) 189. 
112 Neyers (2008) 215ff. 
113 Stevens: (2007) 349-350, (2009) 650 (attributing the chaos in tort law to jurists before courts). 
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been a true alternative; nor is it reasonable to decide tort cases without 
contemplating policy and consequentialist rationales. 114 
Finally, Descheemaeker's thesis persuasively shows that a clear taxonomy 
helps to accomplish legal coherence, certainty and fairness. Yet, it seems 
uncertain that the conventional understanding of tort law around the diverse 
causes of action, as a legal area distinct from equity, can be replaced with a 
merged law of wrongs. What Descheemaeker' s thesis concretely suggests as 
regards the economic torts, I think, is that the latter should be deemed rooted in a 
clear intention. However, as Descheemaeker acknowledges, 11 5 in English law 
intention is equivocal: it can mean deliberate conduct or intended consequences. 
This ambiguity is manifest in the economic torts, thereby complicating any effort 
of systematisation. Likewise, Descheemaeker excludes breaches of contract and 
crimes from the concept of wrong. 116 Even so, I doubt that wrongfulness could not 
include them. If this were the case the long-settled Lumley-tort would be called 
into question. Furthermore, Descheemaeker suggests that all the wrongs should be 
aligned one another regardless of their origin. Still, I consider it contentious that 
the common-law economic torts and the statutory competition torts can be studied 
as a single category ignoring their diverse sources, rationales and ingredients. The 
economic torts are invented by case-law basically to repair and prevent pecuniary 
damage flowing from unfair or even anticompetitive practices. They contain an 
intentional element which varies according to the tort at issue and generally 
require wrongful means. The competition torts are established by statute as the 
key form of private enforcement of competition law. They mainly serve to 
compensate for harm arising from the infringement of the relevant statutes and 
give rise to outcome-based strict liability for deliberate antitrust conduct, namely, 
regardless of the defendant's intention to harm or fault. Nonetheless, I will show 
that both categories unveil the modest function that courts assign to tort law in the 
control of commercial competition. 
114 Cane (2008) 643ff. 
115 Descheemaeker (2009) 271ff. 
11 6 Ibid 22-23, 33-34. See below n.486. 
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II. Tort law's roles 
Tort theories, whether descriptive (the sociological inquiry of which goals tort law 
in fact serves) or prescriptive (the philosophical question about the aims that tort 
law should perform), 117 identify principal and ancillary tasks. From an orthodox 
position, torts form a mechanism of personal redress establishing st
andards of 
right and wrong conduct. 
118 As indicated, tort law is chiefly concerned with 
providing compensation for wrongful harm grounded on corrective justice.
119 
Accordingly, I disagree with Law and Economics' submission that tort 
law 
does not or should not repair individual harm, this being better cover
ed through 
insurance, but does or should serve social goals, like increasing safety.
120 Tort law 
fulfils an essential compensatory mission although it can in addition s
erve social 
purposes such as deterrence. In particular, tort law helps to deter 
and punish 
wrongful conduct, vindicate rights and even make restitution of il
licit gains. 
Compensation, Birks said, is the typical, neither the sole nor the neces
sary target 
of torts. 121 
Moreover, tort law is concerned both with the past, hence resolv
ing 
disputes through certain remedies, and with prescribing future conduct. 
122 
1. Reparation 
Tort law fundamentally compensates victims as if they had not been
 injured.123 
This can be compared with expectation damages for breach of cont
ract which 
leave claimants as though agreements had been performed.
124 Torts are protective; 
contracts, productive. 
125 Tortious liability safeguards the "reliance interest", 
undoing wrongs; contractual liability protects the "expectation interest"
, replacing 
117 Williams (1951) 138. 
11 8 Goldberg (2003) passim . 
119 E.g., Coleman (1992), Owen (1992), Weinrib (1995) passim. 
120 E.g., Shavell (1987) 297. 
121 Birks ( 1995) 37. On vindication in passing-off: see below n.808 and accompanying text. 
122 Cane (1997) 5. 
123 Livingstone v. Rawyards Coal Co. (1880) 5 App.Cas 25 , HL ("Livingstone" ), 39,
 Lord 
Blackburn. 
124 Robinson v. Harman (1 848) 154 E.R. 363, Ex., 365, Parke B. See: Burrows (2004) 33ff;
 Smith 
(2006) 399; Treitel (2007) 625 . 
125 Weir (1976) 5. 
performance.
126 But corrective justice underpins both liabilities. 127 Likewise, tort-
victims are fully compensated (save for contributory negligence) because tort law 
is to protect victims instead of punishing wrongdoers . So, liability re
lates to the 
victim's harm unlike to the tortfeasor's blame.
128 
2. Prevention, retribution and restitution 
Beever claims that private law is all about corrective justice, whereas deterrence 
and punishment are monopolised by criminal law. 
129 I agree that retribution is 
primarily a social concern and torts do not substitute crimes. I too am
 convinced 
that corrective justice offers a formidable understanding of private law. Yet, as 
nu d . . h d 130 merous cases an JUnsts ave stresse , tort law also performs pr
eventive, 
retributive, distributive, restitutionary and extra-compensatory roles
. As Cane 
asserts, tort law vindicates certain rights despite victims being unharm
ed, thereby 
indicating the high value the law attributes to such interests; co
mpensation 
simultaneously serves preventive and retributive goals; and di
sgorgement 
damages punish reprehensible conduct.
131 
Concretely, punitive (exemplary) damages can help to disqmrage and 
castigate the commission and repetition of wrongs , thus repressing in
tentionally 
inflicted harm and supplementing corrective justice; dissuade tortfeasors from 
deliberately making illicit profits; and reinforce private-law rights. Fu
rthermore, 
since exemplary damages form a sort of private retribution
132 there is no need for 
extending the criminal procedural safeguards applicable to the a
ccused. As 
Zipursky indicat~s, the absence of such defences in civil procedure prec
ludes from 
::~ Fuller/Perdue (I 936-7) passim; Whittaker (1996) 208. 
Epstein (2008) 854. 
128 Cane (1 997) 104- 105 , 111. 
::~ Beever (2003) , (2008) passim. Similarly: Coleman (1992) 198, 371. Cf: Birks (1995) 
37. 
Wilkes v. Wood (1 763) 98 E.R. 489, K.B .C., 498-499, Pratt LCJ; Rookes [1964] A.C.
 1129; 
Cassell & Co. Ltd. v. Broome [1972] A.C. 1027, HL ("Cassell") ; Attorney Genera
l of Trinidad 
and Tobago v. Ramanoop [2006] 1 A.C. 328, PC, at (19-20], Lord Nicholls. See general
ly: Morris 
(1931) l 173ff, 1205ff; Stoll (1 970) 3; Lawson/Markesinis (1982) 180-1 81; William
s/Hepple 
(1 984) 29, 73ff; Owen (1992) 717; Wright (1995) 175ff; Howarth (1997) 264ff; Mul
lis (2007) 
229; Edelman (2008) passim. 
· 
131 Cane (1997) l 16ff. 
132 
Ergo, they can be insured against: Lancashire CC v. Municipal Mutua
l Insurance Ltd. (1 997] 
Q.B. 897, CA. 
37 
awarding exemplary damages to punish egregious acts on behalf of the state but 
does not prevent disciplining the wilful injuring of individual victims. 133 
Moreover, punitive damages need not undermine corrective justice if they 
are granted, as English courts have done, cautiously and occasionally. Hence 
Weinrib saluted Rookes for confining exemplary damages to neutralise the 
wrongdoer's unjust enrichment. 134 Likewise, the fact that punitive damages are 
· 135 · · · · · 
awarded for reasonable amounts in specific cases questions certain cnticisms, 
perhaps pertinent to American law, inter alia, that punitive damages can unjustly 
enrich already fully compensated victims, exacerbate vindictiveness 
136 or 
discourage meritorious behaviour, and thereby undermining punitive goals.
137 By 
the same token it seems unnecessary to implement special solutions, like 
exemplary damages being collected by the state or assigned to appropriate 
beneficiaries. 138 Yet, as some authors indicate, the simultaneous realisation of so 
often contradictory rationales as compensation, deterrence and retribution can be 
impracticable. The concrete facts force a choice between these targets. 
139 But 
determining the appropriate measure of punitive damages is also hard. As Cooter 
demonstrated, while too small awards do not deter abnormally risky (or socially 
costly) practices, excessively high amounts may discourage efficient activities, 
especially if they are already burdened with strict liability.
140 
Formerly, English courts awarded exemplary damages to punish 
outrageous conduct. However, in Rookes Lord Devlin restricted them to three 
categories, the second of which being the most pertinent to the economic torts: 
where the defendant calculates to profit from his conduct. 1
41 Rookes remains the 
133 Zipursky (2005) passim. 
134 Weinrib (1995) 114, 134-135. 
135 Cassell ([1972] AC. 1027) imposed punitive damages for knowingly and recklessly publishing 
defamatory information, so affecting the claimant. See: Harris/Campbell/Halson (2005) 59lff. 
136 Burrows (2007) 1677-8. 
137 Schwartz (1982) passim. 
138 Cane (2006) 174, 302; Deakin/Johnston/Markesinis (2007) 949ff. 
139 Chapman/Trebilcock ( 1989) passim. 
14° Cooter ( 1982) passim. See also: Epstein (2008) 854. 
141 Rookes [1964] AC. 1129, 1221, 1226-27. The first category comprises exemplary damages 
awarded against oppressive or unconstitutional action taken by civil servants, e.g., wrongful arrest 
(Holden v. Chief Constable of Lancashire [ 1987] Q.B. 380, CA), malicious prosecution 
(Thompson v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [ 1998] Q.B. 498, CA) and misfeasance of 
public office (Kuddus v. Chief Constable of Leicestershire [2002] 2 AC. 122, HL, "Kuddus"); 
Fairgrieve (2007) 356. The third category includes punitive damages authorised by statute, a 
prominent (foreign) illustration being treble-damages: victims injured in their business or property 
by antitrust conduct can recover the triple in damages plus litigation costs and reasonable lawyers' 
fees (s.4, §§12-27, Clayton Act 1914). The punitive component is two-thirds of the award: Posner 
38 
leading authority on exemplary damages, 142 subjecting them to important 
restraints: compensation must be inadequate to deter and punish wrongful 
misconduct; the claimant must be an indistinguishable tort-victim, thus preventing 
windfalls; and the awards must not exceed the amount of criminal penalties and 
should be commensurate with litigants' resources. Neither procedural constraints 
nor an accurate calculation of profits by defendants are demanded but tortfeasors 
must have compared the risk of injuring claimants with the chance of escaping 
liability. 143 
Conversely, American juries have made unlimited use of punitive damages 
to protect life, bodily integrity and business. 144 In the astounding Texaco Inc. v. 
Pennzoil Co case 
145 huge compensatory and punitive damages were awarded 
against the defendant which, by offering a better deal to one of the negotiating 
parties, interfered with the claimant's prospective contract. In general, English 
and American laws mostly punish malicious, wilful, wanton, high-handed, 
O t · d 146 p · · u rageous or oppressive con uct. umtive damages teach wrongdoers that tort 
d t th . d' . th 147 oes no pay, us vm icatmg e strength of the law. They convey the social 
reproof for objectionable behaviour, such as maliciously injuring others by getting 
into debt or exploiting victims to achieve one's ends. 148 
That exemplary damages must be proportional to litigants' wealth 149 
uncovers a deterrent function. 15° For the U.S . Supreme Court, retribution and 
(2003) 328. Treble-damages were introduced by the Statute of Monopolies (21 Jae.I, c.3 1623, 
Article IV), repealed by the Statute Law (Repeals) Act 1969: Jones ( 1999a) 35-36. 
142 R k . d . 
oo es was reJecte m Broome v. Cassell & Co. Ltd. [1971] 2 Q.B. 354, CA, but reinstated in 
Cassell [ 1972] AC. 1027, 1087, Lord Halisham L.C. In AB v. South West Water Services Ltd 
[ 1993] Q.B . 507, the CA enhanced punitive damages to those torts in which this remedy antedated 
Rookes, e.g., wrongful interference with business and intimidation. Yet, Kuddus ([2002] 2 AC. 
122) restored Rookes, although Lord Scott strongly dissenting, ana it was ratified in Borders v. 
Commissioner [2005] E.W.C.A. Civ. 197, CA See: Cane (1996) 301; Burrows (2004) 41 lff; 
~frns/Campbell/Halson (2005) 585ff; Weir (2006) 219ff; Edelman (2008) 229. 
[1964] AC. 1129, 1227-8, Lord Devlin. 
144
Tunc (1974) 89, 92; e.g., Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Company 119 Cal.App.3d 757 (4th Dist., f
4
~81); Romo v. Ford Motor Company 113 Cal.App.4th 738 (4th Dist., 2003). 
146 729 S.W.2d 768 Tex.Ct.App. 1987 ("Texaco") . See below n.606 and accompanying text. 
147 Rookes [1964] AC. 1129, 1229, Lord Devlin; §908 Restatement (Second) Torts 1979 ("RST"). 
Bell v. ':fidland (1861) 142 E.R. 462, K.B.C., 471, Byles J; Rookes [1964] AC. 1129, 1226-28, 
Lord Devlm; Cassell [1972] AC. 1027, 1039, Lord Halisham L.C.; Kuddus [2002] 2 AC. 122, at 
f19]-[63-67], Lord Nicholls. See: C!ne.(1996) 45; Mullis (2007) 254; Stevens (2007) 88. 
Kemezy v. Peters 79 F.3d 33 (7 Cir.1996), 35, Posner CJ. See: Epstein (1983) 1368-9; Owen 
(1995) 205, 219ff; Stevens (2007) 188. 
149 
Rookes [1964] AC. 1129, 1227-28, Lord Devlin. 
150 Sharkey (2003) 358, 364. 
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prevention are the exclusive targets of punitive damages. 151 But if the law 
prioritises punishment the awards must correspond to the reprehensibility of the 
conduct unlike the magnitude of the harm or the defendant's means: retribution is 
not achieved if exemplary damages are simply additional costs/taxes. 152 
Consequently, on both sides of the Atlantic victims must clearly state whether 
they seek punitive damages or extra-compensation, 153 the latter not being 
presumed from a vague allegation of the former. 154 Precision is necessary because 
exemplary damages entail unique legal effects. Hence the landmark Philip Morris 
USA v. Williams case, 155 which declared it unconstitutional for juries to calculate 
punitive damages pursuant to the harm caused to non-litigants (thus preserving the 
criminal safeguards), 156 is irrelevant to extra-compensation. 157 
Lord Devlin's second category seems entirely germane to the economic 
and competition torts for they embody conduct aimed at or calculated to unjustly 
enriching the wrongdoer at the victim's expense. As Cane says, this conduct is 
unambiguously intentional. The defendant's culpability is fundamental for this 
category of exemplary damages to perform the punitive and restitutionary 
goals. 158 Thus, unlawful interference with business requires the agent's intention 
to harm the claimant as an end or, what typically involves self-enrichment, as a 
means to another end. 159 Further, punitive damages can be awarded even if the 
1 defendant does not obtain illicit gains: restitution is a subsidiary function of 
exemplary damages, 160 their award really depending on the defendant 's attempt 
(successful or not) to profit. 161 However, English courts may be too cautious to 
151 State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003); Exxon 
Shipping Co. v. Baker 128 S.Ct. 2605 (2008). 
152 Ellis (1982) passim; Galanter/Luban (1993) passim. 
153 Calabresi (2005) passim. 
154 Devenish Nutrition v. Sanofi-Aventis [2008] 2 All E.R. 249, Ch.D. ("Devenish") , at [70-74], 
Lewison J. 
155 549 U.S. 346 (2007) . 
156 The U.S. Supreme Court ruled differently in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore 517 U.S. 559 
(1996), generating vehement criticism on grounds similar to those underpinning Philip Morris: 
Colby (2003) passim. 
157 Sebok (2007) passim; Colby (2008) passim. 
158 Cane: (1997) 114, (2000a) 548. 
159 OBG [2008] 1 AC. 1, at [60-62], Lord Hoffmann. 
160 They are 'a very blunt instrument of disgorgement' : Cane (1997) 115 . 
161 For example, article 1371 of the A vant-Projet de Reforme du Droit des Obligations (Art I I OJ a 
1386 du Code Civil) et du Droit de la Prescription (Art 2234 a 2281 du Code Civil) 22.9.2005 
(under Pierre Catala 's direction, "Catala's proposals"), introduces punitive damages for 
'manifestly deliberate fault' and 'fault with a view to gain' (emphasis added), which is patent in 
unfair practices: Rowan (2008) 193, (2009) 329-330, 336. 
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accept this suggestion. They reject exemplary damages to safeguard non bis in 
idem where defendants were already imprisoned for fraud 162 or penalised for 
anticompetitive conduct. 163 In Devenish, the EC Commission had fined the 
defendants' cartel. Although this antitrust conduct was knowingly and 
intentionally targeted at illicit self-enrichment, Lewison J denied punitive 
damages. First, the penalty imposed (though commuted to zero as the defendants 
had been whistle-blowers under the leniency program) sufficiently deterred and 
punished the cartel. Secondly, punitive damages could discourage offenders from 
denouncing serious anticompetitive acts. Thirdly, exemplary damages posed the 
risk of multiple claims (the cartel had an impact on the EC market) let alone the 
difficulty to assess them and to limit them in order to avoid double jeopardy. 164 
Some authors, 165 approving Lewison J' s arguments, criticise the Court of 
Appeal's denial 166 of gained-based damages claimed to deprive the defendants of 
their illicit profits. They argue that the disgorgement of unlawful gains serves the 
public interest in strengthening private enforcement of competition law, prevents 
the unjust enrichment characteristic of anticompetitive behaviour which often 
surpasses the victim's harm, and avoids the complex calculation of compensatory 
damages. The latter are inadequate if the claimant can transfer to her customers 
the overcharge imposed by the defendant. 167 After Devenish, it is concluded, 168 
restitution will probably have to be pursued directly through an action for unjust 
enrichment. 169 
3. Observations 
I agree with the critics of Devenish that account of illicit profits should be allowed 
when claimed through the competition torts, given the nature and aims of antitrust 
162 Archerv. Brown [1985] Q.B. 401, Q.B.D. 
163 Devenish [2008] 2 All E.R. 249. 
164 Ibid at [43]-[69], Lewison J. See: Whish (2008) 303. 
165 OduduNirgo (2009) passim; Sheehan (2009) passim. 
166 Devenish [2009] 3 All E.R. 27. 
167 
In Attorney-General v. Blake [2001] I AC. 268, HL, 284-285, Lord Nicholls subjected the 
(exceptional) award of restitutionary damages for breach of contract to the inadequacy of 
compensatory damages and to the claimant 's legitimate interest in preventing the defendant 's 
unjust emichment. Whether gained-based can be awarded beyond breach of contract remains 
unclear: Rowan (2008) l 38ff. 
168 OduduNirgo (2009) passim. 
· 
169 As recognised in Kleinwort Benson Ltd. v. Birmingham CC [1997] Q.B. 380, CA 
("Kleinwort"). 
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p-
conduct. Yet, I too regard the second category of exemplary damages as en
tirely 
pertinent to the economic torts which form a vehicle for intentionally 
sought 
unjust enrichment. I acknowledge that English courts associate exemplary 
damages with criminal punishment: Rookes prohibited awarding them for s
ums 
exceeding the amount of penalties while double jeopardy was an important 
concern in Devenish. Although the moderate way in which English case
-law 
awards punitive damages is coherent with tort law's main reparatory pu
rpose, 
exemplary damages can be used to deprive tortfeasors of unlawful profit
s as a 
private sanction distinct from criminal punishment or from fines for an
titrust 
practices. As some indicate, punitive damages can be an effective decentr
alised 
mechanism threatening the pocket (not the liberty) of economically powerful 
wrongdoers who have not been sufficiently punished by public law.
170 
The second category of exemplary damages should not be dismissed 
merely because the defendant was criminally punished. They are neit
her a 
criminal sanction nor repress a criminal offence. Reversing the defendant's 
unjust 
enrichment (if this happened) or deterring and punishing malicious behaviour 
targeted at making illicit profits must also be distinguished from the 
other 
categories of exemplary damages involving torts which can really entail th
e risk 
of duplication of sanctions. 
III. Policy of the law towards economic loss 
This section explores the policy and technical grounds by which English 
courts 
deny in principle tortious liability for carelessly inflicted pure economic los
s (the 
"exclusionary rule"), except for very specific situations within the tort of 
negligence and, mainly, the intentional economic torts . 
Among other reasons it is the fear deeply entrenched in courts' mentality 
for the disastrous, yet unproven, social and economic consequences which 
might 
arise from such a general fault-liability rule. Victims are likewise suppos
ed to 
safeguard their own interests in contract without evading privity throug
h tort 
actions. 
170 Galanter/Luban ( 1993) passim. 
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For others, economic loss is before the law less valuable than physical 
damage or should not at any rate be repaired since it generates social w
elfare 
regardless of affecting individual victims. Moreover, accidentally caused fin
ancial 
harm is an expected by-product of legitimate competition. This justifies restricting 
liability through intention and wrongful means, which are mostly incorp
orated 
into the economic torts. 
1. Defining economic harm 
Whereas "consequential loss" derives from the claimant's own physical (personal 
or proprietary) injury, "relational (indirect) harm" flows from the physical damage 
suffered by a person other than the claimant. Pure economic loss is a k
ind of 
relational harm usually comprising loss of (actual or potential) profits: clientele, 
market-share and business. 
171 Although political interests may favour 
compensation for individual damage following public harm, 
172 case-law often 
dismisses reparation of relational economic loss.
173 
2. Rationales for the exclusionary rule 
The exclusionary rule is influenced by policy, institutional, social and c
ultural 
factors leading to contrasting results across the common-law jurisdictions. The 
reasons buttressing this response vary with the facts and can contradic
t one 
another. For instance, there is no evident relation between the ripple e
ffects 
potentially ensuing from liability and the concern for preserving the contra
ct-tort 
divide. 174 
171 Bussani/Palmer (2003) 10-11; Koziol (2006) 872; Howarth (2007) 705-706; Beever (2007) 
n4. ·
 
172 Thus, in Re Exxon Valdez (see, e.g., 270 F.3d 1215 (2001)) fishermen, landowners and natives 
were awarded environmental damages against a corporation owning oil tank
er that ran aground, 
f~using oil s_pill. See: ?oldberg: (_l 991) 250-251, 275; (1994) passim. 
The leadmg Amencan authonty: Robins Dry Dock v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303 (1927). See also: 
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2.1 Floodgates argument 
The most recurrent justification for the exclusionary rule is the judicial fear for the 
detrimental economic impact, and endless litigation, which liability for 
negligently caused financial harm would produce.
175 In Ultramares Corporation 
v. Touche 176 Judge Cardozo warned about the risk of liability indeterminate in 
amount, time and class of potential victims, 
177 a famous ruling quoted by English 
courts when deciding the same sort of problem.
178 Previously, in Palsgraf v. Long 
Island Railroad Company, 179 Cardozo had held that negligence revolved around 
the factual issue of foreseeability and the duty of care to be solved before the 
normative questions on causation and width of liability. However, in Ultramares 
Cardozo limited foresight to avoid imposing indeterminate liability in novel cases 
which Congress and regulators could better handle. 
180 
Ultramares has traditionally been considered as rooted in policy and 
pragmatic reasons. 181 It prevented an extensive liability that posed uncertainty and 
d . . . . . 182 F' . l d 
183 
discouraged pro uctive economic activities. mancia amage, some argue, 
derives from interconnected relations which generate chain reactions, thereby 
potentially spreading more frequently and easily than physical harm. Then, others 
stress, 184 the need for reducing the number of prospective claimants to direct 
' victims suffering consequential (not relational) losses. Hence indirect purchasers 
are not normally allowed to bring antitrust tort suits.
185 Moreover, liability can be 
a disproportionate reaction against those who caused pure economic loss 
incapable of weighing the costs and benefits of their acts. Thus, in Ultramares the 
defendants knew that the balance-sheets they had prepared as auditors were to be 
175 Epstein (2008) 1242. 
176 255 NY 170 (1931, "Ultramares"). 
177 Ibid, 179. 
178 Hedley Byrne [1964] A.C. 465,537, Lord Pearce; Caparo Industries Plc. v. Dickman [1990] 2 
A.C. 605, HL ("Caparo"), 621, Lord Bridge. 
179 248 N.Y. 339 (1928). 
18° Kaufman (1998) 296ff, 307ff. 
181 Bussani/Palmer (2003) passim. Cf (asserting that Ultramares was decided on legal principle 
alone, as the defendant owed the claimants no duty whatsoever): Beever (2007) 234ff; Benson 
(2009) 837. 
182 Rabin (1985) passim; Deakin/Johnston/Markesinis (2007) 159. 
183 Atiyah (1967) 270; Perlman (1982) 72. 
184 Rizzo (1982) passim. 
185 Epstein (2008) 1266. 
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delivered to shareholders and investors but ignored their identity and the 
transactions in which the information was to be employed. 186 
Nevertheless, the risk of indeterminate liability must not be overstated. A 
similar danger emanates from physical harm as litigation on mass and toxic torts 
h 181 v· . f . s ows. ictims o economic losses are often recognisable and the high 
administrative costs of litigation considerably reduce the volume of negligence 
cases.
188 
Indeed the floodgates argument lacks empirical support and may prompt 
judicial incompetence. 189 That too many victims can sue is unacceptable as 
justification. An exaggerated fear for widespread liability should not sacrifice 
individual victims' interests.
190 In my view the fact that courts severely restrict 
liability through a mental element more stringent than mere negligence and 
unlawful means demonstrates the vitality of floodgates argument. Through the 
economic torts courts can counteract the risk of limitless liability and litigation 
attributed to fault liability for pecuniary harm. 
2.2 Contractual remedies 
A powerful reason against tortious liability is that economic losses can better be 
d. 'b d d 191 . 1stn ute an prevented through contract. Jurists recommend using 
contractual remedies to neutralise the immoderate growth of English tort liability, 
as compared to French (and Chilean) contract law which has expanded by virtue 
of the non-cumul principle. 192 
It is said that tort lawsuits can undermine contractual relationships 193 or 
promote the objectionable attitude of blaming others before assuming one's own 
d · · 194 y· a versitles. et, Lord Goff treated tortious liability as the default rule, 
somewhat circumventing privity of contract.
195 Subsequently he held a solicitor 
186 Bernstein (1998b) 115. 
187 James (1972) passim; Bernstein (1998b) 126ff. 
::: Bussani/Palmer/Parisi (2003) 124ff; Gergen (2006) 749-750, 770-771. 
Prosser (1939) 877; Banakas (1996) 22ff; Bussani/Palmer (2003) 18-19; 
Deakin/Johnston/Markesinis (2007) 159 168. 
190 , 
Stapleton (1998) 66; Barker (2008) 184. 
191 
Rabin (1985) passim; Deakin/Johnston/Markesinis (2007) 160; Edelman/Davies (2007) 1239-
40. 
::: Markesinis (1987) passim; Whittaker (1995) passim; Bussani/Palmer (2003) 15. 
1 · Henderson v. Merrett Syndicates Ltd. [1995] 2 A.C. 145, HL ("Henderson"), 196, Lord G
off. 
94 Banakas (1996) 8. 
195 Henderson [1995] 2 A.C. 145, 193. 
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liable for carelessly performing his services towards his client (a testator), thereby 
affecting the claimants (disappointed beneficiaries). This finding, his Lordship 
asserted, was the only way of doing justice to them, although neither the 
defendant had assumed responsibility to the claimants nor the latter relied on his 
services. 196 Conversely, Whittaker suggests confining tort liability to particular 
islands and regulating the effects of certain contracts whose parties have remained 
silent. 197 In the same vein, Weir lamented that Hedley Byrne, the leading case 
affirming liability for negligent misstatements provided by banks, had allowed the 
claimant to transfer its risk to a stranger instead of protecting it by contract.
198 For 
Weir, Hedley Byrne indirectly clashed with Cattle v. Stockton Waterworks Co, 
199 
the effect of which is the denial of liability for carelessly interfering with 
another's contract. No less eloquently, Schwartz reproached that J'Aire Corp. v. 
Gregor/00 preferred fault liability for contract interference rather than using the 
f d h. d . ' b f' 201 theory o contracts ma e to t ir parties ene 1t. . 
As will be seen,202 a strong argument for contractual remedies is raised to 
refuse or delimit tort liability for interference with contract or business. English 
courts confine liability to inducing breach of contract and for intentionally causing 
economic loss to another person's trade by wrongful means. Tort law does not 
replace contractual remedies but fills their gaps. 
2.3 Efficiency 
Law and Economics defends the exclusionary rule from several flanks. 
203 
Liability is said to entail more social costs than benefits. Pure economic loss is 
deemed merely private (as it generates social gains) and spread amongst countless 
victims (each of whom sustains a relatively small damage easily transferable to 
196 White v. Jones [1995] 2 A.C. 207, HL ("White"), 236-237, 259, 268, Lord Goff; Carty (2001) 
253. 
197 Whittaker (1996) passim. 
198 Weir (1963) passim. 
199 (1875) LR 10 Q.B. 453, Q.B.D. ("Cattle"): the defendant negligently allowed its pipes to leak, 
thereby increasing the claimant's cost under a contract with a third party to construct a tunnel. 
200 24 Cal.3d 799 (I 979, "J'A ire") . See below n.603 and accompanying text. 
20 1 Schwartz (1986), (2003) passim. 
202 Below Chapter III, section IIl.3 .2, pp. l 12ff. 
203 Bishop (1982) passim; Goldberg (1994) passim; Posner (2006) 736ff; Howarth (2004) 63, 
(2007) passim. 
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consumers); thereby preventing defendants from calculating how much invest in 
precaution. 
However, Schwartz argued, courts often redress individual harm on 
corrective justice without assessing social costs. Moreover, individual losses often 
involve social costs, such as the diminution in the level of services that the 
claimant's customers experience after the defendant expelled the claimant from 
the market. 
204 
For Esptein the absence of liability can prompt victims to over-
protect through contract and wrongdoers to sub-invest in precaution. 205 And 
Barker perceives discrimination in favour of physical harm and against pure 
economic loss: physical harm is recoverable despite entailing the same wealth-
transfer effect than pure economic loss, which is not.206 
Although I disagree that tort law only fulfils goals outside the tortfeasor-
victim relationship, Law and Economics provides useful criteria to identify 
irrational conduct like that embodied in the economic and competition torts. As 
will be seen, 
207 predatory pricing is a clear illustration of this. It involves a 
business who stops profiting and starts selling at a loss, normally uncovering the 
agent's intention to annihilate identifiable competitors or to prevent future rivals 
from entering the market. Hence the Competition Appeal Tribunal ("CAT") has 
asserted that ' the longer the prices of a dominant undertaking remain below total 
costs the easier it is likely ... to infer [the] intent to eliminate competition'.208 
2.4 The alleged lower rank of financial interests 
Weir founded ~e exclusionary rule on the supposedly inferior hierarchy of pure 
economic interests compared to corporeal property, suggesting that people (unlike 
artificial persons) have deeper affection for tangible goods than money. Therefore, 
the law protects corporeal property but not financial interests against negligent 
interference. This preference for physical harm is consistent with the social scale 
of human values and with the fact that trespass, the predecessor of the tort of 
negligence, exclusively safeguarded physical rights (personal and proprietary). 
204 Schwartz (1996) 128ft. 
205 Epstein (2008) 1266. 
206 Barker (2008) passim. 
207 Below nn.1021ff and accompanying text. 
208 
Aberdeen Journals Ltd. v. Office of Fair Trading [2003] CAT 11 ("Aberdeen Journals") at 
[356]. ' 
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Trespass is actionable per se, despite the victim
 being unharmed: it mainly 
vindicates rights rather than compensating for damag
e. 209 
Actually, however, economic interests can be mo
re valuable (at least 
objectively and regardless of their sentimental price) than corpo
real assets. 210 
Indeed property damage is a kind of economic los
s.211 Moreover, Weir himself 
1 . . ·1 1 2
12 
admits that tangible and incorporeal goods are cur
rent y given s1m1 ar va ue. 
Furthermore, the purportedly lower status of the 
financial interests may only 
signify that the resources to compensate for econo
mic loss are insufficient. Yet, 
without empirical evidence this is mere speculation: 
at least in France the scarcity 
of capital is no impediment to recover pecuniary harm
.2 13 
As some have noted,
214 English and German laws have privileged tangible 
assets over economic interests, contractual right
s and mere expectations. In 
Germany financial interests are excluded from the 
list of protected rights
215 and 
can only be remedied if intentionally or recklessly in
jured through conduct contra 
bonos mores. 216 Conversely, since the 1789 Revo
lution French courts · allow 
compensation for all kinds of harm, including pure 
economic loss, although it is 
rejected where it is indirect or uncertain. 
The predominant nineteenth-century individualism
, symbolised in the 
., Cattle decision, drove English courts into denying
 compensation for claimants' 
relational economic harm. For (Robby) Bernstein and Go
rdley, the real-
rights/personal-rights conceptualist dichotomy, whi
ch likewise influenced courts 
to refuse proprietary protection to contract rights
 and mere expectations, is a 
historical accident. 
217 Indeed, as Atiyah claimed, Cattle did not hinge o
n the 
nature of the harm but on its remoteness (lack of causation) a
nd the floodgates 
209 Weir: (1963) 218, (1976) Sff, (2004) 6-7, (2006) 47. See also : Ib
betson (1999) 160. 
210 Deakin/Johnston/Markesinis (2007) 158. 
211 Atiyah (1967) 269. 
212 Weir (2004) 7. 
213 Bussani/Palmer/Parisi (2003) 124ft. 
214 Banakas (1996) 11-12; Howarth (1996) 44-45. 
215 They are not mentioned in §823 BGB: '(1) A person who
, intentionally or negligently, 
unlawfully injures the life, body, health, freedom, property or ot
her right of another person is 
liable to make compensation to the other party for th
e damage arising from this. (2) The same duty 
is held by a person who commits a breach of a statu
te that is intended to protect another person. If, 
according to the contents of the statute, it may als
o be breached without fault, then liability to 
compensation only exists in the case of fault' . See b
elow n.881 . 
216 §826 BGB: 'A person who, in a manner contrary to public po
licy, intentionally inflicts damage 
on another person is liable to the other person to ma
ke compensation for the damage'. 
217 Bernstein (1998a) 11; Gordley: (2003) passim; (2006) 262, 278f
t. 
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218 
argument. Only subsequently the type of dam
age was highlighted as the 
ultimate criterion against liability.
219 Although conceptualism never attempted to 
limit liability, and was in fact abandoned, it endu
red as precedent220 and was 
justified in policy. 
22 1 But as Weir points out, 'the policy will continu
e to be 
expressed in terms of duty and/or remoteness'. 
222 Thus, the nature and hierarchy 
of pure financial interests coincidentally aid to un
derpin the exclusionary rule 
albeit they are not decisive: by and large West
ern legal systems allow the 
recovery of intentionally inflicted pure economic da
mage through specific torts or 
a general rule. 
223 
For Gordley, the exclusionary rule punishes vic
tims for 
negligently exposing themselves to harm, though th
is rationale is concealed in the 
floodgates argument or, as in France, in forma
l criteria, as remoteness of 
damage. 
224 
Perhaps, as (Anita) Bernstein contends, the exclusionary rule 
keeps 
tort law understandable and accessible for the publi
c: pure financial interests are 
too abstract to be protected by rules design
ed to regulate involuntary 
transactions. 225 
In brief, pure pecuniary interests are important 
but in practice less 
protected than tangible proprietary interests. Financ
ial interests cannot generally 
be redressed through the tort of negligence but thro
ugh the economic torts which 
make more difficult the enforcement of liability. T
he true reason for this is, I 
believe, that courts implicitly endeavour to balance v
ictims' right to compensation 
for pure economic harm against wrongdoers' li
berty to compete. So, pure 
pecuniary damage is rarely compensated not for any
thing in its nature but because 
it often arises from competitive activities, thereby 
being justified. Interestingly, 
the technical reason behind Cattle was that the cla
imant's harm had been too 
remote an effect of the defendant's act, which 
is entirely equivalent to the 
common ground that French (and Chilean) courts employ to ref
use compensation 
~:: Atiyah (1967) 248. See also: Matthews/Morgan/O'Cinneide 
(2009) 181. 
220 
Caparo (1990] 2 AC. 605,633, Lord Bridge. 
221 ft;1urph~ v. Brentwo~d [ 1991] I AC. 398, fil. See
: Howarth (1996) 31; Hepp le ( 1997) 75_ 76. 
. Sometimes I say: 'There was no duty." In othe
rs I say: "The damage was too remote" ... the 
time_ has come to discard those tests which have
 proved so elusive. It seems to me better to 
cons1de~ the particular relationship in hand, and 
see whether or not, as a matter of policy, 
economic loss should be recoverable' : Spartan Stee
l & Alloys Ltd. v Martin & Co. (Contractors) 
Ltd. [1973] Q.B. 27, CA ("Spartan Steel") , 37, Lord Denning MR
. 
222 Weir (2006) 46. 
223 B i/P l ussan a mer (2003) 21 ff. 
· 
224 Gordley (2006) 280ff. 
225 Bernstein (2006) passim. 
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for economic loss. It is noteworthy that Stevens acknowledges that the English 
rights-based model and the French loss-based system usually reach similar results, 
excluding this type of liability for lack of causation. 
226 
Finally, English law clearly prioritises proprietary interests over 
contractual rights and the latter over business interests. It protects proprietary 
interests against their invasion or unauthorised exploitation through strict-liability 
torts where the defendant's intention or fault is immaterial. These include 
trespass, which protects tangible property and is per se actionable (the victim's 
damage is irrelevant), and passing-off, which protects intangible property and 
demands proof of likely (not actual) harm. In both tort law mainly vindicates the 
claimant's rights and gives them priority over third parties' freedom of action. 
Hence the imposition of strict liability and also the granting of injunction as prime 
remedy. Conversely, non-proprietary interests are protected through intention-
based liability and the main remedy is compensation for harm, injunctions being 
granted insofar as damages are not adequate redress. Contractual rights are 
safeguarded through Lumley which requires the defendant's intention to cause the 
breach of another's contract. Business interests are shielded, inter alia, through 
the unlawful-interference tort which presupposes the more stringent defendant's 
intention to harm the claimant. Ultimately, as Owen implies, a rule of strict 
1 liability for the violation of recognised rights reflects the prevalence of victims' 
personal security from harm over tortfeasors' freedom of action. 
227 Similarly, 
Cane shows that the paramount importance the law attributes to proprietary 
interests over contractual rights is manifest in strict liability and the granting of 
injunctions as the chief remedy. Tort law serves to affirm victims' rights, so 
limiting wrongdoers' liberty to act. 228 
3. Pockets of negligence liability 
English courts avoid undermining economic activity. Consequently, only 
occasionally do they award compensation for carelessly caused pure economic 
loss. A major exception concerns damage arisen from negligent misstatements 
226 Stevens (2007) 343ff. 
227 Owen ( 1992) 7 l 9ff. 
228 Cane ( 1997) 84ft, l 39ff. 
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given by banks (Hedley Byrne) or auditors (Caparo) in the offering of advice in 
financial matters, thereby injuring claimants who entered into unprofitable 
business. However, the nature of damage was merely implicit in Hedley Byrne 
and only later case-law noticed it. 229 Particularly, Hedley Byrne offered an 
alternative to liability for fraudulent misstatement. Under deceit the defendant 
makes a false representation intending that the claimant should act on it and 
knowing that the statement is untrue, without believing in its reality or being 
recklessly indifferent to its veracity or falsity. 230 Significantly, Hedley Byrne 
allowed liability for negligent misstatements. By contrast, since Cattle carelessly 
interfering with another's contract has remained lawful conduct. 23 1 
Currently, liability for negligent misstatement is enforced m different 
contexts which are difficult to incorporate into coherent rules. 232 Courts can 
impose liability where defendants voluntarily assumed responsibility vis-a-vis 
claimants who reasonably relied on the advice or information rendered by the 
former,
233 
whether the parties are in a special contract-like relationship234 or the 
defendant promised to discharge a certain obligation on which the claimant (third 
party) trusted. 235 Courts can also impose a duty of care upon the defendant 
provided that it is "fair, just and reasonable" and the claimant's harm is foreseen 
and proximate. 236 
Nonetheless, the tort of deceit (alongside other intentional torts such as 
inducing breach of contract) has the advantage of conferring upon victims the 
possibility of recovering all the actual damage, including consequential losses, 
directly derived from the fraudulent misstatement, 237 whilst defendants cannot 
plead contributory negligence. 238 In tum, negligent tortfeasors only answer for the 
~:~ Atiyah (1967) 264; Howarth (1996) passim; Ibbetson (1999) 194; Carty (2001) 247. 
231 Pasley (1789) 3 T.R. 51; Derry (1889) LR 14 App.Cas. 337; Edelman/Davies (2007) 1315-6.
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232 Barker (2008) l 75ff. 
233 
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234 H 
edley Byrne [1964] AC. 465, 529, Lord Devlin; Williams v. Natural Life Health Foods Ltd. 
[1998] I W.L.R. 830, HL. 
235 White [1995] 2 AC. 207,273, Lord Browne-Wilkinson D6 . 
Caparo [1990] 2 AC. 605, 617-618 Lord Bridge 
237 ' ' 
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. {fsarrow) Ltd [2001] Q.B. 488, CA. See: Rogers (2005) 69. 
Standard Chartered Bank v. Pakistan National Shipping [2003] I A.C. 959, HL; 
Trindade/Cane/Lunney (2007) 272. 
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.,.. 
damage they could reasonably foresee. 239 Comparably, contract-breakers only 
respond for the harm contemplated by the parties when concluding the contract.
240 
Moreover, tortfeasors can allege contributory negligence and contract-breakers 
can do so if sued for the tort of negligence as well. 241 Thus, the tort of deceit can 
still be an alternative to negligence in misstatements cases, providing victims with 
wider compensation although counterbalanced by the hard proof of the mental 
state. 
4. Debate on policy arguments 
Several jurists deny pure economic loss the status of compensable damage 
because it does not violate any right of victims, thus amounting to what they call 
"nonfeasance". They underpin liability in the breach of corrective justice due to 
the infringement by the wrongdoer of the victim's right or legally protected 
interest ("misfeasance"). Then, freedom of action is limited by another's rights 
whose violation (wrongful conduct) triggers tort liability.242 
As Benson indicates, the rationale underlying the exclusionary rule is 
neither policy (floodgates) nor the nature of pure economic loss (as compared 
with physical harm) but damnum absque iniuria: since the defendant does not 
1 encroach upon any victim's right against him, he owes no duty of care to the 
victim. Benson exemplifies his rights-based approach arguing that pecuniary harm 
caused between trade competitors is commonly unrecoverable for it arising from 
the infringement of rights that claimants have towards third parties other than 
defendants, except for specific situations subsumed under the economic torts, such 
as Lumley. However, Lumley presupposes a mental element and the invasion of 
the claimant's contractual right that produces an effect equivalent to real rights.243
 
239 The Wagon Mound (No.I) [1961] AC. 388, PC. 
240 Hadley v. Baxendale (1854) 156 E.R. 145, Exch. ("Hadley") , 151 , Alderson. 
241 Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945; Forsikringsaktieselskapet Vesta v. Butcher 
[1989] AC. 852, HL; Barclays Bank Pie v. Fairclough Building Ltd (No.I) [1995] Q.B. 214, CA 
See generally: Burrows (2004) 264; Cartwright (2007) 163, 266-267; Whittaker (2008b) 81-82, 
89, 113-114. 
242 Weinrib (1995) 134, 161-162; Benson: (1995) 444, 455, (2009) passim; Honore (1995) 77ft; 
Ripstein (2002) 656-657, 685; Stevens (2007) 22ft, 42; Beever (2008) passim. 
243 Benson (2009) 867ff. 
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As Pollock244 and Birks245 have said, beyond the economic torts harming rivals by 
competing with them is damnum sine iniuria. 
Accordingly, supporters of a rights-based model focus on corrective 
justice, disapproving of policy arguments. The latter, as Bell suggests, signal a 
kind of justification whereby judges can assess the merits and effects of opposing 
substantive grounds creatively and consistently with traditions, precedents and 
e t 1 246 F rt 247 d h 248 1. . . l curr n rues. or cou s an aut ors po icy reasonmg is a centra 
justification for the exclusionary rule, whereas the rights-based scheme fails to 
explain tort law in its entirety and corrective-justice theories manipulate instead of 
describing the real case-law. Corrective justice alone cannot solve conflicts 
between individuals. Although a rights-based paradigm can justify strict-liability 
torts, both the defendant's conduct and policy considerations are fundamental to 
negligence. Indeed Hepple championed a policy principle to developing a 
coherent law of negligence. 249 As Bell implies, policy argumentation has an 
overall impact which renders it essential to tort litigation. 250 Stapleton 
concentrates on identifying and evaluating the policy grounds underpinning the 
conventional rationales (for instance, indeterminate liability or the respect for the 
contractual allocation of risks). The goal is to determine whether such "slogans" 
were valid in the concrete circumstances: was the defendant exercising its liberty 
to compete? Was the claimant self-protected through contract or did he belong to 
an identifiable class of victims? Stapleton rejects both the superficial factual 
analogies forming clusters of liability for negligently caused pure economic loss 
and American highly sophisticated tort-doctrines which neither describe real cases 
nor predict further developments. 251 Yet, it must be noted that since U.S. 
corporations could insure against fault liability this area has mainly lied in policy 
and economic considerations advanced by renowned judges and jurists, as 
Holmes, Pound, Hand and Posner. 252 
244 Pollock (1887) 129-130. 
245 Birks (1995) 38. 
246 Bell (1983) passim. 
247 E.g., Spartan Steel [1973] Q.B. 27, 36, Lord Denning MR. 
248 Cane (2008) passim, Douglas (2008) passim, Witting (2008) passim. 
249 Hepple (1997) passim. 
250 Bell (1983) 22. 
· 251 Stapleton: (1991) 294ff; ( 1998), (2002) passim. 
252 Ibbetson (1999) 197. 
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English courts make the policy grounds explicit through imprecise 
formula, for example, "fair, just and reasonable", excluding the recovery of pure 
economic loss for pragmatic as well as systematic reasons, like the respect for the 
tort-contract divide.253 However, policy is also pivotal in both French and Chilean 
liability for carelessly caused economic harm, albeit it is concealed behind the 
concepts of fault, causation and damage. Policy is an indeterminate concept which 
has an undeniable influence on the exclusionary rule. Likewise, policy covers the 
more specific consequential and technical grounds supporting the exclusionary 
rule. 
5. Economic loss flowing from legitimate competition 
That pure economic harm is a foreseeable effect of legitimately exploiting self-
interest in competition is a sound reason to discard liability, certainly if that 
damage is only carelessly caused. 254 At worst, from a Hohfeldian angle, the 
liberty to compete imposes no duty at all on third parties not to interfere with that 
freedom. At best, some argue, 255 competitors can only expect their rivals will 
refrain from intentionally invading their businesses. 
However, as has been asserted elsewhere,256 the prospect of recovering 
1 pure economic loss is further limited by English law. It does not suffice that the 
defendant intentionally injures her competitor for the latter to be compensated but 
must have done so acting in a wrongful manner. This is reflected in the economic 
torts, beyond which intentionally inflicted financial damage is justified in the 
liberty to compete. 
IV. Approaching the economic torts 
The main exception to the exclusionary rule is the economic torts which require 
some form of intention and (save for simple conspiracy and malicious falsehood) 
253 Bussani/Palmer (2003) passim. 
254 Cane (1997) 153 ; Carty (2001) 257-258; Stapleton (2002) 538-539; Koziol (2006) 877. 
255 Cane: (1982) passim, (1995) 402-403; Perry (1992) 263ff; Abraham (2001) passim. 
256 Limpens/Kruithof/Meinertzhagen-Limpens (1980) 50ff; Lucy (2007) 210ff. 
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wrongful means. Intention and wrongfulness significantly vary in content between 
these torts, the organisation of which is thereby complicated.257 
English law denies a general principle of liability for intentionally inflicted 
economic loss such as the prima facie tort or the abuse of rights in its more robust 
variant. English law, Cane says, also demands that economic harm is wrongfully 
occasioned. Intention is, unlike negligence, a logical device for restricting liability 
congruently with competitive freedom, as rivals seldom act solely or primarily to 
hurt one another. Yet, intention cannot on its own limit liability. Competitors 
foresee and often aim at expelling their opponents from the market for profit-
making purposes. Further, tort law is principally concerned with protecting 
victims' rights through compensation rather than punishing injurers; hence it 
cannot exclusively concentrate on the mental element but must also find a 
mechanism for balancing claimants' interests against defendants' freedom to 
compete. The technique is to require wrongful means (illegal conduct, including 
torts and crimes) and admit justifications (mainly wrongdoers' competitive 
freedom and self-interest) which negate liability. 258 As others have indicated, 
courts rely on what Parliament and the common law define as unfair or unlawful 
competition. Then, intention, wrongfulness and justifications aid to restrain 
economic-tort liability in harmony with judicial pro-competition policy.259 I will 
now explore more fully intention and wrongfulness from moral and legal stances. 
1. Harming competitors: a moral-philosophical outline 
Before examining the intention from a juristic viewpoint I will consider what 
business-ethics and philosophy permit and object to regarding commercial 
competitors injuring each other. This is advisable for, as will be apparent, courts 
approach the intention requisite to the economic torts in a form that mirrors the 
moral distinction between intended and unintended consequences. 
Adam Smith claimed that in a capitalist society firms can make profits so 
long as they comply with the law, the limit being at abusive conduct. Mutual 
cooperation, he argued, is egoistic: social welfare results from the "invisible 
257 See above section 1.2, pp.26ff. 
· 
258 Cane: (1997) 57-58, 152; (2000a) passim· (2001) 108-109 
~9 , . Weir (2006) 191; Hedley (2006) 158, l 74ff; Oliphant (2007a) 513ff. 
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hand", the pursuit of self-interest through competition, rather than from virtue.
260 
Indeed, competing and excelling express personal autonomy. 
261 Moreover, to 
foresee that adversaries will be harmed is morally tolerated; to strive for their ruin 
is not.262 Yet, to understand why moral culpability is attached to the intentionally 
caused harm unlike merely foreseen side-effects I will make use of the Doctrine 
of Double Effect ("DDE"): 
'Nothing hinders one act from having two effects, only one of which is 
intended, while the other is beside the intention. Now moral acts take their 
species according to what is intended, and not according to what is beside 
the intention, since this is accidental'. 263 
The DDE distinguishes the effects intended as ends or as means to other 
goals (for instance, self-emichment), from merely foreseen, unintended and 
inevitable consequences. Moral blameworthiness and responsibility are imputed 
to intended results only so far as they flow from an agent's choice, that choice 
providing reasons for acting. Bentham himself differentiated intended 
consequences, which give motives for acting (corresponding to the civilian notion 
of dolus), from foreseen likely outcomes, dubbed "oblique intention", which 
neither offer reasons for acting nor matter to achieve one's target.
264 Anscombe 
demonstrated that an effect is intended if it contributes to the agent's purpose.
265 
1Harrn is deemed a by-product if it ensues from the good effect of one' s action or 
independently of it, so it is sought neither intrinsically nor instrumentally.
266 Side-
effects are therefore not necessary to accomplish a particular aim. The problem is 
to separate side-effects from results pursued as means to other ends. Hart treated 
as intended those effects which are causally closer to the defendant's act.
267 Quinn 
defines as intended those effects sought directly, deliberately and 
opportunistically, defendants utilising victims as instruments to achieve their 
goals, as opposed to incidental or unintended victims.
268 
260 Smith ([1776]/2008): Book I, Ch.11, 22-23; Book IV, Ch.11, 291 -292, Ch.III, 307. 
261 Machan (2007) 31 ; Gibson (2007) 59; Barker (2008) 180-181, 203. 
262 Jackson ( 1996) 86ff. 
263 Aquinas , Summa Theologica , 11-11, Qu.64, art.7 . 
264 Bentham ([1781]/1996) Ch.VIII, §6, 86 & Ch.IX, §17, 94. Modern criminal law, however, 
confines "oblique intention" to side-effects virtually certain to occur: Williams (1 987) 420ff; see 
below section 3.1, pp.58ff. 
265 Anscombe (1963) passim. 
266 Boyle ( 1980) passim. 
267 Hart (2008) 120. 
268 Quinn (1 989) 343-344, 348. 
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These explanations clarify the conceptual distinction between the immoral 
act of intentionally harming others (with malice or self-interest) and the ethically 
admissible injuring of others as a foreseeable side-effect of a lawful activity. Yet, 
they fall short of being workable. As Moore warns, the claimant must prove that 
the wrongdoer's intention squared with the mental element prohibited by the 
1 269 L'k . aw. 1 ew1se, as Cavanaugh says, the law must offer practical ways of 
showing intention. 270 
2. Law's perception of harm caused between commercial rivals 
Moral philosophers acknowledge that business adversaries usually foresee 
contenders' injury as an inevitable by-product of their conduct. 271 Moreover, the 
law generally justifies the intentional infliction of harm in the exercise of the 
liberty to compete and the advancement of one's own economic expectations 
unless sought at another's expense. 2
72 Furthermore, it is a regular opinion among 
Anglo-American judges that legitimate competition involves a struggle for 
superiority to increase customers and trade, leaving winners and losers. Thus, the 
successful rival 'must not be turned upon when he wins'. 273 
Holmes J thought that competitors necessarily harm one another, thereby 
proposing to limit liability by requiring unlawful means. He declared that the law 
often permits deliberately caused harm although justifications rest on policy and 
social advantage, such as the freedom to compete, and are usually hidden behind 
formal arguments. 
274 Subsequently, Holmes J implied that injuring rivals was a 
foreseeable side-effect of competing, as distinguished from the harm inflicted 
"wilfully", that is, as an end or as a means to other end .275 For his part, Lord Reid 
declared that intentionally causing economic loss was a common trade practice 
justified in the advancement of self-interest, 276 while Goff LJ affirmed: 'the 
philosophy of the market place presumes that it is lawful to gain profit by causing 
269 Moore (2009) 46. 
27
° Cavanaugh (2006) passim. 
27 1 Gibson (2007) passim. 
272 Quinn (1989) 344-345 ; Duska (2007) 22. 
273 
U.S. v. Aluminium Co. of America 148 F.2d 41 6 (1 945) 430 Hand J 
274 ' ' · 
275 Vegelahn v. Guntner 44 N.E. 1077 (1896, "Vegelahn"), 1080-81. See below n.527. 
· Aikens v. Wisconsin 195 U.S. 194 (1904, "Aikens") 204 
276 · ' . 
Home Offi ce v. Dorset Yatch Co. Ltd. [1 970] A.C. 1004, HL, 1027. 
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others economic loss' .277 Finally, modem jurists consider intentionally harming 
opponents as endemic to competition, 278 except when it is the agent's exclusive 
( 1. , ) 279 ma 1c1ous purpose. 
Antitrust law itself starts with the premise that free competition inexorably 
affects particular rivals. This legal branch basically safeguards the competition 
process. Hence the CAT remarked that article 82 EC and Chapter II (Prohibition) 
of the Competition Act 1998 prohibit "exploitative abuses", namely, prejudicial to 
consumers, unlike those detrimental to identifiable competitors ("exclusionary 
abuses").28° Competitors defeat their rivals and, as a result, secure monopolistic 
positions which accrue to consumers' benefit.281 Therefore, the abuse of market 
power is punished because of its inimical effect on consumers, competitors and 
the marketplace at large. Yet, it seems to me that the sanction of unfair and 
antitrust conduct somewhat reflects the Kantian lesson that one must never treat 
others as means but always as ends-in-themselves. So it is held that the legitimate 
cutting of prices becomes abusive if targeted at eliminating competitors.
282 
3. Distinguishing intended consequences from side-effects in practice 
Neither criminal nor tort law necessarily mirrors the division between intended 
outcomes and side-effects drawn by the DDE. 
3.1 Crime 
English criminal law treats as equally intended the results aimed at by defendants 
("direct intention") and those side-effects foreseen as virtually certain to happen 
despite being undesired. 283 Williams referred to the latter as "oblique 
277 Leigh and Sillivan Ltd. v. Aliakmon Shipping Co. Ltd. [1985] Q.B. 350, CA, 393. 
278 Perlman _ (1982) 95ff; Perry (1992) 263ff; Cane (1996) 155, (1997) 152. 
279 Epstein (1983) 1368. 
280 Albion Water Ltd. v. Director General of Water Services [200.5] CAT 40 ("Albion Water") , 
[262]. 
281 Whish (2008) 3, 15, 22. 
282 E.g., Compagnie Maritime Belge Transports SA v. Commission Cases C-395/95 & C-396/95 
[2004] C.M.L.R. 1076 ECJ ("Compagnie Maritime"), at [l l 7]-[132] , Advocate General Fennelly. 
283 R v. Woollin [1999] 1 A.C. 82, I-Il.,, 93, Lord Steyn. Cf: Kaveny (2004) passim (arguing that 
foresight cannot be deemed "intentional" but a sufficiently high degree of foresight of occasioning 
the victim's death is equated to actually intending this effect, ergo constituting murder) . 
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· . ,, 284 Th mtentlon . us, the legal response clashes with the moral-philosophical idea 
that side-effects are unforeseen, unintended and unnecessary to achieve one's 
purpose. 285 As Hart explained, criminal law equates side-effects to intended 
consequences in order to convict the accused. 286 Moreover, criminal law often 
aligns recklessness with intention, as both imply an agent choosing his action and 
controlling its outcome: 
'The most obviously culpable state of mind is no doubt an intention to 
cause the injurious result, but knowing disregard of an appreciated and 
unacceptable risk of causing an injurious result or a deliberate closing of 
the mind to such risk would be readily accepted as culpable also' .287 
Recklessness and intention demonstrate extreme indifference to others. 
Hence they are practically similar vis-a-vis certain offences. 288 Thus, criminal 
intent is wider than the philosophical notion of intention, because it includes the 
consequences intended as ends ("direct intention"), as means to other ends 
(necessary for the attainment of ultimate goals) and the side-effects virtually 
certain to follow ("oblique intention"). Pragmatic reasons justify avoiding this 
fine line as regards serious offences. Criminal law illuminates how hard it is to 
d" . . 289 1scnmmate between mental states. Much of the evidentiary trouble is tackled 
by inferring mens rea from actus reus and circumstance.290 Traditio~ally, effects 
were sometimes presumed to be intended by reason of their being foreseen as 
"likely" or "natural" consequences of wrongful acts.291 Yet, modem law requires 
a higher degree of foresight for a result to be deemed intended: the defendant must 
h ~ · l · 292 ave oreseen 1t as a most certam to happen. Nonetheless, to differentiate 
intended (as means) results, oblique intention and recklessness entails quite a 
284 He_ noted that oblique intention contains a higher degree of certainty about the probability of the 
undesired foreseen effect than that in recklessness (which does not meet the intention required for 
r;tder but that for manslaughter): Williams (1987) 423,438. 
E.g., Gorr (1996) passim. 
286 Hart (2008) 120ft. 
287 
288 
R v. G [2004] 1 A.C. 1034, I-Il.,, at [32], Lord Bingham. 
Leader-Elliot (2001) 77ff, 102ft; Ormerod (2008) 107. 
~:~ White (1961); Williams (1962); Brady (1983); Cane (2000a) passim. 
291 
Anscombe (1963) 8; Cane (2000b) passim; Gillett (2001) 57-58; Lucy (2007) 210. 
R_v. Harvey 107 E.R. 379 (1823), K.B.C. , 382, Bayley J; Simons (1992) 496ft; Simester (1996) 
passim. 
292 In R v . . Moloney [ 1985] A.C. 905, I-Il.,, Lord Bridge required a probability 'little short of 
?ver~helmmg' and a 'moral certainty' (ibid, 925-926). So, Lord Bridge indirectly backed oblique 
intention but confusedly used the words 'natural consequences' (ibid, 929): Williams (1987) 432. 
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. 'once we depart from absolute certainty there is a question of degree 
conun rum. , 293 
and an uncertain boundary between intention and recklessness . f l 
Moreover, it is debated whether foreseeing as virtually certain ~ wron: 2~4 
. f which intention can be mferre . 
effect is true intention or mere evidence rom m 
. t the concept of "oblique intention": intention cannot be deduced fro 
Some re3ec 
. dered as intended if the agent 
f . ht 295 For others, a given result can be consi 296 . oresig . h. ved that outcome. This 
would have treated his act as a failure had he not ac ie . 
. . . l intent to include side-effects. Yet, 
discards the possibility of enhancmg cnmma . . . . to the mental state 
. · f oblique mtention m 
as Williams argued, the mcorporatlon o . . btle 
. . r -based way of cucumventmg su 
. d for serious cnmes is a sound, po icy reqmre 
. . 297 distmctions. 
3.2 Tort 
core mental states in crime and tort, concern the 
Intention and recklessness, the A K t Bentham and Austin 
th than conduct as such. s an ' 
effects of conduct ra er acts and intentions, prescribes external behaviour 
contended, the law focuses on . l 298 Intention 
and imposes rights and duties, while motives are exammed by mora s. . 299 
h aim· motives give reasons for actmg. what agents pursue, c oose or ' 
concerns . . "th which acts are perpetrated, 
Thus criminal liability hinges on the mtention wi 300 
' d . b dy acts without a reason. 
. help to construe past con uct. no o although motives 
. tives 
. . . torts relates to consequences, mo 
S. · 1arly the intention m the economic imi , 301 
Provi.de J·ustifications, such as freedom to compete. . . d so they can be 
. nd intention often comci e, As Cane asserts, motive a 
l does not reflect morals completely: 'people are not 
confused. Yet, tort aw , 302 As 
ecessaril condemned for doing the right thing for the wrong reason . 
n y d bad motives do not render legitimate conduct wrongful and Williams argue , 
293 Ormerod (2008) 103. 
294 Ibid 99ff. 
295 Kaveny (2004) passim. 
296 Duff (1990) 31, 6 lff. 
297 Williams (1987) 425-426. 
298 Allen (1924) 180; Freeman (2001) :9(i937) 527· Anscombe (1963) 18ff. 
299 Austin ([1832)/1954) 111; Salmon ' 
300 Gillett (2001) 67; Ormerod (2008) 132. 7 271 
301 Keeton (1984) 26; Trindade/Cane/Lunney (200 ) · 
302 Cane (1997) 35-36. 
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good motives do not justify tortious acts. 303 Although Lord Esher MR reasoned 
that the defendant's bad motive rendered conduct wrongful, 304 and Finnis 
comparably claimed that an act is lawful if and only if both its means and ends are 
licit,305 English law rejects the idea that intentionally caused economic harm is 
tortious unless justified (the prima facie tort). 306 Except for conspiracy to injure 
and malicious falsehood, economic losses are compensable if intentionally and 
unlawfully caused.307 
In tort, intention consists of foreseeing and desiring a certain effect as the 
immediate or ultimate purpose. The harm caused to another person as a 
(necessary) means to accomplish a further aim is equally intended; 308 the 
inescapable side-effects of activities generally are not. 309 Recklessness is the 
awareness that an act will cause an undesired though avoidable result, combined 
with the agent persevering and producing it. It encompasses knowledge/belief of 
high risk-creating and conduct close to gross negligence, which in continental 
systems is equated to intention: magna culpa dolus est. 310 Moreover, tort law 
often treats intention and recklessness alike: deliberately harming others and 
completely disregarding victims are censured with equal vigour as both are the 
agent's choice. In contrast, simple awareness that damage is likely to happen 
somewhere or sometime is not an intention to cause that damage.311 Indeed the 
intentional torts involve planned conduct in a matrix of economic relationships 
whereby wrongdoers use victims to achieve their goals. Conversely, negligence 
typically concerns spontaneous interactions between strangers. 312 
Yet, establishing the boundary between intention, recklessness and 
foreseen side-effects is complex and prone to arbitrariness. First, to understand, 
classify and assess the legal impact of the states of mind is a daunting task. 
Secondly, the characterisation of mental states involves sophisticated policy, 
economic, ethical and technical dilemmas. The law may wish to enforce certain 
303 Williams (1951) 144. 
304 E.g., Allen [1895] 2 Q.B. 21, 38-42. 
305 Finnis (1995) 238ft. 
306 Ames (1905) passim; Keeton (1984) 27-28. 
307 Heydon (1978) 8-9; Fleming (1998) 751 , 767. 
308 Salmond (1937) 518ff; Carty (2001) 107. 
309 Finnis: (199 l) 36, 42ff, (1995) 229, 244; Henderson/Twerski (2001) 1141 ff. 
3 10 Salmond (1937) 522-523; Markesinis/Unberath (2002) 84. 
311 Keeton (1984) 34-35; Simons (1992) 482, (2006) 1063; Sebok (2001) 1173, l180ff; Dobbs 
(2000) 48; Henderson/Twerski (2001) passim. 
3 12 Jung/Levine (1986) passim. 
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moral values reflected in "desire-states" (intention/recklessness) but their 
administrative costs may favour cheaper "belief-states" (knowledge). So 
problematic drawing workable distinctions between intention, recklessness and 
gross negligence can be that American courts usually identify the broad categories 
· 
313 Th' dl 
of intention and negligence; the middle zone remains obscure. ir Y, 
314 · . h d· 
although intention must be proved as any other fact, to uncover it 1s very ar . 
'the thought of man is not triable, for the devil himself knoweth not the thought of 
man'. 3 15 Fourthly, the fact that the overt acts are often the same further 
complicates the separation between intentionally/recklessly inflicted harm and 
injury flowing as a side-effect of legitimate conduct.316 
One way of tackling this crucial evidentiary issue is found in Law and 
Economics which offers both criteria to define negligent conduct
317 
and a valid 
explanation for awarding extra-compensatory and/or punitive damages for 
intentionally or recklessly occasioned harm, particularly that stemming from the 
economic torts. As Landes and Posner show, malicious and reckless wrongdoers 
. 'd . h 318 M l' incur negative and negligible costs, respectively, to av01 causing arm. a ice 
is presumed from the irrational act of expending considerably more in injuring the 
victim than in preventing this from happening: the defendant practically goes into 
debt as to harm the claimant. 319 However, as recently held in England, the 
1 intention to hurt another is also clearly demonstrated by a rational attempt to 
profit at another's expense, 320 this conduct matching Lord Devlin' s second 
321 
category of exemplary damages. 
Now, do the economic torts reflect more faithfully the moral division 
between intended consequences and side-effects? In OBG Lord Hoffmann defined 
313 Keeton (1984) 212ff; Byrd (1988) passim; Simons (1992) 527 . . . . , . 
314 ' [T)he state of a man's mind is as much a fact as the stat_e _of hi~ digestion : Edgmgto~ v. 
Fitzmaurice (1885) L.R. 29 Ch.D. 459, CA, 483, Bowen LJ, deciding this famous case on deceit. 
315 Y.B .17 Edw.IV, 1, Brian CJ. 
316 Anscombe (1963) 44-45 . 
3 17 Harm is deemed carelessly caused if its magnitude, multiplied by its probability, exceeds 1l:e 
costs of preventing it: U.S. v. Carroll Towing 159 F.2d 169 2d.Cir (1947), 173, Hand J. Yet, this 
formula is confined to academic circles. American juries often apply the standard of reasonable 
care in a general fashion: McCarty v. Pheasant Run, Inc .. 826 F.2~ 1:54 7th_(;:ir 0?87), 1557, 
Posner J; Robin (2005) passim. Still, English courts consider. the hkehhood of causi,ng a~~ _th~ 
seriousness of losses, the cost of avoiding them and the social value of tortfeasors act1v1t1es. 
Wagon Mound (No.2) [1967) 1 A.C. 617, PC; Edelman/Davies (2007) 1208 . 
318 Landes/Posner (1981) passim. 
3 19 Epstein (1983) 1368; Ellis (1983) passim; Cane (2000a) 544-545. 
320 OBG [2008) 1 A.C. 1, at [62), Lord Hoffmann; Total [2008) 1 A.C. 1174, at [228-230), Lord 
Neuberger. 
32 1 Rookes [1964) A.C. 1129, 1226-27, Lord Devlirl. 
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the intention required in Lumley and in the three-party unlawful-interference tort 
as the result pursued as an end or as a means to another end (usually self-
enrichment), that is, the breach of the claimant's contract or the claimant's harm 
' 
. 1 322 respective y. Furthermore, Lord Hoffmann understood Woolf LJ's statement in 
Lonrho plc v. Fayed 323 as implying that the harm occasioned as a means to other 
goal was equally intended.324 Thus, side-effects appear excluded from the mental 
element in these prominent economic torts. Still, there are several contentious 
issues. First, Carty complains that the intention required for the unlawful-
interference tort is too wide.325 Since it suffices that the claimant is injured as a 
result of the defendant advancing his economic interest,326 the mental element can 
easily be enlarged to cases where claimants are harmed as a merely foreseen and 
unavoidable consequence of defendants' conduct. The effect would resemble the 
principle of liability for foreseen, unintended damage suffered as the inevitable 
effect of unlawful, intentional, positive acts established in the Australian decision 
in Beaudesert Shire v. Smith .327 This case elicited acid condemnation, particularly 
for embodying a strict-liability tort in circumstances where the invention of strict 
liability is Parliament's province. 328 Hence Beaudesert was replaced with the 
requirement of unlawful acts directed against the claimant329 and moreover in 
' 
England, rejected to prevent the undue extension of liability for- breach of 
statutory duty.33° Conversely, Neyers suggests that it is not obvious why merely 
foreseeing that harm will ensue cannot form the mental element required in the 
unlawful-interference tort. 33 1 
Secondly, it can be maintained that recklessness satisfies the mental 
element of the unlawful-interference tort. Although recklessness comprises the 
awareness of a risk of causing harm coupled with the indifference as to whether it 
follows or not, tort law generally equates recklessness to intent: both involve 
322 [ 2008] 1 A.C. 1, at [62). 
323 I.e., '[a)lbeit that _he ~ay have no desire to bring about that consequence in order to achieve 
what he regards as his ultimate ~nds, from the point of view of the plaintiff, whatever the motive 
of the defendant, the damage which he suffers will be the same': [1990) 2 Q B 479 CA 494 
324 [2008] 1 A.C. 1, at [63) . · · ' ' · 
325 C 
326 
arty (2008) 653ff. See below n.706 and accompanying text. 
327 
OBG [2008) 1 A.C. 1, at [164-165), Lord Nicholls . 
(1966) 40 A.L.J.R. 211, H.C.A. ("Beaudesert"). 
328 D J 'n/H . 
329 
worn ara~i ( 1967) 304, 349; Cane ( 1982) 42. 
N~rthe~n Temtory of Australia v. Mengel (1995) 69 A.L.J.R. 527, H.C.A.; Mullany (1995) f
3
~ssim; Trmdade/Cane/Lunney (2007) 328. 
Lonrho [1982] A.C. 173, 188, Lord Diplock; Steiner (1987) 108. 
331 Neyers (2008) 223ff. 
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deliberation.332 The factual proximity of recklessness to intention is plain in the 
tort of misfeasance in public office, case-law equating reckless indifference as to 
the victim' s harm to targeted malice.333 Some even argue that recklessness and 
intention are essentially identical, just that recklessness is proved by evidence 
whereas intention by inference.334 In OBG, Lord Nicholls held that recklessness 
sufficed as the mental element in the unlawful-interference tort, 
335 
blurring the 
line between recklessly caused harm and intentionally caused injury as a means to 
profit at the claimant's cost. Even so, it is unclear why he discarded reckless 
indifference in the Lumley-tort. 336 
In my opinion it is indisputable that merely foreseen harm falls short of the 
mental element required in torts which essentially exclude negligence as a ground 
of liability. Hence OBG overruled the criticised Millar v. Bassey judgment
337 
which had supported liability for intentionally breaking one' s contract foreseeing 
that the contractor would break its agreement with the claimants although the 
defendant neither intended to harm them nor used unlawful means.
338 
4. The impact of intention upon the economic torts 
Normal competitive behaviour, I think, does not target identifiable rivals but 
'1 foresees harm caused to them as a collateral effect of legitimate business struggle. 
Hence it is justified. Conversely, the intentional infliction of financial harm, as an 
end or as a means to another end, is ethically unacceptable and socially 
inefficient, thereby justifying the imposition of liability. 
The economic torts restrain liability through some forms of intention. As 
many contend, the justification for a mental element lies in that free competition 
inevitably harms known adversaries, attracting their customers by legitimate 
methods. 339 However, English law has always denied a general principle of 
332 Cane (1997) 33-34. 
333 Three Rivers DC v Bank of England (No.3) [2003] 2 A.C. 1, HL ("Three Rivers" ), 192, Lord 
Steyn. 
334 Ibid, 235, Lord Millett. 
335 [2008] 1 A.C. 1, at [166-167]. See: Oliphant (2007b) 24. 
336 Ibid, at [191]. 
337 [1994] E.M.L.R. 44, CA, ("Millar"). See: Weir (2006) 201. 
338 OBG [2008] 1 A.C. l, at [43] , Lord Hoffmann. . . 
339 Sales/Stilitz ( 1999) 426ff; Cane (2001) 109; Chan/Simester (2004) passim; Bubhck (2006) 71 2. 
In Law and Economics: Shavell (1 987) 50, 139-140; Landes/Posner (1987) 111-112; Posner 
(2003) 186. 
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intention-based liability, selecting specific torts incrementally developed from the 
· th 340 action on e case. As Moore argues, the law tolerates wrongdoers targeting 
victims on consequentialist grounds, thus departing from the DDE. 341 Likewise, I 
think that the intentionally doing of economic harm is only exceptionally 
sanctioned as it often involves legitimate competition producing widespread 
social benefit. Still, as Fleming implies, business competition would become 
inoperative if rivals were liable for the losses caused simply because they could 
predict them. 342 I thus regard as significant that liability for economic harm 
inflicted between trade competitors is restrained through a certain mental element, 
therefore excluding simple fault and absolute strict liability. 
First, as some suggest, the requirement of a given intention as opposed to 
mere negligence diminishes the impact of the floodgates argument. 343 Secondly, 
although negligence and strict liability can be founded on corrective justice, 
neither is a good candidate for regulating economic damage in trade. Corrective 
justice is engaged where a tortfeasor deliberately appropriates the victim' s goods 
f: h' · 344 . or 1s convemence. It commands him to restore the pre-existing equality 
between individuals by transferring wrongdoers' gains to victims. And it typically 
explains intention/fault-based liabilities: defendants answer for choosing to profit 
at victims ' expense or behaving with less prudence than required. Conversely, 
strict liability seems to contradict corrective justice, unless it arises from 
abnormally dangerous activities.345 For Weinrib, strict liability denies the equality 
between individuals: it treats victims as passive sufferers with the absolute right 
not to be harmed, thereby punishing the taking of claimants' property, albeit such 
entitlement is not shown; and it blames defendants merely for acting, as they have 
not violated any- duty owed to victims. Although Epstein champions a general 
theory of strict liability rooted in corrective justice, 346 Weinrib highlights its 
illogical implication: insofar as defendants must consider the damage they cause 
340 Rogers (2006) 69-70; Total [2008] 1 A.C. 1174, at [56], Lord Scott. 
341 Moore (2009) 48ff. 
342 Fleming (1 998) 193. . 
::: Seavey (1942) 84; Fleming (1998) 6; Bussani/Palmer/Parisi: (2003) 156-157, (2007) 46. 
Schwartz (1 996) 130. 
345 Gordley (2006) 183-1 ~4'. .196-197, 205~f. . For Fletcher [(1972) 542, 550] , strict liability for 
abnor~ally d~nge:ous act1V1t1es exposes v1ct1ms to "non-reciprocal" risks, i.e. higher in degree 
and d~ffe.r~nt m kmd from those which victims impose on defendants . This criterion extends to 
r:~lt hab.1hty, although Fletcher grounds fault in fairness rather than corrective justice. 
Epstem: (1973) passim; (2008) 1, 160-161. 
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to victims as though it was their own, defendants would end up responding even 
for involuntary acts or would never be liable.347 Epstein argues that defendants 
should be strictly liable for the losses inflicted upon others whenever they would 
have had to bear the damage had they injured themselves. Yet, as Perry asserts, 
that individuals can harm one another is one thing; that a person injures himself is 
another thing. For Perry, strict liability offers no clear solution, as both defendant 
d . . d th h 348 an v1ct1m pro uce e arm. 
In my view although strict liability can be based on corrective justice and 
helps to vindicate proprietary rights, commercial competition would be hindered 
if trade contenders were liable for barely harming one another. Liability must be 
restrained through intention, whether it comprises deliberate conduct (like 
passing-off and the competition torts, which trigger outcome-based strict liability, 
thus relieving claimants from proving the defendant's intention) or intended 
effects. As recently confirmed: 
'[T]he position of [the defendant] was that he wished to defend his 
publication against the damage it might suffer on account of having lost 
the exclusive. But that. . .is precisely the position of every competitor who 
steps over the line and uses unlawful means. The injury which he inflicted 
on [the claimant] in order to achieve the end of keeping up his sales was 
simply the other side of the same coin ... Lord Sumner made this point 
pungently in SorreU 349 ... The injury ... was the means of attaining [the] 
desired end and not merely a foreseeable consequence of having done 
, 350 
so. 
5. The importance of unlawfulness 
The real difficulty in distinguishing unintended side-effects from desired results 
justifies restricting liability through wrongful means. Thus, Lord Nicholls 
347 Weinrib0995) 173ff. 
348 Perry (2004) passim. · 
349 'How any definite line is to be drawn between acts.' .whose real . p~rp~se .1s to ad~ance ~he 
defendants' interests, and acts, whose real purpose is to mJure the plamt1ff m his tra~e, 1~ a t~mg 
which I feel at present beyond my power. When the whole object of the defendants action 1s to 
capture the plaintiff's business, their gain must be his (os~. ,How . sta~ds the matter then? The 
difference disappears . The defendants ' success is the plamtlff s extinction, and they cannot seek 
the one without ensuing the other': (1925] A.C. 700, 742, Lord Sumner. 
350 OBG [2008] 1 A.C. l, at (134], Lord Hoffmann. 
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declared that English law promotes and defends business competition despite the 
fact that rivals intentionally harm each other unless they use unlawful means. 35 1 
Likewise, American authors propose limiting liability for interfering with 
another's prospective economic advantages both through intention and unlawful 
means, the latter including antitrust conduct. 352 For others, deliberately injuring 
competitors is not per se unlawful but inherent to the functioning of the market, 
even if this conduct deserves moral stricture. 353 Wrongfulness is a formal criterion 
that restricts liability within appropriate bounds, thereby preventing the judiciary 
from interfering with Parliament's control over competition.354 As Carty suggests, 
wrongfulness expresses an abstentionist judicial attitude, whereas the prima facie 
tort symbolises an interventionist one. 355 Courts can strike a balance between 
litigants' conflicting interests relying on the conduct prohibited by statute, 
including competition laws. 356 The width of judicial power to repress 
misbehaviour depends on the scope of unlawfulness. 
For Carty a single definition of wrongfulness can bring consistency to the 
economic torts, aiding courts in evaluating carefully the policy and common sense 
problems connected with unlawfulness and justifications. 357 She suggests that 
unlawful means conspiracy, intimidation and wrongful interference with another's 
business are incorporated into the tort of causing economic loss by unlawful 
means. As Heydon and Buckley argued, what defines an economic tort should not 
depend on the infringement of statutes completely unrelated to it. 358 Hence, Carty 
says, unlawful means must be restricted to legal and civil wrongs, namely: torts 
(including statutory crimes independently actionable as breach of statutory 
duty);359 breaches of contracts; and threats to commit one or the other. For her, a 
broad notion of wrongful means, such as 'any act the defendant is not at liberty to 
· , 360 . l d' commit , me u mg agreements in restraint of trade, breach of confidence and 
crimes despite not being autonomously actionable as torts, undermines the 
35 1 Ibid, at [142]-[145]. 
352 Dobbs (2000) 1277. 
::: Fleming (1998) 788; Trindade/Cane/Lunney (2007) 267. 
OBG [2008] 1 A.C. l , at [147-148], Lord Nicholls. 
355 Carty (2008) 642. 
3~ . . 
357 
Fndman (1993) 1~0-121; Cane (2002) 181,224; Deakin/Johnston/Markesinis (2007) 57lff 
Carty (1988) passtm. · 
358 
359 
Heydon (1978) 124; Buckley (1984) 229. 
360 
As proposed in Lonrho [1982] A.C. 173, 187, Lord Diplock. 
. Torquay Hotel Co. Ltd. v. Co~sins [1969] 2 Ch. 106, CA ("Torquay"), 139, Lord Dennin MR 
See below n.418 and accompanying text. g 
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cautiousness with which courts must approach competition when deciding tort 
cases. 
Nevertheless, as shown in the next chapter, the unlawfulness criterion 
settled in the landmark Allen decision was altogether excluded from conspiracy to 
injure in Quinn, arguably for political reasons relating to the tense relationship 
between employers and trade unions. Moreover, the recent key OBG and Total 
cases adopted divergent views on the extent of wrongfulness and justifications 
with regard to unlawful-interference tort and unlawful means conspiracy. These 
divergences have a technical explanation but bring more disorder to the already 
confused economic torts. As stressed in the following two chapters, the intentional 
and wrongfulness ingredients present appreciable dissimilarities between the 
economic torts, rendering the whole area bizarre. Accordingly, as many argue, the 
piecemeal feature of these torts makes their rationalisation impracticable. 
36 1 
6. Observations 
However morally reprehensible it might be to harm others as an end or as a means 
to another end, English tort law rejects a principle of liability for carelessly or 
intentionally caused economic harm such as the neminem laedere tenet in force in 
France and Chile. It equally denies strict liability for the mere infliction of such 
damage. It only represses misbehaviour that generally encompasses wrongful 
means and certain intention. However, passing-off (analogously to the statutory 
competition torts) involves deliberate conduct although brings about strict liability 
for results. Moreover, simple conspiracy and malicious falsehood are purely based 
on intention, thus clearly deviating from the remaining economic torts which 
presuppose wrongful means, although the range of this element varies greatly 
from tort to tort. Consequently, the systematisation of the economic torts around 
an all-comprehensive standard is daunting, if not a waste of time. Nor does it 
seem feasible to align the economic torts with the competition torts because of 
their different sources and underlying rationales . 
Howarth proposes to absorb the intentional torts into the tort of negligence. 
He highlights the erratic dimension of intention which fluctuates widely with the 
361 E.g., Rogers (1998) passim; Van Dam (2006) 115-116; Stevens (2007) 279, 297-298. 
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tort involved. He emphasises the dearth of moral and economic reasons to deny 
compensation for negligently caused pure economic loss. In his view courts can 
control this species of liability through the prudent assessment of the costs and 
benefits derived from competition. The law does not represent morals but 
prohibits defendants from causing victims unjustified harm, whether carelessly or 
deliberately occasioned. Wrongfulness is the conclusive touchstone of tortious 
liability. Then, it would seem discriminatory refusing compensation for 
negligently inflicted pure pecuniary damage. 362 
Yet, there are moral and practical reasons to reject negligence as an overall 
standard of liability for economic loss save mainly for the economic torts. First, 
these torts encompass a certain intention which is morally and legally more 
obnoxious than negligence. The law takes for granted that accidentally beating 
rivals is an inevitable side-effect of competition, socially justified in the benefits 
conveyed to consumers. Conversely, deliberately targeting adversaries as the 
ultimate or immediate purpose of the defendant's conduct discloses excessive 
conduct, whether antitrust or unfair. Secondly, proving a mental element like 
intention is harder than showing negligence, thereby reducing the prospect of 
liability. Intention better satisfies the pervasive judicial concern about an 
expansive liability, encapsulated in the floodgates argument. Neglige~ce liability 
can seriously undermine competition freedom. Thirdly, although the common law 
accepts the strict-liability passing-off tort as chief remedy against unfair 
competition, which is easier to prove than negligence, as I have noted and will 
elaborate in Chapter IV, passing-off mainly vindicates victims' proprietary 
interest in goodwill before compensating for harm. Nonetheless, passing-off is 
rooted in deliberate conduct and, therefore, cannot be committed carelessly. Still, 
I acknowledge that acting exclusively or chiefly to harm another person is 
sufficiently inefficient and irrational conduct to support the entire edifice of 
liability. Hence rather than prohibiting all kind of intentionally inflicted damage 
the law limits the spectrum of liability through the economic torts which 
presuppose a certain intention and unlawful means, the exceptions being simple 
conspiracy and malicious falsehood. 
362 Howarth (1997) passim. 
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v. Conclusions 
This chapter has shown the strained relation between the constant academic effort 
to arrange the heterogeneous torts through a generic principle, affirming or 
denying liability, and the actual case-law which just recognises specific causes of 
action. 
As demonstrated and as will be examined further in Chapters III and IV, 
the disjointed structure of torts in general permeates the economic torts in 
particular, their intentionality and wrongfulness components notoriously shifting 
between each other. The purely intention-rooted simple conspiracy and malicious 
falsehood cohabit with the outcome-based strict-liability passing-off, while the 
remaining economic torts require a certain intention and unlawful means whose 
meaning and ambit greatly differ across these torts. Likewise, although the most 
recent, leading case-law, confirms the economic torts providing a limited redress 
against financial losses between commercial competitors, there is disagreement 
about the exact extent of the role that the economic torts should perform. 
Furthermore, the diverse origins of the economic torts and the competition torts 
(case-law and statutes, respectively) render them independent categories which 
fulfil different functions and cannot be understood through a common theory. Yet, 
1 as will be seen in Chapter V, since courts ultimately decide cases involving both 
sets of torts, one can expect that they will enforce tortious liability with their 
customary prudence to avoid intruding into what is deemed Parliament's 
province: the main regulation of business competition. Two implications emerge 
from the foregoing. First, today it seems implausible to systematize the economic 
torts through a consolidated framework. Moreover, unlawfulness is no less 
problematic than the intentional element. Secondly, as far as commercial 
competitors are concerned, English law acknowledges neither an absolute duty 
not to harm others (strict liability) nor a duty not to injure others negligently or 
intentionally, but just a discrete duty not to damage others intentionally (except 
for passing-off) and wrongfully (save for simple conspiracy and malicious 
falsehood) reflected in the specific economic torts, beyond which the infliction of 
pecuniary damage is justified in the freedom to compete. 
I have also asserted that English law provides diverse remedies hinging on 
the economic tort implicated. Injunctions form the principal measure against 
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unfair practices and are commonly associated with passing-off. However, 
compensation for harm is a paramount goal of the economic torts. Interestingly, 
Lord Devlin's second category of exemplary damages can be employed for 
punitive, deterrent and restitutionary purposes in the economic torts through 
which the wrongdoer aims at profiting at the victim's expense. To divest 
tortfeasors of the unjust enrichment intentionally pursued is a private-law sanction 
distinct from criminal punishment. 
I have contended that policy arguments are broadly against compensation 
for carelessly inflicted pure economic loss, in addition to the more detailed formal 
and consequentialist reasons which support that answer. Likewise, the economic 
torts are coherent with the exclusionary rule. They reduce the prospect of 
recovering financial losses between business competitors and, as a result, mitigate 
the judicial fear against expanding tortious liability and litigation. The economic 
torts also imply that tort law should not substitute but supplement statutory and 
contractual remedies. Thus, tortious liability is confined to extreme situations. As 
Law and Economics reasonably suggests, intentionally or recklessly injuring 
rivals as an end or as a means to another end reveals irrational, often 
anticompetitive, conduct worth repressing through the economic torts. Then, 
negligently interfering with another's contract does not trigger liability unlike 
inducing (intentionally) the breach of another's contract. Furthermore, an 
important reason why English law rejects compensation for carelessly occasioned 
pure financial interests rests in this kind of harm usually being a side-effect of 
legitimate competition, hence justified. Nonetheless, the law clearly discriminates 
against pure economic interests, prioritising the protection of physical assets. The 
law considers that people create special affections towards tangible goods and 
awards compensation (even as non-pecuniary harm) when are negligently 
damaged. Still, for commercial competitors, particularly legal persons rather than 
natural persons, pure financial interests are typically more precious than tangible 
property. Yet, tort law accords the strongest protection to corporeal property 
through strict liability torts such as trespass and, more importantly in this thesis, 
passing-off. Conversely, the other economic interests are safeguarded through 
intention-based liability. Accordingly, contractual rights are shielded against 
defendants who knowingly and intentionally procure the breach of another's 
contract, thereby injuring the claimant's business (Lumley) . In tum, business or 
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trade interests at large are protected through the three-party unlawful-interference 
tort where the defendant intends to harm the claimant and actually harms her by 
using wrongful means against another person independently actionable by the 
latter. Additionally, I showed that English courts can also deny negligence-based 
liability for pure pecuniary harm on formal reasons just as French and Chilean 
courts traditionally refuse liability: treating that damage as too remote a 
consequence of the defendant's act rather than requiring a mental element. 
Deciding a leading case on deceit, Lord Steyn affirmed: 'The law and 
morality are inextricably interwoven. To a large extent the law is simply 
363 . 1 'th formulated and declared morality'. However, I thmk that tort law over aps w1 
morals in a finite zone. It authorizes the infliction of harm (even intentionally) as 
an expected, inevitable side-effect of promoting competitive self-interest. It does 
not punish the immoral conduct of exploiting, injuring or ruining competitors as 
an end or as a means to another end (normally self-enrichment) to its fullest 
extent. Instead of enshrining an intention-based liability rule, which might mirror 
the DDE, the common law selects and sanctions particularly abusive conduct 
through the economic torts. Liability requires intention and generally 
wrongfulness, which is essential to restrain liability, given the great difficulty in 
distinguishing intended from unintended harm. Unlawfulness is coherent with the 
1 nature of the law of civil wrongs as compared with French and Chilean law in 
which, as will be seen, 364 wrongfulness is concealed behind fault, damage and 
causation. 
363 Smith New [1997) A.C. 254,280. 
364 Below Chapter VI, section V, pp.22lff. 
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CHAPTER III 
BASIC ASPECTS OF THE ECONOMIC TORTS 
This chapter evaluates the key features of the English modem economic torts as 
the main redress against pure economic loss occasioned between business 
competitors. As indicated in Chapter II, I will now demonstrate that English law 
rejects a principle of liability for intentionally caused economic harm without 
justification (the prima facie tort and the abuse of rights) but safeguards pecuniary 
interests through specific rules in particular problem-situations. I will submit that 
it is currently implausible to amalgamate the economic torts into a single rule of 
liability for deliberately and wrongfully inflicted financial damage. First, intention 
and wrongfulness greatly contrast between the economic torts. Moreover, simple 
conspiracy is entirely rooted in intention. Secondly, the economic torts affect two 
markedly different sectors of competition, namely business and labour, eliciting 
quite divergent judicial reactions. Courts have restricted industrial competition 
through the torts of simple conspiracy, inducing breach of contract and 
intimidation, yet this movement has been continuously neutralised by statutory 
immunities. Conversely, courts customarily avoid intervening in commercial 
competition, thereby limiting economic-tort liability. Indeed, labour competition 
implies a tense relationship between the judicial and legislative powers, making 
this context highly contingent on politics. Hence this thesis rests on the premise 
that both areas should remain separate. Thirdly, to merge the economic torts into 
one principle is complicated even if the study focuses solely on business because 
English law protects the economic interests unequally. This is reflected in the 
diverse components of the economic torts and the corresponding liability rules, as 
the extreme simple conspiracy (intention-based liability) and passing-off 
( outcome-based strict liability) strikingly exemplify. The economic torts illustrate 
tort law's complexity, which is evident in the various interests protected, types of 
misconduct recognised and remedies available. Although these inconsistencies 
might indicate the convenience of an all-inclusive canon, I will submit that 
English courts have adequately addressed the problem of harm between 
commercial adversaries by weighing the claimants' economic interests against the 
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wrongdoers' freedom to compete, without missing a tidy taxonomy or a general 
criterion. 
Section I analyses the modem leading authorities which instituted the 
economic torts and determined the English courts' approach to the financial loss 
caused between the participants in commercial and labour battle, covering the 
recent landmark case-law which recapitulated central aspects of these torts. It 
evaluates the effects of these decisions in terms of policy and principle, as 
mirrored in the intentionality and unlawfulness elements. Section II scrutinises the 
reasons for remedying economic damage through specific torts instead of a 
general principle based on intention and/or wrongful means. It assesses the impact 
of this method upon legal consistency and certainty. Section III discusses 
exclusively inducing breach of contract and unlawful-interference torts. These 
prominent economic torts have provoked profuse academic debate and litigation 
in Anglo-American jurisdictions, thereby justifying separate treatment. Section IV 
outlines the main conclusions. Passing-off and malicious falsehood are tackled in 
Chapter IV, for they specifically combat unfair competition, thus forming a sub-
area within the economic torts. 
I. Central case-law 
This section explains the cardinal modem decisions on the economic torts and 
assesses their essential consequences for policy and principle. This case-law 
includes Pickles, a property-rights dispute, since it moulded the refusal of a 
principle of liability for intentionally inflicted economic harm. 
1. Facts-situations 
365 1.1 Mogul 
Through a concerted practice (cartel) and predatory pricing the defendants had 
retained the trade of tea from China to Europe, therefore driving the claimant out 
of the market. The claimant sued the defendants for conspiracy to injure. 
365 [1892] AC. 25. 
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The suit was rejected at all instances. From a technical standpoint the 
defendants had neither employed unlawful means nor intended to ruin the 
claimant. Conversely, they lawfully defeated the claimant advancing their own 
b · · 366 usmess mterests. Thus the Court of Appeal held that th 1 · , · , . e c a1mant s economic 
harm was simply incidental to legitimate competition. The defendants had acted 
without "malice in law", that is, lacking the intention to commit a wrongful act, as 
separate from "malice in the ordinary sense" (ill-will). 367 Impermissible 
commercial conduct presupposed unlawful means such as fraud, intimidation and 
intentionally procuring the infringement of another's rights, none of which had 
been used in the instant case. 368 Nor had the defendants acted with the 
predominant intention to injure the claimant. 369 
From a policy perspective, Fry LJ stated that courts should neither control 
the normal development of trade nor define unfair competition. Expelling rivals 
from the market was part of competing. Free competition involved cooperation 
between businesses. Hence agreements in restraint of trade were not illegal 
(criminal) but merely void and unenforceable 370 Lord E h MR d" d . s er 1ssente : the 
defendants had deeply lowered freights, making trade unprofitable for the 
claimant. This evinced malice which rendered the defendants' act tortious.37 1 
Their Lordships unanimously upheld the Court of Appeal's majority 
decision. Competing is to pursue commercial targets, inexorably but 
unintentionally damaging contenders 372 Th d ., d h · · . e e1en ants ad leg1t1mately 
prevented social waste without encroaching on the claimant's right to compete. 373 
1.2 Pickles374 
The claimant sought an in· f h"b Junc ion to pro 1 it the defendant from diverting 
underground water which would otherwise have percolated and flowed into the 
366 
367 
(l888) L.R. 21 Q.~.D. ~44, 553-554, Lord Coleridge. 
S !
Both concepts defmed m: Bromage v. Prosser (1825) 107 ER 1051 KB c 1054 B I J a mond (1937) 525. 
· · · · ., , ay ey ; 
368 
· . (1889) L.R. 23 Q.B .D. 598, 612-614 Bowen LJ 
369 Ib'd 6 ' . 1 , 15-619 BowenLJ 370 ' . Ibid, 626-630, Fry LJ. 
37 1 Ibid , 608-610. 
372 
373 
[1~92) AC. 25, 36-39, Lord Halsbury. 
Ibid, 50-51 , Lord Morris . 
374 [1895) AC. 587. 
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claimant's catchments. The claimant alleged that the defendant had intentionally 
forced it to purchase his water rights. Their Lordships found that the defendant 
had not intended to injure the claimant but exercised his property right by lawfully 
pressing the claimant to buy the right to the flow of water to which it lacked 
entitlement. 375 The exercise of property rights was deemed lawful however 
malicious, mercenary or philanthropic the underlying motive. Motives do not 
render lawful an otherwise tortious act. 376 So, since the defendant's malice was 
unproven, Lord Halsbury's dictum that 'motive is irrelevant to legality'
377 
did not 
f 378 represent the actual acts. 
1.3 Allen379 
Flood and Taylor (the claimants), shipwrights employed daily by a ship-repairers 
firm to restore a ship's woodwork, had done ironwork on ships in another yard. 
As this practice was prohibited by the ironworkers' union some of its members 
who laboured on that ship's ironwork refused to continue working on it. They 
called Allen (the union's delegate) who informed the employer's manager that 
their men would depart unless the claimants were dismissed that day and not 
engaged again. The claimants were immediately discharged and subsequently 
1 
sued Allen (together with the union's chairman and the union's general secretary 
who, however, were eventually released from suit) for maliciously inducing the 
employer to sack them and refuse to hire them again. Kennedy J
380 
and the Court 
of Appeal, applying Temperton v. Russell, 38 1 held the defendant liable for 
inducing breach of contract regardless of the absence of any breach: Allen's 
intention to harm the claimants in their livelihood made Allen's conduct 
unlawful.382 
In an unusual procedure, Lord Halsbury summoned ten judges of the 
Queen's Bench to answer whether, assuming that the facts were certain, the 
375 Ibid, 592, Lord Halsbury; 601 , Lord Macnaghten. See: Simpson ( 1995) 72ft. 
376 [1895] A.C. 587, 598, Lord Watson; 599, Lord Ashbourne; 601, Lord Macnaghten. 
377 Ibid, 594. 
378 Fridman (1958) 491ff; Buckley (1996) 17; Taggart (2002) 188ft. 
379 [ l 898] A.C. l. 
380 [1895] 2 Q.B . 21, 25-36. 
38 1 [ l 893] l Q.B. 715, CA ("Temperton"). 
382 [1895] 2 Q.B. 21, 38-42, Lord Esher MR. 
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defendant was liable. 383 Three Law Lords, following the advice of eight of the 
lower judges, found for the claimants: 384 Allen had maliciously and wrongfully 
threatened the employer to terminate the labour contracts with the claimants and 
to refrain from entering into future agreements with them, thereby invading the 
claimants' right to work free from interference. Since the defendant lacked an 
absolute right his motive (that is, to discipline the claimants for past conduct) 
rendered his conduct tortious. 
The remaining six Law Lords, however, dismissed the action. 385 First, the 
defendant had not used wrongful means but informed the employer of the possible 
scenario that would follow if the claimants were not discharged. Secondly, Pickles 
had decided that a bad motive did not make unlawful an otherwise lawful act. 
Indeed, the defendant had not acted with an improper motive but taken a practical 
measure in self-defence, precluding the repetition of what the ironworkers deemed 
an unacceptable interference with their speciality. Thirdly, the Lumley-tort 
presupposed a breach of contract. The claimants lacked any right to have their 
employment contracts renewed: these agreements were terminable at-will, so the 
claimants had lawfully been sacked. For the same reason the ironworkers could 
have been called to strike without risking any liability. Fourthly, contrary to the 
erroneous decision in Temperton, Lumley did not encompass conduct that 
prevented prospective covenants from being concluded. Lastly, interference is 
inseparable from competition as Mogul had illustrated with respect to business 
battle and which was comparably pertinent to industrial struggle. Although the 
defendants had sought to profit at the claimant's expense, they could not be 
declared liable in the absence of wrongful means. 
1.4 Quinn386 
Leathern (a butcher employing non-union members) sued Quinn (a union official) 
for wrongful interference with his business and for conspiracy. The union ordered 
383 
_Eight judges ~pined th~t Allen had induced the employer not to hire subsequently the 
claimants, so_ seek~ng to ~umsh them. For two others, Allen legitimately prevented the claimants 
~~m competmg with the 1ronworkers, as their employment contracts were terminable at-will. 
385 
[1~98] A.C. 1: 67-90, Lord Halsbury; 109-114, Lord Ashbourne; 154-160, Lord Morris. 
Ibid: 90-109, Lord Watson; 114-143, Lord Herschell; 143-154, Lord Macnaghten; 160-169, 
Lord Shand; 169-175, Lord Davey; 175-181 , Lord James. 
386 [1901] A.C. 495. 
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its members to assist one another in finding jobs with preference to non-unionists . 
The union refused Leathern' s offer to pay all its demands against Leathern' s 
employees if the latter were admitted. Leathern was warned that his dealings with 
Munce (a butcher and long-term customer of Leathem's products) would be 
stopped unless he desisted in hiring non-unionists. The union told Munce that it 
would instruct his employees (union-members) to leave their work if Munce 
persisted in buying from Leathern. Munce ceased trade with Leathern accordingly. 
Their Lordships considered tortious a combination of several persons 
aimed at injuring the claimant's business by inducing his customers and 
employees to break their contracts and not to deal with and work for the claimant. 
Allen was distinguished as it comprised unthreatening individual conduct. 
Conspiracy to injure constituted an autonomous tort, based on the defendants' 
pure or predominant intention to harm the claimant without requiring unlawful 
means. 387 The defendants had abused their right to compete by collaboratively 
preventing Leathern' s customers and employees from exercising their _ rights . 
Conversely, in Mogul the defendants had advanced legitimate interests without 
infringing their rivals' rights.388 
389 1.5 Rookes 
The defendants (union members), irritated at the claimant (draughtsman) for 
having left the union after a dispute, and in pursuance of draughtsmen's full 
membership, threatened the claimant's employer (who too was employer of two 
of the defendants) to go on strike in breach of their employment contracts unless 
the claimant was dismissed. The claimant's employer, yielding to the threat, 
lawfully discharged the claimant. The latter sued the defendants for the harm 
following the unlawful threat. While the Court of Appeal held that the tort of 
intimidation only included threats of violence,390 for their Lordships intimidation 
was outside the legislative immunity and encompassed the defendant's threat to 
break a contract with a third party unless the latter did or abstained from doing an 
act (even lawful) detrimental to the claimant, targeting and actually injuring the 
387 Ibid: 512-515 , Lord Shand; 515-531, Lord Brampton. 
388 Ibid, 532-543, Lord Lindley. 
389 [1964] A .C. 1129. 
390 [ 1963] 1 Q.B. 623 . 
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latter. The claimant could not sue for breach of a contract alien to him but could 
recover damages in intimidation against those who had threatened to break the 
contract. Conversely, threatening to do lawful acts is not tortious except when it 
amounts to simple conspiracy. 391 
1.6 OBG392 
In Mainstream Properties v. Young, the first of the OBG trilogy, two employees 
of the claimant (a property company), breaking their employment contracts, 
redirected a development opportunity to a parallel company of theirs. The 
defendant financed the transaction knowing the contractual obligations of the 
employees, though honestly believing the negotiation did not entail their breach. 
The Law Lords dismissed the Lumley-tort: the defendant had acted in good faith 
neither intending (or being recklessly indifferent) to cause the breach of contract 
' 
nor avoiding investigating whether the transaction involved said breach. 
In OBG v. Allan, the defendants, invalidly appointed as receivers under a 
floating charge, and acting in good faith, took control of the claimant's assets 
' 
thereby causing losses to the claimant. Their Lordships rejected the action for 
unlawful interference with the claimant's business: the defendant had neither used 
wrongful means nor intended to harm the claimant. 
In Douglas v. Hello!, Michael Douglas and Catherine Zeta-Jones granted 
OK! the exclusive right to publish pictures of their wedding, prohibiting all other 
photography. Hello! subsequently published pictures in the UK knowing they had 
clandestinely been taken by an unauthorised photographer. OK! sued Hello!, 
among others, fqr unlawful interference with its business, the House of Lords 
setting aside the claim. Although Hello! had intended to harm and had injured 
OK!, it did not interfere by independently unlawful means with the Douglases' 
liberty to deal with OK! and to perform the obligations ·under their contract. Nor 
did Hello! , unlike the paparazzo, invade the Douglases ' equitable right to 
confidentiality. 
391 (1964] AC. 11 29, 1167-69, Lord Reid. 
392 [2008] 1 AC. 1. 
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1.7 Totaz3 93 
Through an intricate "carrousel" fraud, the defendant (a Spanish company) 
supposedly imported into the UK mobile phones, which subsequently were sold 
from that company to a UK firm and, eventually, exported back to the defendant, 
the operation occurring during a single day. One of the vendors in the series 
recovered input VAT from the claimant (the Revenue and Customs 
Commissioners) showing proper invoice documentation, its buyer vanishing 
without paying the claimant the proportional sum of VAT. As the defendant was 
not a UK VAT-registered company, the claimant failed to recover overpaid credits 
through the statutory procedures. Hence it sued the defendant for unlawful means 
conspiracy and damages. Their Lordships allowed the action, holding that the 
common-law offence of cheating the public revenue constituted wrongful means 
in this type of conspiracy although that offence was not independently actionable. 
2. Implications 
The aforementioned cases settled the courts' position towards tort liability for 
, harm inflicted between competitors in labour and business markets . I will now 
argue that the economic torts form an irregular area of the law lacking a unifying 
criterion, mostly due to political forces which shaped a negative judicial attitude 
to workers and trade unions. I will also highlight the disagreement about the 
extent of wrongfulness, which increases the disorder and uncertainty within the 
economic torts. I will, however, submit that the common law has invariably been 
reluctant to regulate trade competition, circumscribing tort liability to extreme 
situations where claimants are seen to fully deserve to be called victims and to be 
compensated. 
2.1 Against the prima facie tort and the abuse of rights: the wrongfulness standard 
For many years, courts have debated whether the intentional infliction of 
economic harm should be tortious or whether it additionally requires unlawful 
393 [2008] 1 A.C. 1174. 
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means. The former contention, the prima facie tort doctrine, is classically 
supported in Keeble v. Hickeringill, 394 where the defendant was held liable for 
intentionally discharging guns near the claimant's decoy pond, frightening away 
the wildfowl. Holt CJ upheld a principle of liability for maliciously mJunng 
another in his trade, except when the damage flowed from legitimate competition. 
This justification can be traced back to the Gloucester Schoolmasters case 395 
which declared that it is not tortious for the defendant to attract the claimant's 
pupils by setting up a rival school, thereby injuring the claimant. 
Conversely, Tarleton v. M'Gawley 396 epitomises the unlawfulness 
criterion: the defend ant was found liable for harming the claimant in his business 
by threatening his customers through physical violence (firing at them). Allen 
approved Tarleton 397 and construed Keeble, Lumley and Temperton as though 
they had involved wrongful conduct. 398 OBG endorsed this reading. 399 Moreover, 
the great cases of Mogul, Pickles and Allen denied a general rule of liability for 
intentionally caused economic damage, such as the prima facie tort, the abuse of 
rights, neminem laedere (as in article 1382 of the French Civil Code) or liability 
for intentional and immoral conduct (as in §826 BGB). This position, ratified in 
Rookes, was subsequently treated with some hesitation400 until being reinstated in 
OBG. In Mogul, Bowen LJ maintained that deliberately caused economic harm 
without justification was actionable: 
'[!]intentionally to do that which is calculated in the ordinary course of 
events to damage, and which does, in fact, damage another in that other 
person' s property or trade, is actionable if done without just cause or 
excuse' .
401 
394 
395 
103 E.R. 1127 (1706), K.B.C. ("Keeble", reported 1809). See: Simpson (1995) 63ff 
1410 11 Hen.IV f.47 pl.21 · 
~:~ 170 E.R. 153 ( 1793), Assizes ("Tarleton"). 
398 
[1898] A.C. 1, 105, Lord Watson; 137, Lord Herschell. 
~Id, 101-109, Lord Watson. Cf: ibid, 78, Lord Halsbury (holding Keeble to represent the prima 
fac1e tort). · 
399 
400 
[20?8] l_ A.C. 1, at [6]-[29], Lord Hoffmann. 
Mamly m: Torquay [1969] 2 Ch. 106, 139, Lord Denning MR, and Merkur Island Shipping 
Corp. v. Laughton [1983] 2 A.C. 570, HL ("Merkur") 609 Lord Diplock 
401 (1889) L ' ' . 
. R: ~3 Q.B.D. 598,613. ~owen LJ expressed identical view in Ratcliffe [1892] 2 Q.B. 
524, 527 (mahc1ous falsehood) and m Skinner & Co. v. Shew & Co. [1893] 1 Ch. 413 CA 422 
(slander). See below n.832. ' ' 
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This statement has been treated as one of the pillars of the American prima 
facie tort doctrine.402 However, this interpretation does not represent English law. 
Bowen LJ himself restricted liability to damage occasioned to the claimant's 
property or trade through unlawful means: 
'No man, whether trader or not, can, however, justify damaging another in 
his commercial business by fraud or misrepresentation. Intimidation, 
obstruction, and molestation are forbidden; so is the intentional 
procurement of a violation of individual rights, contractual or other, 
assuming always that there is no just cause for it' .403 
Their Lordships affirmed this ruling.404 Mogul became one of the bastions 
of the wrongfulness ingredient. Likewise, in OBG Lord Nicholls quoted Bowen 
LJ precisely to illustrate that intentionally interfering with another's business is 
. . h 1 f 1 405 not tort10us wit out un aw u means. 
While Mogul required wrongful means to impute liability upon businesses 
acting in concert and harming their competitors, Pickles and Allen demanded 
unlawful acts overtly infringing the claimant's rights as a condition for holding 
liable those who acted individually and injured rivals . Scholars of different 
generations maintain that Pickles and Allen ousted an intention-based liability for 
economic damage. 406 To inflict deliberately pecuniary harm is within fair 
competition unless it involves wrongful means.407 In Allen, the claimants lacked 
any right to have their labour contracts renewed. The defendant exercised fair 
competition, so he was not liable regardless of his malicious purpose.
408 
Others 
argue that the wrongfulness yardstick provided more objectivity and certainty than 
a generic intentional tort. 409 For Gutteridge, the abuse of rights undermined 
d d f 
. 410 
freedom of action and brought confusion to the then expan e tort o nmsance. 
Carleton Allen, a resolute supporter of the prima facie tort, lamented that Pickles 
and Allen segregated law from morals: '[i]n practical life nobody is more detested 
402 Forkosch (1957) passim. See below n.518. 
403 Mogul (i889) L.R. 23 Q.B .D. 598,614. See: Fridman (1958) 496; Lipstein (1963) 88. 
404 [1892] A.C. 25. 
405 [2008] 1 A.C. 1, at [142-143]. 
406 Ames (1908) passim; Lawson (1950) 15ff; Landon (1951) 40; Lipstein (1963) 85, 98ff; 
Lawson/Markesinis (1982) 52-53. 
407 Weir (1964) 226; Hoffmann (1965) 118. 
408 Freund ( 1897) 451 ff; Wilgus ( 1902) 52ff. 
409 Pollock (1895); Ormsby ( 1902) 148; Lever ( 1961) 59; Getzler (2004) 315-316. 
4 10 Gutteridge (1933) passim. 
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or detestable than the person who is for ever standing on his rights ... His frame of 
. d . th f 411 mm ... is at o Shylock' . However, this author admitted that moral analysis 
may not fit with the procedurally constructed law of torts .412 
Rookes ratified the method established in Allen, resolving that the three-
party intimidation tort comprises threats to do unlawful acts.413 Whereas in Allen 
the defendant's threat to strike had been lawful (the contracts were terminable at-
will),414 the threat at issue in Rookes was wrongful (the defendants were bound 
not to strike). To suggest, as Pollock and Salmond did, 415 that Quinn was an 
intimidation case which encompassed lawful threats was deemed a 'leading 
heresy' 416 because intimidation involves wrongful means as opposed to simple 
· 417 . 
conspiracy. The leadmg heresy, I think, essentially corresponds to the prima 
facie tort, a theory again rejected in Rookes. Moreover, Weir infers from Rookes a 
principle of liability for intentionally caused economic damage by unlawful 
(impermissible) means widely understood: all those which the defendant is not at 
l"b 418 i erty to use. J. T. Stratford & Son Ltd. v. Lindley confirmed that wrongful 
coercion is essential to intimidation,419 although it held the defendants liable for 
the unlawful-interference tort: they had induced third parties' employees to break 
their labour contracts, putting the third parties in breach of commercial 
agreements with the claimant who thereby suffered actual and prospective 
economic losses.420 
Notwithstanding, the defendant's intention, requisite to economic-tort 
liability, may serve to prove the tort of nuisance, ergo solving the conflicts 
between neighbours holding equal rights to use and enjoy their properties. 
Conversely, in Pickles-type situations the defendant exercises an absolute right 
whereas the claimant has no right at all. As held in Christie v. Dave/21 and in 
Hollywood Silver Fox Farm Ltd. v. Emmett, 422 the unreasonable use of land 
411 II A en (1924) 165. See also: Jenks (1910) 165-166; Finnis (1995) passim. 
412 Allen (1924) 174-175. . 
413 Rookes [1964] A.C. 1129, 1027 Lord Devl1'n 
414 ' . Ibid, 1169, Lord Reid. 
: :: Pollock: (1901b), (1925) passim; Heuston/Buckley (1996) 356. 
417 
Sorrell [1925] A.C. 700, 719, Lord Dunedin; Rookes [1964] A.C. 1129, 1192, Lord Evershed 
4 18 
[19~4] A.C. 1129: 1167-69, 1174-75, Lord Reid. · 
Weir (1964) passim. See above n.360 and accompanying text. 
419 [1965] A.C. 269, HL. 
420 
421 
OBG [2008] 1 A.C. I, at [47], Lord Hoffmann; Deakin/Johnston/Markesinis (2007) 591 
· [1893] ICh.316,Ch.D.,326-327 NorthJ . 
422 ' ' [1936] 2 K.B. 468, K.B.D., 476, Macnaghten J. 
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tantamount to nuisance may be presumed from the fact that the defendant 
·1 d th 1 . ' "t 423 maliciously and unnecessan y annoye e c aimant s amem y. 
In contrast, French courts handle disputes between neighbours through the 
abuse of rights: 424 one is liable for intentionally harming others regardless of 
exercising a property right. Liability for invading another's property requires 
excessive disturbance rather than fault. 425 However, although the abuse of rights 
apparently solves novel situations with more flexibility than nuisance,
426 
English 
and French laws often achieve equivalent results in this specific problem-area but 
deploying different techniques. 427 Nonetheless, beyond conflicts between 
neighbours English law rejects liability for deliberately injuring others in the 
occasion of exercising a right. 
2.2 Politics compromising legal coherence and consistency 
By 1889 whether several businesses could legally promote their commercial 
interests by acting collectively and injuring their rivals was dubious. The 
Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act 1875 granted immunity to conspiracy 
without declaring it lawful. Mogul (1892) clarified that the agreements in restraint 
of trade were void, not criminal, and businesses' combinations triggered tort 
liability only if these involved unlawful means. 
What remained unclear was whether courts would apply the same rules to 
workers and trade unions advancing their own interests. In the American 
landmark case of Vegelahn (1896), the majority held the defendants liable for 
wrongfully preventing third parties from working for their employer rather than 
promoting trade unions' goals.428 However, in a solid dissent, Holmes J suggested 
that the intentional infliction of harm and combinations of businesses or workers 
were part of legitimate competition unless they involved unlawful means.
429 
His 
423 Goodhart: (1936) passim, (1938) 12-13; Buckley (1996) 15; Reid (1998) 143ff; Cane (2000a) 
541; Edelman/Davies (2007) 1275. . 
424 Cf: Gambaro (1995) passim (arguing that neighbours' conflicts are resolved by plannmg-
regulation instead of the abuse of rights) . . . 
425 Civ(3), 4.2.1971, JCP.1971.II.16781, n.R.Lindon (allowing owners to use thetr assets as they 
like without affecting neighbours' property beyond normal inconveniences); Whittaker (2008a) 
374. 
426 Limpens/Kruithof/Meinertzhagen-Limpens ( 1980) 117-1 ! 8. 
427 Markesinis (1977) 80. 
428 44 N.E. 1077, 1077-78, Allen J. 
429 Ibid, 1080-82. See: White (1993) 287ff. 
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unsuccessful attempt to give workers and unions the same treatment entrepreneurs 
received, subjecting both to unlawful means conspiracy, was duly appraised.430 
Thus, Holmes J was prepared to renounce to the prima facie tort and accept 
wrongfulness as the ultimate criterion of liability for economic harm arising from 
concerted actions of businesses and workers alike. 
The majority judgment in Vegelahn is comparable to the English courts' 
bias against workers and trade unions. Case-law has limited severely labour 
competition through tort liabilities. Strikes constituted a criminal offence until the 
Trade Union Act 1871 and the Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act 1875 
decriminalised all but violent labour actions and legalised workers' combinations 
in contemplation or furtherance of trade disputes. At the tum of the century, 
industrial conflicts increased and courts restored the situation preceding those 
immunities: strike-organisers were again held liable for inducing the breach of 
employment contracts and workers' combinations for simple conspiracy (Quinn). 
Courts granted injunctions to stop strikes and awarded damages against trade 
unions even though the latter lack legal personality.43 1 Simple conspiracy became 
the instrument of judicial interventionism. In Quinn and Taff, Lord Halsbury 
formed the panel of judges he liked to use conspiracy against labour and in favour 
of capital, his prestige resulting seriously compromised.432 However, the statutory 
immunities have intermittently reversed these developments . A new government 
passed the Trade Disputes Act 1906, which allowed strike-organisers to act in 
contemplation or furtherance of trade disputes without engaging liability for 
conspiracy or inducing breach of contract. Over the next fifty years judicial 
. ·1 d 433 caution prevai e . In Crofter, the House of Lords permitted trade unions to 
justify their activities in the promotion of self-interest, that is, in order to improve 
labour and collective-bargaining conditions. 434 Nonetheless, in Rookes their 
Lordships found in the three-party intimidation tort comprising the threat to strike 
a new way of repressing trade unions: This tort was not protected by the Trade 
Disputes Act 1906, unlike conspiracy to injure and the Lumley-tort. The claimant 
could not plead Lumley because the employer had legally terminated his labour 
430 (1896) 10 HLR 301. 
431 Taff Vale Railway Co. v. Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants [1901) AC 426 HL ("Taff'). . . ' 
432 Stevens (1979) 90ff; Spicer (1981) 99ff. 
433 [1942) A.C. 435. 
434 Heydon ( 1978) l 8ff. 
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contract. Subsequently, Parliament promulgated the
 Trade Disputes Act 1965, 
which entitled trade unions to threaten to call for 
strikes in advancement of 
industrial disputes. Later case-law curtailed these 
immunities once again but 
further legislation limited them, litigation diminishin
g accordingly. This history 
shows an ongoing interplay between the restriction of
 labour competition through 
the judicial enhancement of tort liability and the statutory neutralis
ation of the 
latter. 435 This tension might end if workers had the 
right to strike. 436 As Kahn-
Freund argued, the 'judicial legislation' embodied in the invention an
d extension 
of the economic torts against trade unions and strik
ers determines the kind of 
economic pressure courts consider as justified in the promotion of 
self-interest. 
Parliament reacts, establishing exceptions to these 
liabilities (immunities and 
privileges), then narrowly construed by courts. Without a proc
laimed right to 
strike this interpretative task is 'apt to become a labyri
nth' .437 
I will suggest that both the wrongfulness criterion est
ablished in Allen and 
the intention-based simple conspiracy tort settled in Quinn refle
cted the prevailing 
political climate. Freund noted that in Allen the 
claimants, unable to prove 
conspiracy, had alleged an ambiguous notion of malic
e that disguised the political 
issues. For example, was there a right not to be inte
rfered with in one's work? 
\ 
'Likewise, could trade unions cause harm out of exerc
ising the liberty to compete? 
Allen resolved this political impasse through form
al language and reasoning 
incomprehensible to the public. Thereafter, trade u
nions could interfere with 
labour relationships by strike. 
438 Consequently, as Terry highlighted, Allen 
justified the intentional infliction of economic harm in the freedom to
 compete in 
. 
b . 439 s· ·1 1 
labour, mirroring what Mogul had settled with respe
ct to usmess. 1m1 ar y, 
for modern scholars, the dismissal of the prima facie 
tort responded to a political 
rather than a technical reason. Until 1910 the Appella
te Committee of the House 
of Lords constituted a political body performing qua
si-legislative roles in labour 
law. Thus, Allen satisfied a social need before Parliam
ent reacted.44° Comparably, 
who is today Lord Hoffmann, treated Allen as settl
ing a political dilemma on 
435 Wedderburn: (1961) 590, (1964) 280-281; Cornish/Clark (1989
) 323ff, 355; Deakin/Morris 
(2005) 5ff. 
436 Elias/Ewing (1982) 321, 356ff. 
437 Davies/Freedland (1983) 327. 
438 Freund (1898) 449ff. 
439 Terry (1904) 10, 19ff. 
440 Lever (1961) 61 ; StevensNamey (1965) 23ff, 148ff; Stein/Shand
 (1974) 250; Stevens (1979) 
77ff, 114. 
consequentialist bases. Instead of doing justice to the claimant, Allen 
strengthened 
the politically weak trade unions, given the legislator
's passivity. Pressed by pro-
unionists, their Lordships authorised collective actio
n to promote workers' self-
interest just as Mogul had for enterprises. Thirteen out of twenty-one
 judges, led 
by the conservative Lord Esher MR and Lord Halsbur
y, imposed intention-based 
liability, against all evidence and precedents, where
as a liberal majority of six 
Law Lords endorsed the wrongfulness yardstick.
441 Probably, as Stevens argued, 
the majority reacted against Lord Hals bury' s blatant effort to uphold 
the Court of 
Appeal's ruling by summoning lower judges.
442 Conversely, Petro holds Allen to 
be purely politics because it rejected the only possible juridical solutio
n, the prima 
facie tort, overlooking the fact that the defendant had
 not merely "informed" the 
claimants' employer what would have happened h
ad the claimants continued 
working, but also threatened the employer's manager 
with calling their workers to 
leave their jobs unless the claimants were dismissed.
443 Yet, it seems to me that 
perhaps not even the prima facie tort would have 
modified Allen's result: the 
majority of their Lordships would have rejected the lawsuit either 
because the 
defendant did not intend to harm the claimants or b
ecause he acted within fair 
competition. The impact of politics upon the case w
as unavoidable. As · has been 
. 1· d 444 11 imp 1e , A en could have accepted the prima f
acie tort but did not, thus 
remaining a well-established precedent. 
In turn, the imposition of intention-based liability fo
r simple conspiracy 
(Quinn) also responded to the political animosity towards w
orkers and trade 
unions. Some criticise that Quinn made liable those who had
 indeed furthered 
self-interest without targeting the claimant: 
445 Quinn 'might well have been 
regarded as one [case] in which ordinary measures had been ta
ken to promote the 
union's interests by excluding non-union labour
'. 446 . Quinn, Cane argues, 
sacrificed the defendants' liberty to compete in ord
er to protect the claimant's 
interest not to be intentionally interfered with in her bu
siness. 447 
441 
Hoffmann (1965) 137ff. Cf: Wedderburn (1964) 260 442 . Stevens (1979) 90ff. 
443 Petro (1982) 565ff. 
444 Heuston/Buckley (1996) 37, 344ff. 
:~ Elias/Ewing (1982) 322ff; Epstein (1983) 1368. 
Crofter (1942] A.C. 435,473, Lord Wright. 
447 Cane (1996) 264ff. 
Q"'] 
There are diverse explanations about the obvious contradiction b~t~e~n 
. W dd b linked these cases to liberal and regulatory Judicial Allen and Quinn. e er um . . . 1 d· 
. . . 1 448 Heuston tried to differentiate the fact-situations invo ve . 
policies, respective Y· . . 1 is not actionable . . h 's economic interests a one 
whereas interfenng with anot er 449 For Lord 
. · autonomous wrong. 
without unlawful means, simple conspiracy is an 1 . t for 
t d ainst the c aiman s hand in Allen the defendant had legitimately compe e ag . . 
S '. . ld f k while in Quinn the defendants had essentially aimed to 
a certain fie O wor ' 450 . · 
. ·ure the claimant advancing no union interest whatsoever. Simple consp~racy 
inJ 
. rt with the exclusive or predominant 
presupposes that the defendants act in conce ' hether their 
. . . . re the claimant without using unlawful means, w 
intention to inJu . . ·ew on the claimant (Temperton); 
underlying motive is to: impose an economic vi d t (as 
. )· press past con uc 
unish persons anxious to join trade unions (Quinn ' or re 452 . 
p d . All ) 451 yet as MacCormick demonstrated, Quinn 
unsuccessfully pleade in en . '. . rd Halsbury declared 
is a notorious illustration of legal inconsistency. although Lo . . dd .th 
. 453 im le conspiracy is at o s wi 
that the law is not always governed by logic, s p th 
fulness Eventually, their Lordships distinguished Allen to preserve e 
wrong . . . h 454 It follows that policy plays a 
doctrine of precedent then binding upon t em. . . h 
. t ts whose inner inconsistencies very muc pivotal role in shaping the economic or ' 
derive from the conflicting political trends. 
2.3 Problems with conspiracy 
. . nomalous in two senses. First, it clashes Simple conspiracy, I will suggest, is a . d th most 
1. . th prima facie tort an e with the unlawfulness rule, symbo ising e . h 
. 1 f abuse of rights. Indeed Lord Lindley grounded Quinn on t e prominent c ass o t 
. f . t t 455 So as modem jurists assert, when several persons ac pnma acie or. ' 
. . th. d 
. . imarily to harm and actually inJure a ir 
collectively with the motivation pr 
448 Wedderburn: (1961) 572, (1964) 257-258. 
449 Heuston ( 1986) passim. 
450 Q · [1901) A.C. 495, 514, Lord Shand. . 
uinn h (1920) passim 
451 Chalmers-Hunt (1903); Charleswort (1988) 277· Polden (2009) 195 ('no one was more 
452 MacCormick (1978) 4~. See al~o: Carty hains of p;ecedents than Halsbury himself . .. most 
adept and unscrupulous m escaping the c 
outrageously in Quinn'). 
. 
453 Quinn [1901) A.C. 495 , 506. . . 1 p edent) [19661 1 W.L.R. 1234 their Lordships 454 Only since the Practice Statement (Jud1cia r:~ often distinguish them: Bell (2007) 39. 
can overrule their own precedents, though they mo 
455 [1901) A.C. 495, 536-537. 
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party, this is per se abusive and tortious. 456 Nevertheless, Quinn is 'too well-
established to be discarded', 457 hence challenging the unlawfulness test. 458 
Secondly, as Lord Lindley postulated, the law assumes as an 'undeniable truth' 
that several people operating in concert can inflict more damage than one person 
acting alone.459 Likewise, in Total the Law Lords asserted that conspiracy was 
more pernicious than individual misbehaviour. 460 Yet, this is an unconvincing 
argument. A single firm functioning individually can cause much greater harm to 
the market than several small enterprises acting in concert: 461 '[T]o 
suggest ... that. .. a multinational conglomerate ... does not exercise greater 
economic power than any combination of small businesses, is to shut one's eyes 
to what has been happening in the business and industrial world'. 462 The 
conventional explanation conceals, I think, the true reason behind simple 
conspiracy: anti-unionist judicial policy. If "numbers" were really critical, simple 
conspiracy would also be deployed against traders' combinations instead of 
unlawful means conspiracy. In sum, simple conspiracy makes the economic torts 
incoherent, although this is understandable from historical and political 
perspectives that accompany the casuistically built tort law. 
Nonetheless, simple conspiracy has scarcely been employed. This tort is 
difficult to show and easy to circumvent. Proving the defendants' prevalent 
intention to damage is complicated, particularly because it is commonly 
indistinguishable from the intention of advancing economic self-interest. 463 
Acting in concert exclusively or principally to harm rivals is unusual. Likewise, 
conspirators can often justify their conduct in pursuit of legitimate self-interest, 
for example the enforcement of anti-racist policies. 464 Additionally, each 
conspirator can act for a different reason. 465 Only exceptionally have the 
456 Deakin/Johnston/Markesinis (2007) 571, 597. 
457 Lonrho [1982] A.C. 173, 189, Lord Diplock; Edelman/Davies (2007) 1318. 
458 Heydon ( 1999) passim. 
459 South Wales Miners' Federation v. Glamorgan Coal Company Ltd. [1905] A.C. 239, HL ("South Wales"), 252. 
460 Total [2008] 1 A.C. 1174, at [56], Lord Scott. 
461 Crofter [ 1942] A.C. 435, 443, Viscount Simon L.C. 
462 Lonrho [1982] A.C. 173, 189, Lord Diplock. Likewise, for Holmes J, the proposition that 
collective action rendered an otherwise lawful act wrongful was 'plainly untrue, both on authority 
and principle ': Vegelahn 44 N.E. 1077, 1081. 
463 Stone (1966) 395ff; Davies/Freedland (1983) 311-312. 
464 Scala Ballroom (Wolverhampton) Ltd. v. Ratcliffe [1958] 1 W.L.R. 1057, CA; Kahn-Freund (1959) passim; Carty (2001) 37ff; Deakin/Johnston/Markesinis (2007) 596ff. 
.455 Hughes (1952) 212. 
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conspirators' intentions been presumed from the overt acts. Thus, in Total, the 
defendants ' attempt to profit by eluding payment of VAT uncovered their purpose 
as to deprive the public revenue of money owed to it. Moreover, the defendants 
could not justify their conduct: they had employed illicit means (cheating the 
public revenue) , obtaining unlawful gains.466 Thus, victims may better avoid the 
. . 467 
problematic mental element by resorting to the statutory competition torts . 
Conversely, unlawful means conspiracy may at first glance have wider 
468 d . . . t h 469 application, because it neither requires a pre ommant mtent1on o arm, nor 
470 F h h. t t 1 de independently actionable wrongful means. urt ermore, t 1s or exc u s 
almost any justification.471 Yet, the fact that Total involved a crime suggests to me 
that wrongful means conspiracy, which originated from criminal law,
472 
is no 
more suitable for business competition than simple conspiracy. 
2.4 Incongruence within wrongfulness 
The span of wrongfulness varies between the economic torts , thereby preventing 
any systematisation. This also reflects the diverse roles that the economic torts are 
ascribed in the regulation of competition. 
Consistently with his former opinion as legal writer, 
473 
in OBG Lord 
i Hoffmann, delivering the majority judgment, defined wrongfulness tightly. On 
this view, the unlawful-interference tort presupposes that the defendant, intending 
to harm the claimant as an end or as a means to another end, uses wrongful means 
against a third party, affecting her freedom to deal with the claimant, who is 
thereby damaged. Thus, the illicitness of the defendant' s conduct is directly 
connected with the harm caused to the claimant in her business interests. The 
wrongful means, Lord Hoffmann added, must be independently actionable (as 
466 [2008] 1 A.C. 1174, at [228-230], Lord Neuberger. 
. 
467 Carty: (1988) 254-255 , (2001) 34ff; Furse (2008) 468. See below n.1043 and accompanymg 
text. 
468 Sales ( 1990) passim. 
469 Fayed [1992] 1 A.C. 448 , 468, Lord Bridge, reversing Metall und Rohstoff AG v. D?naldson 
Lufkin & Jenrette Inc. [1990] 1 Q.B. 391, where the CA subjected unlawful means .conspiracy to a 
predominant intention to harm. Cf: Sales (1990) 491 ; Eekelaar (1990) passim. Fayed was 
confirmed in: Total [2008] l A.C. 1174, at [100], Lord Walker; and in Meretz Investments NV v. 
ACP Ltd. [2008] 2 W.L.R. 904, CA, at [146] , Arden LJ. 
470 Total [2008] l A.C. 1174. 
47 1 Matthews/Morgan/O'Cinneide (2009) 881-882. 
472 Crofter [1942] A.C. 435 , 443-444, Simon L.C. ; Fleming (1 998) 772. 
473 Hoffmann (1 965) 124ft. 
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torts) at the suit of the third party had she been injured. Wrongful means include 
physical force or threats (as in Tarleton); common-law or statutory crimes and 
breach of statutory duty provided that they are independently actionable; fraud 
and misrepresentation; breach of contract; . inducing breach of contract; and the 
three-party intimidation tort (Rookes), in which the defendant too uses wrongful 
means (that is, the threat to break a contract; but not the actual breach) against a 
third party with the intention to harm and actually injuring the claimant.474 
In tum, Lord Nicholls, strongly dissenting, included within unlawfulness 
all sorts of acts that the defendant commits against a third party so as to injure the 
claimant and which the defendant is prohibited from doing, whether torts, crimes, 
breaches of contract or equitable obligations.475 Total applied this broad definition 
by rooting the wrongful means conspiracy in the non-independently actionable 
common-law crime of cheating the public revenue. Following Sales and Stilitz,476 
their Lordships considered that Lonrho had not required for this tort 
independently actionable wrongful means 477 but established that it does not 
demand the conspirators' preponderant intention to injure the claimant, as 
contrasted with simple conspiracy.478 As a result of wrongfulness being widely 
defined, the Law Lords declared unlawful means conspiracy to be an autonomous 
tort rather than entailing secondary liability.479 Sales had argued that conspirators 
assist in the commission of an actionable wrong by another person.480 Likewise, 
Cooper proposed that 'if a person participates by assistance, inducement or 
conspiracy in the actionable civil wrong of another with actual knowledge of that 
wrong, he is liable jointly and equally with the person who committed the 
wrong' ,481 However, in rejecting this principle of accessory or secondary liability, 
474 [2008] 1 A C. 1_, at [6-8]-[47]-[50]-[59-60]-[135]. See: Deakin/Johnston/Markesinis (2007) 
589ff; Edelman/Davies (2007) 13 17; Whittaker (2008b) 97-98 
475 OBG [2008] 1 A.C. 1, at [162] . · 
::~ Sales ( 1990) 51 Off; Sales/Stilitz ( 1999) passim. · 
As the Court of Appeal had erroneously held : Total [2007] 2 W.L.R. 1156 (relying on Powell v 
~fladz [1 998] Lloyd ' s Rep.Med 116, CA, 21 6, Stuart-Smith LJ). · 
Total [2008] I A.C. 1174: at [3 8]-[40], Lord Hope; at [77]-[100], Lord Walker· at [1 22]-[ 124] 
Lord Mance. ' ' 
::: Ib id: at [101 ]-[ 104], Lord Walker; at [116], Lord Mance. See below n.564. 
Sales ( 1990) passim. 
.
48 1 Cooper (1_996) passim. Cooper (ibid, 44) criticises Sales for contradictorily treating unlawful 
means conspiracy both as secondary liability and as a separate tort. 
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I 
I 
I 
Total did not require independently wrongful means in unlawful means 
conspiracy as compared with the unlawful-interference tort (OBG).
482 
Thus, the successive endeavours of rationalisation
483 have not dispelled the 
incoherence within the economic torts, given their dissimilar mental and 
wrongfulness requirements. The disparity between the slim and extended 
approaches to wrongful means upheld in OBG and Total respectively precipitated 
Carty's strong criticism.4
84 Some scholars note that a restrictive concept makes it 
doubtful whether wrongs less serious than crime, such as breach of contract, 
should count as wrongful means in the torts of intimidation, unlawful-interference 
and wrongful means conspiracy.
485 It is observed that unlawfulness ought not to 
hang on the civil actionability of the means exercised by the defendant against the 
victim but on the seriousness of the wrong: crimes and breaches of statutes should 
F- unquestionably be deemed wrongful means by reason of their greater soc
ial 
repercussion than torts.
486 Additionally, as Deakin and Randall demonstrate, the 
inconsistency between the economic torts is aggravated by the fact that the threat 
to break a contract forming the three-party intimidation tort need not be 
independently actionable (Rookes), thus departing from the three-party unlawful-
interference tort. The respect for precedent sacrifices the doctrinal coherence 
sought in OBG.487 As O'Sullivan implies, Lord Hoffmann adopted a strict notion 
, of wrongfulness to achieve consistency across the economic torts .
488 However, the 
judges who decided Total manifested that the wide concept of wrongfulness they 
chose jeopardised the desired systematisation within the economic torts:
489 
' the 
temptation of elegance' (consistency)490 was unattainable between so dissimilar 
torts as three-party unlawful-interference and two-party wrongful means 
· 491 
conspiracy. 
482 Cooper [(1996) 48] had suggested exactly the opposite. As to whether Lumley involves 
secondary liability : see below n.697 and accompanying text. 
483 Weir (1964); Heydon (1978); Carty (2001) passim. 
484 Carty (2008) passim. 
485 Rogers (2006) 809; O'Sullivan (2008) 461. 
486 Matthews/Morgan/O'Cinneide (2009) 890, 932-933. Conversely, if crimes and breaches of 
contract were not wrongs (as Descheemaeker says [(2009) 22-23, 33-34]), unlawfulness would be 
divested of much of its content: see above n.116 and accompanying text. 
487 Deakin/Randall (2009) 546ft. 
488 O'Sullivan (2007) passim. 
489 Total [2008] 1 A C. 1174, at [90]-[95] , Lord Walker. See: Dugdale/Jones (2007) 170-171. 
490 Henderson [1995] 2 A C. 145, HL, 186B-C, Lord Goff. 
491 Total [2008] 1 A C. 1174: at [ 123], Lord Mance; at [224] , Lord Neuberger. 
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Now, the conflicting conceptions of wrongfulness display divergent ideas 
about the mission that the unlawful-interference tort particularly, and the 
economic torts generally, should fulfil. Lord Hoffmann' s thin notion discloses a 
conservative policy according to which t}:ie delimitation of competition is 
Parliament's task, the unlawful-interference tort simply helping 'to enforce basic 
standards of civilised behaviour in economic competition'. 
492 Conversely, Lord 
Nicholls' view represents a liberal approach whereby this tort serves 'to curb 
clearly excessive conduct. .. for intentional economic harm caused by unacceptable 
means' .
493 
2.5 "Two-party intimidation": interfacing contract and tort 
In Rookes the three-party intimidation tort was based on the defendant's threat to 
break a contract with a third party who, yielding to the menace, acted in detriment 
to the claimant. The Court of Appeal had rejected the action considering that it 
undermined privity of contract: if a person cannot sue for the breach of a contract 
to which she is not a party, she cannot either allege the threat to break that 
contract even as intimidation.
494 Their Lordships disagreed: privity of contract is 
endangered only if a third party is allowed to sue for the breach of a contract to 
which she is not a party. Conversely, in the instant case the claimant brought her 
own tort lawsuit for the damage arising from the threat to break a contract used by 
the defendants against a third party. 
495 Furthermore, the tort of intimidation 
presupposes that the third party consents to the threat. If she resists the threat and 
the defendant breaks the contract, the third party would be the exclusive victim 
and could sue the defendant for breach of contract; but there would be no tort of 
intimidation at all .496 
Lord Hoffmann, both as legal writer and judge\ saluted the three-party 
intimidation tort settled in Rookes. 
497 Yet, in OBG Lord Hoffmann left 
492 OBG [2008] 1 AC. 1, at [56] , Lord Hoffmann. 
493 Ibid, at [153-155]. See: Dugdale/Jones (2007) 2. 
494 [1963] 1 Q.B. 623, 695 , Pearson LJ. Similarly: Wedderburn (1961) 577, (1962) 515ff (1964) 
263-264. . 
' 
495 [1964] AC. 1129, 1168, Lord Reid. 
::~ Ibid, 1207-8, Lord Devlin. Analogously: Hamson (1961 ), (1 964) passim. 
Hoffmann (1 965) 124ff; OBG [2008] 1 AC. 1, at [6-8]-[47] . See also : 
Deakin/Johnston/Markesinis (2007) 589ff; Edelman/Davies (2007) 1317; Whittaker (2008b) 97-
98 . 
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unanswered the question whether there is a "two-party" intimidation tort in which 
the defendant (promisor) threatens the claimant (promisee) with breaking their 
contractual relationship. 498 For Weir, not only the threat to break one's own 
contract with the claimant forms the two-party intimidation tort (if the remaining 
conditions are met) but also the deliberate breach of contract. If the careless 
breach of contract can trigger tortious liability in negligence, he argues, the more 
reprehensible deliberate breach should a fortiori entail liability in intimidation.
499 
Nonetheless, as Hoffmann noted, the claimant can avail herself of contractual 
remedies which render the "two-party intimidation tort" superfluous. For 
example, the promisee can regard the contract whose breach is threatened by the 
promisor as repudiated or wait until the latter breaks it, suing him for damages. 
Tort redress is justified where the claimant lacks contractual protection as against 
F the defendant, just as happens in the three-party intimidation and unlawful-
interference torts. 500 Moreover, through the "two-party intimidation tort" 
promisors could evade contractual rules, such as the limitation of compensation to 
foreseeable losses and the denial of exemplary damages for (even intentional) 
breach of contract.501 
The reluctance to accept "two-party intimidation" discloses the narrow 
mission that the common law assigns to the economic torts_. This resembles, I 
think, the non-cumul principle valid in France and Chile.
502 
2.6 Consistent judicial approach to commercial competition 
Although Pollock and Holmes championed the prima facie tort theory, they in fact 
valued wrongfulness, as settled in Mogul, as an adequate instrument to protect 
commercial competition on legal, policy and practical grounds. That a group of 
traders acted collectively, intending to harm and actually injuring their opponents, 
did not render them liable in the absence of wrongful means. The unlawfulness 
test allowed courts to balance the defendants' economic freedom against the 
claimants' interests. Motives just aided to prove or negate justifications once 
498 OBG [2008] 1 A.C. 1, at [61] . 
499 Weir (1964) passim. Similarly: Cane (1996) 130ff, 154-155. 
500 Hoffmann (1965) 127-128. 
501 Wedderburn: (1961) 577, (1962) 515ff, (1964) 263-264; Kenny v. Preen [1963] 1 Q.B. 499, 
CA. 
502 See below n.1092, n.1131 and accompanying text. 
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1" bT h d b · 503 ia 11ty a een ascertamed. Correspondingly, Wyman said that the harm 
arising from commercial competition was justified in public policy: competition 
d d . 1 . 504 pro uce more socia gams than costs. Moreover, as Weir explains, Mogul not 
only ousted the prima facie tort (and cognate principles as the abuse of rights and 
liability for conduct against good commercial morals) but epitomises the judicial 
vision of trade competition: a harmful albeit socially beneficial activity mainly 
regulated by statute. Consequently, the relations between courts and legislature 
have not been strained. 505 Thus, courts award compensation for economic losses 
following unlawful and excessive misconduct, ignoring ambiguous parameters, 
such as malice, which fetter competition. Additionally, the agreements securing 
monopolistic positions are lawful however inimical to adversaries, unless 
prohibited or implemented by illicit means. 
Carty claims that the economic torts are in chaos due to the contradictory 
judicial policies affecting them. Courts adopt an interventionist stance towards 
labour competition through the expansion of intention-based liabilities which are 
constantly counteracted by legislative immunities, whereas case-law is unwilling 
to control commercial competition, thereby limiting liabilities to abusive or unfair 
misconduct, particular! y through wrongful means. Carty proposes approaching 
both sectors of competition cautiously, Parliament retaining the mainstream 
regulation. She saluted OBG for bringing more certainty and coherence to the 
economic torts through a slim concept of wrongfulness and the eradication of the 
"tort of mere interference with another's contract" without causing breach or 
. 1 . 506 mvo vmg unlawful means. Hence Carty lamented the revival of judicial 
interventionism of competition evident in Totaz. 507 Nonetheless, I will stress that 
the function that courts acknowledge to the economic torts specifically in business 
competition remains limited. Although no all-inclusive concept of unlawfulness 
503 Pollock: (1889a/b), (1890), (1892) passim; Holmes (1894) 3ff; Holmes ' letter 21.10.1895: 
Howe (1942) vol.I, 65. · 
504 Wyman (1902) 445. 
sos Weir: (2004) 597-598, (2006) 195. 
so6 A . d . T, s come m ?rquay [1969] 2 Ch. 106'. 13_8, Lord Denning MR and in Merkur [1983] 2 A.C. 
?70, 609, ~ord Dtplock. The ~ackground ltes m these dicta: ' [It is a] violation of legal right. . . to 
~nterfere w1:h con~ractual relat10ns recognised by Jaw if there be no sufficient justification for the 
mterfe:ence , Quinn [1901] AC. 495, 510-511, Lord Macnaghten; ' [The] principle which 
underhes [Lumley] _reac~es, a)I _wrongful acts done intentionally to damage a particular individual f
0
~d actually damagmg htm , tbtd, 535, Lord Lindley. See: Oliphant (2007c) 1602ff below n 594 
Carty: (2001) lff, 261ff; (2008) passim. ' · · 
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organises this area, the common law has consistently refrained from intervening in 
f 1 · · 508 commercial competition and delimiting lawful and unlaw u compet1t10n. 
This is a conservative and abstentionist judicial policy. Carty and other 
leading scholars confirm that the economic torts play a residual role vis-a-vis 
trade competition. Courts are reluctant to tackle antitrust practices that are 
commissioned to criminal and competition laws.509 The economic torts, Deakin 
and Randall argue, supplement antitrust law and help to protect property, contract 
and competition itself against abusive conduct aimed at affecting the economic 
interests in business and in labour generally.510 
Courts take an interventionist attitude where labour competition or 
criminal activity is at stake. This partially explains, I think, the use of the tort of 
simple conspiracy and the enhancement of the concept of wrongfulness in relation 
to unlawful means conspiracy and three-party intimidation. Quinn and Rookes 
involved industrial conflicts when anti-unionist movements prevailed. Total 
concerned conspirators defrauding tax authorities. 
However, where entrepreneurs are implicated such as in the magazme 
market ( OBG), tort liability is managed with moderation. Therefore, the social, 
economic and political trends influence the judicial attitudes and techniques 
through which diverse problem-situations are handled. 
II. Rejecting an overall principle 
This section examines the theoretical attempts to structure the economic torts 
around a single criterion grounded in intention or wrongfulness and the reasons 
why courts dismiss them. Yet, case-law often resolves disputes concemmg 
business contenders fairly, by weighing their conflicting interests. 
508 OBG [2008] 1 A.C. 1: at [148], Lord Nicholls; at [306], Baroness Hale. , . . 
509 Cane (1 997) 158; Deakin/Johnston/Markesinis (2007) 57 lff; Matthews/Morgan/0 Cmne1de 
(2009) 864. 
510 Deakin/Randall (2009) passim. 
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1. Liability for intentionally caused economic harm 
1.1 The prima facie tort theory 
In Tuttle v. Buck, 511 a rich banker was held tortiously liable for installing a 
barbershop, using his personal influence to attract the claimant (barber)'s clients 
merely to ruin the latter. The defendant, the court concluded, established a rival 
business solely to drive the claimant out of the market and intended to retire once 
he achieved this aim. This conduct was defined as unfair competition, quite apart 
from diverting a competitor' s customers by offering better or cheaper products. 
Although Epstein argues that the defendant legitimately defeated the claimant s12 
' 
Tuttle is conventionally deemed the most legendary illustration of the prima facie 
tort, namely, liability for intentionally inflicted economic damage without 
justification, and also the epitome of malicious unfair competition uncovering 
antitrust conduct.513 Moreover, the defendant ' s intention to harm the claimant is 
inherent to predatory pricing, the primary form of the abuse of dominant 
· · 514 position. In fact, Tuttle shows that such intention can be inferred from 
anticompetitive conduct, that is, from the defendant's attempt to retire from the 
market after securing a monopoly at the claimant's expense.sis 
Although the prima facie tort emerged from the unsystematic evolution of 
the action on the case,516 its modem inception is attributed to Pollock 517 Bo 
, wen 
LJs1s d H s19 
an olmes. Pollock proposed a generic intentional tort as counterpart of 
negligence, an idea subsequently endorsed by Holmes. Yet, Pollock (and other 
authors) admitted that the prima facie tort clashed with English case-law. s20 
Furthermore, Pollock applauded unlawfulness as an efficient mode of preventing 
massive and speculative litigation Allen he opined bl · h d h 
. , , reasona y we1g e t e 
5 11 107 Minn. 145 (1909 "Tuttle") 
5 12 ' • 
5 13 
Epstein: (1975) 438, (1983) 1368, (2008) 1275. 
5 14 Holmes: (1881) 144, (1894) passim; Shapiro (1983) passim; Keeton (1984) 1014. 
5 15 
See below nn.1021ff and accompanying text. 
Perlman (1982) 95ff. 
5 16 Brown (1959) 563. 
5 17 p 
5 18 
ollock: (1 887) 129, (1890) passim. 
5 19 Mogul (1 889) L.R. 23 Q.B.D. 598,613. But see above n.402 and accompanying text Holmes (1894) passim. · 
520 . 
Pollock (1901a) 316; Wilgus (1902) 28-29; Ames (1905) 422; Goodhart (1938) passim· Landon 
~~~2 16ff, 40; Vandevelde (1990) 471, 523-524; Taggart (2002) 167ff; Duxbury (2004) 9ff, 
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defendant's right to persuade strangers into doing lawful acts against the 
claimants' right not to be invaded in their work. Wrongfulness was pivotal to 
enforcing liability consistently with economic freedom. Motives, like malice, 
served to rebut justifications exclusively. 521 Pollock and Holmes criticised the 
structure of Allen but valued the outcome.
522 Thus, I think, they advocated the 
prima facie tort for systematisation purposes, although they praised the pragmatic 
advantages associated with unlawfulness as ultimate criterion of liability, whereas 
motives just mattered to justify wrongful conduct. 
Holmes focused on the policy choices affecting liability for intentionally 
inflicted harm and its justifications. 523 For him, tort liability flowed from the 
breach of duties grounded on public policy, that is, preventing tortfeasors from 
causing harm at all (strict liability), foreseeable damage (negligence) or highly 
probable harm (intention-based liability). Holmes treated motives as external 
h. 524 B t 
standards of likelihood of harm without involving moral blamewort mess. u 
later he redefined motives as subjective factors which may justify the intentionally 
and wrongfully inflicted harm. 525 Moreover, in Vegelahn (1896), 
526 
Holmes J 
proposed that workers' combinations were subjected to unlawful means 
conspiracy in the same way as businesses (Mogul), thereby rejecting the prima 527 In A"k 
facie tort that he had championed and would subsequently endorse. t ens 
· (1904), he reasoned that the defendants' motives do not determine liability ('what 
a man is bound to foresee') but help to justify deliberately caused damage.
528 
Thus, liability is triggered by intentionally inflicted injury but can be negated by 
motive-based justifications, especially self-interest. 
Pollock, habitually cited by contemporaneous British judges and lawyers 
against the then conventional prohibition from quoting living jurists, was not a 
prophet in his land. Conversely, Holmes applied the prima facie tort in 
America.529 Likewise, Ames firmly supported a rule of liability for intentionally 
521 Pollock: (1898), (1921) passim, letters 28.12.1897/2.7 .1928; Holmes' letter 29.12.1896: Howe 
( 1942) vol.I, 72, 81, 142, vol.II, 78, 224. 
522Holmes' letters 17.3.1898/28.12.1902; Pollock's Jetter 30.3.1898: Howe (1942) vol.I, 82-85 , 
110. See below n.568 and accompanying text. 
523 Vandevelde ( 1991) 54 7ff. 
524 Holmes (1881) 77ff, 16lff; Howe (1963) 184ff. . 
525 Holmes (1894) passim; Holmes' letter 26.06.1894: Howe (1942) vol.I, 54; White (1993) 215ff. 
526 44 N.E. 1077, 1080-82. 
527 See above n.274 and accompanying text; Petro (1982) 598. 
528 Aikens 195 U.S . 194,204, Holmes J. 
529 Vandevelde (1990) passim; Duxbury (2004) 3ff, 283; Simons (2006) passim. 
98 
occasioned damage unless justified in paramount public policy reasons or in the 
. f b · 530 
exercise O a solute nghts. The American Law Institute too acknowledges the 
theory that the defendant's motive can serve as justification for deliberately 
· fl" d 531 m icte harm. Still, the prima facie tort theory is only recognised by the courts 
of Missouri, New Mexico and New York and in lieu of the nominate torts. 
1.2 The French abuse-of-rights doctrine 
This theory is a judicial reaction against the individualistic ethos of the 1789 
Revolution, reflected in the prime importance of property and liberty to contract532 
alongside the form and style of the Code Napoleon.533 
During the nineteenth century principally non-French jurists, such as 
Zacharie, commenting on the French Civil Code, postulated that unlawfulness 
formed an element of liability independent of fault, an idea later defended by 
Planiol and Savatier. Subsequently, wrongfulness was overlooked: a person could 
be tortiously liable for causing harm through the abusive exercise of a given right, 
such as to compete. 
534 Gutteridge disapproved of the very possibility of upholding 
liability where the defendant had not acted wrongfully but injured the claimant 
who lacked any right whatsoever.
535 For Sacco, the abuse-of-rights doctrine leads 
to arbitrary results: liability can be asserted although the harm follows legitimate 
activities or denied even though the defendant acted wrongfully 536 y t I . e, agree 
with the abuse of rights enhances the impact of wrongfulness by restricting the 
justification for harm. 537 
In France (and in Chile) the abuse of rights, contractual or not, triggers the 
duty to compensate .in tort for all consequential losses 538 It · b · d . 1s a us1ve con uct to 
exercise a right abnormally, negligently, against its economic-social purpose or 
530 Ames (1905) 412ff DI . 
E.g., §870 RST 1979 
D2 . . · 
533 Article 4 of the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen 
Merryman (1985) 17-18; Van Dam (2006) 48 · 534 Parisi ( 1992) 170-171. · 
535 Gutteridge ( 1933) 43. 536 Sacco ( 1991) 359ff 369 
537 ' . 
538_ Salmond
 (1937) 510; Whittaker (2008a) 366. 
Soc, 11 .6.1953, D. 1953.661: the groundless termination of a mandate is culpable and tortious. 
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without any serious interest. 539 Yet, the case par excellence is to inflict harm 
maliciously.540 So, the landlord abuses his right to reject the tenant's petition to 
make transformations to the property if he acts in bad faith or intends to injure the 
tenant.54 1 It is also abusive to bring lawsuits acting with bad faith, malice or gross 
negligence542 and to exercise the right to strike using deplorable methods, for 
instance, repeated strikes, or pursuing irrelevant goals, for example, political ones. 
French courts can grant injunctions, award damages in tort or deprive the act of its 
legal effects, such as holding contracts abusively and unilaterally terminated as 
remaining binding agreements.
543 
More engaging, I think, is the similarity between the prima facie tort and 
the abuse of rights,544 remarked by Anglo-American jurists.545 Josserand too was 
aware about the denial of the abuse of rights by Gutteridge and Walton, among 
others, but neither mentioned relevant case-law (like Pickles) nor associated the 
. . . 546 . d . . 547 I b ·t 
abuse of rights with the pnma fac1e tort. Followmg mo em Junsts, su m1 
that the prima facie tort mirrors the strongest case of abuse of rights. 
The prima facie tort is narrower than the abuse of rights and also than the 
French unfair competition law, judicially created from the delict rules. In addition, 
the rarity of situations where harm is maliciously inflicted and the intricate proof 
of malice confine the prima facie tort to the abuse of the liberty to compete. The 
problem is that damage is often a tangential effect of promoting lawful self-
interest in trade competition. 
539 Limpens/Kruithof/Meinertzhagen-Limpens (1980). 107~f; Viney (1995) 351 -352; 
Mazeaud/Mazeaud/Mazeaud/Chabas (1998) 477ff; Zwe1gert/Kotz (1998) 620; Galand-Carval 
(2005) 95. 
540 Reid (1998) 140-141, 157; Van Dam (2006) 184ff. 
541 Civ(3), 12.10.1971, D.1972.210. 
542 Civ(2), 11.1.1973, Gaz.Pal.1973 .II.710. Likewise: C!v(2~, 21.4.1982, G~z.Pal.1~83 .II.591, 
n.F.Chabas (finding abusive the former husband's refusal, inspired by pure mahce, to give the ex-
wife the "gueth"). Cf Chabas: it is subjective rights, not mere faculties, which can be abused. 
543 Whittaker (2008a) 374. · · 
544 And §226 BGB : 'The exercise of a right is not permitted if its only possible purpose consists m 
causing damage to another'. See below n.1253. 
545 Ames (1905) passim; Walton (1908) passim; Allen (1924) 165, 178; (1952) 52 Colum.L.Rev. 
503 . · 256] h 
546 Josserand (1939) 301 ff. This author was quoted in Chile by Alessandn [(1943) w o 
argued that Anglo-American laws denied the abuse of rig~ts giv_en their 'individualistic character' . 
547 Heydon (1978) 28; Weir (1997) 73 ; Carty (2001) passim; Ohphant (2007a) 526. 
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1.3 Modem defenders of the prima facie tort 
In separate articles, Williams and Fridman championed liability for intentionally 
caused harm, the defendant's improper motive rendering conduct wrongful. Allen, 
they implied, did not oust their theory as the defendant's malice had not been 
proved. 548 Lord Devlin supported a rule of liability for intentionally interfering 
with another's business without justification through individual or collective 
actions: 'Quinn ... without the conspiracy'. 549 Wedderburn replied that it was too 
late to resurrect the prima facie tort doctrine, 550 whereas Hoffmann opined that 
this theory could substitute Allen just like other precedents had been qualified, 
such as the rigour of the formerly exclusive liability in deceit 551 had been 
moderated by accepting liability for negligent misstatements. 552 The prima facie 
tort, Hoffmann suggested, helped to determine whether the violation of the 
victim's right could be justified in the defendant's motive. 553 Eventually, 
however, Lord Hoffmann rejected that doctrine because of its uncertain bounds 
and its lack of practical utility: 'the rarity of actions for conspiracy (in which a 
bad motive can, exceptionally, found liability) suggests that it would not have 
made much practical difference' .554 
Yet, the fact that unlawfulness does not work in simple conspiracy lured 
Dawson into proposing the prima facie tort. 555 For American scholars this doctrine 
is a versatile vehicle to tackle novel situations exceeding the catalogue of 
traditional torts. Courts can thus evaluate the parties' conflicting interests and 
decide whether deliberately caused harm is justified. 556 Heydon valued the 
flexibility of the prima facie tort to handling new abusive business misbehaviour 
without undermining competition. Focusing on justification, he said, this method 
serves to deter irresponsible litigation and determine what impermissible conduct 
548 w ·11· 
549 
1 iams (1939) passim; Fridman (1958) 496ff. 
Rookes [1964] AC. 1129 1216 
550 ' . Wedderburn (1964) 278. 
"l . 
552 
Derry (1889) LR 14 App.Cas . 337. 
Hedley Byrne [1964] AC. 465 . 
553 Hoffmann (1965) 140-141. 
554 OBG [2008] l AC. !, at [1 4] 
555 . 
. Dawson (1972) passim. 
556 (1952) 52 Colum.L.Rev. 503; Forkosch (1957) passim; Brown (1959) 565-566. 
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is . Conversely, wrongfulness could be used against legitimate competition, 
thereby compelling defendants to justify their lawful activities.557 
Others applaud this theory's ability to enhance or restrict liability for 
intentionally caused economic loss on policy, rather than formal reasons, 
especially as regards industrial disputes. 558 For Petro, wrongfulness is a rigid 
technique that treats the defendant's conduct as lawful or unlawful in the abstract. 
In contrast, the prima facie tort, which he considers as elegant and effective as the 
abuse of rights, enables courts to ground liability on the facts and to assess the 
defendant's motives and the means used. So, Petro argues, intentionally inflicted 
harm, such as driving rivals out of the market, is not tortious where it is a side-
effect of achieving a superior goal, for example, to gain market-share through fair 
practices. Here the invisible hand produces both social welfare and private benefit 
to successful particular competitors. The expulsion of rivals can trigger liability if 
it is the sole defendant's aim and leaves no social advantage but instead results in 
. 1 559 pnvate osers. 
2. Liability for intentionally and wrongfully caused pecuniary loss 
Mogul, Pickles, Allen and Rookes are the bastions of wrongfulness as the limit of 
economic-tort liability. Hence Weir postulates a principle of liability for 
. 
' intentionally caused pecuniary harm by wrongful means, including all those 
which defendants are not at liberty to use. This standard, Weir argues , offers the 
predictability that businesses expect, as reprehensible conduct is defined within 
the law. Conversely, the prima facie tort is rooted in immoral conduct, ergo 
. d b 1· . . 560 hinging on justifications which generate uncertamty an exacer ate 1t1gat1on. 
Sales and Stilitz also support liability for intentionally inflicted economic harm, 
both as an end or as a means to another end, by wrongful means broadly 
conceived, that is, including non-independently actionable wrongs, unless 
justified by policy reasons . The torts of deceit, malicious falsehood, intimidation 
and unlawful-interference entail primary liability. Wrongful means conspiracy 
involves secondary liability since it requires an independently actionable tort, 
557 Heydon (1 978) passim. 
558 Vandevelde ( 1990) 482ff; White ( 1993) 287ft. 
559 Petro : (1 982) 565ff, 626ft. 
560 Weir: (1964), (1 997) passim, (2006) 192. 
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while simple conspiracy is anomalous.561 Yet, whereas OBG confirmed Sales and 
Stilitz' s notion of intention, 562 Total treated unlawful means conspiracy as an 
· d d 563 . m epen ent tort rather than as an mstance of secondary liability. 564 
Carty argues for limiting the economic torts mainly through the 
wrongfulness criterion, thus courts refraining from controlling labour and 
commercial competition beyond particularly extreme conduct. 565 Analogously, 
Cane observes that trade contenders harm one another as an inevitable and 
foreseeable effect of legitimate struggle, so negligence liability would undermine 
competition freedom. Instead courts constrict liability through specific intention-
based or recklessness-based torts, wrongful means (save for simple conspiracy) 
and justifications, including self-interest. For Cane, the fact that competitors often 
intend to harm each other, although this is seldom their unique or main purpose, 
'f h . 566 mam ests t e importance of wrongfulness. Epstein values wrongfulness as a 
restraining device because competitors intrinsically intend to injure each other. 
Liability, he argues, is triggered if the defendant damaged the claimant by 
encroaching upon a right of the latter. Justifications, and the factors negating them 
(for instance, bad motive), must be discussed at a later stage. Thus, Epstein says, 
Bowen LJ rightly decided Mogul although by an incorrect route: he initially 
thought the defendants liable for intentionally harming the claimant, but 
eventually accepted a justification. Bowen LJ should have directly dismissed the 
action for lack of wrongful means.567 
Epstein's impressions of Mogul in terms of its method and outcome seem 
to me entirely analogous to Holmes' and Pollock' s observations about Allen's 
structure and result. 568 This shows that the contrasting techniques represented by 
the prima facie tort and wrongfulness need not produce divergent consequences. 
561 Sales/Stilitz (1999) passim. 
562 
563 
[2008] 1 A C. 1: at [62], Lord Hoffman; at [1 66], Lord Nicholls. 
[2008] 1 A C. 1174, at.[ 104], Lord Walker. 
564 See above n.479 and accompanying text 
565 . Carty (2001 ) passim. 
566 
567 
Cane: (1997) 153ff, (2000a) passim, (2001) 108-109. 
Epstein: (1975) passim, (1983) 1368-9. 
568 See above n.522 and accompanying text. 
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3. The common law's position 
Notwithstanding the academic efforts to amalgamate economic-tort liability 
around the intentional and unlawfulness elements, English courts deny any 
general principle outside particular torts. The scope of wrongfulness varies greatly 
between three-party unlawful-interference and unlawful means conspiracy (and 
three-party intimidation). Moreover, wrongfulness is excluded from the polemical 
though settled tort of simple conspiracy. Likewise, case-law rejects a principle of 
liability for intentionally caused economic harm. Here I only can offer a 
condensed account of some of the reasons for this response. 
First, as emphasised in Chapter II and as Weir noted, courts have 
,,. traditionally chosen acts over motives to avoid involving themselves in the 
evidentiary problems typically associated with intention-based liabilities. Courts 
prefer unlawfulness.569 Secondly, as Weir asserts, since the common law frames 
rights narrowly from the outset further qualifications become redundant. Indeed, 
the piecemeal structure of the English torts obstructs the identification of the 
social goals underpinning different rights. Conversely, in France the exercise of a 
. b . d t 570 
right in a manner contrary to its social aims constitutes a us1ve con uc . 
Thirdly, Salmond suggested that systems with rigid case-law and statutes required 
fue abuse-of-rights doctrine in order to apply the law progressively, whereas in 
England courts routinely distinguish precedents and check their validity when 
tackling new circumstances.571 Yet, as Taggart asserts, English courts are bound 
to legal formalism, principles and precedents. Thus, Pickles, the paradigm of 
individualism, remained unchanged regardless of the twentieth-century dominant 
collectivism.572 Fourthly, Allen shows how politically committed judges imposed 
a laissez-faire approach rooted in property and free competition, thereby 
restricting liability to extreme misconduct. 
573 What matters is whether harm 
ensues from wrongful rather than immoral acts. 
574 OBG confirmed that courts 
look with disfavour on the uncertainties ascribed to a generic intentional tort and 
569 This mirrors the judicial fear of the uncertainty following intention-based liability under juries' 
control: Howe (1963) 184ff. 
57° Catala/Weir: (1964) 22lff, 237ff; (1965) 780-781. 
571 Salmond (1937) 32ff. 
572 Taggart (2002) 155ff. 
573 Stoner (1910) passim; Fridman (1958) 490,496. 
574 Carty (2001) 264. 
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rely instead on what statutes define as unfair or wrongful. 575 In rejecting an 
intention-based liability, Lee implies, OBG prevented courts from deciding on 
justifications and distinguishing between subtle motives dissociated from the 
more objective issue of unlawfulness. 576 Likewise, leading American jurists 
propose abandoning the ambiguous criteria, such as "improper motive", which 
characterise the prima facie tort, 577 and grounding liability (for example, for 
interference with contract or business) on illegal means which infringe the 
claimant's proprietary or contractual rights. 578 
4. Observations 
English law excludes any general principle of liability for economic losses caused 
between commercial competitors whether founded on carelessness, intention 
and/or wrongfulness. Negligence is discarded because trade rivals owe each other 
no duty of care and harm is a predictable and unavoidable side-effect of legitimate 
struggle. English law exclusively recognises specific economic torts which require 
a certain form of intention and, generally, wrongful means. However, this is not a 
coherent area partly because both elements change considerably from tort to tort. 
Intention may relate to the consequences of the act, such as the claimant's harm or 
the breach of another's contract, or to the conduct itself, as is the case with 
passing-off. Wrongfulness is excluded from simple conspiracy and where it is 
required it varies in extent. In other words, it is narrowly defined in the three-party 
unlawful-interference tort, while widely understood in unlawful means conspiracy 
and three-party intimidation. Furthermore, whether misconduct of more minor 
importance than crime and torts, including breaches of contract, should count as 
wrongful means is also debatable. 
From a policy perspective, the economic torts are anarchic because of the 
contradictory goals that courts seek depending on the type of opponents embroiled 
in conflict. Political pressures render these torts incoherent in their real operation 
when labour and business markets are compared. Courts have conventionally 
abstained from supplanting Parliament in the ordinance of business competition, 
575 [ 0 
_ 2 08] l AC. l : at [14], Lord Hoffmann; at [145-148] Lord Nicholls 
) 76 Lee (2007) 175. ' · 
577 See §§766-§768 RST. 
578 Keeton (1984) 983-984, 1012-13; Dobbs (2000) 1263. 
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applying the economic torts as a residual remedy appreciably limited through 
wrongfulness. Conversely, case-law has relentlessly intervened in labour 
competition, creating and enforcing torts against workers and trade unions such as 
simple conspiracy, which overlooks wrongfulness at the expense of legal 
consistency. This generates a tense relationship with the legislative power which 
has had to protect workers and unions through immunities and privileges. In the 
commercial market segment, Mogul and Allen have largely been confirmed, 
particularly by OBG, treating cases like Torquay and Merkur, which circumvented 
unlawfulness, as mistaken. Thus, the economic torts should be studied 
discriminating between the distinct classes of adversaries involved. Hence my 
focus on trade competition, where English courts normally give priority to the 
liberty to compete, except when a specific economic tort is committed, and 
F virtually never use the tort of simple conspiracy. In this area, the prospect of 
recovering pecuniary losses is small. My finding is that politics plays a vital role 
in the development of the economic torts in industrial and commercial settings 
where courts have preserved the status quo. Case-law avoids curbing commercial 
competition freedom and protects capital and property from workers and trade 
unions. More keenly, Spicer argues that the conspiracy cases illustrate an 
invariable judicial preference for capital over labour, amounting to a 'class 
jµstice'. 579 But in order to safeguard the employers' interests, courts have used the 
economic torts with regulatory purposes. This has provoked Parliament's 
intervention through the granting of immunities allowing workers and trade 
unions to advance their interests in a level playing field. This is not the case of 
business rivals who generally fight on equal terms. 
The prima facie tort (or the abuse of rights) and wrongfulness embody 
distinct methods of handling economic loss between businesses. The prima facie 
tort leads to upholding liability at the outset, which can however be dismissed at 
the end through the discovery of justifications, like competition. The 
wrongfulness standard determines the rejection of liability at the beginning unless 
harm is shown to have wrongfully been inflicted. Nonetheless, these techniques 
do not necessarily attain different results. Moreover, both largely presuppose the 
579 Spicer ( 1981) 106. 
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judicial ability to weigh the litigants' conflicting interests. Legal consistency, 
fairness and certainty cling to such assessment. 
A · d' 580 s some m 1cate, wrongfulness too forces courts to balance the 
tortfeasor's conduct against the victim's · interests. Bagshaw argues that 
wrongfulness is just a clearer description of the same conduct that the prima facie 
tort treats as intolerable.581 In my view both approaches imply the evaluation of 
the interests in dispute. Stone wrote that 'exegesis on the single formula without 
attention to the interests concretely pressing in various kinds of situation does not 
yield adequate development' .582 By "single formula" he implied the prima facie 
tort, the predominant intention to injure or wrongful means. Stone missed a deeper 
analysis of the clashing interests in the great cases of Mogul, Allen, Quinn, 
Sorrell, Crofter and Rookes. However, I remain unconvinced that the courts failed 
to do such assessment. Moreover, whatever the route followed, courts will be 
forced to weigh clashing interests. Thus, it is possible to speculate that Allen 
might have been decided as it was even if the prima facie tort would have been 
endorsed, rejecting the action because the defendant's intention to harm was 
unproven or through the reasoning that the injury caused to the claimants was 
justified in the advancement of the defendant's self-interest in competition. 
III. Interference with contractual and business interests 
This section is devoted to analysing the principal features of inducing breach of 
contract and unlawful-interference torts. These torts protect contractual rights and 
business interests generally. Yet, the law recognises the superiority of the former 
over the latter. In principle, establishing the Lumley-tort seems easier than 
showing the unlawful-interference tort, and justifying the former appears harder 
than escaping liability from the latter. Both torts require intention and 
wrongfulness but in different measures. Although there is agreement that these 
ingredients are useful devices to limit liability consistently with the liberty to 
compete, there is a vivid debate about the content of each component and whether 
business interests at large, including contractual rights, ought to be safeguarded 
::~ Rogers (1998) passim; Van Dam (2006) 115-11 6. 
Bagshaw (1998) 733 . 
582 Stone (1966) 406-407. 
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from third parties' interference through a single tort. Here, I will also demonstrate 
the circumscribed role performed by Lumley, thus essentially supplementing 
contractual remedies vis-a-vis certain types of covenants. 
1. Origin 
The Lumley-tort emanated from the medieval actio per quad servitium amisit 
within the compulsory work system introduced by the Ordinance of Labourers
583 
to counteract the enormous reduction of workforce following the Black Death. 
Until this Act, masters could not sue the departing servants: employment 
agreements were terminable at-will. Under the Act, the actio could be brought 
against those who enticed servants, wives or daughters to leave their masters, 
584 Th · 
husbands or fathers. Servants' work was deemed masters' property. e actw 
protected the labour relationships pivotal of the feudal hierarchy endangered by 
the Great Plague, just as the Lumley-tort preserves the contractual stability 
585 
essential to the modem market economy. 
Lumley extended the protection to independent contractors. In the case, 
Gye, the defendant (Covent Garden's manager), induced the prima donna Johanna 
Wagner to break her contract with Lumley, the claimant (Her Majesty's Theatre's 
· ~anager), by performing for Gye instead. The diva was bound under a contract 
for personal services to sing exclusively for Lumley for three months in London 
and not to sing for anyone else without Lumley' s written consent. Gye, who knew 
of such agreement, was found liable for intentionally causing Wagner to break her 
contract with Lumley, thereby injuring the latter. 586 Nevertheless, Coleridge J 
dissented holding the opera star to be the sole person responsible for breaking her 
. h L 1 587 contract wit um ey. 
583 1349, 23 Edw.III, Chapter Two. The torts of seduction, entic~ment and harbo~r_ing were 
abolished, regarding spouses and children, by s.5, Law Re~orm (Miscellaneous Prov1S1ons) Act 
1970; and vis-a-vis servants, by s.2(c), Administration.of Justice Act 1982. 
584 Sayre (1923) 663ff; Jones (1958) passim; VaradaraJan (2001) 742-743; Baker (2002) 454ff. 
585 Danforth ( 1981) passim. 
586 (1853) 118 E.R. 749, Q.B., 753 , Crompton J, 755, Erle J. 
587 Ibid, 760-768. 
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2. Evolution 
Lumley has continuously expanded. Brett LJ (subsequently Lord Esher MR) 
l' d . . 588 app 1e it m Bowen v. Hall on the ground that the defendant had intended to 
harm and actually injured the claimant by persuading a worker with certain know-
how to break his contract for exclusive services with the claimant. What rendered 
the conduct wrongful, the judge said, was the defendant's bad motive, defined as 
the intention to harm the claimant or to profit at his expense. 589 Lord Coleridge, as 
his father (Sir John Coleridge) had done in Lumley, dissented: motives did not 
underpin liability but served to rebut the defence of justification against specific 
torts like defamation. 590 In Temperton, Lord Esher MR stretched Lumley to 
encompass all sorts of agreements and conduct preventing prospective contracts 
f b . 59 1 rom emg concluded. Allen, however, rooted Lumley in the breach of 
contract. 592 Intentionally interfering with future or unstable covenants violates no 
contractual right whatsoever. Hence it is not tortious.593 
Nonetheless, Lord Macnaghten and Lord Lindley gave speeches594 which 
influenced subsequent courts to misconceiving Lumley. Thus, in G. WK. Ltd. v. 
Dunlop Rubber Co. Ltd,595 the first claimants (motorcar manufacturers) contracted 
with the second claimants (tyre manufacturers) to use the latter's tyres whenever 
the former' s cars were exhibited. At a major exposition the defendant (the second 
claimants' competitor) replaced the tyres of the first claimants' vehicles with its 
own. The defendant was found liable for preventing a contract from being 
performed without causing its breach, an act treated as a subspecies of Lumley. 
Furthermore, Torquay 596 and Merkur 597 held that interfering with another's 
contract without employing wrongful means is tortious. 
These decisions were criticised for creating confusing categories through 
an inadequate analysis of precedents, 598 including D. c. Thomson & Co. v. 
588 (1880-81) L.R. 6 Q.B.D. 333, CA ("Bowen") .. 
589 Ibid, 338. 
590 Ibid, 343-344. 
59 1 (1893] l Q.B. 715, 725-730 
5~ . 
593 
E.g., (1898] A.C. 1, 121, Lord Herschell. 
594 
Pol!ock (1893), Carpenter (1928) passim; Harper (1953) 878 . 
595 
Quinn (1901] A.C. 495, at 510-511 and at 535, respectively. See above n 506 
596 
(1926) 42 T.L.R. 376, CA ("G. W.K.") , 377, Lord Hewart CJ. · · 
(1969] 2 Ch. 106, 138, Lord Denning MR 5~ . 
598 
[198~] 2 A.C. 570, 608-609, Lord Diplock. 
Grabmer (1969) passim; Wedderburn (1983) passim. 
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Deakin. 599 This case had distinguished Lumley from indirect inducement (like 
temporarily depriving the claimant of his workers, thus preventing him from 
performing his obligations to a third party) and from directly procuring the breach 
of another's contract by wrongful means targeting the claimant, which was later 
incorporated into the unlawful-interference tort. Torquay and Merkur overlooked 
the radical contrast between Lumley, which demands breach of contract, and the 
unlawful-interference tort, which requires independently wrongful means.
600 OBG 
confirmed that the conduct preventing contractual performance, as in G. WK. and 
Thomson, is actionable insofar as the defendant uses unlawful means.
601 Lumley, 
Lord Hoffmann declared, entails accessory liability contingent upon the 
claimant's contract being broken by the promisor, whilst the defendant is 
primarily liable for preventing performance or otherwise causing economic harm 
to the claimant by using unlawful means against a third party, which must be 
b . . d 602 independently actionable by the latter had she een mJure . 
3. Keeping liability within reasonable bounds 
In America, Lumley has reached disproportionate breadth. Some courts uphold 
liability for negligently interfering with unenforceable or terminable at-will 
agreements, as in J'Aire. 603 Unstable contracts, it is argued, bind their parties until 
· being terminated. Likewise, prudent persons should avoid any unreasonable risk 
of invading another's contracts. 60
4 In these cases, liability is impu~ed upon the 
• T 605 f 1 
defendant without requiring breach of contract or, as m .i exaco, or mere Y 
frustrating the claimant's potential agreement to merge with a third party after the 
defendant offered the latter a better deal. 
606 
These developments prompted tough academic criticism. Perturbing 
financial expectations or unstable contracts are characteristic of legitimate 
599 [1952] Ch. 646, CA ("Thomson") . 
600 Grunfeld (1953) passim; Weir: (1997) 2-3, 32ff, (2004) _591-592, (2006) 1~8_; Carty: (2001) 
49ff, (2005) passim; Oliphant (2007c) 1543ff, 1552-53; Deakm/Johnston/Markes1ms (2007) 580ff; 
Edelman/Davies (2007) 1317. 
60 1 [2008] 1 A.C. 1: at (22-28], Lord Hoffmann; at (177-188], Lord Nicholls. 
602 Ibid, at (34-38]. See: Dugdale/Jones (2007) 176; Simpson (2007) 472. 
603 24 Cal.3d 799 1979. See above n.200 and accompanying text. 
604 Harper (1953) 884ff; Keeton (1984) 995-996. 
605 729 S.W.2d 768 Tex.Cl.App. 1987. 
606 See above n.145 and accompanying text. 
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competition. n eed most Anglo-American courts and jurists define contractual 
relations as worth protecting and restrict tort liabilities through intention and 
wrongfulness. Sayre suggested confining Lumley to situations in which the 
defendant attempts to appropriate the same subject-matter of the claimant's 
contract. Inducement, he said, is not tortious if the defendant's liberty to compete 
outweighs the claimant's contractual right and the social interest in contractual 
b·1· 6os s· ·1 
sta 1 1ty. 1m1 arly, Bagshaw proposes restricting Lumley to rivals struggling 
for identical performance. 609 
3.1 Limiting the liberty to interfere with competitors' interests 
It is agreed that intentionally interfering with another's contract without causing 
its breach or with another's prospective commercial advantage without using 
unlawful means (for instance, antitrust conduct, including the abuse of a dominant 
position) is intrinsic to business competition and infringes no contractual rights or 
trade interests of the claimant.610 
Conversely, if courts impose liability relying on the prima facie tort, 
competition would be chilled and opponents forced to justify perfectly fair 
practices. 
611 
Thus, in Alyeska Pipeline Service Company v. Aurora Air Service 
1 612 h 
nc t e defendant was declared liable for intentionally interfering with the 
claimant's subcontract which had rightly been terminated by the contractor after 
its own agreement with the defendant was legitimately terminated by the latter. 
This finding elicited Weir's and Dobbs' harsh objection for weakening 
. . 613 L"k . 
compet1t10n. 1 ew1se, Myers stressed the absurdity of imposing liability for 
persuading contracting parties to exercise their right to terminate unsteady 
agreements or break annullable contracts, such as anticompetitive negative 
covenants, which, in any case, cannot be enforced against contract-breakers. 
Contracts in restraint of trade are invalid and unenforceable, unless reasonable in 
607 
Danforth ( 1981) passim; Keeton ( 1984) 981-982, 1001; Weir: ( 1997) passim (2004) 611 -612 608 Sayre (1923) 663ff, 702-703. ' · · 
609 Bagshaw (2000) 138-139. 
61
° Carpenter (1928) passim; Perlman (1982) 95ff; Keeton (1984) 1011; Dobbs (2000) 1261 , 1275. 
611 
Dobbs (1980) passim; Fine (1983) 1119; Myers (1993) passim; Gergen (1996) 1178 1200-02· 
Cane (1996) passim. ' ' 
61 2 604 P. 2d 1090 (1979, "A lyeska"). 
613 
Weir (1997) 64; Dobbs (2000) 1260ff. 
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the interests of the parties and the public. 614 Obviously, inexistent or void 
agreements cannot be broken.615 Conversely, Myers argued, Lumley's contractual 
right legitimately prevailed over Gye's liberty to compete because the exclusivity 
clause in the Lumley-Wagner agreement was limited in time and territory, 
l 'd 616 therefore va 1 . 
In my view, Lumley-type situations reflect the law's preference for 
contract rights over competition freedom. This limits justifications to the 
advancement of moral principles617 or the exercise of contractual or proprietary 
interests, at least equal to the claimant's. Thus, in Edwin Hill and Partners v. First 
National Finance Corporation Plc618 the defendants had acquired security rights 
necessary to finance a landowner's project knowing of the contract between the 
borrower and the claimants. This agreement was broken following the exercise of 
F such rights. Smith LJ dismissed Lumley so as not to discourage the financing of 
development projects and to avoid landowners restricting the use of property. Yet, 
O'Dair thought that the suit failed because the claimants knew that their contract 
hinged on the landowner obtaining a loan from the defendants whose securities 
h d . · 619 a pnonty. 
3.2 Confining Lumley 
For Woodward, the public interest in preserving contractual relationships as 
such620 is a cogent reason for punishing parties for inducing breach of contract. He 
salutes that Alyeska sanctioned bad faith evident in the fact that the defendant had 
retaliated against the claimant.621 Similarly, Chan and Simester argue that Lumley 
safeguards the "special relationship" 622 that every contract contains. Promisors 
bind themselves to fulfil, treating their undertakings as special. Promisees acquire 
614 Nordenfelt v. Maxim Nordenfelt Guns & Ammunition Co. Ltd. [1894] A.C. 535, HL 
("Nordenfelt"). 
615 Said v. Butt [1920] 2 KB. 497, K.B.D. 
616 Myers (1993) passim. 
· · · · 
617 E.g., preventing the contract-breaker from prostituting herself by forcmg the claimant to ia1se 
her salary: Brimelow v. Casson [1924] 1 Ch.302, Ch.D.; Lever (1961) 64. 
618 [l989] 1 W.L.R. 225, CA. In Zhu v. T_reasur~r Ne': South ~ales (2005) 79 A.L.J .R. 217, the 
H.C.A. confined justifications to the exercise of nghts zn rem: Tnndade/Cane/Lunney (2007) 312. 
619 O'Dair (1991) passim. 
. 
620 I.e., "relational interests". See generally: Green (1934), (1935) passim. 
621 Woodward (1996) passim. 
622 This idea in: Raz (1982) passim. 
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a preference over these obligations. Inducers impa1·r such reason-generating 
promises. 623 
Nevertheless, I think it excessive to use the Lumley-tort to prevent non-
performance under every circumstance. To avoid the unneeded expansion of this 
tort, Waddams suggests the strict observance of the very conditions present in 
Lumley and Lumley v. Wagner: 624 a contract for personal services conferring upon 
the promisee a quasi-property right to performance which overcomes the 
promisor's freedom to break and pay damages in lieu; an exclusivity clause 
restricting, for certain time and in certain area, the promisor' s liberty to 
625 compete or to work for the promisee's rivals;626 the inducement to break the 
contract; and the adequacy of injunctions (as opposed to compensation) to prevent 
the contract from being broken and the inducer from unjustly enriching himself at 
the claimant's expense.627 
In practice Lumley fills contractual gaps, particularly helping to shield 
agreements concerning unique goods or services in respect of which 
compensation is inappropriate and specific performance unavailable. 628 Lumley 
gives proprietary protection to the rights that promisees have under specific-
information contracts, non-competition covenants and long-term business or 
employment relationships. Promisees can assign their rights to higher-value users 
(inducers) and participate in the gains that contract-breakers obtain from 
· d 629 m ucers. Lumley can supplement contractual remedies where defaulting 
promisors are insolvent or promisees want to preserve contracts.630 In these cases, 
tort is not being offered as the primary solution to · contractual imperfections. If 
compensation for harm arising from bad-faith breaches or termination of contracts 
is insufficient, courts should enhance good-faith implied covenants before 
623 Chan/Simester (2004) 139ff. 
624 (1852) 42 E.R. 687, Q.B. 
625 Remarkably, Hohfeld [(1917) 71~] explaine? ~e c_oncept of "negative" contractual right with 
;n examp_le that resembled Lumley: [l]f K, a d1stmgu1shed opera singer, contracts with J that the 
ormer will n~t for ~e next three ~onths sing at any rival opera house, J has a negative right in f
2
~rsonam agamst K, and the latter 1s under a correlative negative duty'. · 
. The abs~nce of non-competition clauses may mean that the promisee did not value his 
mvestment m staff enough to insert those covenants, thus Lumley would be unJ·ustified· Perlman 
(1982) 113-114. 
. 
627 Waddams (2001) passim. 
628 D_obbs (1980) 373-374; Perlman (1982) 86-87, 92; Epstein (1987) 30ff- VaradaraJ·an (2001) 
passim. ' 
629 Be Vier (1990) passim. 
630 Paitlett (1991) 775, 834. 
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631 N d h · 's awarding tort compensatory or punitive damages. or oes t e prom1sor 
insolvency authorise making third parties tortiously liable if promisees can self-
632 r bT . protect through contractual mechanisms. Still, courts do enforce tort ia 1 1t1es 
for interference with contract or business, thus demonstrating that contractual 
· 633 
remedies are not a complete answer to the problems that may anse. 
In England, unlike France or Chile, breach of contract is essentially 
634 S T f remedied through compensation for expectation damages . pec1 1c per ormance 
is subordinated to the inadequacy of damages which are normally deemed suitable 
for obtaining a replacement for the unfulfilled obligation at the marketplace. 
Specific performance is rejected where monitoring compliance is difficult,
635 
in 
employment contracts636 or personal-services agreements.
637 
Courts are loath to 
endanger individual freedom 638 and assume that contracting parties bargain to 
secure certain economic expectations whether through performance or 
compensation. 639 However, damages are typically regarded as insufficient to 
. . ts 640 
enforce post-employment or post-services non-compet1t1on covenan . 
Prohibitory injunctions can be issued if neither involve specific performance nor 
compel defendants to perform or remain idle. 641 Yet, promisors are usually 
prohibited from working for promisees' competitors, and are hence obliged to 
perform or remain redundant. Nor need promisees prove they would suffer more 
. . 1 d 642 I damage if promisors performed for rivals instead of remammg unemp oye · n 
' 'Lumley v. Wagner,643 Wagner was enjoined from violating the exclusivity clause 
with Lumley: the injunction did not entail specific performance.
644 
This illustrates 
the reluctance of courts to force the fulfilment of positive obligations and their 
631 Chutorian (1986) passim. 
632 Gergen (1996) 1231; Dobbs (2000) 1267. 
633 Harper (1953) 873ff; Posner (2006) 743ft. 
634 Photo Production Ltd. v. Securicor Transport Ltd. [1980] A.C. 827, HL, 848-849, Lord Diplock; Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd. v. Argyll Stores (Hol_dings) Ltd. [1998] A.C. l, HL ("Co-operative"); Smith (2006) 378ff; Cartwright (2007) 248ff; Tre1tel (2008) 1729ff. 
635 Co-operative [1998] A.C. l, 11-12, Lord Hoffma~ . . 
636 S.236 Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consohdat10n) Act 1992. 
637 Johnson v. Shrewsbury and Birmingham Railway Company (1853) 43 E.R. 358, Ch. 
638 De Francesco v. Barnum (1890) L.R. 45 Ch.D. 430,438, Fry LJ. 
639 Co-operative [1998] A.C. l , 15 , Lord Hoffmann; Rowan (2008) passim. 
640 Doherty v. Allman (1877-78) 3 App.Cas. 709, HL. 
. 641 Sky Petroleum Ltd. v. V.I.P. Petroleum Ltd. [1974] 1 W.L.R. 576, Ch.D; Evening Standard v. 
Henderson [1987] I.C.R. 588, CA. 
. 642 Marco Productions Ltd. v. Pagola [1945] K.B. 111 , K.B.D. ; Burrows (2004) 534; Tre1tel 
(2008) 1759. 
643 (1 852) 42 E.R. 687 , Q.B. 
644 Burrows (2004) 527ft; Treitel (2008) 1756ff. 
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readiness to forestall breaches of lawful negati·ve covenants, particularly to 
prevent competitors from reaping without sowing through the granting of 
injunctions: Wagner is not compelled to sing for Lumley though restrained from 
performing for Gye. Likewise, Lauterpacht noted, case-law refuses to enforce 
contracts inconsistent with previous agree~ents. Gye was not awarded damages 
by reason of Wagner having broken their agreement. On the contrary, Wagner 
was forbidden to perform for Gye in order to protect Lumley' s pre-existing 
645 contract. A contract to break a previous covenant is illegal and unenforceable, 
the parties being tortiously liable to the promisee under the first agreement.646 
Nonetheless, contract rules question tortious liability for inducing breach 
of contract. Breach of contract is not per se culpable, so the remedies neither deter 
· h 647 . nor pums non-performance. Deliberate and careless breaches are treated alike 
' 
punitive damages are excluded, and promisors can break their contracts paying for 
expectation damages: specific performance is exceptional. Save for professional 
services, liability for breach of contract is strict simply because promisors 
voluntarily bound themselves to perform: 648 'It is axiomatic that, in relation to 
claims for damages for breach of contract, it is, in general, immaterial why the 
defendant failed to fulfil his obligation, and certainly no defence to plead that he 
had done his best'. 649 These features lead Posner into arguing that contractual 
liability embodies a sort of insurance against non-compliance which supports the 
ff · b 650 e 1c1ent- reach. Yet, the Lumley-tort can help to punish particularly 
reprehensible breaches and attend restitutionary purposes. The fact that specific 
performance is exceptional implies that not every breach of contract is deemed 
wrongful, although it confirms that Lumley has a limited role, which is to punish 
serious breaches that are not sanctioned in contract. These are typically bad-faith 
breaches whereby defaulting promisors and 1'nducers unjustly appropriate 
promisees' performance without paying in return. 651 
645 
646 
Lauterpacht ( 1936) passim. 
Brown l enki~son & Co. Ltd. v. Percy Dalton (London) Ltd. [1957] 2 Q.B._ 621 , CA, 638, Pearce LJ; Prentice (2008) 1102 647 
. 
648 
Ch~pman v. Honig [1963]2 Q.B . 502, CA. 
Smith (2006) 373; ~reitel (2007) 769ff; McKendrick (2008) 77 1-772. Yet, intentional breach of 
contract reveals bad fa1~ , rather than co_mmercial self-interest: McKendrick (2007) 696ff (drawin 
:
4
~ ana_log~ bet~een deliberate breach of contract and simple conspiracy). g 
650 
Raznen v. Miles [ 1981 ] A.C. 1050, HL, 1086, Lord Edmund-Davies 
Posner (2009) passim. 
· 65 1 Myers (1993) 1 l 18ff; Remington (1999) passim. 
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4. Challenging Lumley 
4.1 Causation problem 
Coleridge J refused to hold Gye liable as the breach of Lumley' s contract had 
been caused by Wagner.652 It is thus disconcerting that promisees can recover loss 
of profits from inducers653 despite the fact that such losses derive from contract-
breakers' free consent not to perform. 654 As held in OBG, 
655 liability under 
Lumley is secondary to defaulting promisors' breach of contract. Hence Howarth 
argues that contracting parties should assume their own vulnerability to the risk of 
non-performance using contractual remedies rather than transferring responsibility 
,,. to third parties.656 It is also affirmed that defaulting promisors are denied personal 
f 1 , 657 autonomy if others answer for the breaches they ree y commit. 
However, following Erle J ,658 I consider that the Lumley-tort performs the 
circumscribed albeit critical mission of sanctioning knowing and deliberate 
interferences with promisees' contractual rights. As Cane and Bagshaw argue, 
contracting parties take the risk of breach, not that strangers will attack their 
agreement. 659 Lumley indirectly helps to enforce contracts by preventing third 
parties from intentionally procuring their breach. Contractual rights have a quasi-
proprietary effect. Third parties must respect these rights whenever they actually 
or constructively know of them. 660 Moreover, OBG justified Lumley in that 
contractual rights are 'a species of property'. 661 Lumley reacts against the 
652 (1853) 118 E.R 749, 761. 
653 Tort compensation includes all directly and intentionally inflicted losses : Doyle [1969] 2 Q:B. 
158· Smith New [1997] AC. 254. Promisees can also sue contract-breakers for expectation 
da~ages which are limited to those foreseen/foreseable at the time of contracting: Hadley (1854) 
156 E.R'. 145, 151, Alderson. McGregor (2003) 1454ff. Yet, the fact that promisees end up 
unjustly enriched is not necessary. 
654 Whittaker (1996) 208; Weir (2006) 199; Stevens (2007) 275ff. 
655 [2008] 1 AC. 1, at [34-38], Lord Hoffmann. 
656 Howarth (2005) passim; Matthews/Morgan/O'Cinneide (2009) 172. 
657 Dobbs (1980) 358-359; Chan/Simester (2004) 146-147. 
658 Lumley (1853) 118 E.R 749, 756. 
659 Cane (1996) 118; Bagshaw (2000) 132-133 . 
660 Lauterpacht (1936) 506; (1964) 77 HLR 888, 959-960; Jaffey (2007) 89ff; Cartwright (2007) 
220· Treitel (2007) 740-741 ; McKendrick (2008) 1046; Whittaker (2008b) 17, 118; Lee (2009) 
pas;im (arguing that whether a resource is protected through real o.r pers~nal rights hinges .on 
policy reasons and the kind of interest involved. Real and personal nghts give holders exclusive 
control over a good as against third parties). 
66 1 [2008] 1 AC. 1, at [32], Lord Hoffmann. 
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appropriation of contract rights without owners' consent. The freedom to attract 
prospective contractors prevails if competitors ignore that a contender already 
owns the right to performance against such contractors. 662 Ultimately, Lumley 
safeguards contractual security upon which market economy rests. 663 
4.2 Efficient-breach 
It is worth wondering why inducers should be held liable if promisors can choose 
to break and pay compensatory damages. Law and Economics generally sees the 
Lumley-tort as inimical to third parties' offering of better deals to promisors and 
to the "efficient-breach of contract", famously phrased as follows: 'The duty to 
keep a contract at common law means a prediction that you must pay damages if 
you do not keep it and nothing else'. 664 Payment of expectation losses releases 
contract-breakers from liability and promisees from their obligations (or entitles 
promisees to restitution if their duties are already performed).665 
Moreover, if expectation damages fairly correspond to performance, 
promisees are no worse-off whilst promisors and inducers are better-off. As 
Posner and Shavell suggest, by giving contract-breakers the choice to pay 
damages in lieu of performing contract law departs from morality, filling the gaps 
left by contracting parties unable to regulate all the likely eventualities. Promisors 
are entitled to break contracts even intentionally, which occurs whenever 
performing is more expensive than paying damages. Contracts prosper because 
the law authorises or promotes efficient-breach.666 
Perlman proposed eliminating Lumley and conserving liability for 
interference with ·another's contract or business by wrongful means, particularly 
antitrust conduct, unless victims shielded their own anticompetitive practices.667 
Howarth criticises Lumley for forcing debtors to perform unprofitable contracts 
662 Fine (1983) passim; Epst~i~: (1987) !Jassim, (2008) 1249-50; Friedmann (1989) passim; BeVier 
(1990) 926-927. Yet, Epstem s theory 1s not the law in England. It just demands the defendant's 
knowledge of the c?ntract and the causal relationship between the defendant's act and the breach: 
~~e (200?) 525. This suggests to me a strict liability rule, similar to trespass . 
Schofield (1888) 20ff; Terry (1904) !Off; Sayre (1923) 675 ; Cane (1995) 402-403; Weir: 
(1997) 2-3, (2004) 591 -592; Carty (2001) 62ff; Chan/Simester (2004) passim. 
664 Holmes: (1881) 301, (1897) 462. 
665 Fried (1981) 117-118. 
666 Posner (2009) passim, Shavell (2009) passim 
667 . Perlman (1982) passim. 
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and imposing high enforcement costs, likely t
o exceed expectation damages. 
Moreover, it dissuades parties from concluding
 productive bargains, carefully 
self-protecting, settling disputes and competin
g. Lumley, which is a well-
established precedent, should be confined to spec
ific fact-situations such as those 
concerned in Lumley itself and justifications ought to be enhance
d. 668 
Nonetheless, the argument that Lumley undermin
es efficient-breach needs 
to be supported by empirical evidence.
669 Further, efficient-breach can be more 
expensive than Lumley, particularly in 
contracts regarding unique 
goods/services. 
670 Expectation damages can exceed the re-nego
tiation costs 
incurred by inducers, defaulting promisors an
d promisees. That is, whereas 
inducers purchase directly from promisees the rig
ht to performance, the efficient-
breach compels inducers to bargain with promis
ors (who own performance) and 
claimants (to whom performance is owed).
671 Efficient-breach can also be more 
costly than specific performance, injunctions, punitive damag
es or account of 
f. 672 pro its. 
The substantive objection against the efficient-breach is that it r
enders the 
performance of binding contracts uncertain. 
673 Contractual performance is a 
paramount value. As Whittaker suggests, the fa
ct that expectation losses seek to 
situate promisees as if promisors had fulfilled th
eir obligations reveals the law's 
'aspiration (or perhaps priority) that agreements are honoure
d.674 Thus, the breach 
of contract is deemed unlawful regardless o
f the payment for expectation 
damages. 675 For Fried, the breach of contract i
s morally wrong: it betrays the 
. 
. 
. , 
676 ff b 
promisor's commitment to fulfil and the p
romisee s trust. isen erg, 
advocating fault-based liability for breach of cont
ract, argues that moral and legal 
contracts oblige promisors to take future action 
unless performance is seriously 
harmful to promisors, such as if performance is
 extremely costly.
677 Therefore, I 
think, efficient-breach should not be an excuse 
for defaulting. Yet, contract law 
668 Howarth (2005) passim. 
669 Woodward (1996) 1140-1. 
670 Perlman (1982) 78ff. 
67 1 Epstein (1987) lff, 30ff; McChesney (1999) passim. 
672 Myers (1993) 1 l 18ff; Woodward (1996) 1148. 
673 Carty (2001) 66ff. 
674 Whittaker (2008 b) 17. 
675 South Wales [1 905] A.C. 239,253, Lord Lindley; Lauterpac
ht (1936) 507. 
676 Fried (1981) lff, 113. 
677 Eisenberg (2009) 1428-29. 
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does not reflect that ethical expectation. It 
promotes the reverse: specific 
performance is subsidiary; compensation is limit
ed to foreseeable harm even for 
deliberate breaches; and exemplary damages are 
outlawed. Hence Shiffrin asserts 
that American contract law should not encourag
e breach of contract by allowing 
expectation damages but treat as legally binding 
the moral obligation to fulfil, for 
instance, through the award of punitive damages f
or intentional breaches. 678 
Conversely, civilian systems as the French ( or the Chi
lean) contain 
principles and remedies which, at least theore
tically, mirror the morality of 
performing and the immorality of breaking con
tracts. As Scalise shows, 679 the 
efficient-breach encounters several hurdles in F
rance, including the pacta sunt 
servanda and good faith tenets; the recognition 
of specific performance as the 
prime remedy for breach;
680 
and the extension of liability for deliberate breac
h of 
contract to unforeseeable harm. The latter discou
rages the efficient-breach which 
' 
inspired by the desire for self-profiting, is nec
essarily deliberate. Nonetheless , 
compensation for damages is the ordinary rem
edy awarded by courts, or paid 
through out-of-court settlements, and case-law ac
cepts economic criteria, although 
disguisedly. 
Even so, the fact that French courts declare
 third parties liable for 
interfering with another's contract in bad fait
h, without demanding a more 
stringent mental element (as opposed to English law and §
826 BGB), also pre-
empts the efficient-breach. As Whittaker says, i
nducing breach of contract is a 
wrongful and intentional act worth sanctioning
. 681 This fact, I think, does not 
disappear just because contract-breakers can pay for expectati
on losses without 
performing. Even where specific performance is
 the chief remedy, a Lumley-type 
rule can strengthen contracts. 
678 Sh"ffr" 1 m: (2007), (2009) passim 
679 . 
' 
Scalise (2007) passim. 
680 
See, e.g., Whittaker (2008a) 349ff; Barros (2006) 986-987 68 1 Whittaker (2008b) 118. · 
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5. Ingredients 
5.1 Lumley-tort 
Negligently interfering with another's contract is a foreseeable side-effect of 
682 · · · · 1 Y t L l 
competing, not a tort. Inducmg breach of contract 1s mtent1ona . e , um ey 
does not incarnate the prima facie tort. 
683 Inducers do not intend to harm 
. . h · 684 
promisees but seek to cause promisors to break their contracts wit prom1sees. 
If the intention to harm was required, claimants' contractual rights might be 
under-protected. As Bagshaw suggests, inducers could easily eschew liability 
showing self-interest in competition. Moreover, the intention to harm is often 
685 L'k · 
much harder to prove than the intention to procure the breach. 1 ew1se, 
inducers must know of the contracts the breach of which they pursue 
686 
or 
,.. 
recklessly disregard the means of knowing such contracts, 'like the man who turns 
a blind eye' .687 As held in misfeasance of public office, intention can be presumed 
from bad faith or recklessness.
688 
OBG ratified that inducers must know of the contract, or be recklessly 
indifferent to its existence (gross negligence being insufficient), and intend to 
d 689 I M · procµre the breach as an end or as a means to another en . n amstream 
Pr~perties v. Young, Arden LJ dismissed the Lumley-action as the defendant was 
not shown to have intended to injure the claimants. Arden LJ discarded 
recklessness, reasonable foresight of damage and harm inflicted as an inevitable 
or probable consequence of the defendant's act as possible mental elements.
690 
yet for Lord Hoffmann the defendant's intention to harm the claimant as an end 
' 
made it too easy for defendants to escape liability by pleading to have sought self-
682 Cattle (1875) LR 10 Q.B. 453; Sayre (1923) 663ff; Harper (1953) 881; Chan/Simester (2004) 
154ff. 
683 Cf: Bowen (1880-81) L.R. 6 Q.B.D. 333, 338, Brett LJ; (1952) 52 Colum.L.Rev. 505; 
Contiguglia (1956) passim. 
684 Pollock (1893) passim; Holmes (l 894) 2, lOff; South Wales [1905] A.C. 239, 246, Lord 
Macnaghten. 
685 Bagshaw: (1998) 737-738; (2000) 140ff. 
686 Weir (1997) passim, (2004) 607, (2006) 199; Carty (2001) 62ff; Tettenborn (2006) pass_im. 
687 Emerald Construction Co. Ltd. v. Lowthian (1966] 1 W.L.R. 691, CA, 700, Lord Dennmg MR 
See: Dean ( 1967) passim. . 
688 Three Rivers [2003] 2 A.C. 1, 235, Lord Millett; Rogers (2005) 76; Edelman/Davies (2007) 
1308-9; Fairgrieve (2007) 355, 360. 
689 [2008] 1 A.C. 1: at [8]-(39-41], Lord Hoffmann; at [192] , Lord Nicholls. . . . 
690 [2005] E.W .C.A. Civ. 861, at [39-40]. Cf: McBride (2005) passim (assertmg that the mtent!On 
to harm is requisite to the unlawful-interference tort, not to Lumley). 
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profit or prevented losses without targeting claimants.
691 Still, mere carelessness 
' 
foresight and reckless indifference to the breach are insufficient. 
692 Finally, 
preventing contractual performance without causing a breach does not form the 
Lumley-tort. 693 Interestingly, Oliphant considered Weir's concern about an 
uncontrollable tort of mere interference with contract exaggerated, arguing that 
Torquay and Merkur were by and large deemed erroneous.
694 However, I think 
that Weir was right in this respect, as only OBG definitively dispelled all doubts. 
The intentional element in Lumley enables courts to discriminate between 
wrongful conduct and competitive activity. But to shield effectively contractual 
rights, courts substitute the intention to cause the breach for the intention to injure 
the claimant, which would excessively favour defendants. It is noteworthy that the 
intention-based liability in Lumley hangs on the contract-breakers' strict liability. 
5.2 Unlawful-interference tort 
Lord Watson neatly separated inducing breach of contract from causing economic 
loss to the claimant by using unlawful means against a third party. 
695 This 
distinction, which had been blurred particularly in Torquay and Merkur, was 
reinstated in OBG: the inducer is "secondarily" liable for the promisor's breach of 
contract, a result intended by the former as an end or as a means to another end ' 
typically self-emichment. The unlawful-interference tort entails the primary 
liability of the defendant who intends to injure the claimant in her economic 
interests as an end or as a means. The defendant uses unlawful means against a 
third party which must be independently actionable by the latter had she suffered 
harm, thereby impairing the third party from dealing with the claimant, who is 
consequently injured. Merely foreseeing that the claimant will be affected is 
insufficient, although reckless indifference is apparently equated to the intention 
to harm as a necessary means to achieve self-interest or other ultimate goaI.
696 
Thus, Lord Hoffmann apparently favoured Cooper's argument that the inducer is 
::~ OBG [2008] I A.C. l , at [60]-[135]. 
Ibid, at [ 191], Lord Nicholls. 
693 Ibid, at [44], Lord_ Hoffmann (dismissing the much criticised decisions in Torquay [1969] 2 Ch. 
106, 138, Lord Denmng MR; and in Merkur [1983] 2 A.C. 570, 608-609 Lord Diplock) 
694 Oliphant (1999) 321. ' · 
695 Allen [ 1898] A.C. 1, 96. 
696 0 BG [2008] 1 A.C. 1: at [8]-[38]-[49]-[51]-(62], Lord Hoffmann; at ( 166-167], Lord Nicholls. 
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secondarily liable by influencing the contract-breaker's decision not to perform, 
whereas the defendant is primarily liable for unlawful-interference.
697 
However, 
OBG required the inducer's intention to procure the breach rather than mere 
knowledge as Cooper had proposed. Moreover, English tort law, as opposed to 
criminal law, does not adhere to a principle of accessory liability.
698 
Tort law only 
admits joint tortfeasance, that is, the commission of the same wrongful act by two 
or more persons in concert, 699 and the Lumley-tort, which is separate from the 
breach of contract, each of which with its own rules on liability, measure of 
damages, remoteness and justifications.700 
The intention reflects the causal relationship between the defendant's act 
and its effect (that is, the breach of contract or the claimant's damage)
70 1 
and the 
kind of protected interest: Lumley protects the promisee's exclusive right to the 
F- peremptory status of the promisor' s performance, whereas the unlawful-
interference tort shields the claimant's right to performance from being unlawfully 
prevented. 702 Chapter II showed that the intention normally concerns the 
consequences of certain conduct. Accordingly, inducers must intend to procure 
the breach because this is what they want and do, whereas promisees are harmed 
by contract-breakers. Conversely, the defendant must intend to injure the claimant 
in her economic expectations by using wrongful means against a third party: this 
, is his goal and deed. Likewise, the kind of intention mirrors the legal hierarchy of 
the relevant interest. The difficulty to prove intention, requisite to the unlawful-
interference tort, is a legal threshold to protect the claimants' business interests 
over the defendants' liberty to compete. The intention in Lumley, probably less 
complex to establish than the former, uncovers the prima facie priority of 
contractual rights over business interests. 
Deakin and Randall emphasise that the diverse types of intention illustrate 
the superiority of contractual rights over trade interests generally. In order to 
697 See above n.482 and accompanying text. 
698 Amstrad Consumer Electronics Pie v The British Phonographic Industry Limited [ 1986) F.S.R. 
159, CA, 212, Slade LJ; Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland v. Export Credits Guarantee 
Department [2000) 1 A.C. 486, HL, 500, Lord Woolf MR. . 
699 The Koursk [1924) P. 140, CA, 159, Sargant LJ. See below n.1383 and accompanymg text. 
700 Weir (2004) 591; Deakin/Johnston/Markesinis (2007) 1040ff; Deakin/Randall (2009) 543; Lee 
(2009) 520ff. . 
701 Elias/Ewing (1982) 338; Sales/Stilitz (1999) 412; Chan/S1mester (2004) 132-133, 165 ; Carty 
(2008) 669. 
702 Chan/Simester (2004); Lee (2009) 523, 533. 
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make a consistent legal body of the economic torts, they propose treating the 
economic interests (contractual or not) alike, by incorporating Lumley into the 
unlawful-interference tort. Accordingly, the mental element is defined as targeting 
and interfering with the claimant's business, as an end or as a means to another 
end. It suffices that the defendant seeks to profit at the claimant's expense.703 
However, this attempt to organise the disordered economic torts clashes with what 
many scholars had eagerly awaited and OBG settled: the dissolution of the 
'unnatural union' between Lumley and unlawful-interference tort. 704 Further, if the 
economic interests in trade were given the same treatment to that accorded to 
contractual rights, the next logical step would be to equalise the protection of all 
kinds of economic interests, even proprietary interests. I do not think it possible, 
at least in the near future, that courts will place property, contract and competition 
freedom in the same rank. Each of these interests entails different relationships, 
conditions for liability and remedies. The proprietary interest in goodwill is 
principally safeguarded through the strict-liability passing-off tort and the 
availability of injunctions. Contractual rights are protected through Lumley against 
outsiders who persuade promisors to break their contracts with promisees. The 
preservation of economic interests in business at large involves a comparison 
between rivals' freedoms to compete. Moreover, the inclusion of Lumley into the 
unlawful-interference tort might obstruct the imposition of liability on inducers, 
since the claimant would be required to show the defendant's intention to harm 
her rather than the arguably less troublesome intention to procure the breach. This 
very practical consideration convinced Lord Hoffmann that Lumley requires the 
inducer's intention to cause the breach. 
Although -in OBG the damage sought by the defendant as a means to 
another end meets the intentional element in the unlawful-interference tort, 705 
Carty implies that the intention should be confined to. the harm aimed at the 
claimant. She offers, I understand, a solution to avoid the diffuse line between 
intended consequences and side-effects: harm intended as a means can easily be 
confused with harm merely foreseen as an inescapable effect of one's conduct.706 
However, this interpretation narrows the prospect of liability considerably. 
703 Deakin/Randall (2009) passim. 
704 [2008] 1 A.C. l, at [38), Lord Hoffmann 
705 ' 
706 
OBG [2008) 1 A.C. 1, at [164-165), Lord Nicholls. 
Carty (2008) 653ff. See above n.325 and accompanying text. 
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Claimants would need to prove a very strange, almost "pathological", business-
condition: that the defendants acted maliciously or intended to harm the claimants 
as an end. As Lord Hoffmann said, 707 defendants can easily evade a liability 
rooted in a thin notion of intention by showing to have promoted self-interest, 
whether gaining profits or preventing losses. His Lordship chose to restrict 
wrongfulness, possibly for the same reasons Carty suggests to limit intention: to 
eschew the nuances between intended and unintended harm. The issue about 
which approach best controls the expansion of liability remains controversial. 
6. Observations 
Lumley reinforces contractual rights by compelling third parties to respect one 
.r- another's agreements as a fact. Yet, non-performance is basically the concern of 
contracting parties. The unlawful-interference tort protects economic interests in 
business generally from being invaded by others abusing their competition 
freedom through the use of unlawful means against a third party. However, 
significant differences in intention and wrongfulness separate both torts, thus 
hindering their fusion around a common criterion. 
The mental element discloses the policy of excluding liability for 
Regligently caused economic loss which is legitimate competition. In both torts 
the intention relates to the result caused by the agent: the breach of contract to the 
promisee's detriment or the damage occasioned to the claimant's economic 
interests. Nevertheless, the law further restrains liability. It demands that the 
tortfeasor, in exercising her freedom to compete, violates the claimant's 
contractual rights (by procuring the breach of the relevant contract) or economic 
interests (by using wrongful means against a third party). Merely perturbing 
contractual rights or prospective economic advantages without causing breach of 
contract or using wrongful means is fair competition. Yet, as seen,
708 
the common 
law accords stronger protection to contractual rights vis-a-vis other economic 
interests in business. In principle, it is easier to establish the conditions for 
imposing liability in Lumley than to prove the unlawful-interference tort. 
Likewise, the scope of justifications is significantly narrower in the former than in 
707 OBG [2008] 1 A.C. 1, at [59-60]-[ 135]. 
708 Above Chapter II, section IIl.2.4, pp.47ff. See below n.810. 
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the latter. Nonetheless, where promisees' contractual rights are affected by third 
parties without inducing breaches of contracts, promisees may avail themselves 
no remedy other than the unlawful-interference tort. 
There is consensus that tort liability for harm inflicted between 
commercial competitors must be kept restrained in congruence with the free-
competition policy and that this purpose can be accomplished if liability 1s 
subjected to a given intention and wrongful means. However, there is 
disagreement over the dimension of each of these ingredients. OBG defined 
wrongfulness strictly and intention broadly but elicited academic discussion about 
the reasonable width of each. Leading modem scholars propose eradicating the 
instrumentally pursued harm, as a means to another end, from the notion of 
intention, given the similarity between it and side-effects. Jurists remain sceptical 
about using a moral-philosophical concept of intention which, as Chapter II 
showed, poses practical dilemmas. Still, limiting the intention to the damage 
targeted at the victim (as an end) could bias the balance against claimants, forcing 
them to prove malice, whereas defendants would easily negate liability by 
showing to have sought economic self-interest. Notably, perhaps OBG opted for a 
broader intention for the same reason that authors suggest constraining it: to avoid 
the subtle distinction between intended and unintended harm. . In tum, 
wrongfulness is by no means free from problems. On the contrary, the slim notion 
of wrongfulness in the unlawful-interference tort clashes with the wide concept 
governing unlawful means conspiracy and three-party intimidation. 
Finally, English tort law recognises the impact of contractual performance 
on the economy but offers a moderate protection against breach. Breaking 
contracts is not necessarily culpable. Promisors can default, paying damages 
instead, and specific performance is exceptional. Hence the efficient-breach 
theory treats Lumley as in contradiction with contractual principles. Nevertheless, 
I have argued that enticing others into breaking their co~tracts is misbehaviour 
independent of the breach of contract that deserves to be punished in its own right. 
Nonetheless, courts enforce Lumley discretely, filling contractual gaps in specific 
situations involving non-anticompetitive negative covenants and agreements 
concerning exclusive goods/services in respect of which neither compensation nor 
specific performance is available or adequate. 
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significant differences in intention and wrongfulness separate both torts, thus 
hindering their fusion around a common criterion. 
The mental element discloses the policy of excluding liability for 
i:iegligently caused economic loss which is legitimate competition. In both torts 
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contractual rights (by procuring the breach of the relevant contract) or economic 
interests (by using wrongful means against a third party). Merely perturbing 
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. f . . . y 708 th 
contract or using wrongful means IS air competition. et, as seen, e common 
law accords stronger protection to contractual rights vis-a-vis other economic 
interests in business. In principle, it is easier to establish the conditions for 
imposing liability in Lumley than to prove the unlawful-interference tort. 
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707 OBG [2008) 1 AC. 1, at [59-60)-[135] . 
708 Above Chapter II, section IIl.2.4, pp.47ff. See below n.810. 
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the latter. Nonetheless, where promisees' contractual rights are affected by third 
parties without inducing breaches of contracts, promisees may avail themselves 
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There is consensus that tort liability for harm inflicted between 
commercial competitors must · be kept restrained in congruence with the free-
competition policy and that this purpose can be accomplished if liability IS 
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disagreement over the dimension of each of these ingredients. OBG defined 
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instrumentally pursued harm, as a means to another end, from the notion of 
intention, given the similarity between it and side-effects. Jurists remain sceptical 
about using a moral-philosophical concept of intention which, as Chapter II 
showed, poses practical dilemmas. Still, limiting the intention to the damage 
targeted at the victim (as an end) could bias the balance against claimants, forcing 
them to prove malice, whereas defendants would easily negate liability by 
showing to have sought economic self-interest. Notably, perhaps OBG opted for a 
broader intention for the same reason that authors suggest constraining it: to avoid 
the subtle distinction between intended and unintended harm. . In tum, 
wrongfulness is by no means free from problems. On the contrary, the slim notion 
of wrongfulness in the unlawful-interference tort clashes with the wide concept 
governing unlawful means conspiracy and three-party intimidation. 
Finally, English tort law recognises the impact of contractual performance 
on the economy but offers a moderate protection against breach. Breaking 
contracts is not n_ecessarily culpable. Promisors can default, paying damages 
instead, and specific performance is exceptional. Hence the efficient-breach 
theory treats Lumley as in contradiction with contractual principles. Nevertheless, 
I have argued that enticing others into breaking their c~ntracts is misbehaviour 
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concerning exclusive goods/services in respect of which neither compensation nor 
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IV. Conclusions 
This chapter showed that the economic torts form an asymmetrical legal field 
devoid of a consolidating principle. This result partially flows from the piecemeal 
structure and development of tort law, which compartmentalises the conditions for 
imposing liability for pecuniary harm caused between competitors depending on 
the tort at issue. Liability is subjected to a mental element, thus excluding 
negligence. Yet, the content of intention varies considerably between the 
economic torts. Similarly, English law denies a purely intention-rooted liability 
and requires wrongful means. However, unlawfulness is ousted from simple 
conspiracy and the scope of wrongful means is not uniform in the remaining 
economic torts. Thus, there is no principle of liability for intentionally or 
wrongfully inflicted economic harm and it seems unlikely that one can be 
,.. constructed. I have also stressed that there is a political explanation for the state of 
disorder in the economic torts. Courts have traditionally protected capital from 
workers' collective action through the enforcement of economic-tort liability with 
a view of regulating industrial competition. Simple conspiracy and three-party 
intimidation owe their existence to the judicial aversion to labour organisations. 
Hence the relationship between courts and Parliament has been uneasy, the latter 
continuously reacting by granting legislative immunities to counteract those torts . 
' Conversely, courts have followed a laissez-faire approach towards business 
competition, probably because business contenders struggle on equal terms. 
Courts have reduced the impact of the economic torts, particularly through 
wrongfulness, and left to the legislature the normal control of commercial rivalry. 
This illustrates the importance of segregating both sectors of competition. In 
particular, the common law has managed liability for financial harm between 
trade opponents consistently, adopting a circumspect attitude, however the 
technical irregularities overwhelming the economic torts . Although OBG 
disclosed discordant opinions about the role that the unlawful-interference tort 
should fulfil in commercial competition, Lord Hoffmann' s conservative stance 
prevailed. This gives a hint about the residual function that the economic torts are 
ascribed in this area, supplementing antitrust law and helping to protect property, 
contract and competition freedom against extreme or abusive conduct. 
Furthermore, I made plain that the lack of an all-embracing standard applicable to 
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the economic torts does not prevent courts from solving disputes between 
business competitors thus yielding fairness, consistency and certainty, provided 
that courts balance the parties' clashing interests against each other. Indeed, 
intention-based liability and wrongfulness need not produce divergent outcomes, 
for both depend on the judicial ability to weigh said interests. 
This chapter also revealed that the reasons why English law denies liability 
for intentionally caused economic damage without wrongful means (save for 
simple conspiracy) are diverse. Along with interpretations underpinned in 
principle, like the supposedly greater certainty of unlawfulness as compared with 
the prima facie tort, there is an eloquent argument that the dismissal of intention-
based liability (or its acceptance in conspiracy) was basically influenced by the 
political and historical context within which the core economic-tort cases were 
decided. 
Furthermore, this chapter showed that English law denies imposing 
liability upon those who, in the occasion of exercising a right, intentionally injure 
others who lack a countervailing right. However, as regards conflicts between 
neighbours holding equivalent rights, English law may rely on the intention with 
which defendants act and hold them liable in nuisance, thus attaining analogous 
results to the abuse-of-rights doctrine. Likewise, I demonstrated that the prima 
facie tort overlaps with the clearest case of abuse of rights, the scope of which is 
therefore wider than the former. Yet, while simple conspiracy is the exclusive 
representative of the prima facie tort in English law, it has scarcely been used in 
commercial competition. Nor is unlawful means conspiracy a better candidate in 
this domain, particularly considering that prospective claimants can resort to the 
strict-liability statutory competition torts. 
On the other hand, the primacy of contractual rights over economic 
interests in business at large is reflected in the diverse conditions for imposing 
liability for inducing breach of contract in relation to · those concerning the 
unlawful-interference tort, the latter being arguably more difficult to establish 
than the former. There is an ongoing discussion about whether economic interests 
of different sorts should be protected evenly. The distinct kinds of intention and 
wrongfulness each of these torts entail also reveals the fragmented feature of the 
economic torts. 
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Finally, the fact that Lumley-tort basically helps to fill contractual gaps, 
providing redress in very specific covenants, and the fact that case-law d~es not 
acknowledge a two-party intimidation tort, also indicate that the economic torts 
perform a circumscribed task in business competition. English courts are rel~ctant 
to substitute the economic torts for statutory regulation or contractual remedies. 
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CHAPTER IV 
UNFAIR COMPETITION TORTS 
Chapter III discussed the main features of th.e English economic torts. The current 
chapter analyses passing-off and malicious falsehood as the common-law torts 
specifically used to tackle unfair competition. Passing-off and malicious falsehood 
too differ from the statutory competition torts, examined in Chapter V, which are 
grounded in antitrust (not unfair) conduct. Yet, as I will demonstrate, courts 
generally approach passing-off with the same caution observed towards the other 
economic torts in the context of commercial battles. Thus, I will argue that 
English courts have rejected a general tort of unfair competition opting for a 
piecemeal protection of trade values, as the two torts which are the subject-matter 
of this chapter illustrate. Passing-off has incessantly expanded and, in fact, 
protected novel commercial interests more quickly than statutes, often serving 
irresponsible claimants to achieve monopolistic goals. Passing-off is commonly 
decided through injunctions granted in interlocutory proceedings which prevent 
courts from pondering the effects of allowing the action. Courts have attempted to 
mitigate this risk by confining passing-off to its conventional boundaries but this 
method has not solved the issue definitively. More significantly, I will · emphasise 
two points which are usually downplayed. First, I will show that passing-off is 
rooted in deliberate conduct and actually conceals the defendant's intention to 
harm the claimant by drawing away the latter's custom. However, passing-off 
entails strict-liability for outcomes, thereby releasing the claimant from proving 
the said mental element (let alone fault). Strict liability, I will suggest, reflects the 
superior value that the common law attributes to property in goodwill over 
contractual rights and economic interests in business at large which are protected 
through the Lumley and unlawful-interference torts, respectively, thereby 
requiring proof of a mental element. Yet, I will challenge as unprincipled the 
stronger protection accorded to property over the other types of economic 
interests, proposing that passing-off should be contingent upon the defendant's 
intention to harm the claimant. Secondly, I will submit that malicious falsehood 
resembles simple conspiracy in that it is entirely founded on malice (excluding 
wrongful means), it is hard-proving and it is relatively easy to justify. The fact 
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that malicious falsehood has a limited impact on commercial c
ompetition 
sidesteps the formal contradiction between malicious falsehood and the
 remaining 
economic torts which, save for simple conspiracy, require unlawful 
means, and 
also the inconsistent protection of business reputation through inten
tion-based 
liability (malicious falsehood) and outcome-based strict liability (passing-off). 
Section I reviews the modem development of the law against un
fair 
practices. Among the various legal and extra-legal mechanisms offeri
ng redress 
against unfair commercial methods, tort law occupies a reduced area, 
helping to 
prevent and compensate for economic losses. Section II describes the e
lements of 
passing-off and malicious falsehood. In particular, I assess the rejection of a 
principle of liability for unfair business practices and the judicial reluctance to 
regulate competition except for extreme situations. However, I explain
 the debate 
within case-law and scholarship whether passing-off should be conver
ted into an 
all-embracing tort of unfair trading, supporting a negative answer. S
ection III 
synthesises the principal conclusions. 
I. Introduction 
This section describes unfair competition law as a distinctive legal dom
ain within 
wh\ch the economic torts, and especially passing-off and malicious 
falsehood, 
p~rform a limited function. The central issue that courts face is dete
rmining to 
what extent the proprietary interests in trade-values (as goodwill) must be given 
priority over competition freedom. This conceals an ongoing tension b
etween the 
courts and Parliament concerning the distribution of the power 
to protect 
commercial competition from unfair practices. 
Unfair competition law aims at avoiding excessive competition and tack
les 
obnoxious, unfair or unethical business acts inimical to compe
titors and 
consumers. Antitrust law is a separate yet complementary discipline co
mmitted to 
preserving free competition through the prevention and punis
hment of 
anticompetitive conduct. 
709 Broadly speaking, unfair competition encompasses 
'any act of competition contrary to honest practices in industrial or c
ommercial 
709 Handler (1936) 214-215; Terry (1988) 296-297; Henning-Bodewig (2006) 3ff. 
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matters'. 
710 Article 10(3).bI·s of the ParI·s C · 'd onvention provI es examples of 
prohibited conduct partially overlapping with passing-off and 
malicious 
falsehood, 
7 11 
the specific torts whereby the common law counteracts unfair 
commercial misbehaviour.
712 In England, the term "unfair competition" was first 
employed to hold that equity prevented the defendant from misrepres
enting his 
work as the claimant's.
713 This is passing-off, the impermissible act of deceiving 
the typical consumers: 
714 
'nobody has any right to represent his goods as the 
goods of somebody else' .
715 At the tum of the twentieth century, the law against 
unfair competition was relocated within intellectual property law, then
 becoming 
the legal branch entrusted with the protection of diverse trade values: 
intellectual 
property rights ("IPRs"), which shield from the unauthorised imitation or 
exploitation of the right-holders' ideas, particularly industrial property i
n the form 
of trademarks (that is, unique symbols on which right-holders have a legal 
monopoly qualified by another person's right to use same brand descrip
tively);716 
trade-names; get-up, packages and labels; and goodwill. Trade-nam
es include 
descriptive words whose use is reserved to those who through 
effort and 
investment create a "secondary meaning" associated with the origin of
 a product, 
service or business, rather than 
. ") 717 G d · 11 ' . meanmg . oo WI IS the 
with its nature or characteristics ("primary 
benefit and advantage of the good name, 
reputation, and connection of a business. It is the attractive force whic
h brings in 
custom.' 718 
Unfair competition law has been used with flexibility for curbing no
vel 
immoral business behaviour affecting consumers and competitors, det
erring and 
710 
Articl_e 10(2).bis, the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property 188
3 ("Paris 
Convention"). 
11 1 I h' h 
.e., a~ts w. 1~. can pose co~usion as to the competitors' business
, goods, industrial and 
commercial actJv1tJes; an? allegations (false or not) made in the course of trade that ca
n disparage 
those tra?e~values o~ m_is_Iead the public vis-a-vis the nature, the 
manufacturing process, the 
charactenst1cs, the su1tab1hty for the1r purpose or the quantity of the go
ods. 
7 12 Wadlow (2004) 62-63. . 
~:: ~o~g v. Kirby (1803) 32 E.R. 336, Ch. 340, Lord Eldon. 
" Th1rsty fol,~ want beer, not explanations': Montgomery v. Thomp
son [1891] A.C. 217, HL 
( Montgomery ), 225, Lord Macnaghten 715 • 
Reddaway [1896] AC. 199,204, Lord Halsbury 
716 . 
' 
Cornish/Llewellyn (2007) 3ff. 
717 
rv.litchell \ 1896) 275_-280; Rogers (1913) 139; Haines (1919) 2ff; Handler/Picket
t (1930) 
passim; Hennmg-B0dew1g (2006) 18. 
7 18 
Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Muller & Co's Margarine Ltd. [1901] AC. 21
7, HL 223-
224, Lord Macnaghten. 
' 
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rectifying damage to goodwill.719 According to the dominant economic policy the 
common law can repress all sorts of unfair competitive methods or confine to 
passing-off.720 The moderate approach is to expand gradually the notion of "unfair 
competition" through the careful analysis of the harmful business practices, 
establishing clear precedents and construing IPRs in a manner that avoids the 
monopolisation of ideas whose imitation is intrinsic to competition. 
721 
This 
reflects, I think, the tension between the private monopolistic interest in trade 
values (as IPRs) and the public interest in free competition resolved by case-law 
or statutes. Some rely on the courts' ability to tackle unfair competition without 
opening 'a Pandora's box of vexatious litigation' .722 International News Service v. 
Associated Press 723 famously illustrated the friction between the judicial and 
legislative pressures.724 The claimant (AP) and the defendant (INS) were direct 
p competitors in the market of gathering and distributing news. INS induced 
employees of AP's newspapers members to breach their internal by-laws, 
providing INS with copies of the news stories which AP had elaborated from the 
news collected by it, pending their publication. INS used AP' s news stories 
verbatim in its newspapers without acknowledging their source. The U.S Supreme 
Court enjoined INS from copying and distributing AP' s news to prevent the 
defendant from reaping where it had not sown.725 Although AP lacked a property 
' . . . . 
right in the news stories not yet published it had a quas1-propnetary mterest m 
those intangibles whose misappropriation for commercial use by INS entailed 
unfair practice and unjust enrichment to AP' s detriment. 726 The majority 
judgment, Epstein notes, solved the concrete problem that the common-law rules 
on property, contract and tort left unsettled. INS committed neither passing-off 
(by omitting the source of the news stories, INS could not compare them with 
719 Rogers (1913) 148, (1919) passim; Haines (1919) 27. . 
720 The latter more conservative tendency is illustrated with Mosler Safe Co. v. Ely-Norris Safe 
Co. 273 U.S. 132 (1927), Holmes J dismissing the passing-off action as the claimant (a 
manufacturer of safes containing an explosion chamber) failed to show that the defendant had 
misrepresented the fact of producing the same type of device. This case shows the difficult issue of 
causation. Holmes J stated that the defendant had not caused the claimant's loss of clientele: 
costumers could have purchased from the claimant's competitors even if they would have known 
of the misrepresentation. 
721 Chafee (1940) 1302ff. · 
722 New York & R. Cement Co. v. Coplay Cement Co. 44 Fed.277 (1890), 278, Bradley J; Rogers 
(1913) 139, 157-158. 
723 248 U.S. 215 (1918, "International News"). 
724 Rogers (1919) passim; Haines (1919) 22. 
725 International News 248 U.S. 215,239, Pitney J. 
726 Ibid, 243-244, Pitney J. 
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AP's news) nor the Lumley-tort (the information was not confidential but intended 
to be published). Likewise, whereas the rule of first possession grants indefinite 
property in corporeal things, news can only be owned temporarily. The court 
sorted out this by recognising AP a "quasi-proprietary right in news" collected for 
publication that could only be opposed against its direct rival for a limited time.727 
For Epstein, it was efficient not to acknowledge AP permanent ownership as news 
exists to be distributed. So, whereas the majority decision understood the central 
distinction between news, corporeal things and copyright (the duration of which is 
too long to be extended to the former), the dissenting judges apparently did not.728 
Thus, Justice Brandeis held to be for Congress to create property rights in news.729 
Therefore, International News concerned the appropriate manner of 
balancing the public interest in competition against the monopolisation of 
valuable (unprotected) incorporeal goods and whether this duty should rest with 
courts or legislation. Some American contemporaneous scholars argued that case-
law was more responsive to unfair competition than statutes: although Congress 
can address these problems with wider perspective it intervenes sporadically.730 
For others, statutes could regulate unfair practices more dynamically than the 
intermittent case-law, following the evolving social and economic trends. 
Moreover, the common law's incremental approach over-stated extreme 
misconduct, leaving gaps which can only be filled by regulation.731 
Currently, however, unfair competition law encompasses overlapping legal 
fields (tort law, trademarks and consumer protection) and sources (general 
principles, case-law and special legislation). Furthermore, self-regulation 
(non/soft-law) is a major mechanism for enforcing the observance of honest trade 
behaviour, for example in the advertising business, without generating excessive 
litigation as compared with legal devices.732 
Consequently, the law against unfair competition is an autonomous and 
open-ended field whose crux is weighing competition freedom against innovation, 
effort and investment encapsulated in diverse trade-values. Parliament and courts 
727 Ibid, 236. 
728 Epstein (1992) passim. 
729 1 . l N nternatwna ews 248 U.S. 215 263 
730 , ' . 
73 1 
Handl~r/P1ckett (1930) 788; Handler (1936) passim; Callmann (1942) 609. 
732 
Fathch1_ld (1936) 305ff; Chafee (1940) 1289. 
B0dew1g (1994) 198-199; Henning-Bodewig (2006) 10-11; Mailers/Heinemann (2007) 30-31. 
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permanently dispute the right to define the equilibrium between such conflicting 
interests. 
II. The unfair competition torts 
Putting aside specific statutes, English law protects businesses from unfair 
competitive methods through the economic torts. Yet, the preservation of trade 
values basically focuses on passing-off, which is mainly used to prevent unfair 
practices through injunctions, and malicious falsehood, which provides 
compensation for harm caused to competitors in their goodwill through false and 
d
. . th . d · 733 fraudulent statements 1sparagmg eir goo s or services. 
,, 
1. Passing-off 
1.1 Contours 
Passing-off essentially helps to defend the reputation of the claimant's product or 
services and consumers' accurate information. So, it prevents claimants from 
losing clientele for reasons other than their own inefficiency and customers' 
preferences.734 In a celebrated case passing-off was defined as '[a] man is not to I 
d f th 
, 735 
sell his own goods under the pretence that they are the goo s o ano er man . 
Thus, the defendant misleads the claimant's consumers into believing that they 
purchased the claimant's goods or services while actually bought the defendant's. 
Costumers are thus likely to be confused and prevented from making informed 
choices, whereas the defendant profits from the claimant's established commercial 
reputation.736 Passing-off infringes the 'most elementary principles of commercial 
morality' by stripping the claimant of its legitimate trade.
737 
Nonetheless, passing-
off counterbalances unfair competition in a roundabout fashion: the claimant is 
not the deceived consumer but the defendant's competitor 'whose trade is likely to 
733 Heydon (1978) 82; Cane (1996) 79, 98ff. 
734 (1964) 77 Harv.L.Rev. 911. . . 
735 Perry v. Truefitt (1842) 49 E.R. 749, Ch., 753, Lord Langdale MR. S1m1larly : Sykes v. Sykes 
(1824) 107 E.R. 834, K.B.C. 
736 Cane (1996) 61, 78 ; Weir (2006)196. 
737 Reddaway [1896] A.C. 199,209, Lord Herschell. 
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suffer from the deception practised on the public but who is not himself deceived 
at all' .738 
Passing-off has been adapted to the changing economic context with great 
flexibility. Nineteenth-century courts offered equitable injunctive relief without 
d d" d · 739 eman mg ece1t and harm: passing-off turned complicated for the opposite 
reason. Subsequent case-law enhanced the protection to trademarks and trade-
names. Likewise, the commercial mutability and indefinable rationale of passing-
off rendered this tort useful for safeguarding trade values against 
misrepresentation related to the merchandise (primary meaning) or the place of 
manufacture (secondary meaning), as the "drink cases" illustrate.740 
Of more significance, I think, is the incessant clash between the claimants' 
interest in trade values, the defendants' liberty to compete and the consumers' 
right not to be misinformed which has pervaded the development of passing-off. 
As Carty argues, the fact that passing-off is mainly resolved at interlocutory stage 
often prevents courts from assessing the impact of allowing the action. 
Accordingly, dominant firms can secure monopolistic positions by using passing-
off as a general tort against legitimate competitive activities. However, to avoid 
the misuse of passing-off courts demand proof that the defendant misrepresented 
his goods as though they were the claimant's ones and that the claimant was likely 
to be injured in her goodwill.74 1 The requirements of misrepresentation, goodwill 
and likely damage to it were established in AG Spalding & Bros v. AW Gamage 
Ltd, 742 augmented to five in Advocaat 743 and reinstated to three in Reckitt & 
Colman Products Ltd. v. Borden Inc. (No.3). 744 
738 1 Bollinger SA_ v. Costa Brava Wine Co. Ltd. [1960] Ch. 262, Ch.D. ("Cham a ne" ) 274 
~:nckwerts J; Werr (2006) 197; Epstein (2008) 1291. P g ' ' 
740 
Millington v. Fox (1838) 40 E.R. 956, Ch. 
I.e., Champagne [1960] Ch. 262; Vine Products Ltd. v. Mackenzie & Co. Ltd. (No.5) [1968] 
F.S .R. 625, Ch.D.; John Walker & Sons Ltd. v. Henry Ost & Co. Ltd. [1970] 1 WLR 917 Ch D. 
HP Bulmer Ltd. v. J Bollinger SA. (No.3) [1978] R.P.C. 79, CA; Erven Wamink BV. ~. J Town~nd 
~/ons (Hull) Ltd. (No. ]) [1979] A.C. 731, HL ("Advocaat"). See: Wadlow (2004) 15ff 
Carty (2001) passim. · 
742 
743 
[1914-~5] All E.R. ~ep.147, HL ("Spalding"), 149, Lord Parker. 
I.e., m1?epresentat1on, by the defendant in trade, to its prospective/ultimate consumers of 
goods/~erv1c~s, calculated to harm the claimant's business/goodwill , and actually or likely 
fLoducmg this effect: [ 1979] A.C. 731 , 742, Lord Dip lock. 
[ 1990] l W.L.R. 491, HL ("Jif Lemon"), 499, Lord Oliver. 
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Jacob J stated: ' [at] the heart of passing off lies deception or its likelihood, 
deception of the ultimate consumer in particular'. 
745 Misrepresentation consists of 
using or imitating trademarks, trade-names or get-up in a manner calculated 
(likely) to deceive consumers as to the origin of a certain good, service or 
business (secondary meaning) distinctively linked to the claimant, the defendant 
pretending that the claimant's good, service or business is associated with him. 
Misrepresentations connected with the quality, nature, geographical area or other 
features of the good or service (primary meaning) may also form passing-off. 
Courts grant injunctions to protect provisionally the use of descriptive names, 
746 . b d'ff' 1 words or get-up with unique reputation. Nevertheless, 1t can every 1 1cu t to 
prove that consumers will likely be deceived: people often purchase products for 
747 'd b . . 1 
what they are, whatever their origin. Expert and survey ev1 ence can e cntlca , 
although the likelihood of consumers' deception can more easily be established 
F where the litigants do not compete with one each other, given the widespread 
licensing and diversification between them. 
748 Courts grant injunctions in these 
749 
cases. 
Yet, it seems to me that the decision whether passing-off shields 
worthwhile commercial values or yields undue advantages at the expense of the 
claimants' competitors hinges on a subjective appraisal. In Cadbury Schweppes 
Pty Ltd. v. Pub Squash Co. Pty Ltd750 the Privy Council rejected the suit because 
no consumer would confuse the claimant's drink "Solo" with the defendant's 
' 
"Pub Squash": passing-off requires more than a simple confusion, imitation or 
misappropriation of another's ideas. 751
 The defendant must normally pose a 
considerable risk that reasonable purchasers of the relevant goods or services will 
be disoriented. 752 Consumers' experience and the manner how products are 
displayed can be material: 'persons whose life or education has not taught them 
much about the nature and production of wine, but who from time to time want to 
745 Hodgkinson & Corby Ltd v. Wards Mobility Services Ltd (No.]) (1995] F.S.R. 169, Ch.D. 
("Hodgkinson"), 174-175. 
746 E.g., Chocosuisse Union des Fabricants Suisses de Chocolat v. Cadbury Ltd. [ 1998] R.P.C. 
117, Ch.D. ("Chocosuisse"). 
747 Hodgkinson (1995] F.S.R. 169, 178, Jacob J. 
748 Lego Systems A/S v. Lego M Lemelstrich Ltd. (1983] F.S.R. 155, Ch.D. ("Lego"). 
749 Spalding (1914-15] All E.R. Rep.147, 153, Lord Parker; Mirage Studios v. Counter-Feat 
Clothing Co. Ltd. [1991] F.S.R. 145, Ch.D. 
750 [1981] 1 W.L.R. 193, P.C. ("Cadbury"). 
751 Ibid, 200-201 , Lord Scarman. 
752 United Biscuits (UK) Ltd. v. Burtons Biscuits Ltd. (1992] F.S.R. 14, Ch.D. 
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purchase champagne, as the wine with the great reputation, are likely to be misled 
by the description "Spanish Champagne"'. 753 
As Lord Bridge argued in Jif Lemon, courts refuse to grant injunctions if 
they perc · 1 · · 754 H e1ve a monopo 1st1c attempt. ere, however, their Lordships held the 
defendant liable for selling preserved lemon juice using a plastic container very 
similar in size, shape and colour to the claimant's popular "Jif'. Thus, passing-off 
served to confer a common-law monopoly upon the claimant's industrial design 
that could not be registered as trademark, filling a statutory gap which was only 
removed with the Trademarks Act 1994.755 The Law Lords considered that the 
average inadvertent consumer looked at the shape without reading the label on the 
package. Hence some authors criticised this judgment for restricting free 
competition. The defendant had incorporated a label on its product that made it 
clear its origin, discarding any misrepresentation.756 So, Jif Lemon shows us that 
passing-off can furnish wider defence against unfair competition than trademark 
legislation: 'I still have some doubts as to whether the law of registered trade 
marks needs to be stretched to cover conduct readily caught by more general 
unfair competition rules. Thus out-of-date goods have been dealt with easily by 
passing off'. 
757 
Indeed, as Lord Scarman said, passing-off has developed by 
protecting unregistered marks or registered marks against practices other than 
trademark infringement. It has safeguarded descriptive materials (as sl~gans) and 
visual images that consumers link to the claimant's goods thanks to advertising 
campaigns. 758 
Needless to say, passing-off cannot exist if the claimant lacks goodwill. 
This is a proprietary right over business rooted in the customer connection derived 
from the prestige or reputation of the claimant's products or services (that is, the 
public knowledge ·and good impression about them).759 Likewise, the claimant's 
goodwill must actually or likely be affected by the defendant's 
753 
J. Bollinger v. Costa Brava Wine Co. Ltd. (No. 2) (1961] l W.L.R. 277, Ch.D., 291, 
Danckwerts J. See: Carty (2001) 183. 
754 (1990] I W.L.R. 491,495. 
755 
Rogers (1994) 208 ; Cane (1996) 59ff. 
756 
Christie (1990) passim; Weir (2004) 588. 
757 
Boehringer lngelheim KG v. Swingward Ltd. [2004] E.W.C.A. Civ. 129 CA at (20] Jacob LJ 758 Cadbury [1981] I W.L.R. 193,200. , , , . 
759 
Murray (1997) passim; Carty (2001) 181, 203ff. 
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misrepresentation.760 The law does not require actual economic damage because 
there is a proprietary interest in goodwill at stake. Hence passing-off entails strict 
liability.761 The claimant's goodwill and the likelihood of it being harmed can 
more readily be proved, and injunctions granted, where both parties are rivals. 
Conversely, courts dismiss claims brought by celebrities against non-competitors: 
the risk of consumers' confusion declines if litigants lack a common field of 
activity.762 The claimant must show that her product is of superior quality than the 
defendant's merchandise and that the defendant alleged his good to be connected 
with the claimant's product.763 Proof of the likelihood of harm to goodwill helps 
to dissuade prospective claimants from employing passing-off for monopolistic 
aims. 764 Speculative claims, founded, for instance, on successful commercial 
magnetism 765 may conceal the attempt to establish a general tort of unfair 
,t"-competition. 766 
Now, the harm to goodwill causes claimants loss of profits (like diversion 
of trade) which are recoverable depending on the hypothetical question about the 
number of consumers that would have remained with the claimant had passing-off 
not been committed.767 The claimant can also sue for the devaluation of reputation 
caused by the defendant's discredited goods passed as though they were the 
claimant's famous ones, provided that the consumers' negative perception 
l.k 1 . . h 1 . t 
768 M 
towards the defendant's products is 1 e y to mJure t e c a1man. oreover, 
passing-off itself involves a presumption of nominal damages (just like in 
trespass) alongside substantial damages.769 
760 Draper v. Trist [1939] 3 ALL E.R. 513, CA, 525-527, Goddard LJ; Jif Lemon [1990] 1 W.L.R. 
491,499, Lord Oliver. 
761 Heydon (1978) 88ff; Cane (1996) 78-79. 
762 Harrods v. Harrodian School [1996] R.P.C. 697, CA ("Harrods"), 714, Millett LJ. See: Jones 
( 1999b) 28ff. 
763 Harrods [1996] R.P.C. 697, 720-721, Millett LJ. 
764 Alfred Dunhill Ltd. v. Sunoptic SA. [1979] F.S.R. 337, CA, 368, Roskill LJ_-
765 E.g., the loss of control over the quality of the defendant's prbducts even 1f the defendant ran a 
different business than the claimant's one, enjoying prestige abroad: Lego [1983] F.S.R. 155. 
766 Carty (2001) 211 ff. 
767 Epstein (2008) 1292. 
768 Unitex Ltd v. Union Texturing Co. Ltd. [1973] F.S.R. 181, CA. 
769 McGregor (2003) 1467-68. 
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1.2 The misuse of passing-off 
Traditionally, courts are loath to systematise the law around an overall tort-
principle, to construe statutory rights progressively and to fill legislative gaps. As 
. d' d 770 . m 1cate elsewhere, courts mterpret narrowly the private monopoly over 
creativity, effort and investment contained in IPRs. Not only are these rights 
limited in time and by the public interest in free competition (which allows the 
imitation of ideas and innovation to consumers' benefit) but courts generally leave 
to statutes the creation of new rights to safeguard commercially valuable ideas.771 
American case-law is analogously committed to safeguard free competition. 
International News was confined to its facts, 772 the copying of published written 
material not protected through IPRs is permitted, 773 tort claims disclosing 
monopolistic goals are rejected774 and IPRs are construed so as not to comer the 
market. 775 Some even propose to eradicate liability for the misappropriation of 
trade-secrets arguing that the spread of information and expertise over industries 
·t r . . 776 . can rev1 a 1se competition. This pro-competition judicial policy is mirrored in 
specific torts, strict rules of evidence and a cautious interpretation of IPRs. 
Nevertheless, there has been a continuous dispute within English case-law 
between the conservative idea of keeping liability confined and the expansionist 
conception that passing-off is a 'protean' tort always changing and growing777 that 
resembles a general tort of unfair competition. The latter tendency, Carty 
suggests, has been prompted by powerful firms seeking to increase their market 
influence by enjoining existing/prospective competitors and is facilitated by the 
fact that passing-off is regularly resolved at interlocutory stage, so courts lack 
770 9 (l 64) 77 Harv.L.Rev. 932ft; Heydon: (1978) 134ff (1980) 143; Cornish/Llewellyn (2007) 
l 2ff, 36ff. , 
771 E th 'h .g., e copyng ton car-exhausts does not cover spare parts: British Leyland Motor Corp. Ltd. 
r1/rmstrong Patents Co. Ltd. [1986] R.P.C. 279, HL. 
773 
Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp. 35 F.2d 279 (1929), 280, Hand J. 
774 
Sears, R~ebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co. 376 U.S. 225 (1964). 
Internatzonal News 248 U.S. 215, 250, Brandeis J; Shredded Wheat Co. v. Humphrey Cornell 
Co. 250 F.960 (1918), 964, Hand J. 
775 Zlinkoff (1943) 529ft, 546ff; Brown (1948) 1206; Knight (1978) 164ff; Denicola (1999) 
passim. 
776 McBrearty (1980) passim. 
777 Advocaat [1979] A.C. 73 1, 740, Lord Diplock. 
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time to examine in-depth the substan
tive issues. Yet, case-law has over a
nd over 
. 1 . . t 778 
confined passing-off to its c ass1c req
mremen s. 
In Advocaat their Lordships gran
ted an injunction forbidding the 
defendant from selling in England its
 egg-flip (a beverage made with wine) under 
the name "advocaat" (which contains eggs a
nd spirit). Lord Diplock opined that 
the defendant had acted dishonestl
y and the law should protect com
petitors 
(whatever the number) whose business or g
oodwill attached to said descriptive 
word has been affected by such 
conduct. 779 Consequently, he ratifi
ed the 
Champagne decision. Here Danckwe
rts J implied that passing-off amoun
ted to a 
wider tort of unfair competition whi
ch even protected descriptive words 
making 
reference to the locality where a pro
duct had been elaborated. 
780 Yet, the fact that 
the defendant had not passed its good
s as the claimant's products but used 
a name 
th~t did not describe the product 
sold convinced N aresh that Advoc
aat had 
reinforced a monopoly instead 
of preventing consumers from 
being 
misinf orme . a ury d 
781 c db rei·nstated the conventiona
l stance, Lord Scarman . 
stressing the need for balancing the
 claimant's interest in the investme
nt in his 
goods against the defendant's liberty 
to compete. Liability hanged on the v
iolation 
of the claimant's "intangible proper
ty right" in his exclusive prodl:lct. A
 tort of 
782 . 
1 d d 783 
unfair trading lent itself to monopoly.
 This reasonmg was app au e · 
, ' Passing-off has experienced 
other extensions nonetheless. T
hus, 
supermarkets can be liable for sellin
g their own brands using similar pac
kaging 
than that of the manufacturer provid
ed that the farmer's misrepresentatio
n likely 
caused the dilution of the latter's 
trademark, thereby injuring goodwill. 
784 In 
principle, it is for trademark legisl
ation to protect against the erosion
 of the 
success of the claimant's product or i
mage. Passing-off does not safeguard
 against 
the dilution of the distinctiveness of
 brand names:
785 the claimant must show the 
likelihood of harm to her goodwill.
786 Likewise, some courts have accepte
d the 
778 Carty (2001) passim. 
779 [1979] A.C. 731,740, 744. 
780 [ 1960] Ch. 262, 275, 284. 
781 Naresh (1986) passim. 
· 
· h' h 
782 [ 1981] 1 W.L.R. 193, 205. Lord Scarm
an distinguished the facts m Advoca
at (with w 1c 
decision he had agreed: [1979] A.C. 731 , 75
6) from those in Cadbury: [1981] 1 W.L.R., 1
99. 
783 Adams (1985) passim, Carty (1993) passim. 
. 
784 Taittinger SA v. Allbev Ltd. [1993] F.S.R
. 641 CA, 674, Mann LJ. See: Mills (1995) 11
6, 123ff. 
785 Harrods [1996] R.P.C. 697, 715-716, Millet
t LJ. 
786 Carty (2001) 223ff. 
140 
"inverse" or "reverse" passing-off t
hrough which the defendant asserts 
that the 
claimant's goods are his.
787 
For Holyoak, this case-law perverte
d passing-off to 
punish the misrepresentation of pr
oducts as such and blamed defend
ants for 
failing to mention the true origin of
 the goods (a matter pertinent to IPRs) even 
though the claimant's goodwill has
 not been iniured 788 Furth 
· 
ci • ermore, c
ertam 
courts have granted injunctions for "threatene
d" passing-off, therefore holding 
manufacturers liable to final consu
mers for putting products into circ
ulation 
although the latter were not passed a
s the rival's merchandise. So, the de
fendant 
was prohibited from registering the
 claimant's famous internet domain
-names 
without their owners' consent and fro
m retaining them for future sale desp
ite the 
fact that the claimant's goodwill had
 not been affected as the defendant h
ad used 
no name whatsoever. 78
9 
Although the common law has nev
er suffered a 'monopoly-phobia', 790
 
Derenberg suggested a broad tort
 to sanction immoral business p
ractices 
generally. 
791 
Later, Brett championed an all-
embracing tort against the 
misappropriation of the commercial 
fruits of talent and effort, as this cond
uct was 
not covered by passing-off, injurious falseho
od and specific statutes. 792 For 
Horton and Robertson, passing-off se
rved to prevent free-riders from paras
itically 
imitating their competitors' new p
roducts by exploiting the latter's g
oodwill 
regardless of the absence of misre
presentation. Victims, they said, ar
e more 
vulnerable as their products have no
t been launched. Hence a tort such 
as that 
proclaimed in International News c
ould bring consistency within the d
isparate 
European national laws against unfai
r practices. 793 
For others, passing-off should be app
lied flexibly to comply with the duty
 
of 'effective protectiorLagainst unfa
ir competition' established in article 
IObis of 
the Paris Convention. 
794 
Still, this rule can only be implem
ented by statute. 
Likewise, despite its narrow scope
, passing-off complies ~ith the o
bligation 
established in the said provision, that
 is, to offer their nationals and the nat
ional of 
787 B . L C 
788 nsto onservatories Ltd. v. Con
servatories Custom Built Ltd. [ 1989] R p C 
455 CA 
Holyoak (1990) 567. 
· · · 
' · 
789 
. 
pas~i~:lc v. One-In-A-Million Ltd [1999] 
F.S.R. 1, CA. See: Carty (2003) passim; Sim
s (2004) 
190 E iv:· C 
791 astern me orp. v. Winslow-Wa
rren, Ltd. 137 F.2d 955 (1943) 958-959 Fran
k J 
Derenberg (1955) 29 34 
' ' 
· 
792 '
 . 
Brett (1979) passim. 
793 
794 Horton:Robertson 
(1995) passim. 
Dworkm: (1979), (1981) passim. 
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other Parties the same degree of protection against unfair competiti
on. Article 
lObis does not specify the remedies to be recognised and it is perfectly
 legitimate 
to repress unfair practices through criminal law (for example, the Trade 
Descriptions Act 1968) while prevent them through passing-off, malicious 
falsehood and self-regulation. 
795 Furthermore, as Alkin argues, the narrow 
protection against specific unfair competitive practices does not fo
reclose the 
possibility that courts no longer require misrepresentation by focusing 
on damage 
· · 
· f "d 796 H e an 
to goodwill, therefore affordmg protection agamst ree-n ers. 
owev r, 
overall tort of unfair competition might absorb the established econom
ic torts and 
acquire an unpredictable size detrimental to commercial strife.
797 
Case-law has (in obiter) acknowledged a general tort and treated the loss 
of control over a business-name disconnected with the claimant as 
a sufficient 
ground of passing-off.
798 However, Jacob LJ recently considered that general tort 
as unnecessary and uncertain: 
799 
'the basic economic rule is that competition is 
not only lawful but a mainspring of the economy'. Thus, courts 
should not 
. 
. . 800 · ff · 80 l legislate on unfair competition. Although passmg-o may contmue to 
grow, 
it seems unlikely that in the near future courts will replace the known 
torts with an 
all-inclusive cause of action. 
802 In my view, courts are generally reluctant to 
recognise a widespread tort of unfair trading, let alone from the sweepi
ng passing-
off. The fact that this tort is often decided at a preliminary stage prev
ents courts 
' 
from pondering the effects of enjoining defendants from competing. 
Distinguishing between fair and unfair business behaviour belongs to 
Parliament. 
Courts confine liability to the specific, incrementally developed econ
omic torts. 
Dane J said that a generic tort clashes with the economic and sta
tutory torts 
whereby the common law defines the frontier between lawful and 'unt
rammelled' 
competition.803 However abundant the case-law stretching passing-off
, courts by 
and large adopt a laissez-faire attitude towards the harm that trade rivals inflict ( or 
795 Wadlow (2004) 46ff. . . . . 
. . 
796 Currently, claimants can only secure protection against outsiders using 
signs s1mtlar or 1dent1cal 
to the claimants' registered trademark: s.10(3 ), Trademarks Act 1994. 
797 Aikin (2008) passim. 
798 Harrods [1996] R.P.C. 697, 715, Millet LJ; Murray (1997) passim. 
799 L 'Oreal SA. v. Bellure NV [2008] E.C.C. 5, CA, at [161] . 
800 Ibid, at [141]-[159]. 
801 Deakin/Johnston/Markesinis (2007) 817. 
802 Bently/Sherman (2009) 780. 
803 Moorgate Tobacco Co. Ltd. v. Philip Morris Ltd. (No.2) ( 1984) 156 C.L.R. 414, H.C
.A., 445-
446. 
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threaten) on each other. Still, this does not remove the risk of future expansions of 
passing-off happening, thus demanding new adjustments to conserve competition. 
1.3 An intentional and strict-liability hybrid 
Unlike the other economic torts, passing-off triggers strict-liability for
 damage. It 
suffices that the defendant creates the likelihood of confusion am
ongst the 
claimant's consumers. Whether the defendant intended such effect, w
as reckless 
or negligent is immaterial to the assertion and negation of liability:
804 'If the effect 
of what the defendant says or does is to amount to a false representati
on, that its 
products or services are those of the claimant, then it is no defence to
 say that it 
was not intended or even desired'. 
805 Although fraudulent acts can indicate that 
consumers were misled into confusion, 
806 to have acted in good faith without 
intending to deceive them is no justification. 807 
In my opinion, passing-off is regulated by strict liability and princip
ally 
remedied through injunctions, given the paramount importance of property within 
the common law. Property is strongly protected against third parties' 
invasion or 
unauthorised exploitation. Passing-off resembles trespass. Although 
passing-off 
safeguards the incorporeal right in goodwill while trespass defend
s tangible 
property, both torts vindicate victims' proprietary rights preventing 
them from 
being violated. As Cane says, passing-off is rights-based while the othe
r economic 
torts are conduct-based. 
808 I too concur with Cane that trespass entails conduct-
based strict liability, as it is actionable per se (the victim need not sustain harm), 
whereas passing-off triggers outcome-based strict liability: dama
ge to the 
claimant's goodwill must at least be likely. 
809 Nevertheless, I think that passing-
off is very close to trespass precisely because it only requires probab
le damage 
rather than actual harm. As a result, the typical remedy is an injunction to prevent 
804 
Montgomery [1891] A.C. 217,220, Lord Herschell; Spalding [1914-15] All E.R. R
ep.147, 149, 
Lord Parker; Cadbury [1981) 1 W.L.R. 193,205, Lord Scarman· Chocosuisse [1998) 
·RPC 117 
137,LaddieJ. ' 
· · · ' 
::: f!FC Bank plc v. Midla_nd Bank plc [2000] F.S.R. 176, Ch.D., 181, Lloyd J . 
_[WJ,hat t~e defendant intended to achieve . . . can give some indication of what it w
as likely to 
~~h1e~e : Irvine v. Talksport Ltd [2002] E.M.L.R. 32, Ch.D. , at [68], Laddie J. 
Mitchell (1896) 294~f; Salmond (1907) 431-432; Winfield (1937) 635; Cane (19
96) 78 ; 
Wadlow (2004) 314ff; Tnndade/Cane/Lunney (2007) 285, 287; Bently/Sherman (2009
) 746 764 
808 Cane (1982) 31, 35-36, 40 n.62A 
' · 
809 · ' Cane (1997) 45ff, 146. 
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damage from being caused. On the other hand, the common grounds of outcome-
based strict liability (namely, tortfeasors should bear the losses arising from their 
business just as they profit otherwise; and the need for facilitating compensation 
for damage) are pertinent to passing-off and the competition torts (which also 
involve outcome-based strict liability), although these torts derive from conduct 
which is not abnormally dangerous. 
As already seen, 810 English tort law protects more strongly tangible 
property than pure financial interests. The harm inflicted to the former is generally 
recoverable in negligence unlike that caused to the latter. I argued that the true 
reasons for this distinction are that pure economic losses usually arise out of the 
exercise of the liberty to compete which justifies the infliction of harm and that 
competitors owe each other no duty of care. More problematically, however, the 
common law establishes a hierarchy between pure economic interests reflected in 
JI" diverse tort liability rules. Property in goodwill enjoys the strongest protection 
through outcome-based strict-liability (passing-off) . Contractual rights are 
safeguarded more narrowly through Lumley: the promisee has to show that the 
inducer intended to procure the breach of the contract by the promisor. Finally, 
economic interests in trade at large are shielded through the unlawful-interference 
tort which demands the defendant's intention to harm the claimant. Nevertheless, 
I do not consider that property (corporeal or incorporeal such as goodwill) is in 
, itself more valuable than contractual rights and business interests. The common 
law should confer an equivalent protection to the various economic interests. 
Specifically, the tort of passing-off should be subjected to proof of the defendant's 
intention to harm the claimant. Just like the unlawful-interference tort, this is the 
result pursued and provoked by the defendant. Conversely, the Lumley-tort 
requires the defendant's intention to procure the breach of contract: this is what 
the inducer pursues and produces. Therefore, liability for interference with 
economic interests should depend on wrongful means along with a mental 
element that reflects the relationship between the defendant's conduct and the 
result sought as an end or as a means to another end. 
In my view, passing-off at least involves deliberate conduct. It is not 
possible to pass one's goods as though they were one's competitors negligently, 
8 10 Above Chapter II, section III.2.4, pp.47ff; and n.708. 
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inadvertently or accidentally. Indeed, it is a basic principle of marketing that firms 
should examine their competitors' products carefully before launching their own. 
The claimant does not have to show that the defendant intended to harm her or 
deceive consumers. Hence passing-off entails strict liability for the result, that is, 
the harm threatened or caused to the claimant's goodwill by confounding 
consumers. But because this intention need not be proved passing-off is, I believe, 
at any rate deliberate, just as the statutory competition torts which comprise 
deliberate (antitrust) behaviour and trespass which, pursuant to the leading 
authorities, embodies the intentional invasion of another's right. 811 Although Cane 
argues that trespassers can act without intending to interfere with landowners' 
property or even ignoring that the land belongs to the claimant,812 I consider this 
to be exceptional and, anyway, irrelevant to passing-off. 
Furthermore, I think that passing-off presupposes the intention to harm 
competitors by drawing away their customers to the defendants' benefit. The 
intention is presumed from the very act of pretending that what the defendant sells 
is his rival's product. It is indicative that, in common language, "pretend" means 
'to behave as if something is true when the agent knows that it is not, especially in 
order to deceive people or as a game' .813 In contrast, as explained in Chapters II 
and III, the intention in the remaining economic torts is not taken for granted. 
However, passing-off should no longer trigger outcome-based strict liability but, 
as argued in the preceding paragraph, be constrained by requiring evidence of the 
defendant'.s intention to injure the claimant. 
2. Malicious falsehood 
The defendant commits this tort if he maliciously communicates to third parties 
written or oral lies about the claimant's business (including assets, employees, 
811 Fo_wler v. La~ning [1959] 1 Q.B. 426_ Q.B.~., 45~, Diplock J; Letang [1965] 1 Q.B. 232, Lord 
Denmng MR. Still, ~respassers may be !table m negltgence if they acted carelessly and claimants 
s~ow damages: Natwnal Coal Board v. J.E. Evans & Co. (Cardiff) LD [1951] 2 K.B . 861 , CA; 
Vm~ v. W~~t~am Forest London Borough Council [2000] 1 W.L.R. 2383, CA; Transco Pie v. 
United Vtilttte~ Water Pie [2005] EWHC 2784, Q.B.D. See: Weir: (2004) 321 -322 (2006) 91 
133-134; Deakm/Johnston/Markesinis (2007) 451-452, 483-484. ' ' 812 Cane (1996) 29, (1997) 30ff. 
8 13 Cambridge Advance Learner's Dictionary: http://dictionary.cambridge.org. 
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814 th 1 . d kn . goods, services and customers) calculated to harm e c a1mant an owmg 
that they are untrue or being recklessly indifferent to their veracity. 
815 Successful 
claimants can recover all the economic losses (like loss of profits, business and 
816 
goodwill) shown to be a natural and reasonable effect of the falsehood. 
This tort encompasses diverse types of misrepresentations, for instance, 
that the claimant stopped doing business, as happened in Ratcliffe. Nonetheless, 
malicious falsehood is limited to punishing extreme harmful commercial lies 
comprising a strong mental state. 817 So, this tort is ineffective to police 
comparative advertising as opposed to passing-off and specific regulations. 
Truthful defamatory statements of unfavourable opinion about a competitor's 
goods or business practices may entail the abuse of the freedom of commercial 
speech to divert that rival's clientele, not malicious falsehood. Judges are 
unwilling to superintend the advertising process inherent to competition which is 
OUtside their function: 
'If an action will not lie because a man says that his goods are better than 
his neighbour's, it seems to me impossible to say that it will lie because he 
says that they are better in this or that or the other respect. Just consider 
what a door would be opened if this were permitted ... the Courts of law 
would be turned into a machinery for advertising rival productions by 
obtaining a judicial determination which of the two was the better'. 818 
Malicious falsehood requires the use of deceptive information supporting 
the defendant's allegation of superiority over his opponents' products: 'All the 
courts will decide is whether a specific statement ... concerning the plaintiffs' 
goods or services is or is not untrue'. 819 Malice does not render the comparison 
tortious:820 it must disparage or denigrate rivals' goods or services.
821 Misleading 
comparisons are insufficient: reasonable businessmen should not take seriously 
814 If the falsehood transmitted to third parties concerns the claimant's person, the defendant may 
be liable for defamation. If the lie is communicated directly to the claimant it may involve deceit. 
815 Ratcliffe [1892] 2 Q.B. 524, 527-528, Bowen L.J; Carty (2001) 156ff; Trindade/Cane/Lunney 
(2007) 284. 
816 Joyce v. Sengupta [1993] 1 W.L.R. 337, CA; Carty (2001) 167ff; McGregor (2003) 1462ft. 
817 Bodewig (1994) 198-199; Carty (2001) 152ff, 174-175 . 
8 18 White v. Mellin [1895] A.C. 154, Ill.,, 165, Lord Herschell. 
819 De Beers Abrasive Products Ltd. v. International General Electric Co. of New York Ltd. [1975] 
1 W.L.R. 972, Ch.D. ("De Beers"), 982, Walton J. See: Weir (2006) 197. 
820 Hubbuck & Sons Ltd. v. Wilkinson Heywood & Clark Ltd. [1899] I Q.B . 86, CA, 91-92, 
Lindley MR. 
821 Heydon (1978) 85-86; Carty (2001) 158ff; Cornish (2007) 536. 
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vituperative, general or fuzzy claims. Malice, Cane remarks, protects 
competition freedom. 
823 Malice, Carty emphasises, is the limit of commercial 
speech freedom. Discussing the advantages of products in a -market economy is 
socially beneficial: misinforming consumers prompts inefficient choices. 824 
Obviously, it is a major obstacle to prove malice, namely, that the 
defendant made a false statement calculated to injure the claimant knowing of its 
untruth or being recklessly indifferent to its authenticity. Whereas the defendant's 
intention to harm the claimant is not required but suffices to establish malice 825 
' 
h' h . b d · 826 
w IC 1s orrowe from defamat10n, gross negligence ('carelessness, 
impulsiveness or irrationality in arriving at a positive belief that it is true')827 falls 
short of malice. Furthermore, the defendant can justify her act in the pursuit of 
legitimate self-interest in competition. She can also prove an honest belief in the 
veracity of the false declaration, although the claimant can rebut it showing the 
defendant's intention to harm. The defence of honest belief preserves commercial 
rivalry, particularly because attributing intentions to legal entities is complex. 828 
Hence Hepple suggested resorting to the tort of negligence to circumvent the 
troublesome proof of injurious falsehood, 829 as courts had done vis-a-vis 
employers who carelessly give inaccurate references for their former employees 
thereby injuring them. 830 Likewise, for Weir it was 'entirely possible' that case-
law made competitors liable in negligence for what they say about each other. 831 
As seen before, 
832 
Ratcliffe contains one of the three dicta from Bowen LJ 
cited in defence of the prima facie tort theory. Bowen LJ defined malicious 
falsehood as 'an action ... for damage wilfully and intentionally done without just 
occasion or excuse', embracing 'falsehoods not actionable per se ... maliciously 
published ' . 
833 
Much later, Roxburgh J said that "maliciously published" signalled 
822 
De Beers [1975] 1 W.L.R. 972, 978, Walton J; Vodafone Group Plc v. Orange Personal 
Communications Services Ltd. [1997] F.S .R. 34, Ch.D., 39, Jacob J . 823 Cane (1996) 99. 
824 Carty (2001) 163ff. 
::: Wilts Un~ted Dairies~- Robinson (Thomas) Sons & Co. [1957] R.P.C. 220, Ch.D. 
E.g., Spring v. Guardian Assurance Plc [ 1993] I.C.R. 412, CA, 428-429 Glidewell LJ· Emaco 
~;d. v. Dyson Appliances Ltd. [1999] E.T.M.R. 903, Ch.D. ' ' 
Horrocks v. Lowe [1975] A.C. 135, Ill.,, 150, Lord Diplock. 828 Wadlow (2004) 13ff, 407-408. 
829 Hepple (1997) 69. 
830 S . G d ' A prmg v. uar, tan ssurance Plc [1995] 2 A.C. 296, Ill.,, 
831 Weir(l998) 11 7. 
832 Above n.401. 
833 [1892] 2 Q.B. 524, 527-528. 
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'the wilful and intentional doing of damage without JU
St occas10n or excuse 
and Harman J construed malice as a dishonest or imp
roper purpose. 835 Thus, I 
conclude, malicious falsehood does not incorporate wr
ongful means: Bowen LJ 
expressed that falsehoods are not actionable per se. I
t is purely rooted in said 
malice or, as Carty says, on falsehoods uttered at peri
l rather than on unlawful 
means.
836 Yet, as Heydon noted, malicious falsehood clearly contr
adicts the strict-
liability passing-off. To destroy a competitor's reput
ation by lying about her 
business is tortious under conditions more severe tha
n those applicable to the 
· b I . b ' t d 
837 
stealing of that reputation y ymg a out one s own ra 
e. 
Although malice reflects the courts' unwillingness to r
egulate commercial 
. 
. . 
838 't 
competition and free speech through a general unfair co
mpetition tort, 1 seems 
odd that the protection of business reputation and 
goodwill is subjected to 
disparate rules of liability. However, the fact that malic
ious falsehood is tough to 
prove and easy to rebut renders it futile (as occurs with simple c
onspiracy) to 
neutralise unfair practices. Thus, the formal inconsi
stency between malicious 
falsehood and the other economic torts does not underm
ine but indeed reflects the 
non-interventionist judicial policy. Put differently, although malicious 
falsehood 
lacks wrongful means its practical ineffectiveness confi
rms the reduced role of the 
economic torts in the control of commercial competitio
n. 
3. Observations 
The foregoing subsections demonstrated that courts ar
e reluctant to intervene in 
competition. This attitude is patent both in the confine
ment of passing-off to its 
classic elements and in the actual uselessness of the 
intention-based malicious 
falsehood. English courts recognise circumscribed in
stances of economic-tort 
liability for unfair commercial behaviour within an in
cremental approach. They 
reject an all-embracing unfair competition tort. As many argue, 
839 the common 
834 Joyce v. Motor Surveys Ltd. (1948] Ch. 252, Ch.D., 254. 
835 Serville v. Constance (1954] 1 W.L.R. 487, Ch.D., 490. S
ee: Carty (2001) 165; 
Deakin/Johnston/Markesinis (2007) 816. 
836 Carty (2001) 173. 
837 Heyden (1978) 84. 
838 Carty (2001) 174. 
839 Burns ( 1981) passim; Cane ( 1996) passim; Weir: ( 1997) 51-52, 70
, (2004) 59:-598, (2006) 
196; Carty (2001) 1-2, 11; Wadlow: (2004) 2ff; (2006) 2; Rogers (2
006) 786: Cormsh/Llewellyn 
(2007) 15ff, 53. 
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law combats unfair competitive practices through very 
specific causes of actions. 
Courts leave the regulation of business to Parliament: 'T
o draw a line between fair 
and unfair competition ... passes the power of the Cour
t'. 840 A broad principle is 
perceived as a threat to legitimate strife: 'There is. no tor
t of taking a man's market 
or customers . .. no tort of competition . . .It woul
d serve only to stifle 
· · , 841 
competition . Equally, for scholars maliciously in
juring competitors is not 
tortious unless it involves unlawful means. 
842 Similarly, in the U.S. unfair 
practices are mainly tackled through passing-off and 
the unlawful-interference 
tort, not through the prima facie tort. 
843 Additionally, comparative advertising is 
given ample room as part of free competition. 
844 
III. Conclusions 
English law employs two specific economic torts, p
articularly passing-off, to 
prevent unfair practices and compensate for conseque
ntial damage. These torts 
perform a discrete role which reflects, first, the balanc
e between the claimants• 
proprietary interests in goodwill and the defendants' 
freedom to compete, and 
secondly, the judicial disinclination to regulate commercial battle which
 is mainly 
a statutory concern. Nonetheless, whether courts ough
t to protect the claimant's 
interest in goodwill or give priority to the defendant'
s liberty to compete is a 
difficult question subject to their discretion. 
The common law has relentlessly resisted the attem
pt to construct a 
general tort of unfair trading that would mirror an inte
ntion-based tort principle. 
At a policy level, such a tort is said to distort free co
mpetition and disturb the 
harmonious relationshtp between courts and Parliamen
t in the handling of trade 
struggle. From a formal angle, courts usually, but not a
lways, demand the classic 
requirements of passing-off to mitigate its likely mon
opolistic effects and avoid 
using it to extend statutory monopolies such as th
e IPRs. The continuous 
enhancement of passing-off to shield new dimensions o
f trade assets demonstrates 
that courts can deal with emerging social issues more 
rapidly than statutes. The 
840 
841 Mogul (I 889) L.R. 23 Q.B.D. 598, 62
6, Fry LJ. 
842 Hodgkinson [1995] F.S.R. 169, 174
-175, Jacob J. 
Handler (1936) 180-181; Callmann (1940) 587ft; Chafee (1940) 130
2ff Adams (1985) · . 
~frty: C 1996a), (1996b ), (200 l) 264-265; Wadlow (2004) 37ff; Molle
rs/Heinemann (2007) ~~~sim, 
844 Derenberg (1955) 18; Keeton (1984
) 1014-5. 
Saxlehner v. Wagner 216 U.S. 375 (1910); Romano (2005) 371ft, 393
ft. 
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problem with this, I think, is that passing-off is usually decided without the 
tranquillity needed to deliberate about the impact of stretching it. Courts are then 
more vulnerable to convert passing-off into a monopolistic device. Although this 
risk can be reduced through the adherence to the orthodox constituents of passing-
off, this does not guarantee that passing-off will stop growing. This tort is 
naturally suitable for discrepant interpretations. 
In tum, malicious falsehood is confined to extreme conduct involving 
disparaging commercial lies. The real difficulty of proving malicious falsehood 
confirms that a purely intention-based liability falls short of neutralising unfair 
practices. Neither malicious falsehood nor simple conspiracy requires wrongful 
means. This clearly contradicts the other economic torts. In particular, it is 
puzzling that commercial reputation is safeguarded through so opposite rules as 
,, the intention-based malicious falsehood and the strict-liability passing-off. 
Nevertheless, the practical inadequacy of malicious falsehood diminishes the real 
impact of that inconsistency without hindering the courts' conservative attitude 
towards commercial strife. Indeed, it shows that purely intention-based torts are 
powerless in business competition. The common law attaches to wrongfulness. 
I also demonstrated that passing-off is the prime tort against unfair 
competition essentially because it prevents damage from occurring through 
Jnjunctive relief. Passing-off serves to vindicate the proprietary interest in 
goodwill the high hierarchy of which within English law explains why this tort 
triggers strict liability and is mainly remedied through injunctions. Although 
passing-off requires harm, it suffices to show the likelihood of the claimant's 
goodwill being impaired, which can be proved more easily vis-a-vis trade 
competitors. Furthermore, I argued that passing-off entails strict-liability for 
outcomes but it requires deliberate conduct, just like the statutory competition 
torts hinge upon anticompetitive behaviour. Although passing-off departs from the 
other economic torts in that the defendant's negligence or intention to harm the 
claimant need not be shown, passing one's goods as if they were one's 
competitors' products cannot be done inadvertently or accidentally but only 
deliberately. Moreover, passing-off actually embodies the defendant's intention to 
harm the claimant by luring the latter's customers with the pretence of being 
selling the claimant's goods or services. The fact that this mental state is taken for 
granted from the very conduct does not imply that it is non-existent. It only means 
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that claimants need not prove it, although its presence clearly helps to show 
passing-off. In this sense, I think, passing-off is apparently different but 
substantially similar to the other economic torts. Even so, the strict-liability 
ascribed to passing-off reveals the pre-eminence of proprietary economic interest 
in goodwill over contractual rights and economic interests in business at large 
which are protected through the intention-based Lumley and unlawful-interference 
torts. Yet, passing-off too requires wrongfulness, represented by the violation of 
the claimant's goodwill. The abnormal torts are simple conspiracy and malicious 
falsehood. 
Nevertheless, I have argued for further restricting passing-off through the 
requirement of proof of the defendant's intention to harm the claimant. The 
different types of economic interests should be endowed with equivalent 
protection. The current preference for proprietary interest in goodwill over 
contractual rights and economic interests in trade is unprincipled. Ultimately, just 
as competitors are not liable for merely interfering with their rivals' contractual 
rights or economic expectations without acting with the intention to cause the 
breach of contract (Lumley) or to harm the claimant (unlawful-interference), 
passing-off should no longer trigger outcome-based strict liability. Ultimately, 
even if the demand of evidence about the mental element in passing-off did not 
imply a radical change in the way in which real cases are decided, proof of the 
said intention might nonetheless increase the formal consistency within the 
economic torts. 
151 
I I 
I. 
1] 
I 1 
;'· 
CHAPTERV 
COMPETITION TORTS 
So far I have considered the common-law economic torts. This chapter is dev
oted 
to the statutory competition torts that trigger liability for harm resulting f
rom 
"antitrust conduct", that is, anticompetitive agreements between enterprises 
that 
may affect trade and the object or effect of which is to prevent, restrict or distort 
competition in the relevant market (infringing article 81 EC and Chapter I of the 
Competition Act 1998), as well as harm resulting from the abuse of a dominant 
position in that market (infringing article 82 EC and Chapter II of the Competition 
Act 1998). As will be seen, these statutes have been interpreted as conferring 
upon individual victims a right to damages stemming from antitrust cond
uct, 
which has traditionally been alleged in England through the generic tort of bre
ach 
of statutory duty. However, s.47A of the Competition Act 1998, as amended
 by 
the Enterprise Act 2002, gives any person the right to claim compensation
 for 
damages for breaches of Chapter I and/or Chapter II without the need to frame
 the 
action as a particular statutory duty. 
I will show that the competition torts play a modest role in the 
enforcement of those aspects of antitrust law which are the public author
ity's 
majn concern. They offer compensation for harm suffered by individual rivals, 
~hereas anticompetitive conduct hurts consumers and competitors at large. M
ore 
importantly, I will demonstrate that tortious liability for antitrust conduct is s
trict 
as regards the outcome, so that claimants are released from any need to pro
ve a 
mental element. However, liability is grounded in antitrust conduct that aim
s to 
affect the market in general but often targets identifiable contenders. Suc
h a 
mental element need not be established in tort, as it is implied in the antit
rust 
conduct. This confirms that liability under competition torts is contingent on
 the 
antitrust conduct established in the administrative prosecution process carried
 out 
by the EC Commission (Competition Directorate) or the Office of Fair Trading 
("OFT"), which I will indistinctly call "competition authorities". 
845 The 
845 Although the authorities enforcing UK competition law include the Compet
ition Commission 
(concerning mergers, particular markets and regulated sectors) and sector-regulators (
for 
communications, gas and electricity, water, rail , airports and postal services), the investigation a
nd 
enforcement of articles 81/82 EC and Chapters I/II of the Competition Act 19
98 is conducted, and 
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competition torts merely aid the legislator in its control of competit
ion. 
Nonetheless, the claimants must show they have been harmed by the anti
trust 
conduct, a process which is often complicated and in itself restrains the amb
it of 
liability. Furthermore, I will submit that although the economic torts and
 the 
competition torts are distinct, given their diverse origins and objectives, they 
regulate commercial competition only discretely. Consequently, English co
urts 
are likely to apply them so as not to curtail firms' freedom to compete. 
Section I explains the cause of action whereby the competition torts can be 
alleged. Section II describes the legal framework within which the competi
tion 
torts operate. Section III surveys private enforcement of antitrust law
, its 
interaction with public enforcement and the main obstacles it encounters. Sec
tion 
IV analyses antitrust tort liability in terms of its basis and its interface with
 the 
economic torts. Section V recapitulates the key assumptions of this chapter. 
I. Compensation for damages arising from antitrust conduct 
This section explains th · e compensation to which trade rivals harmed by 
anticompetitive practices are entitled. It shows that, although the ECJ decl
ared 
that individuals enjoy EC rights directly effective before national courts, 846 in 
particular those under articles 81/82 EC (then articles 85/86 EC), 847 English courts 
nevertheless paved the way for the statutory affirmation of the righ
t to 
compensation for antitrust harm. 
Courts developed the tort of breach of statutory duty to provide 
compensation to individual victims for breaches of articles 81/82 
EC. 
Subsequently, the _ECJ recognised this Community right but delegated 
the 
elaboration of the appropriate remedies to national legislatures. Eventually, s.
47 A 
of the Competition Act 1998, as incorporated by the Enterprise Act 20
02, 
conferred on injured persons the right to claim damages for the infringement of 
articles 81/82 EC and/or Chapters I/II of that statute. 
the decision whether they have been infringed is made by the EC c · · 
h 
c · · . 
, omm1ss1on or t e OFT ( or the 
84~mpet1t1on Appeal Tnbunal, "CAT", on an appeal f
rom an OFf's judgment). 
847 Van ?end en ~oos v. Ned~~-Landse Tariefcommissie case 26/62 [1963] E.C.R. I, ECJ. 
Ecf elgische Radto en TelevlSle v. Societe Beige des Auteurs case 127173 [1974] 2 C.M.L.
R. 238, 
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1. Seeking compensation for antitrust harm in England 
In Britain, compensation for antitrust harms has been pursued through 
conventional torts rather than novel causes of action. 
848 
The possibility of 
remedying injuries stemming from breaches of EC competition law through 
damages awards was discussed in the leading case of Garden Cottage Foods Ltd. 
v. Milk Marketing Board.849 Since 1980 Garden Cottage Foods ("Garden", a small 
UK enterprise) had bought 90% of its demand for butter from the Milk Marketing 
Board ("MMB"), reselling 95% of it to a Dutch customer. In 1982, MMB 
informed Garden that all its sales of bulk butter for export would be managed by 
independent distributors (Garden's competitors). Garden applied for an injunction 
alleging that MMB had abused its dominant position, in violation of article 86 EC 
(currently article 82 EC), by forcing Garden to deal with its competitors, who 
charged higher prices. Parker J refused the injunction on the ground that damages 
provided adequate redress. 850 The majority of the Law Lords reinstated this 
judgment. Lord Diplock accepted the right to injunctions and damages for breach 
of the directly enforceable article 86 EC. He did not reach the issue of whether the 
85 1 b d'd . . th t 
appropriate vehicle was the tort of breach of statutory duty, ut 1 mtimate a 
this was the case. 852 Conversely, Lord Wilberforce refused to decide this 
subs~antial issue in an interlocutory proceeding, although he maintained that 
article 86 EC could only be enforced through penalties non-payable to private 
victims.853 Later case-law ratified (in obiter) Lord Diplock's opinion.
854 
Unless the relevant statute provides expressly for a civil action for 
damages (which is unusual), in principle, breach of a statutory duty does not entail 
848 Valor International Ltd. v. Application des Gaz S.A. [1978] 3 C.M.L.R. 87, CA, 100, Roskill 
LJ. See: Whish (1994) 64; Jones (1999a) l 13ff. Cf: Apflic~tion des Ga~ ~.A. v. Falks V~~ita~. Ltd. 
[1974] Ch. 381, CA, 396, Lord Denning MR (proposmg undue restnct1on ~f compet1t1on and 
"abuse of dominance within the common market" as new torts); Barretts & Baird (Wholesale) Ltd. 
v. Institution of Professional Civil Servants [1987] I.R.L.R. 3, Q.B.D., 5,. Henry J, and Alvizou 
(2002) 193 (championing the "Euro-Torts" emanated from the breach of articles 81/82 EC). 
849 [1984] 1 A.C. 130, HL ("Garden Cottage"). 
850 Reversed by [1982] Q.B. 1114, CA. 
851 Brealey/Hoskins (1998) 119ff; Jones (1999a) 128-129. 
852 [1984] A.C. 130, 141. 
853 Ibid, 151-152. 
854 Bourgoin S.A. v. Ministry of Agriculture [1986] 1 Q.B. 716, CA, 787, Parker J; Ple_ssey 
Company Pie v. General Electric Company Pie [1990] E.C.C. 384, Ch.D., at [37-38] , Morntt J. 
See: Hoskins (1992) 257-258. 
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tortious liability. 855 Whether the silent statute did intend to grant a civil remedy is 
a complex policy question to be determined by the court: 'The statutes say 
nothing about civil remedies for breaches of their provisions. The judgments of 
the courts say all'. 856 Liability can only be imposed if (i) the statute intended to 
safeguard through a civil action the relevant class of persons and for the type of 
injury corresponding to the particular claimant; (ii) the defendant infringed the 
statutory duty owed to the claimant; and, (iii) the claimant was thereby injured. 85
7 
Therefore, a mere causal link between the defendant's breach and the claimant's 
harm is no indication of the legislative intention to confer a tort action for 
damages. The court must examine the text of the statute, the surrounding 
. 
~8 
circumstances and the precedents. All in all, the tort of breach of statutory duty 
is highly unpredictable. For example, while Lord Denning MR recognised a tort 
action whenever the defendant interfered with the claimant's business through the 
commission of a statutory crime against a third party, 
859 Lord Diplock plainly 
rejected any such a general principle, holding that whether there was a civil 
remedy depended entire I y on the interpretation of the statute ( a rule that he 
I. d . G d 860 app 1e m ar en Cottage). These knotty issues apart, the tort of breach of 
statutory duty is independent of negligence. 
861 Hence pure economic loss is 
recoverable through the former tort. 862 Likewise, the statute establishes 'an 
absolute obligation ... to perform or forbear from performing a specified activity', 
unlike 'the obligation imposed by common law ... to take reasonable care to avoid 
injuring another'. 863 Thus, it entails strict liability. 864 
Notwithstanding the difficulties posed by this tort, Garden Cottage 
confirmed that in the UK, those harmed by the infringement of EC competition 
855 X v. ~edforshire. CC [1995] 2 A.C. 633, HL, 731, Lord Browne-Wilkinson. See: 
Stanton/Sk1dmore/Harns/Wright (2003) 24-25; Buckley (2005) 337· Rogers (2006) 349· Jones 
(2006) 522, 526-527. ' ' 
856 Boyle v. Kodak Ltd. [1969] 1 W.L.R. 661 , HL, 672, Lord Diptock. See: Bell (1983) 84· 
Buckley: (1984) 204, (2005) 340. ' 
857 A k ' N t. inson v. ~w~astle and Gateshead Waterworks Company (1877) 2 Ex.D. 441, CA; Phillips 
v. Bnttanta Hygienic Laundry Company, Ltd. [1923] 2 K.B. 832, CA; Bonnington Casting Ltd. v. 
Wardlaw [1956] A.C. 613, HL. 
::: Cutler v. Wandsworth Stadium Ld. [1949] A.C. 398, HL, 407, Lord Simonds. 
Exp. Island Records Ltd. [1978] Ch. 122 CA 135 137 
860 ' ' ' . Lonrho [1982] A.C. 173, 183, 187. 
::: London Pa~senger Tran.sport Board v. Upson [1949] A.C. 155, HL, 168-169, Lord Wright. 
Stanton/Sk1dmore/Harns/Wright (2003) 269-270, 411-412· Stanton (2004) 333ff' Rogers 
(2006) 338. ' ' 
::: Smith v. Cammell, Laird & Co. Ltd. [1 940] A.C. 242, HL, 258, Lord Atkin. 
Buckley (2005) 351. See below n. l 004 and accompanying text. 
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laws could obtain compensation through the generic tort of breach of statutory 
duty. This tort is also deemed coherent with EC law, as it triggers strict 
liability. 865 Furthermore, the traditional requirement that the defendant should owe 
a duty to the claimant for the kind of loss the latter suffered
866 is irrelevant to the 
breach of competition laws:867 the claimant may be awarded damages despite not 
being the defendant's competitor. 868 Currently, however, the tort of breach 
statutory duty seems superfluous: the Competition Act 1998 (s.47 A) clearly 
confers the right to claim damages before the CAT following breaches of articles 
81 and/or 82 EC or Chapters I/II of the Competition Act 1998, previously 
established by the EC Commission or the OFT, which have binding effect upon 
the CAT (s.58A). 869 Thus, the competition torts are exceptional. Statutes rarely 
bestow on individuals a tort-right to sue other private parties for the harm they 
9ccasioned by infringing such legislation. 870 
2. Reaffirming the EC right to compensation for anticompetitive harm 
In Courage Ltd. v. Crehan871 the ECJ restated the right of any person harmed by 
conduct in breach of the EC competition provisions to claim compensation for 
damages. The ECJ allowed the party in weaker economic position to an 
anticompetitive agreement within the UK market to sue the other party 
res~onsible for injury arising from the infringement of article 81 EC. The defence 
in pari delicto (that is, where both parties are equally wrongful the defendant 
should prevail) 872 could only succeed against a party bearing significant 
865 Rodger (2003) 103-104; Beard (2005) 260ff; Lenaerts/Gutman (2006) 92. 
866 E.g., South Australia Asset Management Corporation v. York Montague Ltd [1997] A.C. 191, 
HL, 211, Lord Hoffmann. 
867 Thompson/O'Flaherty (2008) 1443. . 
868 Crehan v. fnntrepreneur Pub Co (CPC) [2004] E.W.C.A. Civ. 637, CA, at [156-167], Gibson 
~f Stanton/Skidmore/Harris/Wright (2003) 412, 414; Stanton (2004) passim; Beard (2005) 258, 
262-263; Mollers/Heinemann (2007) 40 I; Whish (2008) 303-304. . . . . 
870 Deakin/Johnston/Markesinis (2007) 395. Another remarkable example 1s the Fmanc1~l Serv1~es 
and Markets Act 2000, s.150 allowing investors to claim damages resultin~ from abusive_ trad1?g 
practices (i.e., in contravention of the ~onduct_ of Busi~ess Rules estabh~hed by the Fmancial 
Services Authority) committed by financial services providers. Howe~er, this statute, as the Trad~ 
Descriptions Act 1968, protects consumers rather than competitors: Carty (2001) 146ff, 
Stanton/Skidmore/Harris/Wright (2003) 399ft. 
871 Case c-453/99 [2002] Q.B. 507 ("Courage"). . . . 
872 Langton v. Hughes (1813) l M&S 593, K.B .C., 596, Lord Ellenborough; Bmssevat~ v. Wetl 
[1950] AC. 327, HL; Gibbs Mew Plc v. Gemmell [1999] E.C.C. 97, C_A, at [39-~2]: Gibson LJ._ 
The parties to an illegal agreement cannot in principle claim compensat10n or rest1tut1on (ex turpi 
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responsibility in the distortion of competition, considering her bargaining power 
and the economic-legal background of the agreement. 873 
Thus, Courage resembles the leading American case Perma-Life Mufflers, 
Inc. v. International Parts Corp,874 which acknowledged the standing of a weaker 
party to an anticompetitive contract. Courage too applies to the violation of article 
82 EC and/or Chapters I/II of the Competition Act 1998. 875 The recognition of a 
right to a civil action had been championed as vital to enforce the direct 
effectiveness of articles 81 and 82 EC. 876 Courage was a significant advancement 
as those provisions are silent about such right. Likewise, Courage entrusted with 
national legislatures the establishment of the substantive and procedural rules for 
exercising the right to compensation for anticompetitive harm, subject to the 
principles of equivalence and effectiveness. 877 
As already seen, in England this right was traditionally framed as the 
common-law tort of breach of statutory duty until it was laid down in the 
Competition Act 1998. The principle of effectiveness was recently adduced to 
reject a claim for restitutionary damages through an action for breach of article 81 
EC, the court holding that compensation imparted sufficient relief. 878 The 
proposals that the ECJ dictates the remedies to enforce EC rights, and that tort 
principles are codified, thus enhancing private enforcement of competition law on 
equal level across Europe, 879 remain to be done; or they might never be executed, 
due in part to the divisions between the European legal systems. 880 
causa): 'No court will lend its aid to a man who found his action upon an immoral or illegal act' 
Holman v. Johnson _(1775) I Cowp. 341, K.B.C., 343, Lord Mansfield. See: Virgo: (1997) 150ft' 
(2006) 721 ff; Komnmos (2002) 462ff · ' 
873 . 
874 
[2002] Q.B. 507, at [32-36]. See: Edelman/Odudu (2002)· Andreangeli (2004) 759 
392 U.S. 134 (1968). ' . 
875 
Jones (1999a) 130ff; Stanton/Skidmore/Harris/Wright (2003) 22-23 414· Rodger (2003) 103-
104; Stanton (2004) passim. ' ' 
876 . 
HJ Banks & Co Ltd v. British Coal Corp. case C-128/92 [1994] 5 C.M.L.R. 30, ECJ ("Banks") 
t;/26]-[45]-[53], Van Gerven (Advocate-General). ' 
Courage [2002] Q.B. 507, at [47]. See: Oliver (1987) 881ft Brealey/Hoskins (1998) 104ft 
I 22ff. ' ' 
:~: Devenish [2009] 3 A_JJ E.R. 27, CA. Cf: Odudu/Virgo (2009) passim, Sheehan (2009) passim. 
Claydon_ (1983) , Fnend/Shaw (1984) passim; Jones (1999a) 245ff; Drake (2006) 8S7-858· 
!rdrean~eh (2007) passim; Van Gerven (2006) passim, (2007) 31 ff. ' 
Kommnos (2008) 142ff. 
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3. Observations 
This section showed that today, any commercial competitor harmed by antitrust 
conduct can seek compensation for damages by directly invoking the Competition 
Act 1998, provided that the EC Commission or the OFf has conclusively asserted 
the infringement of articles 81/82 EC or Chapters I/II of the Competition Act 
1998, a determination which is res iudicata in the proceeding before the CAT. 
This statutory right encompasses the competition torts. The interpretative effort 
made by English courts, and the ECJ, dispelled prior doubts about the existence of 
such right. English law881 imposes tort liability for breach of statutory duty if the 
. 882 Th. h 
victim proves she is within the scope of protection of the statute. is approac 
influenced the ECJ' s comprehension of articles 81/82 EC. The Competition Act 
;(° 1998 surpassed the EC Treaty by unambiguously granting the said action for 
anticompetitive harm. The common law heralded the statutory recognition of this 
right. Comparably, as will be seen in Chapter VII, the Chilean Competition Act 
explicitly acknowledges this right, thus avoiding the complexities of deciphering 
the legislator's intention. 
II. Competition law context 
This section outlines the background within which the competition torts operate. 
Whereas antitrust conduct affects unknown consumers and rivals who participate 
in a specific market, the competition torts safeguard identifiable traders from 
threatened or actual damage derived from said conduct. 
1. Targets 
883 · 
The nearly axiomatic importance of competition to economic progress is 
manifest in the EC, UK and U.S . modem antitrust legislation. Thus, the 'Magna 
881 Similarly, §823.2 BGB confers on victims the right to compensation for damages emanated 
from the very risk that a statute intended to avoid. See above n.215 . . .. 
882 Limpens/Kruithof/Meinertzhagen-Limpens (1980) 74ff; Zwe1gert/Kotz (1998) 602; 
Markesinis/Unberath (2002) 719-720. 
883 Dhall (2007) 3ff. 
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Carta of free enterprise' ,884 the Sherman Act 1890, penalises both monopolies and 
agreements in restraint of trade ("trusts") which distribute their great economic 
and political power among numerous small independent producers of equivalent 
strength. 885 
Antitrust law principally protects consumers against anticompetitive 
conduct. 886 That some competitors must abandon the market or diminish their 
market-share is commended as an effect of a healthy economy ( one that rewards 
the most efficient or innovative entrepreneurs), provided that consumers can 
acquire goods or services of higher quality at lower prices. 887 Likewise, even 
those mergers which reduce costs can be fined if they are inimical to consumer 
· 888 . 
mterests. Precisely, Bork censured American case-law that, by shielding small 
business from competition, prejudiced consumers. 889 
2. Prohibited conduct 
Formerly, UK competition law was a complex and formalistic system, comprising 
the Restrictive Trade Practices Act 1976, the still-in-force Fair Trading Act 1973 
and a variety of common-law doctrines. The Competition Act 1998, in accordance 
with EC competition law, rationalised this situation: it forbids and punishes 
anticompetitive agreements whose purpose or effect is to prevent, restrict or 
distort competition (Chapter I) and the abuse of a dominant position in the 
relevant market (Chapter II), mirroring articles 81 and 82 EC, respectively.890 The 
OFT is charged with the enforcement of these rules, its decisions being 
reviewable by the CAT. 891 
"Horizontal · agreements" involve competitors, that is, persons situated at 
the same level in the production/supply chain (for example, agreements between 
::: U.S. v. Topco Associates, Inc. 405 U.S. 596 (1972), 610, Marshall J. 
Hey don (1980) 141; Jones ( 1999a) 7 
886 . 
E.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. U.S. 370 U.S. 294 (1962, "Brown Shoe"), 320, Warren CJ; Albion 
Water [2005] CAT 40, at [262]; Korah (2007) 132-133;Whish(2008) 193 360 · 
887 Wood (1989) 1153. . ' · 
888 K. k If wood/Lande (2008) passim. 
889 Bork (1993) 7ff. · 
890 S 60 C · · 
. ' .. ompet1t1on Act 1998, instructs courts to interpret the Act consistently with EC Law 
!l~surpnsmgly, the UK and EC rules can overlap: Sloane/Gregory (2005) 22-23 · 
Chapters III & IV Competition Act 1998. See: Rodger (2003) 103; Bellamy 
0
(2007) 387 39Iff 
Alth?ugh mergers can also aff~ct competition, I focus on anticompetitive agreements and abuse of 
dommance as the regular practices through which contenders injure one another. 
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manufacturers). "Vertical agreements" concern non-competitors (such as 
between wholesalers/distributors and retailers/sellers). 
892 
By 
agreements 
definition, therefore, horizontal agreements should be more relevant to the 
competition torts than vertical agreements. Moreover, compared with vertical 
agreements, horizontal agreements are more likely to be prejudicial to consumers. 
Agreements fixing prices, restricting outputs or allocating markets ("cartels") 
entail the most pernicious anticompetitive effects893 and often are the result of 
conspiracy. 894 Judicial experience signposts the harmfulness and unlawfulness 
intrinsic to cartels. These agreements normally have an anticompetitive object 
which explains the severe sanctions attached to them. Furthermore, they are 
presumed to restrict competition, 895 thereby relieving claimants of the heavy 
burden to prove of anticompetitive effects, as evident in recent case-law denying 
F liability. 896 The Sherman Act (s.1) declares per se illegal '[e)very contract, 
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade 
or commerce among the several states, or with foreign nations'. 
897 
Similarly, 
Article 81 EC and Chapter I of the Competition Act 1998 prohibit anticompetitive 
, 898 
agreements, unless they are exempted from sanction. 
Conversely, vertical agreements regularly produce consumer welfare. 
Whether they are punished follows from balancing their positive and negative 
economic consequences (the "rule of reason")899 along with each party's market 
power. 900 Arrangements, inter alia, prohibiting from purchasing of competing 
products, forcing parties to deal exclusively within certain geographical areas or 
to sell above certain prices (resale price maintenance) are commonly 
. . , 901 
ant1compet1t1ve. 
892 Whish (2007) 39, 45 . 
893 Heyd on ( 1980) 133-134. 
894 A consequence that Adam Smith himself deplored: ([1776)/2008) Book I, Ch.X, 129. 
895 Consten and Gruding v. Commission Cases 56/64 & 58/64 [1966) C.M.L.R. 418, ECJ. 
896 E.g., Racecourse Association v. OFT [2005) CAT 29.' at [177-202]; P&S Amusements Ltd. v. 
Valley House Leisure [2006) U.K.C.L.R. 867, Ch.D.; Whish (2008) 336: . . 
897 Thus it has been declared that 'there are certain agreements or practices w~ich because of their 
pernicio,us effect on competition and lack of any redee~ing ~irtue are conclusi~ely presumed to be 
unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have 
caused ' : Northern Pacific Railway Company v. U.S. 356 U.S. 1 (1957) , 5, Black J. 
898 Black (1997) 145ff; Whish (2008) 117-118. 
899 Standard Oil Company of New Jersey v. U.S. 221 U.S . 1 (1911). . 
900 Myers (1993) 1150; Rodger (2002) 222-223; Holmes (2004) 28; Whish (2007) 56. 
901 Dhall (2007) 9. 
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In principle an agreement will be deemed anticompetitive if its object is to 
restrict competition. When this is unclear, the court will examine the economic 
impact of the contract, taking into account the structure of the market and the 
conditions under which the parties to the covenant operate.902 Conventionally, the 
purpose of the agreement is defined as the objective meaning and aim of the 
contract determined through market analysis. 903 However, Odudu argues that 
parties' subjective intention (inferred from external circumstances) serves to 
demonstrate the anticompetitive purpose of the agreement and also discloses and 
prevents its likely negative effects on the market: 'knowledge of intent may help 
the court to interpret facts and to predict consequences' 904 Th t . a an agreement 
targeted at restricting competition necessarily entails anticompetitive 
consequences stems from the moral principle that intended results are more likely 
to occur than unintended (merely foreseen) outcomes. 905 Thus, Odudu holds, 
parties ' subjective intention suffices to establish that the agreement has an 
anticompetitive purpose. This avoids the complex proof of antitrust effects and 
market assessment under the rule of reason. Courts can anticipate the 
anticompetitive impact of the agreement at issue. 906 
In tum, enterprises are prohibited from abusing their dominant position in 
the relevant market (Article 82 EC; Chapter II Competition Act 1998). Through 
this practice, also called "monopolisation" 907 the dom· t f' b h , man Irm e aves 
independently of its competitors, thereby excluding them from business or 
exploiting consumers. This conduct is not automatically unlawful. Courts must 
evaluate the share of the dominant firm and of its rivals in the relevant market, the 
entry barriers (including legal costs, access costs and irrecoverable or "sunk" 
costs) and the inflqence of the abuse on that market. This makes it difficult to 
distinguish predatory pricing from an efficient reduction of prices to attract 
consumers. 908 Further, the law prioritises the protection of consumers against 
9025. 'I'< h" ociete ec_ mque Miniere v. Maschinenbau Ulm G.M.B.H. Case 56/65 [ 1966) c ML R 357 
C
375, ECJ; Institute of Independent Insurance Brokers v. Director General of Fair Tr~di.ng. ['.WO I 1' 
AT 4, at [169-171). 
903C . R ompagme oyale Asturi.enne des Mines S.A. v. Commission Cases 29-30/83 [1985] 1 
~4M.L.R. 688, at [26) , ECJ; Whish (2008) 115-116, 335-336. Board of Trade of City of Chicago v. U.S. 246 U.S. 23 1 (1918) 238 B ct · J 
905 Kenn ( 1966) 650. ' ' ran eis · 
906 y 
907 
Odudu: (2001) 60, 69ff; (2006) 114, 121-122. 
S.2, Sherman Act. 
908 M h. El · " . atsu~ l;,a ectnc Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corporation 475 U.S . 574 (1986 
Matsushita ), 594, Powell J; Heydon (1980) 142; Whish (2008) 730. ' 
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exploitative abuses 909 whereby the dominant firm imposes excessive (unfair) 
pricing and reaps monopoly profits to maintain or increase its market-position, 
rather than naturally responding to the economic conditions.
9 10 
Only secondarily 
does competition shield other economic agents, including competitors, from 
exclusionary abuses, like refusals to supply goods/services or allow access to 
essential facilities (that is, substitutes being unavailable or technically, legally or 
1. ) 9 11 economically unreasonable to rep 1cate . 
3. Regulating restrictive practices 
Restrictive practices are rectified by courts and statutes. In Mitchell v. 
Reynolds, 912 a bond to restrain oneself from trading absolutely or in certain 
location without reasonable consideration was held void, as it affected the 
F-
restrained party and the public interest.913 This decision incepted the common-law 
doctrine that makes illegal the agreements in restraint of trade (for instance, 
exclusive purchase agreements), thus favouring the public interest in competition 
over contractual liberty.914 Nevertheless, Mogul and Allen settled that restrictive 
practices (whether anticompetitive agreements or abuse of dominance) did not 
involve unlawful means for tort purposes.915 However, Nordenfelt
916 
reinstated the 
prit1ciple, valid in contract law, that agreements in restraint of trade are void and 
~nenforceable unless they are deemed reasonable in the interests of the parties and 
the public. This shows that the doctrine of restraint of trade adapts to new market 
conditions, economic theories and procedures, allowing courts to distinguish 
. . , 917 
legitimate restrictions on commercial contracts from restnctlve practices. 
909 Albion Water [2005) CAT 40, at [262); Whish (2008) 189ff, 360-361. .. 
910 Hoffmann La Roche & Co. AG v. Commission of the European Communmes Case 85/76 [1979) 
3 C.M.L.R. 211, ECJ. . · 1 G bH & C 
911 Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. KG v. Mediaprint Zeitungs- und Zett!chriftenver ag m o. 
KG C7 /97 [ 1999) 4 C.M.L.R. 112, ECJ. IPRs may impose ~ntry ~~r~1ers fund amen ta~ for res_earch 
and development, unless competitors are deprived of essential fac1ht1es: U.S. v. Terminal Railroad 
Association of St. Luis 224 U.S . 383 (1912); Korah (2007) 129ft. 
912 (1712) 88 E.R. 637, K.B.C. 
913 Treitel (2007) 713. 
914 Essa Petroleum Co. Ltd. v. Harper's Garage (Stourport) Ltd. [1968] A.C. 269, HL 
("Harper's"), 324, Lord Pearce; Rodger (2002) 222. 
915 Heydon (1971) 28, 277-278. 
916 [1894] A.C. 535. . . 
911 Harper 's [1968) A.C. 269: 327, Lord Pearce, 331 , 333, Lord Wilberforce; Pollock (1912) 98 , 
Prentice (2008) 1090-91, 1134. 
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These practices can likewise be illegal and unenforceable by statute. 
Whereas American antitrust legislation reacted against the increasingly 
economically powerful oligopolies,918 English law decriminalised monopolies in 
1772919 and limited statutory restrictions on commerce so as to promote economic 
th 920 h 1 ' grow : t e rea danger was seen to be excessive (unfair) competition. As 
argued in Chapter III, the nineteenth-century case-law maintained a politically 
conservative approach to competition, as evident in the use of simple conspiracy 
against workers and trade unions (unlike traders) and in judicial reluctance, 
affirmed in Mogul, to control commercial competition. Thus, efficient competition 
could paradoxically depend on monopolist corporations. Parliament reacted 
decades later, by enacting the Monopolies and Restrictive Practices (Inquiry and 
Control) Act 1948.921 Today, restrictive practices include breaches of relevant (EC 
or UK) competition provisions. Interestingly, the common-law and the statutory 
remedies often overlap as contracts in restraint of trade frequently entail 
anticompetitive effects. The common-law doctrine enables courts to delete the 
(severable) aspects of an agreement which render it unreasonable, whereas the 
relevant competition provisions proscribe and declare null antitrust agreements, 
given their overall impact on the economy.922 There is a vivid debate about the 
relationship between both remedies which I cannot tackle here.923 
Finally, the common-law economic torts and the statutory competition 
torts serve to counteract restrictive practices in a limited way: the competition 
torts permit rivals to recover losses following antitrust conduct; the economic torts 
prevent and compensate for damage ensuing from unfair competition. 924 
Likewise, the economic torts may substitute for the competition torts that have not 
been or could not b_e claimed. Moreover, breaches of competition rules (antitrust 
918 Pollock (1904) passim· Broder (2005) 28 32 
919 ' ' · 
920 
By repealing the Statute of Edward VI (1552). 
921 
Mogul (1889) L.R. ~3 Q.B.D. 598,629, Fry LJ; Wilberforce/Campb~ll/Elles (1966) 32-33. 
See generally: Letwm (1954) 355-356, 381-382; Hunter (1966) 68ff Stein/Shand (1974) 248ff 
~\evens (1979) 158-159; Cornish/Clark (1989) 267ff; Smith (2006) 219ff. ' 
Lever (2001) 116-117; Rodger (2002) 225-226; Carty (2001) 36· Treitel (2007) 717· Prentice 
(2008) 1135-36. ' ' 
923 In Da~s M_edical Aids_ Ltd. v. Pihsiang Machinery Manufacturing Co. Ltd [2004] E.C.C. 21, the 
Q.~.D. d1sm1ssed an action f~r breach of contract based on article 81 EC brought by a distributor 
agamst a ~anufacturer, holdmg that provision to exclude the alternatively-alleged restraint-of-
trade doc~nne. _See: Bella~~ (2007) 388. _Cf: Lucey (2007) passim (suggesting that this doctrine 
can _c~~x 1st with compet1t1on law, as 1t renders restrictive practices unenforceable without 
proh1b1tmg them). 
924 Heydon (1980) 135; Weir: (2004) 598, (2006) 99, 197. 
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conduct) can also constitute the unlawful means that are a precondition to 
economic torts such as wrongful means conspiracy, unlawful-interference tort and 
intimidation. 
4. Observations 
In England, tort law appears to pursue a goal more modest than competition law. 
Thus, the statutory competition torts offer compensation for harm sustained by 
identifiable businesses as a result of antitrust conduct affecting consumers and 
rivals at large. Antitrust conduct is a deliberate act targeted at damaging 
anonymous persons. As apparent in anticompetitive agreements, the parties' 
intent, the purpose and the effect of such arrangements are closely related. 
III. Private enforcement of competition law 
I will now demonstrate that, in preventing and compensating for damage derived 
from antitrust practices, the competition torts can be used merely to help the 
competition authorities m prosecuting, deterring and punishing such 
misbehaviour. I will suggest that the competition torts play a moderate role in this 
context. Tort litigation is likely to occur only after anticompetitive conduct is 
asserted. Moreover, the fact that the competition authorities concentrate on the 
most serious offences reduces the ambit of antitrust tort litigation. The complexity 
of proving causation and harm, along with the lack of incentives such as extra-
compensatory damages, also aid to reduce antitrust tort litigation. 
1. Generalities 
The EC Commission and the OFf are entrusted with the enforcement of EC and 
UK competition laws, respectively. It is their task to declare infringements and 
punish antitrust practices through, for example, penalties, directors' 
disqualification or imprisonment. 925 Tort law simply assists the competition 
authorities, sometimes by dissuading potential infringers from committing 
925 Mailers/Heinemann (2007) 389,661; Whish (2007) 50-51. 
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anticompetitive acts but especially by compensating for the losses sustained by 
known competitors or consumers. The threat to initiate tort proceedings and 
obtain redress (injunctions, damages awards and restitution of defendants' 
unjustly earned profits) may deter antitrust conduct, as long as there are judges 
able to interpret and apply the rules clearly and consistently. 926 Empirical research 
shows that tort claims can prevent anticompetitive conduct, the rules prohibiting 
anticompetitive practices influence the volume of litigation and certain procedural 
safeguards curb unfounded lawsuits.927 
Nonetheless, antitrust-tort case-law remains sparse in Europe, even though 
potential claimants can seek injunctions and damages for breach of articles 81 and 
82 EC. The predominant task of the regulators and competition authorities seems 
to reveal a state-dependent mentality in competitors and consumers, whereas in an 
aggressive litigation culture such as America, antitrust law is fundamentally 
implemented through tort actions. 928 The paucity of private enforcement in 
Europe also responds to the absence of treble-damages, the lack of resources and 
investigatory powers of private litigants, and the adversarial nature of tort 
proceedings ( disputes being confined to the allegations and evidence supplied by 
the parties, thereby excluding wide-ranging interests), 929 let alone the high 
litigation costs burdening losing parties930 and the prohibition of contingency fees 
93 1 agreements . In the last four decades, there have been no more than fifteen final 
judgments entered in the UK, the claimant succeeding on only one occasion.932 
926 Yeung (1998) , 
927 
~ee,. in Salop/White (198.5) p~ssi":, the "Georgetown Private Antitrust Litigation Project" 
~~;v1ewmg over 2,000 tort-claims filed m U.S. district-courts between 1973 and 1983). 
" ~ever (2001) 111; Gerber (2007) passim; Paulis (2007) 8ff. Tort claimants are indeed called 
~nvate attorney-general": Associated Industries of New York State, Inc. v. lckes 134 F 2d 694 (2nd C1r. 1943), 704, Franck J. 
· 
:
2
~-i,uller (1978) passim; Yeung (1998) 586, 608; Jones (1999a) 35-36; Jolowicz (2000) 28, 176-
930 w· l G ire ess rouf :le v. Radio Joint Audience Research Ltd. [2005] U.K.C.L.R. 203, Ch.D., at [53], Lloyd J; ClVII Procedure Rules 44.3.(2)(a); · Holmes (2004) 28ff; Rayment (2005) 149; 
Zuck~rman (2006) 999-1000; Furse (2008) 137. The loser-pays rule can encourage or deter 
lawsmts and settlements: Salop/White (1985) 1049ft. But litigation may be misused if claimants 
~
3
~ver pay costs (the America.n rule): Snyder/Kauper (1991) 596ft. 
. Ger?~r.(2007) 439_; Epstem (2008) 884. English courts forbid such agreements to prevent bad-faith ht1g1o~s behav10ur and lawyers from giving partisan advice: Callery v. Gray [2001] 
E.W .C.A. C1v .. ~ 1.17, CA. Ss. 58/58A, the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990, allow "conditional fee agreemen~s , 1.e., success fees payable to the winning party's lawyer or speculative fees (the 
~~rmal fee bemg reduced or waived): Andrews (2007) 1770-72. 
I.e., lnntrepreneur Es~ates Lt~ . . v. Mason [1993] 2 C.M.L.R. 293, Q.B.D. Partially successful: 
Hendry v. World Professional Billiards and Snooker Assoc. Ltd. [2002] E.C.C. 8, Ch.D. In Crehan 
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Many cases are settled out-of-court on confidential terms. The threat to commence 
tort proceedings perhaps prevents anticompetitive conduct, but private parties are 
averse to initiating litigation with uncertain prospects.
933 
The competition torts essentially compensate for individual harm and only 
indirectly (or, paraphrasing Komninos, 'reflexively')934 promote compliance with 
antitrust legislation. Accordingly, tort claims normally follow the assertion of 
antitrust conduct: "stand-alone" tort lawsuits are exceptional.
935 
One reason for 
this is that the infringement declared by the EC Commission or the OFT is res 
iudicata for subsequent tort cases, 936 thus confining proof to damage and 
causation. Consequently, waiting to litigate until after the antitrust conduct is 
declared in a regulatory context can drastically reduce the cost and uncertainty of 
litigation.937 Conversely, stand-alone claimants have no access to the evidence 
.I" gathered (if any) by the competition authorities and can only bring their actions 
D. · · 938 (probably framed as breach of statutory duty) before the Chancery 1v1s1on. 
Stand-alone claimants therefore usually prove the antitrust conduct 
through a sophisticated market assessment. For example, Arkin v. Borchard Lines 
ucf39 rejected a stand-alone allegation of predatory pricing. The defendant had 
not been shown to have intended to expel the claimant from the business and the 
claimant failed to mitigate its own losses by leaving the market or seeking 
inj\mctive relief.940 However, the High Court can stay proceedings until the public 
i~vestigation concludes, so prospective claimants will likely take advantage of 
that investigation.941 Indeed, stand-alone actions can be more useful as defences 
or counterclaims against actions for breach of anticompetitive contracts. Stand-
alone actions are less attractive as private parties cannot participate in the public 
v. lnntrepreneur Pub Co (CPC) [2004] E.C.C. 8, Ch.D., [2004] E.W.C.A. Civ. 637, CA, the claim 
was eventually rejected: [2007] 1 A.C. 333, HL. 
933 Komninos (2002) 459; Rodger (2008) passim. 
934 Komninos (2008) 6. 
935 Rodger (2003) 104ft; Van Gerven (2007) 23ff. . . . . 
936 S.58A, Competition Act 1998. In America, the verdicts in government antitrust mvest1gat1ons 
are primafacie evidence in further tort proceedings: s.5(a) Sherman Act. . . 
937 Lever (2001) 109ft; Stanton/Skidmore/Harris/Wright (2003) 415; S1ragusa/D'Ostum (2007) 
482ft; Komninos (2008) 7, l 7ff. 
938 Ss.47A/58A/60, Competition Act 1998 . 
939 [2005) E.W.C.A. Civ. 655 , CA. 
940 Milutinovic (2007) passim. 
94 1 Mailers/Heinemann (2007) 403, 458ft; Whish (2008) 303-304. 
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investigation or access the evidence disclosed therein. 942 Conversely, the 
competition authorities possess wide inspection and correctional faculties, as well 
as the ability to evaluate the economic impact of antitrust conduct through market 
analysis, all of which cannot easily be achieved in civil proceedings. The 
competition authorities have access to a significant range of evidence, usually by 
"dawn raids". However, political and budgetary concerns mean that public 
prosecutions are directed at the most serious offences, thereby affecting the 
intensity of private enforcement. 943 Private litigants may claim damages arising 
from any kind of anticompetitive practice, including ones with minimal public 
impact.944 Yet, it is implausible that private litigants regularly complain of trivial 
conduct that will not probably be investigated and could therefore only be 
remedied through stand-alone actions. The success of public enforcement 
determines the range of tort lawsuits commenced . 
2. Avoiding the abuse of private competition-law enforcement 
This section proposes that the competition torts should be accorded limited scope 
in this area and that procedural and substantive techniques help to prevent their 
being perverted. Tort actions can be misused against non-essential offences, given 
the difficulty in identifying antitrust behaviour and the malleability of competition 
law. Unmeritorious claimants can secure monopolistic positions at their rivals' 
expense. For example, mergers can diminish competitors' profits but enhance 
surviving companies' efficiency (via economies of scale), thereby lowering prices 
to consumers' benefit. 945 American antitrust tort litigation has often been 
employed as a busi_ness strategy: firms can intimidate competitors by suing them 
for treble-damages and force risk-averse defendants to conclude confidential 
942 L~ver (2001) ~ 1~'.f; Naz~ini (~004) 79, 85; Monti (2007) 434ft;' De Smijter/Woods (2007) 
pa_s~tm. The _proh1b1tI_on ~g~ms~ disclosure is based on the presumption of innocence and the 
pnv1lege agamst self-mcnmmat1on: Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v. Westinghouse [1978] Ac 547 HL· 
Wa~lbroeck/Slate~ (2007) passim. ~owever, the CAT can order the exhibition of docu~ent~ 
pert1~~nt to the d1sput~ ~fter evaluatmg the legitimate interests of individuals, enterprises and the 
pubhc. Claymore Daines Ltd. v. OFT (Disclosure: Further Information) [2004] CAT 16· 
Rayment (2005) 115ft. ' 
943 Yeung (1998) 5~8-599; Wils (2003) passim; Waller (2003) 230-231; Holmes (2004) 28ff- v 
Gerven (2006) passim; Buxbaum (2007) 48ft. ' an 
944 Jacobs (1984) 1367. 
945 Baumol/Ordover (1985) 247ft; Cane (1996) 161 ; Yeung (1998) 592; Jones (1999a) 181 ; 
Waelbroeck/Slater (2007) passim. 
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settlements in exchange for not modifying their anticompetitive methods. Claims 
usually target minor anticompetitive conduct, such as vertical agreements, as 
opposed to cartels. 946 The abuse of tort lawsuits leads to lengthy, costly and 
complex trials (especially as regards measuring, tracing and apportioning 
damages), multiple payments (diluted among numerous claimants) and 
inconsistent or erroneous decisions. 
To prevent or lessen this problem, American courts assess the merits of the 
claims, evaluate the possible pro-competitive impact of the conduct at stake and 
limit locus standi at the beginning of proceedings. 
947 First, the claimant must 
prove that she suffered harm and that it flowed directly from the defendant's 
conduct ("antitrust injury"). The claimant must be an intended victim belonging to 
the class of persons ( or the economic sector distorted by the antitrust conduct) that 
the statute was designed to protect.
948 Secondly, "antitrust standing" is limited to 
t{c;se who directly purchased from the defendants 949 or their competitors. So, 
again, claimants must show an interest protected by the statute. Conversely, 
indirect purchasers lack standing regardless of whether they were intended · 
victims. 950 Analogously, courts reject the "passing-on defence", by which 
defendants seek a reduction in the damages payable proportional to the 
overcharges that claimants ( direct purchasers) paid to defendants and then 
d . d' h 951 transferre tom irect pure asers. 
' 
· Direct purchasers are permanently and closely related to wrongdoers, so 
·1 th . d' h 952 
they can prove antitrust conduct and harm more eas1 y an m irect pure asers. 
Moreover, the costs of litigation often exceed the damages that indirect purchasers 
can expect to receive. 953 The level of optimal deterrence of antitrust conduct can 
only be attained if standing is limited to direct purchasers. Thus, direct purchasers 
946 Austin (1978) passim; Snyder/Kauper (1991) 551 ff. 
947 Page (1985) passim; Areeda/Kaplow (1997) 76ff; Jones (1999a) 177; Beard (2005) 272-273; 
Monti (2007) 431 ff; Waelbroeck/Slater (2007) passim. 
948 Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-0-Mat, Inc. 429 U.S. 477 (1977): the defendant bo~ght the 
claimant's competitors' businesses driving the claimant out of the market, the court holdmg t~at 
the claimant's lost profits had not derived from the antitrust conduct. See: Page (1980) passim; 
Areeda/Kaplow (1997) 77, 85-86; Jones (1999a) 153ff. 
949 Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois 431 U.S. 720 (1977). 
950 Associated General Contractors of California v. California State Council of Carpenters 459 
U.S. 519 (1983); Areeda/Kaplow (1997) 83. Defendants' shareholders, employees and suppliers 
lack standing too: Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co. 183 F. 704 (1910). 
951 Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp. 392 U.S. 481 ( 1968). 
952 Page ( 1985) passim. 
953 Mollers/Heinemann (2007) 644-645; Epstein (2008) 1255. 
168 
would not relocate but reduce the higher costs incurred due to the antitrust 
conduct, indirect purchasers thereby paying lower prices. 954 For others, the real 
reason for the restrictions on standing is judicial unwillingness to handle highly 
sophisticated and substantive litigation.955 
The denial of standing to indirect victims seems sensible, as they suffer 
damage too unimportant and hard to prove to be worth suing over, at least 
individually. In addition, the lack of class actions can render impossible or 
excessively difficult the exercise of the EC right to compensation for 
anticompetitive damage, thus contrasting with the plethora of American 
economic-tort cases, including mass torts and breach of contract, litigated through 
class actions. 
956 
Still, if indirect purchasers had legal standing and defendants 
could raise the passing-on defence, direct purchasers might not sue in the first 
place: antitrust conduct would be under-deterred. 957 The CAT has confined locus 
d' d' 958 . 
stan i to irect purchasers. Some propose reducmg compensation (by not 
allowing treble-damages and class actions) for the most severe anticompetitive 
practices, using injunctions as the chief remedy. 959 
The American experience suggests that keeping antitrust tort litigation 
within strict bounds can be a sound solution. However, in the UK, the extension 
of standing to indirect purchasers is supported by Courage960 and the passing-on 
defence can prevent claimants from unjustly enriching themselves by transferring 
th · l · d ' 961 
eir osses to m irect purchasers. Nonetheless, the troublesome calculation of 
the losses passed by direct purchasers to indirect purchasers poses doubts about 
the use of the passing-on defence otherwise than against those who overpaid taxes 
and transferred them to their customers. 
962 It has been proposed that indirect 
purchasers should be a~le to recover overcharges in the same proceedings brought 
by direct purchasers and using the evidence gathered therein. 963 
954 L 
955 
andes/Posner _(1979) 60 I ff, 634-635. 
956 
Be:ger/Bernstem ( 1977) passim. 
Rom/Monsour (2006) passim. 
957 Beard (2005) 274ff. 
958 
BCL Old v. Aventis [2005] CAT 2. 
959 
Reich (2005) passim; Furse (2008) 144. 
960 [2002] Q.B . 507. 
961 
Beard/Jones (2002) 254; Milutinovic (2007) passim. 962 A d . Kl · 
s suggeste m emwort [1997] Q.B. 380 and resolved in Marks & Spencer Pie v. 
~fmmissioners of Customs and Excise [1999] 1 C.M.L.R. 1152, Q.B.D. 
Petrucci (2008) passim. 
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3. Specific difficulties 
;('-
Antitrust tort disputes involve complex factual, economic and policy issues. 
Courts must compare the pro-competitive and anti-competitive effects of 
prohibited conduct and weigh legal certainty against economic efficiency.
964 
For 
present purposes, three particular problems deserve attention and are briefly 
addressed below. 
3.1 Harm and causation 
Unlike indirect purchasers, competitors can claim damages through the antitrust 
torts. Yet, they must prove injury due to the defendant's anticompetitive conduct 
as distinct from the harm suffered by consumers and markets generally. Causation 
and harm are essential constituents of the competition torts ; the need to establish 
these elements deters irresponsible litigation. Notably, these issues were left 
d "d d. C 965 un ec1 e m ourage. 
Proving antitrust harm and causation entails a hypothetical inquiry: would 
the claimant have made a profit had it not been wronged by the defendant?
966 
Causation is crucial to determine the defendant's liability and the claimant's 
st&nding. Hence, Milutinovic has suggested that causation should be defined at the 
~utset of proceedings.967 Likewise, to estimate the amount of lost profits is often 
complicated.968 American courts require proof that the claimant's harm flowed 
from the anticompetitive aspect of the defendant's conduct, though they do not 
demand evidence of the exact amount sought. The defendant cannot profit from 
his wrong on the pretext that the claimant failed to prove her injury with 
precision. A just and reasonable estimation suffices, comparing actual harm 
against the profit that the claimant would otherwise have obtained. 
969 
Expert 
testimony is crucial to persuade judges and juries that the methods for showing 
964 Jacobs (1 984) 1368, 1374; Yeung (1998) 585-586. 
965 Van Gerven: (2006) passim, (2007) 23ff; Whish (2008) 302-303. 
966 Shavell (1987) 138. 
967 Milutinovic (2007) passim. 
968 Beard (2005) 280-281. 
969 E.g. , Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc. 327 U.S . 251 (1946) , 264-265 , Sto_ne CJ; Zenith 
Radio Corporation v. Hazeltine Research, Inc. 395 U.S. 100 (1 969), 123-124, White J; J. T_ruett 
Payne Company, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corporation 451 U.S. 557 (1981 ), 565 -567, Rehnqmst J. 
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speculative profits were based on the facts . 970 In Devenish, Lewison J was 
prepared to award an account of illegal profits given the harsh proof of harm.971 
3.2 Remedies 
The competition torts provide compensation for harm flowing from antitrust 
conduct. Although damages can be claimed in the CAT or the Chancery Division, 
the CAT seems preferable, given its members (economists, accountants, well-
versed judges and practitioners in private litigation) and the fact that its 
jurisdiction is confined to awarding damages.972 The High Court considers itself 
less prepared to handle the complex economic questions involved in assessing 
damages973 and can transfer to the CAT cases involving the infringement of UK 
. . 1 974 competition rues. However, the hard calculation of damages often precludes 
compensation. 975 
By contrast, injunctions are crucial to prevent anticompetitive conduct.976 
The High Court has exclusive jurisdiction to grant injunctions subject to the 
applicant's undertaking to pay damages if the action is later found to be 
groundless. 977 The court must assess the risk of injustice to each party, preserving 
the status qua if both parties would equally be affected. Likewise, the court has to 
check that damages are not adequate, that there is a serious issue to be tried and 
that the claimant undertook to compensate the defendant if the action were to be 
rejected. 978 
970 . Areeda/Kaplow (1 997) 74. 
971 
972 
[2008] 2 All E.~. _249, at [ 19], rejected in: [2009] 3 All E.R. 27, CA. 
S.47 A, ~ompet~t1on Act 1998; Rodger (2003) 113 ; Brown (2007) passim; Clough/Wilson 
(200'.) passir:i : Whish (2?08) 300. Healthcare at Home Ltd. v. Genzyme Ltd. [2006] CAT 29, was 
the ~irst ?ec1s1on awarding damages (for abuse of dominance), although the parties settled on 
confidential terms. 
973 Clarit~s (U.K.) Ltd. v. The Post Office [2001] U.K.C.L.R. 2, Ch.D. ; Attheraces Ltd. v. British 
Horseracing Board Ltd. [2007] E.C.C. 7, CA; Chester CC v. Arriva Plc [2007] E W H C 1373 
Ch.D. See: Furse (2008) 151. , · · · · ' 
974 S. 16, Competition Act 1998. 
975 
976 
Rodger (2003) 109ff; Van Gerven: (2006) passim, (2007) 3lff; Mollers/Heinemann (2007) 399. 
Garden Cottage [1984] 1 A C. 130, 15 1, Lord Wilberforce; Holleran v. Daniel Thwaites Plc 
!}?89] 2 C.M.L.R. 91 '., Ch:D. ("Holleran"), at [51] , Gibson J. See: Steiner (1987) 114ff. 
97 8 
E.g. , f.!etwo rk Multi_media Television Ltd. v. ]observe Ltd. [2001 ] U.K.C.L.R. 81 4, Ch.D. 
American _Cyanamid Co. v. Ethicon Ltd. [1975] A.C. 396, HL. See: Jacobs (1983) assim· 
Brealey/Hoskms (1998) 149ff; Andrews (2007) 1725. P ' 
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3.3 Exemplary damages 
Chapter II showed that exemplary damages are contentious in tort law generally. I 
will now demonstrate that they too are polemical in the competition torts. Punitive 
(and extra-compensatory, that is, treble) damages are blamed for exacerbating 
irresponsible litigation and for discouraging infringers from denouncing 
anticompetitive practices, thereby undermining public prosecution and leniency 
programs.979 Conversely, it is proposed that the regulator determines the level of 
optimal punishment. 98° Furthermore, punitive damages dissuade victims from 
avoiding or mitigating damage.
981 
Others argue that extra-compensatory damages deter antitrust conduct by 
providing claimants with a potent financial reward. 982 In particular, treble-
damages foster private litigation which supplements public prosecution to achieve 
the optimal degree of prevention and punishment.983 Multiple-damages awards are 
efficient, as they are inversely proportional in the amount payable to probability 
of discovering antitrust conduct.984 In fact, Beccaria and Bentham proposed that 
the lower the chance of detecting and punishing misbehaviour the higher the 
penalty should be. Punishment serves deterrence if it is proportional to the 
offence. 985 Similarly, Becker argued that economic efficiency and optimal 
detvrfence could be achieved if, before undertaking a given activity, wrongdoers 
internalised the social costs arising from their misconduct, less the likelihood of 
b . . h d 986 emg pums e . 
979 Salop/White (1985) 1049ff; Baumol/Ordover (1985) 253; Snyder/Kauper (1991) 596ff; 
Waelbroeck/Slater (2007) passim. 
980 Breit/Elzinga (1974) passim. 
981 Robin (2005) passim. 
982 Polinsky (1986) passim; Rodger (2003) 104-105; Holmes (2004) 35-36; Wind (2005) 668; 
Paulis (2007) l 2ff. 
983 Areeda/Kaplow (1997) 73ff. 
984 Baumol/Ordover (1985) 263 . . . . 
985 '[T]he disadvantage of the punishment should exceed the advantage ant1c1pated from the cnme; 
in which excess should be calculated the certainty of punishment and the loss of the expected 
benefit' Beccaria ([1764)/1996) 49-50. 'The value of the punishment must not be less in any case 
than what is sufficient to outweigh that of the profit of the offence', Beccaria's Dei Delitti e Delle 
Pene, §6, French trans. by Andre Morellet, §23, quoted by Bent~am [ 1781 ]/1.996) Ch.XIV, §8, 
166. For Bentham (ibid), if the offence was nonetheless committed the punishment would be 
'altogether inefficacious'. 
986 Becker (1968) passim. 
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A central concern is how to calculate the adequate amount of fines, so as 
not to discourage efficient conduct but still deter antitrust practices. 987 Lawyers 
and economists have extensively discussed the impact of penalties on private 
enforcement, particularly of punitive damages on antitrust tort actions. Landes and 
Posner argued that higher firies (as in treble-damages) increased private 
enforcement and the probability of detection above the optimal level. 988 Polinsky 
and Shavell maintained that to accomplish optimal deterrence, punitive damages 
should represent the product of the claimant's loss and a factor that reflected the 
likelihood of escaping liability, regardless of the gravity of the offence or the 
defendant's wealth. 989 Yet, Hylton recommended a fixed minimum award that 
would mirror the chance of anticompetitive conduct being disclosed and tort 
liability imposed. If the defendant's profits exceed the claimant's losses 
exemplary damages perform a punitive role: they compel the defendant to 
internalise such loss. Otherwise, exemplary damages dissuade potential 
wrongdoers from acting altogether. 990 
The ECJ has not indicated how to achieve the compensatory ideal 
proclaimed in Courage. 991 The principle of effectiveness demands full 
compensation. Conversely, the principle of non-discrimination prohibits national 
laws from enforcing EC rights through remedies less favourable than those 
governing domestic actions. So, English courts should award exemplary damages 
for the .Euro-torts, as these damages are allowed vis-a-vis the English competition 
992 torts. Exemplary damages can protect against the abuse of market-power993 and 
prevent defendants from profiting by antitrust conduct. 994 yet, although Buxbaum 
had suggested limiting punitive damages awards to serious infringements, 995 
Devenish dismissed exemplary damages notwithstanding that the defendants had 
obtained their illicit gains through a cartel, conduct which would seem to fit Lord 
Devlin's secondary category of exemplary damages. The co1:1rt wanted to prevent 
double jeopardy. The defendants had already been fined by the EC Commission, 
987 Page (1980) 475ff. 
988 L . andes/Posner (1975) passim. 
989 . 
990 
Polinsky/Shavell (1998) 954-955. 
Hylton (1998) passim. 
991 Whish (2008) 302. 
992 
993 
Burrows (2004) 419; Mailers/Heinemann (2007) 647-648; Lane (2007) 428. 
Kuddus [2002] 2 A.C. 122, at [66], Lord Nicholls; Beard (2005) 283-284. 
994 Rodger (2003) 109ff. 
995 · Buxbaum (2007) 52ff. 
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although they were exempted from the penalty: they were whistler-blowers 
protected by the leniency program. 
996 Competition authorities depend on 
individuals denouncing their own firms' antitrust practices, so the authorities 
encourage whistle-blowers via the promise of release from or reduction of 
fines .997 
Currently, non bis in idem is conclusive for rejecting exemplary damages 
where the antitrust conduct has already been punished ( or even if the fine was 
released under the leniency program), which is the likely scenario considering that 
tort actions will usually follow public prosecution. Yet, as argued in Chapter II, 
exemplary damages aid in depriving defendants of profits illicitly obtained 
through antitrust conduct, a function distinct from retribution. So, just as Devenish 
has been criticised for refusing gained-based damages, 
998 this decision is 
guestionable in that it denied exemplary damages despite the defendants having 
acted with a view to profiting from their wrong. Admittedly, this conclusion is not 
supported by empirical evidence about the effectiveness of punitive damages as a 
deterrent. Still, as Komninos implies, exemplary damages belong to the category 
of private enforcement, whose mission differs from that of public enforcement.
999 
Thus, punitive damages do not in fact entail double jeopardy. 
4. Observations 
The competition torts help competition authorities to enforce antitrust laws, but 
play a secondary role. Potential claimants are likely to take advantage of the 
evidence gathered in public investigations and the binding force of the judgments 
asserting anticompetitive practices. Actions for damages will probably follow 
public prosecutions, and are therefore likely to involve the most serious offences. 
Areas of dispute in tort litigation will be reduced to the issues of causation and 
harm. However, claimants may be more interested in enjoining defendants, 
thereby avoiding the harm altogether. Then, although actions for damages are 
critical, injunctions can also be significant. 
996 Devenish (2008] 2 All E.R. 249, at (48-52], Lewison J. 
997 Peretz (2005) 82; De Smijter/Woods (2007) passim. 
998 OduduNirgo (2009) passim; Sheehan (2009) passim. 
999 Kornninos (2008) 21 -22. 
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Antitrust tort liability should be constrained within narrow bounds. This 
can be attained by confining locus standi to those able to prove both direct harm 
and causation: competitors and direct purchasers. Exemplary damages can be a 
powerful incentive to litigate and a means of stripping defendants of their illicit 
gains. They can also discourage defendants from acting with a view to profiting 
from antitrust activities. 
IV. Competition torts 
Legal scholarship has focused on the competition torts as a mechanism for 
enforcing competition law and, at any rate, without much attention to the mental 
element that is my primary concern. I shall submit that the competition torts 
trigger strict liability for harm although they revolve around deliberate conduct 
that defendants often commit with the intention to injure individual rivals. The 
intention to harm identifiable victims need not be shown. It is implicit in the 
antitrust conduct that has already been punished by the competition authorities. 
The competition torts form a civil remedy for damages awarded to the particular 
victim of antitrust conduct, as a supplement to the public enforcement of 
competition law. Furthermore, I will contend that English courts are likely to 
apply the competition torts with their habitual circumspection: outcome-based 
strict liability does not in itself impair competition. 
1. The nature of antitrust tort liability 
The ECJ declared that fault is immaterial to the administrative sanctions triggered 
by infringement of articles 81 and 82 EC. 
1000 Yet, whether liability for antitrust 
harm is fault-based or strict was not clarified in Courage but in Manfredi v. Lloyd 
Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA: 
1001 liability presupposes the breach of competition 
rules, harm and causation. Whish argued that because Member States must answer 
for the harm caused by violations of non-directly-effective EC provisions, 1002 
individuals should obviously be liable for the injury arising from the breach of the 
1000 . 
1001 C~ntinental Can v. Commission Case 6/72 (1973] E.C.R. 215. 
1002 Jomed C~ses C-295/04 through C-298/04 (2006] E.C.R. I-661 9, ECJ. See: Lane (2007) 428. 
Francovich v. The Republic (Italy) Joined Cases C-6/90; C-9/90 [1993] 2 C.M.L.R. 66, ECJ. 
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directly applicable articles 81 and 82 EC. 
1003 The underlying rationale of strict 
liability is, I think, the same than that of breach of statutory duty:
 strict liability is 
imposed because the defendant infringes a specific statutory duty
 (as articles 81 
and 82 EC) which must be observed in absolute terms.
1004 Similarly, states are 
strictly liable for harm caused by actions in excess of their legisl
ative discretion; 
. . 1 . b h" . . d l 005 
otherwise, a "suff1c1ent y senous reac 1s reqmre . 
Strict liability is morally justified in that tortfeasors must answer for their 
acts. Legitimate activities become wrongful given their undesira
ble effects. The 
causal link between the defendant's conduct and the victim's har
m is the gist of 
liability. 1006 Nevertheless, some consider fault-based liability 
to be a better 
deterrent of anticompetitive practices than strict liability, althoug
h negligence is 
f . . 1007 F 
L d 
indeed presumed from breaches o compet1t1on statutes. 
or aw an 
/· 
Economics, the choice between fault and strict liability is cont
ingent upon the 
legal costs (like compensation) and precaution costs that each regime generates
. 
Thus, tortfeasors lack an incentive to be careful if avoiding
 harm is more 
expensive than causing it. In this case, the defendant would n
ot be liable in 
1008 . 1· b'l' b th 1 
negligence (according to the Hand formula), so stnct ia 1 1ty may e e on 
Y 
. 1009 Th h . . 1 d t . d 
way by which victims can secure compensation. e c 01ce 1s 
a so e ermme 
by the class of risk involved. If the risk can only be prevented
 by prohibiting 
• 
victims from acting at all , defendants should not be held liable.
1010 Strict liability 
offers full compensation and serves to control the level of haza
rdous activities 
regardless of the defendant's blameworthiness, whereas fault liabi
lity can be more 
efficient as regards non-dangerous activities, encouraging victims
 and injurers to 
. h . 1 d d f t' 1011 achieve t e optima stan ar o precau 10n. 
1003 Whish (1994) 64. 
1004 See above 864 and accompanying text. 
1005 Brasserie du Pecheur S.A. v. Federal Republic of Germany, R. v Secretary o
f State fo r 
Transport Joined Cases C-46/93 & C-48/93 [1996] Q.B. 404, ECJ, at [80] . S
ee: Tridimas (2~01) 
30 l ff; Stanton/Skidmore/Harris/Wright (2003) 242, 246; Milutinovic (2007
) 726ff; Komnmos 
(2008) 195. 
1006 Winiger (2002) 5ff; Gilead (2005) 28ff; Cane (2006) 93 . 
1007 Milutinovic (2007) 726ff, 756; Siragusa/D'Ostuni (2007) 478ff. 
1008 See above n.3 17. 
1009 Kaplow/Shavell (2002) passim. 
1010 Posner (2003) 178-1 79. 
10 11 Shavell (1 987) 9ff, 31-32; Landes/Posner (1 987) 70; Cane (2006) 175ff. Cf: 
Weinrib (1995) 
189 (advocating fault liability for ultra-hazardous activities: the materialisatio
n of the risk reveals 
negligence, similarly to res ipsa loquitur) . 
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The economic torts reflect a compromise arrangement to
 exclude 
negligence, which also touches the competition torts. Rivals ca
nnot be liable in 
fault, for they owe no duty not to carelessly or intentionally ha
rm one another. 
This explains the general denial of compensation for negligentl
y inflicted pure 
economic loss.
1012 
Likewise, fault liability is excessive: competitors would answer 
for all the losses that a reasonable person would have foreseen as 
likely effects of 
the antitrust conduct, even to indirect victims (such as final consumers). 1013 On th
e 
other hand, EC law does not make liability dependent on the defen
dant's intention 
to harm a particular competitor. This intention can be extremely d
ifficult to show, 
as competitors necessarily target each other. 
1014 Even the objective intention to 
drive rivals out of the business can be hard to prove through eco
nomic evidence 
such as market analysis .
1015 In tum, strict liability is supported by the wording of 
articles 81 and 82 EC. These provisions impose unequivocal proh
ibitions without 
leaving addressees any margin of discretion. 
1016 Further, the Competition Act 
1998 does not subject the recovery of damages to fault or intention.10 17 As seen, 
the most accepted tort to claim damages for breach of EC (and UK) competitio
n 
provisions in England is breach of statutory duty, which triggers s
trict liability. 101s 
Conversely, in Spain and France this class of liability is rooted in
 the defendant's 
fault, proved by the claimant or presumed from the bre
ach of s~atute 
' 
respectively.
1019 
In my view, this species of tortious liability is neither grounded in 
negligence nor in bare causation of harm. Rather, it is strict liab
ility for harmful 
consequences underpinned in deliberate (antitrust) conduct targeted a
t 
undermining competition generally. Moreover, antitrust conduct o
ften implies the 
defendant's intention t? harm a recognisable opponent. Yet, for pragmatic reasons 
1012 . 
See above Chapter II, section III, pp.42ff; Steiner (1987) 110· Stanton/Skidmo
re/Harris/Wright 
(2003) 270. ' 
10 13 Hoskins (1 992) 26 1. 
1014 , 
_ Whish (1994) 65; Jones (1999a) 118. 
io1J Whish (200~) 731. 
1016 
. 
~anks [1994] 5 C.M.L.R. 30, at [53], ':an Gerven (Advocate-General) ; Buck
ley (1 984) 223-
224, Cane (1996) 219-220; Brealey/Hoskms (1998) 123-124· Stanton/Skid
more/Harris/Wright 
(2003) 267. ' 
:~:; Stanton/Skidmore/Harris/Wright (2003) 269-270, 411-412; Carty (2001) 3
8ff; Weir (2006) 99. 
Garden Cottage [1984] I AC. 130, 141 , Lord Diplock (breach of article
 82 EC) · R v 
Secretary of State for Transport ex. p. Factortame Ltd (No.6) [2001] 1 W.L.R
. 942, Q.B.D '. 
(breach of EC law generally). 
101 9 · 
Ashurst -~eport. Study on the Conditions of claims for damages in case of infringe
ment of the 
EC Competttwn Rules 31.08.2004: Thompson/O 'Flaherty (2008) 1447. 
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the competition torts entail strict liability for outcomes: the claimant need not 
show that the defendant intended to injure him. 
Komninos recently wrote that antitrust tort liability is strict given its 
compensatory function, whereas antitrust administrative liability requires the 
defendant's fault or intention, as it fulfils punitive and deterrent aims. 
1020 This 
confirms that antitrust conduct is intentional. Thus, just like passing-off, the 
competition torts presuppose deliberate conduct and often the intention to harm a 
discernible rival, which need not be demonstrated. The best example and most 
conspicuous form of abuse of dominant position, which incorporates the 
. d . . 1021 Th .. 
defendant's intention to eliminate its contenders, is pre atory pncmg. is is 
reflected in the competition torts. Although the intention to drive competitors out 
of the market is conceptually distinguishable from the intention to injure a 
;("- particular person, predatory pricing usually injures one or a few known 
. 
· 1022 
adversaries. Thus, predators commonly mtend to harm concrete competitors. 
f . . '1023 1 . 1 Unilaterally cutting prices is 'the very essence o competition un ess its goa 
is to eliminate rivals. 1024 However, to show that the defendant targeted at a 
particular competitor is complex. Striving for efficiency and consumer welfare 
involves a desire to defeat rivals. Accordingly, proof revolves around the negative 
impact of the abusive conduct on the market. Thus, McGee saluted the result in 
Mogul, since the defendants had caused no social loss through their predatory 
p~actice which ceased before the case concluded. Predatory pricing is usually 
. d . . k t 1025 In irrational conduct, as m Tuttle, an an expensive way to gam mar e power. 
America and in the EC, the defendant's abuse of dominant position in the relevant 
market is inferred from the fact of selling products at loss, namely, below the 
average variable costs ("A VC"), with the intention of expelling rivals from the 
market. 1026 Furthermore, the CAT asserts that the longer a (super) dominant firm 
sells its products below A VC the easier is to presume the intention to exclude 
1020 Kornninos (2008) 194. 
1021 See: above n.207, n.514, and accompanying text; Whish (2008) 189,731. 
1022 This conduct: 'has the reasonably foreseeable result of driving a rival from the market'; 'goes 
beyond a normal competitive response'; 'is disproportionate to the threat'; and 'has the object or 
effect of preserving or strengthening a dominant position'. Claymore Dairies Ltd v. OFT [2005] 
CAT 30, at [270]. See: Thompson/O'Flaherty (2008) 962. 
1023 Matsushita 475 U.S. 574, 594, Powell J. 
1024 Compagnie Maritime [2004] C.M.L.R. 1076, ECJ, at [132] (Advocate General Fennelly). 
1025 McGee (1958) passim. 
1026 AKZO v. Commission Case C-62/86 [1993] 5 C.M.L.R. 215, ECJ, at [72]; Atlantic Richfield 
Company v. USA Petroleum Company 495 U.S. 328 (1990). See: Areeda/Kaplow (1997) 87. 
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· 1021 T ll . . 
competitors. o se at pnces below the reasonably anticipated AVC is, some 
contend, per se unlawful.
1028 However, American courts also demand evidence of 
the defendant's ability to recoup the losses incurred to sell below costs through 
the exercise of market power in the long ter_m.
1029 Conversely, the ECJ had not 
required such proof.
1030 Whish suggests that this element should be proved if the 
defendant lacks considerable market power and an intention to eliminate rivals is 
not patent. 1031 
Nevertheless, the association between both kinds of intention may not be 
so evident in other types of antitrust behaviour. A hard-core cartel has the object 
or effect of distorting competition, rather than the intention of injuring single 
rivals. Even so, the fact that antitrust conduct is deliberate and intended to 
undermine competitors, if not concrete rivals, reveals that the competition torts do 
not sanction the infliction of harm pure and simple. These torts entail strict 
liability for harm but rest on deliberate conduct. As Tune put it, intention-based 
liability serves to repress deliberately-inflicted harms which the agent could have 
avoided. 
1032 
Conduct-based strict liability is irrelevant. Competition is not an 
abnormally dangerous activity but often produces social benefits regardless of the 
individual losers it inevitably creates. As argued, the outcome-based strict liability 
in the competition torts has a pragmatic justification: claimants are heavily 
burdened with proof of individual harm directly caused by the defendant's 
antitrust act, as separate from the negative impact that the latter had on the market, 
consumers and competitors generally. 
1033 As Cane indicates, the difficulty of 
showing the defendant's intention explains the imposition of outcome-based strict 
1027 
Napp Pharmaceutical Holdings Ltd. v. Director General of Fair Trading [2002] E.C.C. 13, 
~!T, at [228]-[307]-[310]-[33~]; Aberdeen Journals [2003] CAT 11, at [356]. 
Areeda/Turner (1975) passim. Cf: Easterbrook (1981) passim (arguing that predatory pricing is 
advantageous to consumers). 
1029 u, . 
rreyerhaeuser v. Ross-Simmons 549 U.S. 312 (2007) (extending this standard of proof to 
Po~~datory bidding/buyi~g). See: Epstein (2008) 1272-3. . 
Tetra Pak Internatwnal SA v. Commission Case C-333/94P [1997] 4 C.M.L.R. 662, ECJ, at 
[44]. In Carter Holt Harvey Building Products Group Ltd v. The Commerce Commission [2004] 
U.K.P.C. 37, PC, Lord Hope (at [67]) required proof of the ability to recoup losses. France 
Telecom SA v. Commission Case T-340/03 [2007] 4 C.M.L.R. 21, CFI, did not (appeal waiting for 
the ECJ's final decision) . 
1031 Whish (2008) 736. 
1032 Tune (1974) 86. 
1033 
Brown Shoe 370 U.S. 294, 320, Warren CJ; Van den Heuvel (1963) 182-183. 
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liability. Otherwise, the chance of being compensated would be excessively 
reduced. 1034 
The economic torts and the competition torts have diverse sources and 
underlying policies. 1035 Courts create the economic torts as a means of restraining 
liability in line with competition freedom. Hence the economic torts involve a 
certain form of intention and (with exceptions) wrongful means. The competition 
torts are a legislative invention whereby individual victims can obtain 
compensation for the economic harm they have suffered from another's antitrust 
conduct. These torts supplement the public enforcement of competition law. 
However, these differences do not preclude the common law from approaching 
both categories of torts consistently. As suggested elsewhere, English courts are 
likely to implement the competition torts as cautiously as they do the economic 
torts and, therefore, remain immune to the influence of EC law.
1036 Moreover, the 
ha(d proof of harm and causation effectively restricts the prospect of 
compensation. As with the economic torts, the competition torts play a limited 
purpose in business rivalry. 
2. The overlap with the economic torts 
Steiner proposed to redress anticompetitive harm through the economic torts so as 
to keep 
1
liability within manageable boundaries, thereby excluding compensation 
where damage was a side-effect of legitimate competition.
1037 Hoskins and Whish 
suggested that the tort of breach of statutory duty was no help in ascertaining 
causation, that is, whether the claimant's harm derived from the defendant's 
antitrust conduct or from other facts, such as the claimant's own fall in 
productivity or failure to react to market conditions. 1038
 
It has been postulated that antitrust harm could be claimed through the 
unlawful-interference tort, inasmuch as the defendant had intended to harm the 
claimant, for example, by driving the latter out of the market or preventing her 
1034 Cane: (1982) 32, (1997) 49-50. 
1035 Cane (1996) passim. 
1036 Carty (2001) 39ff; Deakin/Johnston/Markesinis (2007) 603. 
1037 Steiner (1987) passim. 
1038 Hoskins (1992) 260-261; Whish (1994) 64-65. 
180 
from entering the business through predatory pricing. 1039 Anticompetitive conduct 
can shape the element of wrongfulness in the three-party unlawful-interference 
tort. The breach of competition law is autonomously actionable (through the 
competition torts) by the third party (direct victim), thus complying with the 
requirement established in OBG. 1040 Moreover, it is clear from both the ECJ's 
case-law and the English law that anyone harmed by antitrust conduct has the 
right to seek compensation. Nonetheless, although application of the unlawful-
interference tort provides consistency and legal certainty, 1041 as seen before the 
scope of wrongfulness varies noticeably between the economic torts. Likewise, 
antitrust conduct can also underpin liability under the torts of three-party 
. . 'd . d 1 . 1042 
mt1m1 ation an un awful means conspiracy. Conversely, simple conspiracy 
seems ineffective to handle commercial competition. 1043 Finally, although some 
courts and authors extend Lumley to inducing breaches of EC law, 1044 I think that 
a more reasonable approach is to limit Lumley to inducing breach of contract. 
Nowadays, under the Competition Act 1998, antitrust harm is clearly 
compensable in tort without proof of the defendant's fault or intention. The 
economic torts are subsidiary. In the U.S. some postulate a doctrine unifying the 
competition torts and the economic torts around commercial practices and 
bl d 1045 H . compensa e amage. owever, m England both sets of torts form separate 
categories with different sources and goals. The economic torts, with their mental 
and wrongfulness components, reflect the courts' indisposition to control 
commercial rivalry. The competition torts belong to the regulatory system 
designed to punish and deter antitrust conduct, which partly explains that they 
entail outcome-based strict liability. These torts are rooted in deliberate conduct 
that is targeted at pre_venting, restricting or distorting competition at large, 
although it often embodies the defendant's intention to harm a particular rival. 
Once antitrust conduct is asserted by the public authority, the claimant does not 
have to demonstrate any intentional element, because it is presumed from the 
1039 
Brealey/Hoskins (1998) 126-127; Weir (2006) 197-198 
1040 • [2008] l AC. 1, at [44], Lord Hoffmann. 
1041 
Stanton/Skidmore/Harris/Wright (2003) 272ff; O'Sullivan (2007) 507. 1042 Jones (1999a) 122-123. 
10~ . See above n.467 and accompanymg text. 
:~: Holleran [1989] 2 C.M.L.R. 917, at [51] , Gibson J; Reid (1998) 14lff. 
Waller (2003) passim. 
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antitrust conduct. In addition, as many have argued, 1046 to require evidence of a 
specific intention would be exaggerated, given the dearth of antitrust case-law and 
that claimants are heavily burdened with proof of damage and causation. Yet, the 
economic and competition torts play all a marginal role in business struggles. 
Moreover, British courts are likely to enforce them with their usual prudence. 
3. Observations 
This section showed that the competition torts generate strict liability for 
consequences, although it is rooted in deliberate conduct. Accordingly, fault-
based liability is ousted. Antitrust conduct is targeted at the market itself but 
regularly entails the agent's intention of harming recognisable adversaries. Such 
intention need not be verified in tort proceedings because it is latent in 
anticompetitive conduct. Not only is liability sufficiently restrained through the 
requisite damage and causation, but also the defendant's intention to injure the 
claimant can irrebuttably be inferred from the fact that the antitrust conduct 
specifically hurt the individual claimant. As a result, the competition torts are 
simply an adjunct to competition law. 
Antitrust conduct can form the wrongful means in the principal economic 
tor;ts. Yet, it appears improbable that, assuming that the competition authority has 
~onclusively stated antitrust conduct, the competition torts will be displaced by 
the economic torts. This is for the economic torts require proof of the facts and of 
the defendant's intention. Nevertheless, the peculiar structure and goals of the 
competition torts do not impede the CAT and the ordinary courts from applying 
this kind of tort liability with the caution traditionally observed in the economic 
torts. 
v. Conclusions 
The competition torts make a limited and indirect contribution to the prevention 
and punishment of the transgression of competition rules. Antitrust law is mainly 
enforced by the public authority. A central motive for this imperfect function lies 
1046 Jones (1999a) 118ff; Carty (2001) 37; Stanton/Skidmore/Harris/Wright (2003) 270; Monti: 
(2002) passim, (2007) 395, 424ff. 
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in the nature and rationales of tort law, as distinct from those of competition law. 
The competition torts particularly help to compensate for the economic harm 
occasioned by anticompetitive conduct to particular traders. Yet, antitrust 
behaviour largely impairs consumers and competitors in general: only 
concomitantly can it injure recognisable entities. Moreover, the benefit that tort 
claimants obtain from a successful public investigation of antitrust conduct 
exceeds the service that tort law renders to the competition authority: tort actions 
follow and hinge on the conclusive declaration of antitrust conduct. Consequently, 
tort litigation is confined to the most serious offences, those which drew the 
public authority's attention. Thus, arguments in litigation concentrate on damage 
and causation, which has the effect of restricting tort claims to those parties able 
to prove these complex issues, namely, direct purchasers and competitors. 
The main thrust of my argument is the mixed nature of antitrust tort 
liability. The core is deliberate conduct whose object or effect is to hurt 
indeterminate economic agents within a specific market, but which can also 
incorporate the intention to harm identifiable rivals. The effect is strict liability for 
the harm caused to an individual claimant. The defendant's intention to injure the 
claimant need not be proved: the requisite state of mind is implicit in the antitrust 
conduct and is also inferred from the fact that this act distinctively harmed the 
concrete claimant. This confirms that the competition torts form an appendix to 
competition law. They complement the legislative regulation of antitrust conduct 
that protects numberless consumers and contenders. Nevertheless, as compared 
with the economic torts, the competition torts do not make things easier for 
claimants. It can be intricate to identify the harm sustained by a particular 
claimant from the negative impact of the antitrust practice upon countless 
unknown victims. Ultimately, English courts are likely to administer antitrust tort 
liability with their common reluctance to assume legislative powers in commercial 
strife. It is this laissez-faire approach (which may often have the effect of 
promoting competition) that brings the economic torts and competition torts 
together. Tort law in general plays a modest role in the realm of business rivalry. 
Specifically, the competition statutes allow individual victims, especially 
adversaries, to sue for harm arising out of antitrust breaches, whether in contract 
or in tort. What makes this remedy unique is that it originates in public 
(competition) law as contrasted with the common-law economic torts. 
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CHAPTER VI 
FUNDAMENTALS OF CHILEAN TORT LAW 
This chapter attempts to describe the basic principles of Chilean
 tort law. It claims 
that, for the sake of consistency with the existing law and as
 a matter of legal 
policy, Chilean courts and jurists should weigh victims' right to be compensated 
for pure economic loss flowing from commercial co
mpetition against 
wrongdoers' liberty to compete. I will argue that tort liability i
nvolving business 
rivals should not be regulated by the overall principle of culpa but 
limited through 
requiring that the defendant causes economic harm to the claim
ant with intention 
or gross negligence. I will contend that this kind of miscon
duct discloses the 
~ buse of the right/liberty to compete, whereas carelessly caused
 economic harm is 
just a side-effect of legitimate competition. I will suggest that, although Chilean 
courts have traditionally restricted compensation for negligently
 caused economic 
losses for lack of causation or for uncertainty of damage, this m
ethod is unsuitable 
for trade opponents who owe one another no duty of care. 
Section I introduces the sources of tort law, emphasising th
e practical 
importance of legal scholarship and case-law for the developm
ent of this field . 
Section II underlines the central principles and functions 
of Chilean extra-
contractual civil liability. Simple fault is the default rule in mos
t areas of tort law 
but cannot adequately manage liability for harm arisin
g from business 
competition. In this domain liability should be limited throug
h the defendant' s 
intention to harm the claimant or at any rate gross negligen
ce, both of which 
simultaneously increase compensation to all direct losses. Sect
ion III infers what 
the Chilean courts' approach towards compensation for pure eco
nomic loss would 
be by analysing the existing case-law. Section IV reviews the m
eaning and impact 
of the abuse of rights as a specific fount of tort liability as w
ell as a defining 
feature of unfair practices and anticompetitive conduct. Secti
on V assesses the 
justification for wrongfulness and breach of statutory duty with respect to culpa. 
Section VI sets out the chief conclusions. 
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I. Overview 
This section describes the legal sources of Chilean law. Altho
ugh case-law and 
legal doctrine are secondary formal sources they are in p
ractice critical to 
elaborate the law of delict from the general rules enshrined in
 the Chilean Civil 
Code ("CHCC"). Hence the influence of these sources upon this thesis. Furthe
r, a 
consistent case-law is fundamental to achieve legal certainty and
 justice. 
1. Legislation and the CHCC 
It is validly argued that the 1789 French Revolution and subse
quent codification 
influenced the political independence alongside the inception o
f new and rational 
law in Latin America. The CHCC (1855), perhaps the most authoritative 
and 
original code in the region, is in the legal-classicist tradition, 
manifested in the 
respect for the formal sources, especially statutes. It is writt
en in a persuasive 
style, containing numerous definitions and examples aimed to
 provide for legal 
certainty didactically. Its author, Andres Bello, used multif
arious sources to 
produce a code suitable for the reality of his time, 
1041 reflecting the French 
liberalism in commercial matters and the Spanish conservatism
 in family law. Its 
juristic-linguistic excellence and ideology grounded on liberty, equality and 
private autonomy have endured several legislative reforms. I
ts generic norms, 
including the principle of tort liability for culpa, have been a
pplied without 
alterations to tackle novel problems.
1048 The primary formal source of Chilean 
law, which is affiliated to the civil-law tradition, is legislation
, as visible in the 
d f ' . . 1049 
e m1t1on of statute, - in the rules on statutory interpretation, 1
050 in that customs 
constitute law only if a statute so recognises it 
1051 and in that case-law is a 
1047 
I.e., the .~oman l~w and Alfonso X (The Wise)'s Siete Partidas; the natura
l Jaw ers· the 
modern trad1t1on predisposed to abstraction, epitomised by culpa
 and refi'ned by G t· y D ' 
and Poth' · s · , d . 
' ro 1us, omat 
1048 ier, av1gny. s an Bentham's ideas; the Code Napoleon 
and its commentators 
. See gene~ally: L1~a (1933) 17, 36ff, (1944) 322ff; Lawson (1953) 51 ; Matu
s (1958 74-75 · 
ZL
1m~enst/K/ ru1thof/Memertzhagen-Limpens (1980) 5; Dominguez (1989) 111-112
 (2007j) 3lOff'. 
we1ger otz (1998) 113- 114 597 616· M ' 
' ' 
, 
. , , , rrow (2001), (2004) passim; Corral (2003) 82ff 
~,:tz,man (2005) ~5-46, 61 ; Tapia (2005) passim; Barros (2006) 57, 76. 
' 
d [A] dehc'lba:atwn of s~
vereig~ will which, expressed in the form prescribed by the Cons
titution 
or ers, pro 1 its or permits' (article 1 CHCC). 
' 
1050 Articles l 9ff CHCC. 
1051 Article 2 CHCC. 
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,/ 
secondary authority. 1052 Moreover, for Chileans legislation is a mam way of 
handling social challenges.
1053 Specifically, statutes and regulations have played a 
major part in the building of the Chilean economy. Since the 1950s the growing 
commercial exchange with the U.S. has influenced Chile into adopting the same 
market-oriented paradigm. Thus, Chilean competition laws prohibit identical 
kinds of antitrust conduct than in America (and in the EU).
1054 In sum, business 
issues are dealt with prospectively by legislation and retrospectively by courts. 
Tort law's role is residual. 
2. Case-law 
Courts have conventionally been regarded as mechanical interpreters of the law 
whose decisions entail merely doctrinaire authority: 
1055 they lack legislative 
pbwers. 1056 From the beginning of the Chilean state (1810) courts have been 
structurally and ideologically apolitical. Lower judges follow the higher courts' 
rulings seeking to be promoted. The judiciary has continuously decided 
controversies in a conservative fashion, protecting contract, property and 
economic freedom, while failing to safeguard the democratic values during 
. dl . d" h" 1057 Pmochet' s sa y notonous Ictators Ip. 
Under article 3 CHCC, case-law is an indirect legal source which binds the 
particular litigants exclusively: 'It is only for the legislator to explain or interpret 
the law in a generally compulsory manner. Court decisions have no binding force 
but in respect of the cases on which they are pronounced'. This norm is usually 
construed as excluding stare decisis, even vis-a-vis the Supreme Court's findings. 
Judges cannot simply cite precedents as a justification even on analogous issues. 
Final judgments produce res iudicata effect though limited to the concrete 
litigants. 1058 Notably, article 3 CHCC emanates from article 5 of the Code 
Napoleon which prohibited French courts from dictating general rules as they had 
1052 Article 3 CHCC. 
1053 Dominguez (2007b) 315. 
1054 Mirow (2004) l 67ff, 239; Tapia (2005) 31 , 357ff. 
1055 
'[J]udges are no more than the mouth that pronounces the words of the law': Montesquieu 
([1748]/1873) Book XI, Ch.6, 182. 
1056 Lira (1956) 58ff; Claro (1978) 30-31, 120, 127; Merryman (1985) 23; Vodanovic (1998) 132. 
1057 Hilbink (2007) passim. 
1058 Claro (1978) 33-34; Corral (2000) 57. 
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often done during the old regime.
1059 Yet, since Chilean courts have never been 
allowed to interpret rules with an overall mandatory impact, the "presumption of 
truth" attached to final judgments is solely to avoid contradictory decisions. 1060 
However, this is an idealised goal. Similar cases are commonly decided in 
antithetical directions, thereby sacrificing legal certainty, equality before the 
I I 061 1 · t b .: . . d I 062 . aw, equa I y e1ore Justice an due process. Outstandmgly, Streeter 
construes article 3 CHCC in conformity with these principles: although the 
conclusive section of judgments binds the concrete litigants alone, court 
decisions' reasoning must be followed (yet not mechanically repeated) in future 
. I d. 1063 I . I 
eqmva ent Isputes. t IS a so argued that the Supreme Court should develop a 
uniform and predictable case-law. Still, without legal reform it is unrealistic that 
d b b. d" 1064 prece ents can e m mg. Only occasionally have courts acknowledged that 
judicial coherence and legal certainty presuppose treating analogous cases 
alike. 1065 
Nevertheless, Chilean case-law fills the legislative lacunas and renders the 
principles or rules concrete. Courts elaborate legal notions and institutions along 
with solving new questions through the old code provisions. Thus, courts settled 
compensation as the primary function of torts. Moreover, it is recognised that the 
general tort principles demand continuous specification by courts and jurists. 1066 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court and the competition tribunals 
1067 have 
constructed the bases of competition law and described antitrust practices 
resembling the Anglo-American methods in this field.
1068 As Lawson observed, 
civilian systems are really judge-made law, so legislation is less significant, 
1059 , . 
The lot 16-24.8.1790 forbade courts from invading Parliament's power and compelled them to 
enforce laws: Boyron (2008) 29. 
1060 Guzman (2007) 34, 49ff; Dominguez (2007b) 311-312. 
1061 'N . h th 1 . 
e1t er e aw nor any authonty shall establish arbitrary differences' (article 19/No.2 
Chilean Constitution 1980, "CHC"). 
1062 
'Th 1 . f h 1 · · · e equa protection o t e aw in the exercise of nghts ... Any decision issued by a court shall 
be founded on a previous proceeding legally tried' (article 19/No.3 CHC). 
1063 Streeter (1992) 113 ff. 
1064 , Dominguez (2000) 65; Romero (2004) passim. 
:~:; An extraordinary excep_tion in: CA.Santiag~/7.12.2004/GJ/294/43. 
Matus (1958) 81; Dominguez: (2005) passim, (2007b) 322ff; Tapia (2005) 348; Barros (2006) 
18, 34. 
1067 F I th C .. ' R l · ("C " ormer y, e omiswn eso uflva R ); currently, the Tribunal de Defensa de la Libre 
Competencia ("TDLC"). 
1068 Witker (2000) 82; Valdes (2006a) 239-240. 
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remarkably in tort, than in the common law and civil courts a
re not invariably 
uncreative. 1069 These impressions, I think, are germane to Chile. 
If French courts have been crucial in developing tort law congrue
ntly with 
socio-economic trends and precedents,
107° Chilean judges have often interpreted 
tort rules cautiously. 
1071 Yet, regardless of its reduced ability to innovate and 
refine principles, Chilean case-law is undoubtedly the practical s
ource of tort law. 
Courts apply the principle of culpa and assess causation and dam
age with ample 
freedom. However, the absence of stare decisis and clear judicial reasoning 
renders case-law unpredictable in critical points, including the 
determination of 
fault and quantification of damages.
1072 Indeed, it is difficult to delimit legitimate 
from illegitimate conduct without precedents being followed. 
1073 Additionally, it 
seems unfeasible that Chilean case-law becomes a compulsory
 source. Cultural 
factors, like the false belief that inventiveness hinders legal 
certainty, block 
changes. But I am optimistic that the level of judicial consistency can be raised. 
3. Legal doctrine 
Jurists have made a fundamental contribution to legal develop
ment in civilian 
systems, keeping the law ahead of the facts, envisaging emergi
ng problems and 
pr(?pe>sing solutions. 1074 For instance, French scholars masterly explain case-la
w 
from theoretical and practical perspectives.
1075 Analogously, Chilean academics 
exercise a persuasive influence upon lawyers and judges: 
1076 they contemplate 
judicial tendencies and scientific, technological, economic or social phenomena, 
. 
f · 1077 
suggestmg answers to uture issues. 
Moreover, jurists have been the real promoters of change in Chilean tort 
law, from Alessandri's (1943) vastly cited treatise
1078 to Barros' (2006) ambitious 
1069 Lawson (1953) 55. See also: Puig (1956) 659ff; Merryman (1985) 36-37, 47 . 
1070 Lawson (1953) 82; Zweigert/Kotz (1998) 617; Van Dam (2006) 44; Boyron (200
8) 27ff. 
1071 Matus (1958) 77 ; Abeliuk (2005) 184. 
1072 Tapia (2005) passim. 
1073 Parisi (1992) 11-12, 181 ff. 
1074 Lawson (1953) 66ff; Merryman (1985) 56ff. 
1075 Van Dam (2006) 45. 
1076 Golbert/Nun (1982) 13. 
1077 Dominguez ( 1989) 110. 
1078 Luis Claro, possibly the greatest Chilean private-law scholar, lack
ed time to cover tort liability 
in his Explicaciones de Derecho Civil Chileno y Comparado, the
 most exhaustive Chilean civil-
law treatise which comprises seventeen volumes published from 1
898 to 1944. 
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work. Alessandri almost completely relied on contempo
raneous French 
commentators (Planiol, Ripert, J osserand, Henri and Leon Mazeaud), who
se 
ascendancy over twentieth-century Chilean tort-doctrine arguab
ly surpassed that 
of the French Civil Code itself.
1079 Barros and other leading scholars use wider 
European and Anglo-American materials. Conversely, Latin-Am
erican doctrine is 
scarcely influential, given the modest legal-cultural exchange be
tween Chile and 
its neighbours.
1080 
Latin-American jurists remain anchored to European doctrines 
and only gradually build their own. 
1081 Bello's approach is worth imitating: 
foreign solutions should not be unthinkingly transplanted into Ch
ile but adapted to 
the local needs. Thus, comparative law helps to discard unworka
ble solutions. 1082 
This thesis starts with such premise. 
4. Observations 
Statutes are at the top of the hierarchy of formal sources. Howe
ver, case-law and 
doctrine are central to interpreting the general principles of deli
ct and solve new 
problems: hence my focus on these sources. Likewise, a consi
stent case-law is 
vital, more than judicial creativity, to attain equality and fairness. 
II. Extra-contractual civil liability 
This section expounds the Chilean tort principle of culpa. I argue t
hat, to preserve 
competition freedom, liability for economic injuries inflicted between traders 
should be restrained through the defendant's intention to harm
 the claimant or 
gross negligence, which Chilean law equates to the former. I 
too propose that 
compensation for all direct harms (foreseeable and unforeseeable) should for t
he 
sake of legal consistency be restricted to breach of contract an
d tort committed 
with the said intention or gross negligence. 
1079 Zelaya (2004) 100-101, 115. 
1080 Dominguez (1967) 917. 
1081 Mirow (2004) 235ff. 
1082 Eder ( 1950) 157ff; Abeliuk (2005) 187. 
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1. Fundamental categories 
Civil liability comprises the defendant's obligation to repair the harm done to the 
claimant through the intentional or careless breach of contract ( contractual 
liability) 1083 or by an intentional (delict) or negligent (quasi-delict) 
1084 act or 
omission (extra-contractual, delictual or tortious liability). 108
5 However, they 
differ basically from each other in that contractual liability arises from the 
infringement of a pre-existing duty, whereas tort liability emanates from the harm 
th . . d} f . t I 086 caused by the tortfeasor to e victim regar ess o any previous agreemen . 
Thus, contracts and "illicit acts" (a term used more frequently than "delict" and 
"quasi-delict") create obligations. 1087 Another significant and practical difference 
is that a breach of contract forms a rebuttable presumption of fault, 
1088 save for the 
obligations of means, while tort claimants must generally prove defendants' 
;l"-
1. · · 1089 neg 1gence or mtentlon. 
Tune argued that contract and tort often overlap, thereby rendering their 
theoretical distinction rather arbitrary. 
1090 Nonetheless, as Dfez-Picazo said, the 
parties cannot easily evade the agreed form of distributing their risks by resorting 
to tort. 1091 Specifically, Chilean case-law supports the non-cumul principle that 
forbids promisees from bringing tort actions for damages against defaulting 
promiso.rs where the harm derives from the breach of the relevant contract. This is 
for contracting parties bind themselves to their own will and the pacta sunt 
servanda. 1092 As will be seen in Chapter VII, the contract-tort separation 1s 
particularly relevant to tortious liability for interference with contract. 
Tort liability ensues from the breach of the generic or specific duty not to 
harm others culpably (carelessly or intentionally): alterum non (neminem) 
1083 The place in which contractual liability is treated signals its centrality within the law of 
obligations: Book IV, Title XII, On the Effect of Obligations, articles 1545ff CHCC. 
1084 See, however, Descheemaeker (2009) 67, 184 (holding that the Roman law incorporated 
intentional and faulty acts into delict, whereas quasi-delict covering strict-liability events). 
1085 Treated in Book IV, Title XXXV, On Delicts and Quasi-delicts, articles 2314ff CHCC. 
1086 CS, 11.5.2004, GJ/287/247; Tapia ([1941]/2006) 14, 130, 358; Alessandri (1943) 42-43 ; 
Gatica (1959) 56; Abeliuk (2005) 190,817; Barros (2006) 18ff, 978ff. 
1087 Articles 578/1437/2284 CHCC. 
1088 Article 1547 CHCC; Gatica (1959) 75. 
1089 Article 1698 CHCC. 
1090 Tune (197 4) l 9ff. 
1091 Diez-Picazo (1999) 264,268. 
1092 CS, 3.7.1951, RDJ/48/1"/252; CS, 19.8.1983, RDJ/80/2"/79; CA.Santiago, 16.4.2007, 
LexisNexis/36181; Dominguez (2008) passim. See: above n.502, below n.1131 and accompanying 
text. 
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laedere. 
1093 Although this duty is not strictly an "obligation" as the parties are 
indeterminate, 
1094 it represents a principle under which reparation of damage is the 
main function of tort law. Thus, compensation relates to the victim's loss; not to 
the defendant's blameworthiness. From a corrective-justice angle, tort law's 
mission is to rectify the balance between the wrongdoer and the victim altered by 
th . . 1095 C . . II e mJury. ompensatlon 1s usua y a sum of money equivalent to the victim's 
(effectively proved) harm. This proportional rule prevents the claimant's unjust 
enrichment and preserves the defendant's right to a due process. 1096
 Similarly to 
English law, 
1097 Chilean tort victims must in principle be fully compensated for 
their losses as if they had not been injured, irrespective of the kind of harm 
suffered and of whether the defendant acted with intention (dolo) or fault 
(negligence). 1098 Nevertheless, tort liability also serves to punish wrongdoers, 1099 
to prevent or discontinue harm through precautionary (injunctive) measures, to 
provide for in-kind reparation (specific performance) 1100 and even to divest 
defendants of their illicit gains. 1101 
As section III shows, carelessly caused pure economic loss (embodied into 
lucrum cessans) is generally compensable in Chile, as opposed to England. 
Financial damage is not discriminated against because, as suggested in Spain, it 
represents an attack on the claimant's right of property enshrined in the 
Constitution. 
1102 Moreover, I will argue that neminem laedere must be tempered 
as regards the harm commercial competitors inflict each other by requiring the 
defendant's intention to injure the claimant or at least gross negligence. Fault-
based liability clashes with the liberty to compete for business rivals owe one 
another no duty of care. Further, I will show that, along with the pre-eminent 
1093 
Articles 44/1437/2284/2314/2329 CHCC; CS, 24.1.2002, GJ/259/38. 
1094 AJessandri (1943) 43ff. 
1095 Barros (2006) 37-38, 78ff, 215-216. 
1096 
CS, 8.7.1935, RDJ/32/1"/422; Tapia ([1941]/2006) 8-9; Alessandri (1943) 545; Gatica (1959) 
23; Dominguez: (1990) 126, (2007a) 403ff. 
1097 
Livingstone (1880) 5 App.Cas 25, 39, Lord Blackburn. 
1098 · 
Articles 1556/2314/2329 CHCC; CS, 26.11.1970, RDJ/67/1 "/535; CS, 8.11.1971, 
RDJ/68/4"/274; CS, 6.11.1972, . RDJ/60/4"/181; CS, 27.10.1983, RDJ/80/4"/121; Tapia 
([1941]/2006) 375; Alessandri (1943) 28ff, 547; Dominguez (1990) 135; Diez (1997) 159; Corral 
(2003) 336. 
1099 S . 
ee below section 3.3, pp.202ff. 
1100 
Articles 1698/2333 CHCC; article 680 Chilean Civil Procedure Code ("CPC") 1101 
Tapia ([1941]/2006) 139ff; Alessandri (1943) 123ff, 533; Rodriguez (1999) 344; Corral (2003) 
336; Barros (2006) passim. 
1102 Reglero (2002a) 75ff. 
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compensatory role, economic-tort liability performs important preventive and 
retributive goals, particularly in connection with unfair and antitrust practices. 
2. Fault-based liability 
2.1 Introduction 
To understand why tort liability for pecuniary damage involving commercial 
competitors ought to be qualified through an intentional element it must first be 
considered that the tortfeasor' s ordinary fault in principle does trigger liability. 
While strict liability is exceptional and necessarily regulated by statute, 
culpa (which in broad sense covers negligence and intention) is the overall and 
supplementary tort rule whereby courts balance the litigants' conflicting interests. 
v1ctims must bear their losses unless intentionally or negligently caused by 
another person. Culpa justifies and limits the duty to compensate for harm which 
is attributed through the causation test. 1103 
As Barros argues, fault/intention-based and strict liabilities are grounded in 
corrective justice, which signals the relationship between the wrongdoer's conduct 
and the victim's injury. Strict liability is not simply an efficient regulatory 
instrument to accomplish public goals but it is a legal choice, rooted in corrective 
justite'. for protecting the victim's interest regardless of the defendant's blame.1104 
Compensation is a cost that wrongdoers must face in exchange for profiting from 
their injurious activities. 11 05 Nonetheless, Holmes said, social life would be 
intolerable if strict liability was the general regime. 1106 Fault/intention-based 
liability is warranted for, as criminal-law jurists maintain, the law has to repress 
wrongful conduct and not only wrongful effects (that is, the invasion of protected 
interests). 1107 
1103 CS, 19.4.2000, RDJ/97/5'/83; CS, 4.9.2002, RDJ/99/1"/186; CS, 13.11.2002, GJ/269/39; Tapia 
([1941 )/2006) 156-157, 348; Alessandri (1943) 93, 109, 120ft; Lira (1944) 285,289; Dominguez: 
(1989) passim, (2001) 13-14; Corral (2003) 100ft; Abeliuk (2005) 206; Barros (2006) 61-62. 
1104 Barros (2006) 255-256. 
1105 Tapia ([1941)/2006) 27. 
1106 Holmes (1881) 50. 
1107 Welzel (1997) 75 ; Bustos (2004) 93-94. 
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However, Chilean courts expand negligence through the legal 
presumptions of fault (such as for the acts of others), 1108 which defendants can 
only rebut by showing to have taken all the available or imaginable measures to 
prevent the accident. 1109 Thus, fault liability becomes virtually indistinguishable 
from strict liability. 
2.2 Negligence 
Fault means the infringement of the duty not to harm others which is usually 
defined ex post by courts through various criteria: the intensity and probability of 
harm, the social value of the defendant's activity, the costs of avoiding damage, 
and the relationship between the wrongdoer and the victim. Whether the 
defendant acted negligently is a normative issue under the Supreme Court's 
t 1 . . 111 0 F 1 . . . con ro via cassatlon. au t 1s assessed obJect1vely, comparing the defendant's 
act with the applicable standard of care. The defendant's guilt is immaterial save 
for increasing compensation. 1111 So, this notion of negligence squares with the 
English concept of 'not doing or doing what a reasonable person would or would 
not do'. 11 12 
The CHCC does not define fault, but under Pothier' s influence it adopted 
in article 44 the Roman tripartite division of fault: 1113 gross negligence (culpa 
lata), slight negligence (culpa Leve, equivalent to the reasonable person standard) 
and slightest negligence (culpa lev(sima). Hence fault is conceptualised as the 
1108 Articles 2320/2322 CHCC. 
1109 Barros (2006) passim. Spanish tort liability, equally founded on fault (article 1902 SCC; STS, 
13.4.1998, ~J/2388) ~as also m?ve~ closer to strict liability. As this can only be imposed by 
statute, the mterpretat1o_n _of ;"h1ch 1s restrictive, courts use indirect methods, e.g., raising the 
normal standard of care m busmess/professional activities (STS, 23.3 .1993, RJ/2545) and inferring 
fault from certain facts (STS 22.2.1991, RJ/1587; STS 19.6.2000, RJ/5291) . Sometimes courts 
accept a general and reb~ttable pre~umpti~~ of fault (STS 4.2.1997, RJ/677). Subsequently, culpa 
becomes a stereotype to impose stnct hab1hty: Santos (1967) passim; Diez-Picazo: (1999) 24, 37-
f1~0 (200 l) 1009; Reglero (2002b) l 88ff; Pena (2002) passim; Martin-Casals/Sole (2005) 228ff. 
CS 7_.4.1958, RDJ/55/1"/35; CS, 2.7.1998, RDJ/95/4•/95; CS, 28.1.1999, RDJ/96/4./7 1; 
Alessa~dn_ (1943) 204; Meza (1997) 258; Abeliuk (2005) 217; Barros (2006) 95ff, 145-146. 
Cassat1on 1s the r~medy whereby th_e Su~reme Court annuls final court judgments pronounced in 
breach of.substantive law that matenally mfluences the decision, i.e., had the court applied the Jaw 
correctly 1t would have resolved the controversy otherwise (articles 764/767 CPC) 
1111 I . . · A essandn (1943) 92; Barros (2006) 28-29, 61. Similarly, in Spain, Quintano (1957) 1049; in 
France: Tune (1974) 71, VanGerven/Lever/Larouche (2000) 302 332 1112 ' . Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks ( 1856) 11 Ex. 781, Exch., 784, Alderson J. See: Dominguez 
(1989) 117. 
1113 As ~omat,. for Code Napoleon's drafters that division was too inflexible for evaluating 
contractmg parties' endless creative power: Visintini (1999) 11-12; Dominguez (2007) 109. 
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absence of diligence in the performance of a contract or in the execution of an 
act. 111 4 This division is traditionally restricted to contract: 1115 the slightest 
negligence, it is said, brings about tort liability. 111 6 Conversely, Barros extends the 
triple classification to tort: culpa leve is the residual and appropriate category to 
measure the behaviour that can legitimately be expected from strangers in extra-
contractual relations. 1117 As Dfez-Picazo argued, it is umeasonable to impose on 
. 
111 8 
tortfeasors the highest level of care that only a few persons can observe. 
Likewise, foresight is intrinsic to fault (which is accordingly defined as 
'the possibility of foreseeing what has not been foreseen') 11 19 and to causation 
(the harm imputable to the defendant). The defendant is liable for the harm that a 
reasonable person would have foreseen. Moreover, a direct harm is generally also 
foreseeable. 1120 Thus, through foreseeability courts resolve the issue of causation 
with relative ease, applying the "but for test". 1121 Whether damage was a direct 
ef fect of the breach of contract or the delict and whether damage was foreseeable 
at the time the contract was made or the tort committed are factual problems 
within the trial courts' discretion. 1122 
Conversely, since unforeseen harm outreaches carelessness and is remote, 
it is generally umecoverable. It is noteworthy that, under article 1558 CHCC, 
defaulting promisers are liable for the damage foreseen or foreseeable at the time 
of concluding the contract. However, liability extends to all the direct losses 
(incluaing unforeseen or unforeseeable ones) flowing from the intentional or 
grossly negligent breach of contract. 1123 Article 44 CHCC aligns gross negligence 
with intention (dolo) in civil law generally. Gross negligence is deemed as 
1114 Tapia ([1941]/2006) 339ff; Alessandri (1943) 172. 
11 15 Under article 1547 CHCC, if the contracting parties have not stipulated differently, the 
defaulting promiser is liable for culpa lata , culpa lev{sima or culpa !eve depending on whether the 
contract is for the benefit of the promisee, the promiser or both parties, respectively. 
11 16 CS, 7.4.1958, RDJ/55/1"/35; Tapia ([1941]/2006) 361; Alessandri (1943) 48, 172, 196; Meza 
(1997) 252; Rodriguez (1999) 180. 
111 7 Barros (2006) 80ff. 
111 8 Diez-Picazo (2001) 1026-27. 
11 19 CS, 29.3.1962, RDJ/59W/21 ; CS, 24.10.1963, RDJ/60W/459; CS, 17.10.1972, 
RDJ/69/4./168. 
11 20 Gatica (1959) lOOff, 125. 
11 2 1 Dominguez (2001) 14ff. 
1122 CS, 12.8.1953, RDJ/50/1"/288. 
11 23 Article 1150 of the Code Napoleon is the equivalent to article 1558 CHCC. Further, although 
Spain lacks a similar provision, courts and jurists admit the same effect: STS, 30.3 .2005, RJ/63 12; 
Montes (2007) 732, 744. 
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objectionable as deliberate conduct. 1124 Interestingly, French case-law enhances 
compensation to all direct losses in case of intentional or grossly negligent breach 
of contract. Although the French Civil Code does not include a rule like article 44 
CHCC,faute lourde embodies a reprehensible act contrary to good faith .1125 Faute 
lourde sometimes involves an abnormal b~haviour revealing the debtor's 
incapacity to fulfil the basic contractual duties, thus equivalent to dol. 1126 Yet, 
currently French courts require proof of the gravity of the defendant's act as the 
real cause of the breach.11 27 
Chilean courts and jurists tend to restrict article 1558 CHCC to contract. 
Consequently, tortfeasors must answer for all harms arising from delict or quasi-
delict. This is for tort liability connects persons who were completely strangers to 
one another until the harmful conduct took place. Conversely, contractual liability 
(except for deliberate or grossly negligent breach) is confined to the risks that the 
parties could contemplate and distribute when concluding their agreement. 1128 The 
restriction of compensation in contract hinges on private autonomy, corrective 
justice and good faith. It originated from an old French rule, generalised by 
Pothier, reiterated in article 1150 Code Napoleon and adopted by English law. 1129 
In the latter the paramount importance of the contracting parties' consent is 
reflected in that not even deliberate or extremely careless breach expands 
compensation beyond what losses were foreseen by those parties at the time of 
making their covenant. 1130 Moreover, promisees cannot elude the limitation of 
contractual liability through the bringing of tort claims. The non-cumul principle, 
settled in French case-law, 1131 forbids promisees from so doing in Chile as well. 
Further, it is argued that tort liability involves full compensation for intentionally 
or carelessly inflicted harm which is only narrowed through causation. 
Conversely, in contract full compensation is restricted to intentional or grossly 
1124 
CS, 10.11.1920, RDJ/19/l"/415; Alessandri (1939) 77-78 ; Somarriva.(1939) 38; Gatica (1959) 
126ff. Cf Claro (1937) 527 (rejecting the application of article 1558 CHCC to culpa lata) . 
1125 
Planiol/Ripert (1945) 177-178; Josserand (1950) 309; Colin/Capitant (1960) 48 ; 
Mazeaud/Mazeaud/Tunc (1962) 572-573 . 
1126 Com, 11.7.1995, Bull.civ.IV.No.215 . · 
11 21 C . h.M1xte, 22.4.2005, JCP.2005.11.10066, n.J-P.Tosi; Com, 21.2.2006, D.2006.AJ.717, 
obs.E.Chevrier; Viney/Jourdain (2006) 636ff. 
1128 CS . 
, 14.4.1953, RDJ/50/4"/40; CA.Santiago, 27.12.1993, GJ/162/58 ; Tapia ([1941]/2006) 361 , f
1
~f Alessandri (1943) 49,552; Gatica (1959) 57-58; Abeliuk (2005) 231. 
Hadley ( 1854) 156 E.R., 151 , Alderson B. 
11 30 Dominguez (2000) 494ff, 506ff; Pefia (2002) 233ff. 
11 3 1 E . 
.g., C1v(l ), 11.5.1982, Gaz.Pal.1982.Il.612, n.F.Chabas & (1983) RTDCiv 145, obs.G.Durry. 
See: .above n.502, n.1092 and accompanying text. 
195 
negligent breaches. It is criticised that the constraint of contractual liability has a 
deleterious impact on commercial transactions and that it underestimates that 
contracting parties can insure against wider liability. 
1132 
The contrary thesis, with which I agree, is defended by Barros, to whom 
tort and contractual liabilities are limited to direct and foreseen losses except for 
illicit acts or breaches of contract committed with intention or gross negligence. 
Foreseeability is inherent to fault, so authors of quasi-delict (unless perpetrated 
with gross negligence) should answer for foreseeable harm alone.
1133 Chadwick 
and Tapia said that contract-breakers and wrongdoers were liable for all direct 
harms derived from their intentional conduct. Deliberate breach of contract was 
equated with delict. Conversely, liability for careless (but not grossly negligent) 
breach of contract does not cover events outside the contracting parties' will and 
exp;ctations. 1134 Likewise, Gatica identified a punitive aim in the extension of 
compensation to all losses arising directly from intentional or grossly negligent 
breach of contract. This explains the prohibition and nullity
1135 of the covenant 
excluding ex ante liability for such misbehaviour.
1136 As Dominguez argues, the 
intentional breach of contract discloses total disregard for honouring promises, 
d . , 'b · 1
137 
thereby eservmg a pnvate retn ut1on. 
In my view, the distinction between carelessly and intentionally (or grossly 
negligen,tly) caused economic harm is all significant in contract and tort. Full 
compensation is confined to foreseeable harm as what persons contractually 
linked or not can expect from each other. For the sake of legal consistency 
1 . d . 1138 In 
. . d 
foresight should regulate fau t m contract an m tort. tum, mtentlon an 
gross negligence are implicitly sanctioned in both contexts by stretching the duty 
to compensate for all direct losses, comparably to the English economic torts. Yet, 
to draw the distinction between unforeseen damage and indirect damage is 
complex. This, needless to say, can produce mistaken judgments either awarding 
or denying compensation. The causal relationship between the wrongdoer's act 
and the victim's harm can become blurred. 
1132 Dominguez ( 1990) 133. 
1133 Barros (2006) 92. 
1134 Chadwick (1938) 169; Tapia ([1941]/2006) 558ff. 
1135 Article 1465 CHCC. 
1136 Gatica (1959) 117-118, 139-140. 
1137 Dominguez (2000) 5 l 6ff. 
1138 In Spain, it is argued that, as a matter of justice, defendants should be accountable for all 
harms intentionally inflicted upon promisees or third parties: Yzquierdo (2001) 249. 
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3. Intention 
3.1 Conceptual issues 
Article 44.6 CHCC defines dolo as 'the positive intention to inflict injury upon 
another's person or property'. Dalo is a factor vitiating consent; 
1139 an element 
enhancing contractual liability for all direct injuries; 1140 and the gist of delict 
(. . 1 ) 1141 Ind mtentiona tort . eed, dolo is essentially a delict. The deliberate breach of 
contract is tortious: it is placed beyond the parties' agreement.
1142 
Several private-law scholars suggest using that concept of dolo in criminal 
law in the interest of legal coherence and certainty. 
1143 Criminal delict is 'any 
voluntary act or omission punished by the law', 
1144 the word "voluntary" denoting 
the agent's consciousness about the causal relation between his conduct and the 
t 1145 y h'l . . . 
ou come. et, w 1 e m pnvate law dolo mvolves a generic intention to injure, 
criminal intent implies the foresight and desire of committing the statutorily 
described conduct. Additionally, in civil law dolo is reduced to dolus directus (the 
intention to harm the claimant as an end or as a means to another end). 
Conversely, in crime dolus directus (to seek to commit the offence as an end) 1146 
and dolus eventualis or recklessness (to foresee and accept that result without 
desiring it, as different from "conscious negligence", that is, to expect certain 
result although believing it will not happen) are punished equivalently. 1147 
Dalo involves the intention to harm another person as a means or as an 
end. An obvious illustration is the unfair competitive act aimed at ruining 
. 1 1148 . 
nva s. The best exa~ple, however, 1s perhaps the abuse of rights in its most 
1139 Articles 1458/1459 CHCC. 
1140 Article 1558 CHCC. 
1141 Articles 2284/2314 CHCC. 
: ::: Cha?wick (l 938/1939) passim; Tapia ([l 941]/2006) 554ff. In Spain: Montes (2007) 745-746. 
Tapia ([1941]/2006) 162ff; Alessandri (1943) 40; Fueyo (1991) 417; Rodriguez (1992) 33, 
(1999) 164; Corral (2003) 209; Abeliuk (2005) 201. In Spain: Cossio (1955) 23. In England· Lucy (2007) 21 Off. . . 
11 44 Article 1, Chilean Criminal Code. 
1145 Etcheberry ( 1987) 229ff. 
11 46 C . A.Santiago, 3.10.1989, RDJ/86/4"/135. 
1141 C • 
. S, _21.4.1960, RJ?1!5'./4 160; CS, 3.6.2002, GJ/264/114 (shooting at another's body with a 
h1gh-cahbre shotgun, mJunng and thereby killing the victim, is murder: the defenda
nt recklessly 
accepted the most serious effect). 
1148 ' · Alvarez/Lizana (1995) 118. 
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intense sense, as paradigmatically showed in the case of someone who was found 
liable for maliciously publishing an advertisement in a newspaper in order to 
discredit a certain brand of automobiles and its seller, 1149 a situation close to 
malicious falsehood. Likewise, authors maintain that the exercise of a right 
becomes wrongful if it is solely targeted at injuring others. 1150 The difficulty is 
that because dolo is defined by statute ( and legal definitions are binding) 1151 the 
claimant must prove the defendant's intention to injure, even though the proof is 
indirect and inferred from facts. 1152 Although the examples available do not 
concern commercial competitors, they show that Chilean courts further restrict 
dolo to malice. Thus, maliciously requesting the embargo of the claimant's 
property meets that concept, while the bringing of actions for the recovery of 
money by seizing the defendant's goods is within the claimant's legitimate 
right. 1153 The obstruction by the servient tenement's owner of a drainage canal 
merely for disturbing the dominant tenement's owner's easement is deemed a 
,;-. 
delict. 1154 The intention to harm has also been presumed from the fact that the 
defendant eluded his obligations and simulated the transfer of his goods to a 
company he had founded with relatives and from which he later retired, thus 
d f d. h' d. 1155 e rau mg 1s ere 1tor. 
However, jurists allege that dolo is not realistically reduced to the 
defendant's disinterested malice but typically includes the infliction of harm as a 
means of seeking self-benefit. 1156 Similarly, Spanish authors propose to extend 
' do'lo beyond the damage deliberately caused as to include the taking of advantage 
of one's position. 1157 In Chile it is agreed that the intentional breach of contract is 
often prompted by the promisor's intention of profiting at the promisee's expense 
quite apart from malice. 1158 Pothier, on whom Bello relied to define dolo, 
endorsed a wider concept which embraced malice, the mere acceptance of damage 
· 1159 
and bad faith. Likewise, Pothier equated culpa lata with dolo. Moreover, 
1149 CS, 15.11.1927, RDJ/25/1"/501; Abeliuk (2005) 201. 
1150 Ducci (1936) 27; Alessandri (1943) 163ff; Meza (1997) 262. 
1151 Article 20 CHCC. 
1152 CS, 6.1.1920, RDJ/18/18/335; CS, 31.7.2006, RDJ/103/18/596. 
1153 CS, 3.3.1927, RDJ/25/1"/117. 
1154 CS, 19.10.1943, RDJ/41/1"/266. 
1155 CA.Santiago, 21.4.1993, RDJ/90/2"/57. 
11 56 Alessandri (1943) 164. 
1157 Montes (2007) passim. 
1158 Tapia ([1941)/2006) 566; Fueyo (1991) 419; Rodriguez (1992) 32ff. 
1159 Pothier (1761/(1978)) §§553-554. 
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French courts treat as "intentional" the deliberate refusal by the promisor to 
perform his obligations with awareness of injuring the promisee. Jean Mazeaud 
applauds this view since promisors break contracts lured by self-interest. 
Furthermore,faute lourde could not be aligned withfaute dolosive if the latter was 
circumscribed to disinterested malice. 1160 
In Chile, Rodriguez extends dolo to recklessness (foreseeing and accepting 
the victim's harm as a likely consequence of the defendant's act). 1161 This finds 
support in certain case-law which demands the intention to cause "iniuria" that is 
'.I ' ' 
an illicit act (iniuira) and harm. Thus, dolo is defined as deliberate wrongful 
conduct, including recklessness. 1162 This idea, I think, mirrors vorsatz (§826 
BGB): the intention to harm or the conscious indifference to the injury derived 
from a wrongful act, 
1163 
and also the Spanish tendency to treat as intended the 
inevitable and prejudicial effects of the defendant's conduct despite not being 
deliberately pursued.
1164 However, as jurists affirm, recklessness is a criminal-law 
category whose counterpart in private law is gross negligence, albeit the latter is 
objectively assessed. 1165 Accordingly, I submit, recklessness is irrelevant to civil 
law: gross negligence is equated with intention for all legal effects, particularly in 
contract and tort. 
1166 Grossly disregarding another's interests resembles the 
intentional acceptance of a harmful consequence. Moreover, gross negligence 
plays an evidentiary role: the troublesome proof of dolo can be avoided because it 
can be inferred from culpa lata. 1167 
Therefore, the dominant trend in Chilean law excludes recklessness from 
intention, whose place is occupied by gross negligence. Furthermore, Chilean 
case-law acknowledges the equivalence between gross negligence and intention, 
1160 c· 1v(l), 4.2.1969, D.1969.601, n.J.Mazeaud. See generally: Viney/Jourdain (2001) 590ff, 
(2006) 625ff, 659ff; Banfi (2003) passim; Galand-Carval (2005) 95-96; Rowan (2008) J 91 ff. 
1161 Rodrfguez: (1992) 34; (1999) l 64ff. 
1162 
CA.Iquique, 18.6.1953, RDJ/50/4"/8 l; Chadwick (1939) 17; Corral (2003) 209-210. 
: ::: Limpens/Kruithof/Meinertzhagen-Limpens (1980) 30; Markesinis/Unberath (2002) 84, 889. 
STS, 27.4.1973, RJ/1875. See: Concepcion (1999) 67. 
1165 C . 
ury (1992) 295; Bustos (2004) 955ff. Comparably, m Germany: Jescheck (1981) 783; Roxin 
(1997) 1025. 
1166 E . 
. g., CS, 9.8.1944, RDJ/42/1 "/244, CA.Santiago 1.6.1998 GJ/216/195 
1167 · ' ' , 
Claro: (1936) 525, (1978) 151; Alessandri (1943) 168-169; Banfi (2003) passim; Barros 
(2006) 72-73, 158ff; Domfnguez (2007c) 117-118. In Spain: Yzquierdo (2001) 236; Montes 
(2?07) 740. Cf Vine_y/Jou:dain (2006) 629, 673-674 (arguing that the general presumption of good 
faith prevents ~rom mferrmg dot fromfaute lourde, and extreme imprudence cannot be equated to 
calculated malice). Yet, French case-law certainly endorses culpa lata dolus aequiparatur. 
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. 1168 h d l 
save that the former 1s presumed from the breach of contract w ereas o o 
must always be proved. 1169 Conversely, some argue that the claimant should 
demonstrate the defendant's extreme carelessness. First, article 44 CHCC 
identifies gross negligence with intention for all private-law purposes. Secondly, it 
seems unfair that whereas the promisor who intentionally breaks a contract is not 
obliged to compensate for losses unless he is shown to have acted with dolo, the 
promisor who does so acting with gross negligence would answer for all direct 
. h . d t 1110 H damage without need for the prom1see to prove sue m1scon uc . owever, 
recent case-law has held that the promisee who seeks full compensation for the 
losses following breach of contract must show the promisor' s intention or gross 
negligence. 1171 Still, as authoritatively opined elsewhere, 1172 case-law declared 
that tort compensation includes all direct losses flowing from delict and quasi-
de\i_ct alike. Nonetheless, I consider that "full compensation" is confined to 
foreseeable harm that people can normally expect to commit or suffer during their 
contractual or spontaneous relations. The rationale for increasing contractual 
liability in the presence of intention or gross negligence is retributive, or at least 
extra-compensatory. For the benefit of legal consistency such criterion should 
extend to tort liability. 
Ihering rejected tortious liability for pure economic loss caused with gross 
· · 
1173 Th. b . I th'nk 
negligence in order to protect free compet1t1on. 1s o servatlon, 1 , 
. 
comes into conflict with systems which enshrine culpa lata dolus aequiparatur. 
Gross negligence reveals disregard for another's interests close to the intention to 
harm, thus deserving comparable sanction. French jurists and courts accept that 
axiom although their Civil Code does not acknowledge it. The clearest way of 
recognising the analogy between gross negligence and intention is, as article 44 
CHCC illustrates, via legislation. 1174 Tort liability normally follows the slightest 
fault. Yet, liability should be restricted in harmony with competition freedom 
1168 Article 1547 CHCC. 
1169 Article 1459 CHCC; CS, 10.11.1920, RDJ/19/1"/415 . 
117° CA.Concepcion, 2.7.1984, GJ/49/101; Chadwick (1938/1939) passim; Rodriguez (1992) 58ff; 
Baraona (1997) 173-174; Banfi (2003) 21 lff. 
1171 CS, 26.12.2007, 5493-2006/LegalPublishing/38447; CS, 15.1.2008, 3070-
2006/LegalPublishing/38344; CS, 27.3 .2008, 6700-2006/LegalPublishing/38680. 
1172 Dominguez: (1990) 13lff, (2000) 515. 
1173 Zweigert/Kotz (1998) 598. 
1174 In Spain: Pena (2002) 439. In France: articles 1366/1382-2 Catala's proposals; Rowan (2008) 
193. 
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where trade adversaries are implicated, through the requirement of intention or 
gross negligence. English law excludes the latter as an alternative ingredient in 
deceit. Hence subsequent courts imposed liability for pure economic loss arising 
f 1· . 1175 rom neg 1gent misstatements. Conversely, Chilean courts avail themselves of 
gross negligence as a control device similar to intention. 
3.2 Restraining tortious liability congruently with competition freedom 
Intention and gross negligence can be efficient mechanisms to apply tort liability 
between commercial rivals without hindering their liberty to compete. This mental 
element is embodied, Barros suggests, in the abuse of market power, unfair 
practices and bad faith interference with another person's contract. 1176 
In France, Starck claimed that tortious liability served to safeguard the 
victim's person or tangible property but to deter and punish the infliction of 
economic harm and non-pecuniary damage. He showed that French courts 
imposed fault liability for the harm caused to person and to corporeal assets but 
they sometimes subjected liability for financial losses to a "characterised" fault 
like that incorporated into unfair competition (concurrence deloyale), that is, acts 
contrary to the honest business behaviour. 1177 French law does not remedy the 
damage which is the natural and inevitable consequence of the normal exercise of 
an individual liberty or right, like competition, unless it is abused. 1178 
Furthermore, for De Van-Karila the damage is not a mere effect but a constituent 
part of such a socially valuable activity as competition. Thus, the fact that the 
defendant infringed the duty not to harm others negligently does not trigger 
liability; except to the_ extent that he abused the right to injure. So, following 
Starck, De Van-Karila argues that pecuniary harm is not per se wrongful but the 
defendant has the right to inflict it out of competing. Conversely, the victim's 
1175 Limpens/Kruithof/Meinertzhagen-Limpens (1980) 32ff 
1176 . . Barros (2006) passim. 
1177 · · E.g., Pans, 6.11_. ~ 9_89, D. l 99?.564, n.D.Thouvenin (holding that the rights to inform 
consumers and to cnt1c1se competitors are denigrating and culpable when exercised without 
prudence and objectivity). 
1178 . S_ee ~enerally: Starck, Bons (1947) . Essai d'une theorie generate de la responsabilite civile 
c?nstdere ~n sa double fonction de garantie et de peine privee, Paris, Thesis. Starck's theory is 
d1scuss~d m: Tune (198?) 153-154; Starck/Roland/Boyer (1996) 114, 150; Dominguez (2000) 
493; Pena (2002) 64; Tapia (2005) 347ff; Viney/Jourdain (2006) 563-564. 
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right to security in her bodily integrity and tangible property prevails over the 
defendant's freedom to act. 1179 
The differentiation between physical damage and economic harm is, I 
think, analogous in France and England. Stronger protection is given to physical 
and corporeal property. Ownership of tangible resources is shielded through the 
per se actionable tort of trespass and property in goodwill is protected through 
passing-off which involves outcome-based strict liability. Likewise, the 
interference with bodily integrity and corporeal property is protected through the 
tort of negligence or the generic fault principle. Conversely, English law generally 
denies liability for carelessly inflicted pure economic harm: compensation must be 
sought through the economic torts which presuppose intention. Certain French 
case-law demands a "characterised fault" which is implicit in unfair practices and 
helps to restrict liability independently of whether economic loss is deemed 
iq.<lirect or uncertain. However, "characterised fault" is controversial and less 
stringent than the mental element contained in the economic torts. 1180 If Chilean 
courts are to enforce liability in accordance with competition freedom, they ought . 
to demand the defendant's intention (to harm the claimant or to procure the breach 
of contract) or at any rate gross negligence. 
3.3 The effect of dolo and culpa lata: enhancement of compensation 
' 
Although intentionally inflicted harm invariably entails liability, the width of tort 
liability primarily depends on the quantity and intensity of harm rather than on the 
118 1 h C ' ' t t' t h wrongdoer' s blameworthiness. However, t e tort1easor s men 10n o arm or 
gross negligence enhances the duty to compensate to all direct losses. Intention is 
more reprehensible than simple fault as wrongdoers know their acts will produce a 
result disapproved by the law. Total disregard for legal prohibitions exceeds 
negligent conduct. Extra-compensation is also consistent with the greater 
difficulty in assessing harm and in establishing the causal link between the 
defendant's conduct and the claimant's injury. 1182 Therefore, French courts award 
1179 De Van-Karila (1995) passim. 
11 80 See below nn. l 402ff, nn.1430ff and accompanying text. 
11 81 Alessandri (1943) 164; Tapia ([1941]/2006) 149; Tune (1974) 73-74; Dfez-Picazo (1 999) 351 ; 
Pefia (2002) 233ff. 
11 82 Tune (1974) 95 ; Pefia (2002) 99, 433; Barros (2006) 164ff, 404. 
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more damages to victims of deliberate acts in spite of dismissing the dichotomy 
delict/quasi-delict. 1183 
In Chile, an intentional or grossly negligent breach of contract increases 
liability (article 1558 CHCC) within which authors discover a retributive goal. 1184 
This rationale extends to delict and quasi-delict (comprising gross negligence). 
So, like in the tort of deceit, defendants respond for all direct losses. 1185 
Comparably to France and Spain, Chilean extra-contractual liability mainly serves 
to compensate for the victim's harm. 11 86 Yet, deterrence and punishment are 
intrinsic to culpa. 11 87 Likew1·se, Ch1'lean tr1·a1 courts perform a camouflaged 
punitive function. Formally, courts recognise a purely reparatory policy to restore 
the victim's status quo. 
1188 However, implicitly they use punitive criteria to 
d t . t 'b t 1· 1189 . e ermme con n u ory neg 1gence and order higher awards of non-pecuniary 
injury within their discretion. 11 90 The nature of the defendant's conduct ' 191 and the 
gravity of the defendant's fault 1192 are among other significant retributive strands. 
Through this concealed method courts elude the risk of their decisions being 
quashed since punitive damages are not enshrined in the law. 
In Spain, Reglero champions punitive damages as a salutary dissuasive to 
supplement compensation both for non-economic damage and loss of profits 
where the tortfeasor intentionally (or grossly negligently) injured the victim or 
. tl · h d h · If f 1193 · 
unJus y ennc e 1mse rom his wrong. For Reglero, exemplary damages do 
not endanger non bis in idem and the due process: they differ from criminal 
1133 V 
anGerven/Lever/Larouche (2000) 302 332 
1184 · ' • 
Gatica (1959) 117, 3?9ff; Segura (2005) 641,644. In Spain: Reglero (2002a) 65. In Germany: 
Jescheck (19.81) 20; Roxm (1997) 77. In French law, punitive damages are deemed consistent with 
the aggravation of compensation for intentional or grossly negligent breach of contract: Rowan (2008) 183ff. 
118s C . 
11 8 artwnght: (1996) 496,514, (2007) 163, 267; Whittaker (2008b) 89. 6 Tune (1974) 30; Barros (2006) 241. 
11 87 Domfnguez: (1989) 113, (2006) 267. 
1188 CS, 16.10.1970, RDJ/67/4./424. 
1189 • 
1190 Article 2330 CHCC; CS, 20.8.1973, RDJ/7014"/288; CS, 24.6.1980, FM/259/168. 
CS , 15.11.1927, RDJ/25/1"/501; CS, 26.8 .1941, RDJ/39/1•/203; CS, f9.4 .1984, RDJ/81/4"/29; 
CS, 14.9.1987, RDJ~84/4•/137; CA.Santiago, 6.7.1925/RDJ/26/1•/141; CA.Santiago, 26.9.1990, 
GJ/123/47; CA.Santiago, 1.9.2003, GJ/279/2003/115. See: Alessandri (1943) 30-31 546· 
D?mfnguez (!990) passim; Dfez (1997) 163; Barros (2006) 218-219. French law is very s'imilar'. 
XJrey/Jourdam (2001) 4ff; Whittaker (2008a) 415 ; Rowan (2009) 342. 
11 92 CS, 19.5.1999, FM/486/730; CS, 13.11.2003, GJ/281/104. 
11 93 CS, 1~.4.19~8, RD~/26/1 "~141 ; CS, 2.12.1998, FM/481/2737. 
In Chile, third partt,es . (nett~er authors nor accomplices) can be divested of their ill icit profits 
emanated .from another s mt~n.t1.onal tort: articles 1458/2316 CHCC; CS, 5.7.1967, RDJ/64/4/174; 
Alessandn (1943) 169;. Pena1hllo (1996) 87; Corral (2003) 62; Dfez-Picazo (1999) 50. Yet 
w~eth.er those wh~ profited from the tortfeasor 's gross negligence must make restitution of their 
gams 1s controversial. In favour: Barros (2006) 164. Cf: Ducci (1936) 62; Alessandri (1943) 483. 
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sanctions. Nor end up claimants unjustly enriched as they are compensated 
commensurately with the defendants' objectionable misconduct. 1194 
Nevertheless, without legal reform it is unlikely that Chilean courts will 
manifestly acknowledge extra-compensatory and exemplary damages. Legislation 
seems requisite to certainty and equality, as illustrated by Article 1371 of the 
Catala's proposals, the most recent (and criticised, particularly by the bench) 
attempt to enact punitive damages for 'manifestly deliberate fault' (which 
includes malicious and reckless, but not grossly negligent, breach of contract) and 
for 'fault with a view to gain' (a kind of intention resembling Lord Devlin's 
second category of exemplary damages ). 1195 Today the award of punitive damages 
in Chile faces several obstacles: the legality principle (nullum crimen nulla poena 
sine Lege) whereby only conduct previously described and sanctioned by statute 
c
9
n be punished; 1196 non bis in idem; the insufficiency of procedural guarantees 
for defendants provided by civil litigation; and the possible unjust enrichment of 
victims as a result of being awarded sums for harm that they did not suffer, 
thereby boosting irresponsible litigation. 1197 
4. Observations 
I have argued that fault-based liability for economic harm inflicted between 
business rivals is inimical to the liberty to compete. This result can be avoided if 
liability is subjected to proof of the defendant's intention or gross negligence. 
Although courts could control liability by holding economic loss to be uncertain 
or remote, this is a flawed expedient: it takes for granted that trade competitors 
can be liable in negligence when the fact is they owe each other no duty of care. 
Although I am not aware of economic-loss cases in which gross 
negligence has been applied article 44 CHCC aligns it with intention in private 
law. Gross negligence is more stringent than mere fault though it is easier to prove 
than intention. This can be useful particularly given that Chilean courts often 
restrict dolo to the intention to harm as an end (malice). 
1194 Reglero (2002a) 62-63, 71-72. 
1195 Whittaker (2008a) 416-417; Rowan: (2008) 177ff, (2009) passim. 
1196 Article 19/No.3 CHC. 
1197 Segura (2005) 652ff; Barros (2006) 304ff. In Spain: Diez-Picazo (1999) 46, 237; Yzquierdo 
(2001) 52. 
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I have also argued that the principle of full compensation should be limited 
to the direct and foreseeable losses arising from negligent breach of contract or 
quasi-delict. Liability for unforeseeable harm should be confined to breaches of 
contract and torts committed with intent.ion or gross negligence. The 
intensification of liability fulfils an extra-compensatory or retributive function 
with respect to such reprehensible conduct. 1198 The legal basis for this increase is 
article 1558 CHCC which, by reason of legal consistency, should also influence 
extra-contractual civil liability. In effect, fault is the failure to foresee what a 
reasonable person would have foreseen. 
Accordingly, compensation cannot include harm beyond that expectation. 
Conversely, where the wrongdoer intends to harm the victim or acts with extreme 
negligence, which is equivalent to reckless indifference, the wrongdoer is no 
longer treated through an objective standard of care but must assume 
responsibility for all losses consequential upon his conduct. Moreover, the 
punitive criteria used by courts to award higher sums for non-pecuniary harm are 
pertinent to pure economic loss, in particular that derived from intentional or 
grossly negligent misbehaviour. Courts need not wait until Congress allows 
punitive damages. They can directly award higher sums for damages in tort or 
order the restitution of illicit profits relying on article 1558 CHCC. 
Finally, a general principle of liability for negligence may produce order 
although not necessarily sound case-law: 'An undifferentiated approach may 
satisfy the quest for uniformity but is unlikely to produce desirable decisions' .1199 
Rather than using culpa as an abstract concept, Chilean courts and jurists should 
distinguish and categorise the diverse types of intention required for triggering 
tort liability in com_mercial competition. Consideration of the mental elements 
embodied in the English economic torts might help to attain such aim. Even in the 
English law of restitution it has been argued that fault should be refined by 
incorporating various mental elements, such as intention, knowledge and 
recklessness. 1200 
I 198 · . Banf1 (2003) passim. 
1199 · Flemmg (1953) 481. See also : Weir (1 998) 137- 138 
!WO · . . 
· V Irgo (2006b) passim. 
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III. Pure economic loss 
So far I have demonstrated that culpa ought to be qualified through intention or 
gross negligence vis-a-vis commercial competitors. This section shows that culpa 
in principle covers all types of harms. Yet, I will argue that liability for pure 
economic loss caused between trade rivals should be limited through intention or 
gross negligence. Fault-based liability is in principle undesirable even if it is 
dismissed on the basis that pure economic loss is remote or unproven. 
Competitors necessarily harm and owe no duty of care to one another. 
1. Conceptual structure 
I" Damage is widely understood as the infringement of a subjective right or 
legitimate interest in the claimant's person or goods, whether economic or non-
pecuniary. Compensation is limited to abnormal or serious harm as opposed to 
1201 11 . . d 
mere inconvenience. The claimant must prove that she was persona y mJure 
as a direct consequence of the defendant's act. The existence, quantification, 
certainty and causation of damage are factual issues within trial courts' 
jurisdiction. 1202 Nonetheless, it is argued that the question about the certainty of 
' C · . 1203 Th harm' is a legal issue to be determined by the Supreme ourt via cassation. e 
great problem is that case-law has not clarified the essence and contours of 
compensable damage. This concept is as sweeping as culpa and the abuse of 
rights. Legal certainty and coherence require that the Supreme Court takes control 
over the definition of the conditions for liability and that these conditions are 
specified according to the fact-situations concerned. 
Chilean judges and scholars are seldom familiar with the expressions "pure 
economic loss", "expectation/positive interests" (which place promisees as though 
contracts would have been performed) and "reliance/negative interests (which 
1201 CS, 16.10.1954, /RDJ/51/1°/488; CS, 6.11.1972, RDJ/69/4°/181; CA.Santiago, 3.6.1973, 
RDJ/70/4"/65; Dominguez: (1990) 125, 128, (2006) 269-270; Dfez (1997) 21, 34; Corral (2003) 
138, 146; Abeliuk (2005) 229; Barros (2006) 22lff. Others confine harm to the encroachment of 
subjective rights: Fueyo (1991) 364, Rodrfguez (1999) 259. 
1202 CS, 6.1.1920, RDJ/18/1"/335; CS, 14.4.1928, RDJ/26/1"/141; CS, 4.9.2002, RDJ/99/1 °/186. 
1203 Alessandri (1943) 214; Diez (1997) 242, 270; Dominguez: (1990) 137, (2006) 260, 270ff; 
Barros (2006) 236ff. An isolated ruling adhering to this thesis: CS, 24.9 .1943, RDJ/1 "/228. 
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t · t · , t t ) 1204 A . F 120s . . . res ore vie 1ms s a us quo . s m ranee, Chilean courts and Junsts 
regularly employ the two traditional heads of economic damage enshrined in the 
law: damnum emergens (actual losses, similar to negative interests) and lucrum 
cessans (loss of expected gains, equivalent to expectation interests). Both are 
recoverable in contract1206 and tort. 1207 "Pure economic loss" is concealed behind 
these categories, particularly lucrum cessans. However, as Barros indicates, unfair 
practices also bring about damnum emergens, such as the loss of value or likely 
turnover of an enterprise. 1208 Analogously, in Spain pure financial loss is 
connected with damnum emergens and lucrum cessans, particularly flowed from 
unfair acts that deprive claimants of actual or prospective clientele or business. 
1209 
It is noteworthy that, as appears from the leading tort treatises, 
1210 there are 
virtually no Chilean disputes on "pure economic loss". I found two concrete cases 
where this kind of damage seems hidden under lucrum cessans though they did 
not involve trade rivals. In the first case, the defendant had deposited in the court 
which conducted proceedings against a debtor the amount that it owed to the 
latter, although omitting to mention that the claimant was one of the debtor's 
creditors. The court ordered payment to the other creditors and to make restitution 
of the balance to the debtor, the claimant receiving nothing. In later tort 
proceeding the claimant was awarded a sum of money equivalent to the debt that 
she had been prevented collecting from its debtor due to the defendant's fault. 
1211 
In the second, very recent case, the claimant, an agricultural producer, 
commissioned a company to embark and send from Chile several tonnes of 
special rose-hip therapeutic oil to an importer domiciled in Japan. The defendant 
(non-competitor) communicated to the importer and the Chilean health authorities 
that the claimant's product was polluted with pesticide. The importer sent the load 
back to Chile refusing to purchase it. Subsequently it was shown that the product 
was uncontaminated. The claimant brought a tort action to recover lost profits and 
1204 T . . . , 
wo 1mpress1ve exceptions: Dommguez/Dominguez/Domfnguez (1996) passim; Barros 
(2_008a) 410, 414-415 (associating negative interests with damnum emergens and positive interests 
with lucrum cessans and specific performance). · 
120s N. h 1 ( 9 . . 1c o as 1 92) 226-227; Bussani/Palmer (2003) passim; Whittaker (2008a) 353-354. 
1206 Article 1556 CHCC (similar to article 1149 of the French Civil Code). 
1207 CA.Concepcion, 19.8.1965, 1965/136/ Rev. D. U. Concepci6n/85; CA.Santiago, 7.12.1984, 
RDJ/4"/266; Dominguez (2006) 266-267. 
1208 Barros (2006) 257. 
1209 Del Olmo (200 I) 264. 
1210 I . . 
.e., Alessandn (l 943) and Barros (2006). 
1211 CS . 
, 15 .11 .1919, RDJ/18/2"/164; Alessandn (1943) 221. 
207 
non-pecuniary damage ansmg from the defendant's false accusation. The 
defendant was found liable for carelessly inflicting economic harm to the 
claimant's commercial reputation. His false, serious and negligent accusation had 
prevented the transaction from succeeding. The claimant was awarded as lucrum 
. 
. 1 1212 
cessans the pnce of the frustrated export up to the amount proved at tna . 
Conversely, there is copious case-law on "relational" or "indirect" 
pecuniary harm, normally framed as lucrum cessans and suffered by claimants as 
a consequence of the direct victim's personal or proprietary injury. The most 
recurrent cases concern indirect victims stripped of the means of support formerly 
provided by direct victims negligently killed or injured in traffic or work 
accidents. As will be seen in the next paragraph, these claims frequently fail not 
because the defendant acted with simple fault but because lucrum cessans is 
cleemed non-existent or remote. Courts dismiss actions based on an estimation of 
the direct victim's likely labour life, since claimants overlook normal events 
which would mitigate the harm, such as diseases, discharge or the end of the work 
before the direct victim reached the retirement age.
1213 
This indicates that courts are likely to reject compensation for pure 
economic loss occasioned between commercial competitors on the grounds of 
uncertainty of damage and/or lack of causation, a method with which I will 
• 
disagree. 
2. Uncertainty and remoteness 
In principle, as a result of the legal recognition of subjective rights, all kinds of 
damage intentionally or negligently caused must be compensated.
1214 
Nevertheless, in Chile the prospect of pure economic damage being 
compensated is not auspicious. Trial courts customarily characterise lucrum 
cessans (the type of harm nearest to pure economic loss) as uncertain, a decision 
which is not reviewed by the Supreme Court. 1215 Trial courts award non-economic 
1212 CA.Concepcion, 30.12.2008, 360-2005 (pending the Supreme Court's decision on cassation, 
case No. 3516-2009). See below n.1363 and accompanying text. 
1213 CS, 27.3.2002, GJ/261/80; CA.Santiago, 26.9.1990, GJ/123/47; CA.Santiago, 29.8.2003, 
GJ/278/282. 
1214 Zweigert/Kotz (1998) 617; VanGerven/Lever/Larouche (2000) 208,236. 
1215 CS, 6.1.1920, RDJ/18/1"/335 . 
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damage instead, 1216 which is often inferred from the direct victim's death or 
injury. Economic losses are not compensated as claimants fail to show the income 
that they received from the direct victims. 1217 
Compensation for lucrum cessans is denied, I think, because proof of such 
future damage is essentially hypothetical or probabilistic. Lucrum cessans 
occupies the middle ground between damnum emergens (highly certain damage) 
and loss of chance (which is unrecoverable in Chile,1218 whereas French courts 
assign a value to the possibility of making profits). To prove lucrum cessans the 
claimant must compare her actual situation with the gain she might have got had 
she not been injured; for example, weighing the transactions made before against 
those made after suffering harm (by analogy) or determining the income that she 
would have earned had the tort not been committed (by projection). Claimants 
must also establish the likelihood of that loss happening in the future and that it 
directly flowed from the defendant's conduct. 1219 
It has been suggested that courts should merely require evidence of the 
reasonable probability (not mere possibility) of suffering lucrum cessans, given 
that this kind of harm lacks absolute certainty. Nor should courts demand proof of 
the exact amount of loss if the claimant has shown that she has effectively 
sustained it. It ought to suffice that the loss of profits was presumed from the fact 
that the claimant had been deprived of his work for a prolonged period due to the 
defendant's act, as has been resolved. 122° Courts are not bound by the code rules 
which limit compensation in contract but have ample discretion to award damages 
for loss of profits in tort, including lump sums. 1221 Only exceptionally lucrum 
cessans has been awarded even though the amount of it could not be assessed 
accurately. For example, claimants have been awarded loss of maintenance arising 
from the direct victim's death, after showing that the direct victim had worked for 
several years for the same employer and received a fixed monthly salary.
1222 
These suggestions notwithstanding, courts frequently reject compensation 
for loss of profits holding it speculative. Courts demand proof of the reasonably 
1216 CS - . 
, 24.10.2000, GJ/244/98; CA.Santiago, 1.7.2003, GJ/277/149. 
1217 CS, 27.9.1968, RDJ/4./241. 
1218 Nor in Spain: STS, 29.11.1986, RJ/4922; Bar/Drobnig (2004) 85. 
1219 Gatica (1959) 107ff, 143-144; Tapia (2005) 293ff; Dominguez: (1990) 148ff, (2007a) 416ff; 
Barros (2006) passim. 
122° CA.PuntaArenas, 7.4.1993, 7263-93. 
1221 Dominguez (1992) 214ff; Diez (1997) 57ff, 182; Elorriaga (2002) passim. 
1222 CS, 23 .5.1977, RDJ/74/4./281. 
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. . d d 1 . t 1223 F 
expected income, at least for certam peno , un er norma circum
s ances. or 
instance, the owner of a patent which the defendants had reprodu
ced in breach of 
copyright claimed the sum that the defendants earned from se
lling the illicitly 
copied materials. The court set aside the claim declaring the dam
age to be merely 
possible rather than reasonably likely. The claimant could not p
rove that he was 
prepared to manufacture as many materials as the defendant il
licitly produced. 
. 
. 
. 1 1224 
The court confmed compensation to the value of those matena s. 
Courts also regard lucrum cessans as too remote a consequenc
e of the 
defendant's conduct. Thus, the defendant's city council had re
fused to issue a 
permit to execute a dwelling project requested by the claimant's real-estate 
developer. The Supreme Court, allowing a constitutional action 
(called "recurso 
de protecci6n") 1225 brought against the defendant, ordered the latter to issue the
 
/ 
permit that it had arbitrarily and illegally denied. Nonetheless, the
 claimant issued 
a tort action for damages flowing from the delay, including the d
irect increase of 
financial costs, the fall in profitability of the project and the loss of the 
opportunity of diverting recourses to better alternatives. Eventua
lly, the Supreme 
Court dismissed this claim for lack of causation. The claimant 
had assumed an 
obvious financial risk in incurring expenses when he had a mer
e expectation to 
have the project approved. The defendant's refusal to issue the permit was at that 
I 
time legitimate because it has not been declared arbitrary or illega
l. 1226 
3. Compensating without hindering competition 
That tort liability should be imposed consistently with the liberty
 to compete is a 
recent contention in Chile. 
Barros argues for restricting compensation for pure econo
mic harm 
because commercial rivals naturally and intentionally harm o
ne another. He 
salutes the refusal of liability except for specific torts (as in England) or extrem
e 
behaviour against good commercial customs embodying the age
nt's intention or 
reckless indifference to harm the claimant (as in §826 BGB). He promotes th
e 
1223 CS, 16.10.1954, RDJ/51/1 "/488; CS, 28.5.2002, GJ/263/170; 
CA.Santiago, 26.5.1944, 
RDJ/41/2./41; CA.Santiago, 30.5.2003, GJ/275/97; CA.Concepcion
, 28.8.2002, GJ/266/210. 
1224 CA.PedroAguirreCerda, 6.10.1986, RDJ/83/4"/248. 
1225 See below nn.1267ff and accompanying text. 
1226 CS, 29.5.2003, 3084-2001. 
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confinement of liability to situations incorporating the abuse 
of the right to 
compete, that is, unfair practices and anticompetitive conduct. H
e however notes 
that courts can constrain fault-based liability by treating pure e
conomic loss as 
indirect or uncertain. 1227 
Indeed, this is the technique through which Chilean courts 
approach 
lucrum cessans and which squares with French law. Consequently
, compensation 
for pure financial losses is admitted at the outset and is then quali
fied by reason of 
their being remote or speculative or having already been repair
ed. 1228 Similarly, 
American case-law sometimes denies compensation for me
re expectations 
frustrated by outsiders who invaded the claimants' prospective
 business on the 
ground of being conjectural. 1229 
This procedure is coherent with the widely accepted (in Chile) duty not to 
harm others carelessly and with the fact that corporeal goods 
and incorporeal 
interests, such as contractual rights and purely financial intere
sts, are equally 
protected by the right of property enshrined in the Constitution.
1230 Nevertheless, 
even if this method attains analogous results than to those arrive
d by the English 
and German tort regimes, I think that it mistakenly assumes that 
competitors owe 
each other a duty of care while in fact the reverse is true. 
I will therefore insist on requiring a mental element more strin
gent than 
simple fault as far as trade adversaries are involved. As Flem
ing argued, the 
crucial issue in the tort of negligence is to limit liability, amongs
t others, through 
the concepts of duty and causation.
123 1 Extending this analysis to the field of harm 
between commercial rivals, I will suggest that Chilean courts op
t for controlling 
this species of liability through an intentional element which is co
nsistent with the 
essence of competing. 
1221 B . 
arros (2006) passim. See further: Limpens/Kruithof/Meinertzhagen-Limpens (19
80) 25-26· 
Zweigert/Kotz (1998) 603. 
' 
1228 
Mazeaud/Mazeaud/Mazeaud/Chabas (1998) 660-661 ; Viney/Jourdain (2006) 30
ff Whittaker· 
(1995) 331, (2008a) 413. 
' · 
1229 Keeton (1984) 1006. 
1230 Article 19/No.24 CHC. 
1231 Fleming (1953) 474. 
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4. Observations 
Chilean courts should, for the sake of legal consistency, qualify nemin
em laedere 
in line with competition freedom. I think that they can find a valuable 
guide in the 
arguments that lead Anglo-American tort law into foreclosing the 
recovery of 
carelessly caused pure economic loss. Using the devices available in C
hilean law, 
courts can restrict liability through the requirement of the defendant's 
intention to 
harm the claimant or gross negligence. This control mechanism m
ay not only 
prevent floods of litigation but confine liability to abusive misco
nduct, thus 
signalling that the role of tort liability in the regulation of business 
battle must 
remain a thin one. 
Yet, I admit that this suggestion might be considered as unwarrante
d or 
exaggerated. First, it can be deemed contrary to the principle of 
liability for 
,,. 
negligently caused harm. If the lower courts subjected liability to intention or 
gross negligence their decisions might be quashed via cassation for in
fringing the 
code rules on delict. Furthermore, courts may choose to restrict liabil
ity between 
commercial rivals using the familiar criterion of holding pure econo
mic loss as 
indirect, uncertain or unproven, as they have done vis-a-vis lucrum
 cessans. 
However, it is still possible that courts might reinterpret the delict r
ules in line 
with )he Chilean Unfair Competition Act ("UCA"), 
1232 which defines unfair 
pra~tices as intentional conduct. Moreover, I do not think it incomp
atible with 
neminem leadere that courts explicitly recognise that competitors owe e
ach other 
no duty of care. The best approach to this species of tort liab
ility should 
acknowledge that negligently caused economic harm is a side-effect 
of business 
competition. To discard liability for lack of causation or uncertainty
 of damage 
practically solves the tension between the litigants' conflicting interes
ts but at the 
expense of misunderstanding the gist of competition and sac
rificing the 
defendant's liberty to compete. Additionally, this technique mak
es liability 
dependent upon causation and damage whereas it is the defendant's c
onduct that 
should really matter. Consequently, Chilean law has much to 
learn from 
'conservative regimes' 
1233 such as the English economic torts. 
1232 Law 20169/2007. 
1233 Bar/Drobnig (2004) 30, 123ff, 214 (alluding to English and German tort regimes). 
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IV. Abuse of rights 
This section shows that Chilean law accepts the principle of 
liability for 
intentionally inflicted economic harm even if it is brought about on t
he occasion 
of exercising a right. The most notorious case of abuse of righ
ts involves 
deliberately caused damage which, as I will contend, helps to cont
rol liability 
between trade opponents. The abuse of rights underpins unfair pr
actices and 
antitrust conduct, especially the abuse of dominance. 
1. Introduction 
The modern doctrine of the abuse of rights, which emerged from Frenc
h case-law, 
attempted to rectify both legal formalism (the conception that rules predetermine 
the solution of all possible conflicts) and absolutism of rights (radicalised in the 
Code Napoleon).
1234 
Consequently, subjective rights were considered as relative 
legal powers to accomplish worthwhile goals rather than being used c
apriciously. 
More importantly, this doctrine attempts to moralise the law and provi
des a strong 
justification for imposing tort liability for damage arising from the abnormal 
exercise of rights. 1235 
2. The academic debate 
Planiol and Ripert disapproved of the abuse of rights declaring tha
t subjective 
rights could exclusively be limited from outside, by statute or contrac
t. The term 
"abuse of rights", _ they argued, was self-contradictory. A ri
ght cannot 
simultaneously be exercised in conformity and against the law. 
1236 Conversely, 
Josserand accepted the concept of an abuse of rights which involved 
the exercise 
of a right against its social or economic rationale established by 
the law. 1237 
Chilean jurists have been entangled in analogous controversy. Thus, for 
Rodriguez the abuse of rights is absurd and simply means that the 
agent acted 
without any right at all. Liability should not be imposed for the harm
 caused to 
1234 A. a/R . t1enz mz (2000) 34. 
1235 • . 
Alessandn (1943) 25lff; Lira (1944) 281-282. 
1236 Planiol (1926), Ripert (1949) passim 
ID7 . . Josserand ( 1939) passim. 
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another person out of exerc1smg a legitimate interest. 1238 In contrast, Barros 
accepts the idea of an abuse of rights which can consist of the defendant's 
intention to harm the claimant or the violation of the minimum standards of 
sociability, good customs and good faith governing reciprocal relations. The wider 
the scope of the right determined by the law, the narrower the space left to the 
. 1239 
abuse of nghts. 
As Barros explains, Chilean law recognises "subjective rights" as an 
independent category including personal rights (such as in contract) and real 
rights (like property). Subjective rights give holders legal entitlement to exercise a 
claim (protected through procedural and substantive remedies) against third 
parties who owe the duty not to invade such rights. Nonetheless, subjective rights 
are limited in two ways. First, they are constrained externally by statute or by 
coptract to permit a pacific coexistence between individuals enjoying equal 
freedom. Thus, the right of property must neither violate the law nor encroach on 
neighbours ' rights. 1240 Likewise, contractual rights exclusively bind the 
contracting parties: they are not absolute, so cannot be enforced against third 
parties. 1241 Furthermore, the liberty to compete must not be exercised against 
morals and public order. 1242 Secondly, subjective rights are limited internally: they 
. d b . 1 1243 
must not be exercise a us1ve y. 
Jhen, right-holders abuse their rights if they act within the external 
margins defined by the law but exceeding the internal bounds of the right at stake. 
Thus, I think, the abuse of rights limits and justifies tort liability for intentionally 
caused economic harm along with yielding content to unfair practices and 
antitrust conduct. A good example is the abuse of a dominant position which is 
prohibited by the law but simultaneously entails the abuse of the liberty to 
compete. 1244 Likewise, for Spanish jurists the abuse of the right to compete 
1238 Rodriguez: (1 998) passim; (1 999) 78ff. 
1239 Barros (2006) 618ff. 
1240 Article 582 CHCC. 
1241 Articles 578/1545 CHCC. 
1242 Article 19/No.21 CHC. 
1243 Barros: (1999) passim; (2006) 611 ff. 
1244 As many assert: Montt (1995) passim; Witker (2000) 107; Barandiaran (2002) passim; Ortuzar 
(2003) 74-75 ; Valdes (2006a) 2 1 l , 555-556; Gomez (2006) 5. 
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embraces unfair competition the unlawfulness of which emanates from its abusive 
character. 1245 The abuse-of-rights doctrine helps to deter unfair acts. 1246 
3. The Chilean approximation 
The abuse of rights lacks express statutory recognition in Chile just like in France. 
However, it is implicit in several rules whose clarity and conciseness question the 
need for it to be codified. 1247 For instance, a partner' s bad faith or inopportune 
. . f · 1248 · . 
res1gnat1on rom a company 1s null. L1kew1se, landowners are entitled to dig 
water-wells in spite of preventing their neighbours from receiving water. 
However, landowners must block their water-wells if they are useless or less 
valuable than neighbours' damage. 1249 These and other rules confirm the existence 
of a general principle. Jurists and judges concede that the abuse of right involves 
unlawful conduct against good customs and good faith, thereby triggering tort 
liability, particularly if the defendant intentionally injured the claimant. 1250 
Yet, as Guzman argues, Chilean courts and legal writers should refine the 
abstract notion of "abuse of rights" through a neat categorisation of fact-
situations. Typification is critical to lift the level of legal development. 125 1 Not for 
nothing is the casuistic classic Roman law seen as a model to imitate. Similarly, 
Spanish authors regard the abuse of rights, which is enshrined in article 7.2 SCC, 
as too diffuse to be helpful. Indeed, courts are forced to use the general principles 
or the rules regulating the relevant activity to decide whether the defendant 
behaved unlawfully. 1252 
Therefore, Chilean courts and scholars should specify the undifferentiated 
concepts of intention, <lamage and abuse of rights to tackle more effectively the 
harm in business rivalry. 
1245 I . b h f h d f · · · 
.e. , .1? reac o t e goo a1th obJect1vely understood , as defined in article 5, Spanish Unfair 
Compet1t10n Act 1991, Law 3/1 99 1 ("SUCA") 
1246 
Me?endez (1988) passim; Molina (1993) 60ff, 125-126; Massaguer (2002) lOOff 
Font/Miranda (2005) 27ff. ' 
1247 Ortuzar (2003) 69. 
1248 Articles 21 10/2111 CHCC. 
1249 Article 56, Chilean Waters Code. 
1250 · 
CA.Santiago , . 27.7.1943 , RDJ/41/2./56 1; CS, 28.5 .1998, RDJ/95/1 •/57; CS, 9. 11.2004, 
GJ/293/114; Ducci (1936) 43; Alessandri (1943) 25lff; Diez (1997) 38; Corral (2003) 125 · 
Barros: (1999) passim, (2006) 64Iff. ' 
125 1 Guzman (2003) 3 l 6ff. 
1252 Menendez ( 1988) 137; Atienza/Ruiz (2000) passim. 
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4. The prototype of abuse of rights 
In Chile, the intentional infliction of harm without justification is the paradigmatic 
. 1253 
case of abuse of rights, just like what happens with German law (§226 BGB), 
French law or the American prima facie tort theory. Chilean courts usually 
associate the abuse of rights with the defendant's disinterested malevolence which 
underpins civil delict. The classic case concerned a buyer of a car who, having 
found defects in it, made exaggerated requests to the claimant (car-seller) who 
resisted them. Through the newspaper advertisements whereby the defendant 
offered his car for sale, he denigrated the car-brand and the seller. The court found 
that the defendant had abused his right of property which only allowed him to 
offer his car for sale without injuring the claimant. The defendant was declared 
F 
tortiously liable. 1254 The facts of this case fairly correspond to malicious falsehood 
and disparagement of products as a major category of unfair conduct. 
Nonetheless, the abuse of process is perhaps the form of abuse that most · 
typically generates tort liability. This also uncovers certain judicial inclination to 
confine the abuse of rights to very extreme misconduct, such as the intentional or 
grossly negligent causation of damage. This is the case with the creditor who in a 
collection proceeding requested and obtained the attachment of some assets 
' d' · f h' d bt 1255 H knowing that they belonged to a third party as 1stmct rom 1s e or. ere 
the abuse of the right to request seizure was inferred from the defendant's 
intention to harm the claimant. Similarly, the defendant who carried out execution 
against the claimant's property knowing that the claimant was not a partner in the 
debtor's company, a fact easily verifiable in the Commercial Registry, was found 
to have abused its right to sue as he had injured the claimant acting with extreme 
inattention. 1256 Conversely, a court held for the defendant who had acted as 
executant in a mortgage foreclosure and successively requested the nullity of the 
public auction of the encumbered real estate, thus preventing it from being 
transferred to the claimant (buyer) . The court took into account that the claimant 
could not prove the defendant's intention to injure her. Likewise, the defendant 
1253 See above n.544. 
1254 CS, 15.11.1927, RDJ/25/1"/501. 
1255 CS, 24.7.1905, RDJ/3/1"/60. 
1256 CS, 28 .5 .1998, RDJ/95/1•/57 . 
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had legitimately sought procedural measures despite annoying the claimant. 
Although the court distinguished several variants of the abuse of rights (including 
negligence, abnormality, absence of legitimate interest and conduct contrary to 
good customs or good faith), it confined the abuse of rights to malicious 
behaviour. 1257 In another case, the defendant had published a newspaper 
advertisement announcing that the claimant had ceased to work for him. The court 
held that the defendant had legitimately informed the public without intending to 
harm the claimant. Moreover, the claimant was found to have contravened a non-
compete clause inserted in the contract for personal services with the defendant by 
attempting the constitution of a company operating the same type of business as 
the defendant's trade. 1258 These examples also demonstrate that the abuse of rights 
is rather like an alternative manner of describing intentionally inflicted harm. 
However, the malicious exercise of a right is a strange hypothesis of 
abusive conduct, proof of which is hard and can effortlessly be negated through 
justification. 1259 The claimant must bring evidence that the defendant intended to 
harm him as a means to another end or acted grossly negligently. Indeed, the 
intention to harm the claimant can be surmised from the absence of utility for the 
defendant. For instance, it can be inferred from the irrational act of digging a 
water-well seeking no benefit whatsoever. 1260 This recalls French law 1261 and 
s . h 1 1262 y . s . . pams aw. et, m pam the abuse of nghts is independent of tortious 
liability. It involves the abnormal exercise of a right and serves to prevent 
imminent or foreseeable harm through the actions of cessation and of restoration 
of the status qua. It also triggers tort liability if the victim shows damage and 
unlawfulness. The abuse itself operates as a rebuttable presumption of fault. 1263 
1257 , CA.Santiago, 9.11.1992, GJ/149/58. 
1258 CS, 16.9.1912, RDJ/11/1•/7 . 
1259 Barros (2006) 632-633. 
:::~ Article ~6, Chilean Waters Code; Alessandri (1943) 262ff. 
E.g., C1v~l), 19.11.1996, Bull.civ.I.No.404 (holding that the claimant-buyer had abused his 
contractual nght to enforce a penal clause upon failure to show that he had suffered damages 
following the breach of a non-compete covenant by the defendant-seller) 
1262 · . 
. Pursuant to article 7.2 SCC, the abuse of rights encompasses the exercise of a right maliciously 
(mferred ~rom ab~ormal conduct or the lack of benefit) or manifestly exceeding its legal limits 
(e.g., unfalf or antitrust conduct). The leading case (STS, 14.2.1944, RJ/293) defines the abuse as 
the exercis~ of a r_igh~ with the intention to harm the claimant, without any serious legitimate 
P2~rpose or man ObJeCtl~ely abnormal way. See: Molina (1993) passim; Concepcion (1999) 63. 
Gomez (2006) passim. 
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5. Beyond tort 
Chilean law accepts the abuse of rights even outside tort law. This happens with 
the registration in Chile ·of the claimant's international trademark, the defendant 
misappropriating the claimant's prestige and shielding its products from 
competition. 1264 Similarly, the TDLC held that the defendant had abused its right 
on a registered trademark over a generic product (used for Japanese food) as his 
only goal was avoiding all competition (in the distribution and sale of that 
product). The association of a product by a generic name through a trademark 
afforded a clear advantage to the defendant, preventing rivals from employing 
such name and imposing entry barriers to the relevant market. This unfair practice 
was aimed at attaining, keeping or increasing a dominant position in the relevant 
market. 1265 Accordingly, it fell within the TDLC' s jurisdiction. 1266 
F· Likewise, there is abundant case-law on recurso de protecci6n involving 
the abuse of certain rights or liberties enshrined in the Constitution. Recurso de 
protecci6n is a constitutional action that empowers the courts of appeal and the 
Supreme Court to issue all kinds of orders to safeguard one or more of these rights 
. 1267 · f d 1268 
or liberties, including the nght of property and economic ree om, to 
prevent third parties from arbitrarily and/or illegally interfering with the exercise 
1269 '' h . . ' 
of these rights by their holders . Recurso de proteccwn restores t e victim s 
stqtus quo, although victims can later bring tort actions before civil courts for the 
harm arising from the violation of such rights. The defendant's conduct is abusive 
if it causes abnormal annoyance to the claimant, according to its intensity, 
duration and/or geographic area. 1270 Thus, a recurso de protecci6n brought against 
a foster-home institution alleging that the uproar made by the children maintained 
by it violated the claimant's right to live in an environment free of 
1264 CPrCen, 31.5.1996, DecisionNo.974. 
1265 Article 3(c) of the Law 19911/2003 (DFL 1/2005), i.e., Chilean Competition Act 2003 
("CHCA"). 
1266 TDLC, 21.9.2005, DecisionNo30. 
1267 Article 19/No.24 CHC. 
1268 'The right to undertake any economic activity not contrary to morals, public order or national 
security, complying with the legal norms which regulate it': article 19/No;2~ CHC. Independently 
of recurso de protecci6n, any person can bring recurso de amparo economico (Law 18971/1990) 
to denounce a third party ' s breach of article 19/No.21 CHC to the competent court of appeal. 
1269 Article 20 CHC. 
1210 Jana/Marin (1996) 19ff; Ortuzar (2003) passim; Tapia (2005) 180; Barros (2006) 249-250; 
Pefiailillo (2006) 27. 
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contamination 1271 was dismissed: the noise reflected a natural expression of 
childhood, as illustrated by Oscar Wilde's The Selfish Giant, rather than a 
contaminating activity. 1272 
There are only a few reported cases on tort proceedings following the 
declaration of abuse of constitutional rights through recurso de protecci6n. 
Moreover, these cases do not concern competitors. 1273 However, there is case-law 
which reflects the need for balancing the litigants' conflicting interests, which is 
the kind of issue that the economic torts imply. It is often difficult to separate the 
abuse of rights from a collision of rights. Thus, a neighbour brought an action 
against a clay-pigeon shooting club arguing that this activity disturbed her 
property right. The court concluded that such activity seriously affected the 
claimant's right, thereby becoming illicit, arbitrary and abusive. The sport 
practised in the respondent's property did not fit in any of the constitutional limits 
to private property. This was for the "social function" of property relates to 
national security, public interests, public health and environmental 
· 1274 S . conservation. ome applauded that the court defmed the abuse of rights by 
reference to arbitrary conduct. 1275 For others there were two equally, legitimate 
and competing rights which should have been balanced in their merits without 
employing the abstract notion of abuse of rights. 1276 
In another case, the respondents (bank shareholders) had exercised their 
right not to withdraw dividends paid for their shares. Consequently, the dividends 
were converted into capital. The claimant argued that the respondents (the 
claimant's debtors) had abused that right, thus undermining the claimant's 
property over the contractual right against the respondents. The Supreme Court 
ruled that the respondents had acted exclusively to obtain a pecuniary advantage 
unrelated to the banking activity. The respondents had abused their right to 
capitalise part of the dividends, thereby injuring the claimant. 1277 Some criticise 
the decision since the claimant was not affected given. that the respondents' 
1271 Article 19/No.8 CHC. 
1272 CA.Concepcion, 17.7.1990, FM/382/1990/47i . 
1273 E.g., CS, 9.11.2004, GJ/293/11 4 (dismissing the action for damages to the reputation brought 
by ~ ~o:mer undergraduate against a university which had legitimately suspended him for 
plagiansmg another student's work). 
274 CA.PedroAguirreCerda, 23 .1.1985, RDJ/82/5"/67. 
1275 Ortuzar (2003) 92. 
1276 Guzman (2003) 320. 
1277 CS, 22.4.96, FM/449/523. 
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obligation was still pending and was therefore unenforceable.
1278 For others, this 
f , h 1279 t ff t f case clearly represented the abuse o ng ts or at any ra e a con 1c o 
, 1280 
nghts. 
The contrast is that in the abuse of rights the claimant lacks any right at all 
(as in Pickles) although the defendant is liable. In the collision of rights both 
litigants have clashing interests, such as in nuisance. However, the result can be 
identical. Thus, it appears that Chilean law has not refined these categories but 
uses them as generic formulas. 
6. Observations 
The abuse of rights serves to justify liability for anticompetitive conduct and 
unfair practices as well as to understand the need for compensating intentionally 
ilflicted economic harm. Although the abuse of rights can also consist of 
negligent behaviour, tort liability for economic damage arising from competition 
should be limited to the most extreme case, namely, dolo or culpa lata. In this · 
form the freedom to compete can be preserved. In any event, Chilean case-law has 
usually confined the abuse-of-rights doctrine to the deliberately caused harm. 
I have argued that the most conspicuous case of abuse of rights is simply 
another way of depicting intentionally occasioned injury which is worth 
compe'nsating. The abuse of rights can reveal wrongful conduct and be invoked to 
make tort actions more persuasive. Yet, to prove the abuse of rights, particularly 
the intention to harm or gross negligence, is often complex. The abuse of the 
liberty to compete renders unfair commercial practices unlawful. The connection 
between unfair competition and the abuse of rights is evident in systems lacking 
specific legislation, as the French law, but also even if unfair competition is 
statutorily forbidden, as now happens in Chile. The only difference is that 
claimants can choose between using the special statute or the tort principles. The 
abuse of the right to compete also reflects the abuse of a dominant position 
although the claimants can seek compensation without need for invoking the 
abuse of rights but solely rely on antitrust conduct. 
1278 Rodriguez ( 1998) passim. 
1279 Ortuzar (2003) 89, 100. 
1280 Barros (1999) passim. 
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Finally, Chilean courts employ crude categories such as culpa, damage and 
abuse of rights. It would be more useful if, rather than codifying these abstract 
notions, judges elaborated a catalogue of concrete fact-situations. 
V. Wrongfulness 
I will now show that, for tort purposes, Chilean courts and jurists generally 
incorporate wrongfulness (which I use as a synonym of unlawfulness even though 
the latter is narrower) into fault which must in principle be proved. However, fault 
is presumed and absorbed by wrongfulness where the defendant infringes a 
specific statutory duty intended to protect the class of persons and from the type 
of harm matching the claimant. Nevertheless, I will suggest that the presumption 
of fault is inconvenient vis-a-vis the breach of competition laws. 
1. Role and justification 
In Chile unlawfulness is not generally regarded as an independent component of 
tortious liability but subsumed under culpa, that is, the breach of a generic or 
specific duty of care imposed by the law and which is objectively assessed. 128 1 
Culpa is equivalent to the French faute, which Planiol labelled as an "illicit act" 
and Henri and Leon Mazeaud as an "error of conduct". 1282 Wrongfulness is part of 
fault and can alternatively comprise the breach of the general duty not to harm 
others, the violation of a specific statutory duty or the infringement of another's 
rights. In the two last cases the act is presumed to be culpable. 1283 Unlawfulness is 
also embodied in harm and causation: the defendant's conduct is treated as 
wrongful because it is culpable and it directly injured the victim. 1284 Trial courts 
evaluate causation as a fact, while the Supreme Court decides the normative issue 
of attributing the harm to the defendant's act. 1285 In sum, as Descheemaeker 
1281 
CS, 12.8.1981, RDJ/78/4"/120; CA.Santiago, 14.10.2002, RDJ/99/2"/132; Abeliuk (2005) 199· 
Barros (2006) 94; Dominguez (2007) 121. ' 
1282 
Zweigert/Kotz (1998) 619; VanGerven/Lever/Larouche (2000) 300-301. 1283 
Galand-Carval (2005) 92; Viney/Jourdain (2006) 367 374 
1284 ·, ' . 
CA.Concepc1on, 19.8.1965, 1965/136/Rev.D U Concepcion/85 1285 . • . 
CS, 16.10.1954, RDJ/51/1"/488; CS, 26.1.2004, RDJ/101/l"/19. 
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argues, there is no need for distinguishing wrongfulness from fault, damage and 
causation: wrongfulness is invariably understood as the breach of duty. 1286 
Conversely, Rodriguez champions the autonomy of wrongfulness. He 
argues that wrongful conduct is necessarily culpable even if the tortfeasor acts in 
good faith . The effect is to confine the justification, proof of which lies on the 
defendant, 1287 to acts that do not violate the law. 1288 For Corral, unlawfulness is 
the breach of the general duty not to harm others or of the specific (legal or 
regulatory) prohibition. In his opinion, courts should give content to neminem 
laedere. Unlawfulness is merely tautological if it is limited to infringement of the 
duty not to cause wrongful damage. He maintains that wrongfulness is an 
independent element of liability since the law defines delict and quasi-delict as 
acts which cause "injuria", 1289 a term that encompasses both unlawfulness and 
harm. Corral asserts that although fault, wrongfulness and damage are different 
ther· often materialise simultaneously. 1290 If wrongfulness is accorded autonomy, 
it ought to be refined by courts to be workable. 
2. The Spanish case 
In contrast, Spanish courts generally consider unlawfulness as an autonomous 
component of liability which signals the illicitness of conduct. Consistently with 
the eatliest signification of iniuria in Roman law, unlawfulness is the violation of 
the general duty not to harm others enshrined in article 1902 SCC. 1291 For Pena, 
wrongfulness was ignored in France partly because faute was imprecisely 
translated as culpa. He maintains that wrongfulness is independent of fault since 
strict liability ensues from illicit acts regardless of fault and because justifications 
. 1292 
negate wrongfulness, not negligence. Thus, wrongful conduct may be faultless. 
Busto and Pena argue that unlawfulness prevents the excessive expansion 
of liability. This is for courts can assess whether the defendant infringed a legally 
protected interest (which involves the duty of care, the class of persons protected 
1286 Descheemaeker (2009) 17. 
1287 Article 1698 CHCC. 
1288 Rodriguez (1999) 115-116. 
1289 Articles 1437/2284 CHCC. 
129° Corral (2003) l 18ff. 
1291 E.g., STS 28.2.1994, RJ/686; STS, 29.12.1997, RJ/9602. 
1292 Pena (2004) l 79ff. 
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and the damage) before evaluating culpability (that is, the breach of duty). 
Conversely, had unlawfulness been covered by fault the question whether the 
defendant's conduct was wrongful would be totally uncertain. 1293 Del Olmo also 
values wrongfulness as a sound device to control liability for negligently caused 
pure economic loss. He shows that the policy reasons to exclude liability, such as 
the fluid transmissibility of information not consumable by its use, should be 
analysed in relation to the duty of care rather than in connection with the issues of 
causation and foresight. 1294 
A small sector of Spanish case-law and legal doctrine incorporates 
wrongfulness into harm 1295 or into fault. However, fault-based liability may be 
imposed even though the defendant carried out legitimate activities. 1296 
3. Wrongfulness under question 
Wrongfulness is challenged even in Germany where it constitutes a distinct 
condition for liability. The modem "conduct-theory" considers artificial and 
troublesome the division supported by the "result-theory" between fault (the 
breach of the due care) and wrongfulness (the infringement of the protected 
interests listed in §823 BGB or the improper conduct defined in §826 BGB). The 
risk of separating both elements is that perfectly legitimate acts, like luring away a 
competitor's customers without violating any right of the claimant, can be treated 
as wrongful conduct. Hence the conduct-theory merged fault with wrongfulness, 
which is understood as the defendant's objectively culpable act that infringes the 
victim's right. One effect of this conception is to allow compensation for 
negligently caused pure economic loss on the ground that the defendant violated 
the claimant's "right" to an established and operating business. For its part, the 
result-theory roots strict liability in the infringement of the protected interests 
under §823.1 BGB. 1297 
1293 Busto (1998) 187-188; Pefia (2002) passim. 
1294 Del Olmo (2001) 275ff, 367. . 
1295 E.g., STS 21.1.2000, RJ/225; Puig (1956) 672-673; Yzquierdo (2001) 28; Reglero (2002a) 
52ff. 
1296 E 
.g., SSTS: 12.12.1984, RJ/6039; 31.12.1997, RJ/9195 . See: Santos (1967) 618-619; 
Albaladejo ( 1997) 490; Martfn-Casals/Sole (2005) 239ff. 
1297 Zweigert/Kotz (1998) 599; VanGerven/Lever/Larouche (2000) 302ff; Markesinis/Unberath 
(2002) 79ff; Van Dam (2006) 72ff; Barros (2006) 62, 96-97. 
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In sum, unlawfulness seems more suitable for furnishing legal certainty 
about the prohibited conduct in casuistic systems as the Roman (iniuria) or the 
English (breach of duty of care). Conversely, a broad fault principle such as that 
of French or Chilean law swallows unlawfulness: whether liability is excluded for 
absence of fault or of unlawfulness is a merely theoretical debate. 1298
 But Spanish 
law shows that it is even possible to recognise unlawfulness alongside endorsing a 
general rule of culpa. 
4. Breach of statutory duty 
Just as the contract-breaker's fault is inferred from the breach of contract 
1299 
(except for obligations of means), the infringement of the statutory duty defined 
by statute or regulation is in Chile deemed wrongful and culpable behaviour 
I 
(" l . ,-r, . l") 1300 cu pa zn1 raccwna . 
Culpa infraccional normally involves the violation of statutes establishing 
criminal offences, the perpetration of which injures victims. It must be noted that 
under the principle of legality criminal offences can only be created by statute. 
Likewise, criminal judgments condemning the accused constitute res iudicata in 
subsequent civil proceedings, thus forming irrefutable evidence as to the facts and 
the offender's culpability.1301 Court decisions declaring the contravention of other 
' 
statutes or regulations entail similar effect, 1302 particularly the assertion of 
antitrust conduct by the TDLC or the Supreme Court. 1303 Moreover, the failure to 
apply this legal presumption of culpability is an error of material influence on the 
outcome of the case. Thus, it can be annulled via cassation. 1304 In contrast, the 
acquittal of the accused from criminal or administrative charges is not binding 
upon civil courts: the absence of criminal liability does not exclude tort 
liability. 1305 Therefore, the treatment of breach of a statutory prov1s1on 1s 
1298 Tune ( 197 4) 11; Limpens/Kruithof/Meinertzhagen-Limpens (1980) l 5ff. 
1299 Article 1547 CHCC. 
130° CS, 20.7.1992, RDJ/89/1"/90; Alessandri (1943) 52; Abeliuk (2005) 210; Barros (2006) 
passim. 
1301 Article 178 CPC; CS, 7.5.1935, RDJ/31/1"/347 ; Alessandri (1943) 175 ; Barros (2006) 98. In 
Spain: Quintano (1957) 1052. 
1302 E.g., traffic accidents: CA.Santiago, 6.7.2005, GJ/301/149. 
1303 See below n.1358 and accompanying text. 
1304 CS, 6.1.1998, GJ/211/113. 
1305 Article 179.1 CPC; CS, 24.10.2000, GJ/244/98. Acquittals form conclusive evidence where 
the accused did not commit the act, had no participation in it, or the incriminatory proof was 
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comparable to that of French, German and English law. In France the violation of 
express mandatory rules is culpable unless justified. In Germany victims have 
under §823.2 BGB the right to recover damage flowing from the risk that the 
statute intended to prevent. Likewise, the breach of the statute imposing a certain 
standard of conduct is a rebuttable presumption of fault. In England, the victim 
injured by the violation of a statute whose purpose is to protect her against such 
harm can bring a tort action for breach of statutory duty. 1306 Similarly, Chilean 
courts consider the breach of statute by the defendant as the cause of the 
claimant's harm if the claimant falls in the statutory protection. There must be a 
sufficient connection between the defendant's breach of the rule of conduct and 
the claimant's (statutorily protected) interest and damage. 1307 Legislation may 
redundantly require this causal link, 1308 which is anyhow intrinsic to liability. 1309 
Furthermore, the practical impact of culpa infraccional is remarkably analogous 
to the strict-liability tort of breach of statutory duty: claimants must only prove 
harm and causation. 1310 
Corral, acknowledging the autonomy of wrongfulness, argues that the 
breach of criminal/administrative statutes asserted in the corresponding 
proceedings is res iudicata and forms a presumption of unlawfulness. But fault, 
except when the statute establishes strict liability, must be shown. 1311 In tum, 
Dominguez criticises that civil courts infer fault for tort purposes exclusively from 
the contravention of the criminal/administrative statute, whereas 
criminal/administrative fault has to be proved independently of that breach. 1312 
Dominguez notes that since civil courts do not assess whether the defendant could 
foresee the harm caused, they eventually impose strict liability for outcome which 
contradicts the principle of fault. 1313 In brief, although in Chile fault is generally 
absent: article 179.2 CPC; CS, 13.6.1952, RDJ/49/4"/168; CS, 8.7.1971, RDJ/68/18/211; Barros 
(2006) 964-967. 
1306 Zweigert/Kotz (1998) 602; Markesinis/Unberath (2002) 719-720. See above Chapter V, 
section I. l, pp.154ff. 
1307 CS, 22.4.1998, GJ/214/ 115. 
1308 E.g., Article 171, Chilean Road Traffic Act (Law 18290/1984). 
1309 Dominguez (2001) 11. 
1310 VanGerven/Lever/Larouche (2000) 306, 568, 574ff; Van Dam (2006) 240ft. 
13 11 Corral (2003) 120ff, 137,215. 
131 2 E.g., CA.PedroAguirreCerda, 11.3.1988, RDJ/85/4./28. 
13 13 Domfnguez: (1989) 119,121; (2007c) 134ft. 
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included into wrongfulness, the breach of statutory duty constitutes wrongful
ness 
from which fault is deduced, as in France.
1314 
5. Observations 
Whether wrongfulness is autonomous or incorporated into fault is a formal cho
ice. 
Courts must always evaluate the litigants' conflicting interests and cle
arly 
establish which types of injurious conduct are unacceptable. Specifically, the 
harm derived from business competition is at first sight justified, unless the 
defendant abused her right to compete. 
There is reason for fearing that behind the presumption of fault following 
the breach of statutory duties courts may end up applying strict liability
 for 
results, thereby betraying the fault principle. However, as will be shown in
 the 
;!"-
next chapter, antitrust conduct entails strict liability for outcomes as a prac
tical 
means of facilitating the institution of tort actions once the competition auth
ority 
conclusively declares that conduct, a decision which is binding upon civil co
urts. 
Yet, this species of tort liability is neither based on the bare causation of harm
 nor 
in negligence but on the deliberate antitrust conduct targeted at consum
ers, 
competitors and markets, although it often aims at identifiable rivals. I will re
ject 
the idea that antitrust tort liability hangs on simple fault presumed from the bre
ach 
I 
of the' statute. I will instead propose that this liability is founded on 
the 
defendant's intention to harm the claimant which is inferred from the anti
trust 
conduct. This is wrongful misbehaviour from which the defendant's intentio
n to 
injure a known rival can be deduced. This is an adequate criterion for imposing 
tort liability between business adversaries. 
VI. Conclusions 
This chapter showed that Chilean law is prepared to compensate for neglige
ntly 
caused economic loss in various fact-situations which, although have not u
ntil 
now implicated commercial competition, give an indication that even in this f
ield 
courts would prima facie accept fault-based liability. However, I have 
1314 Whittaker (2008a) 364, 373. 
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demonstrated that the prospect of recovering lucrum cessans is reduced beca
use 
case-law tends to consider it as uncertain or indirect. I have argued that eve
n if 
this procedure practically limits liability and attains results similar to the Eng
lish 
economic torts it mistakenly assumes that competitors owe each other a dut
y of 
care and ignores that negligently caused harm is a side-effect of legitim
ate 
business strife. Thus, I proposed to replace the principle of culpa with 
the 
defendant's intention to harm the claimant or, at least, gross negligence, whic
h is 
statutorily equivalent to the former and similar to recklessness (proper of criminal 
law), as it discloses a notorious disregard for the claimant's interests. Moreover, I 
have shown that the intentional infliction of economic harm often discloses
 the 
abuse of the right ( or liberty) to compete which is manifest in unfair practices and 
anticompetitive conduct. Furthermore, antitrust conduct is per se abusive 
and 
wrongful, operating as threshold of liability, the defendant's mental state b
eing 
presumed from that conduct. To require an intentional element (which must be 
proved except when is inferred from antitrust behaviour) is coherent with the 
nature of competitive activity and the pro-competition policy underlying
 the 
Chilean economic constitution. Additionally, it deters irresponsible litigat
ion. 
Eventually, courts and scholars must realise that the neminem laedere princi
ple 
suffers an important modification when tackling economic harm arising f
rom 
business rivalry. 
I have also demonstrated that in Chile tort liability is conceived of as 
fulfilling basically compensatory and deterrent aims. Exemplary damages are
 not 
an alternative without statutory recognition, thus discovering a clear associatio
n of 
punishment with criminal liability. Still, courts implicitly use retributive criter
ia to 
award higher compensation for non-pecuniary harm which in my view c
ould 
reach pure economic loss. The seriousness of the defendant's conduct, which 
dolo 
and culpa lata blatantly reveal, stands out among such punitive consideratio
ns. 
Furthermore, I have maintained that compensation for all direct harms shoul
d be 
limited to breaches of contract and torts committed with the intention to harm
 the 
claimant or gross negligence. 
Wrongfulness is traditionally embodied within fault. Yet, I showed that 
wrongfulness can only help to control liability for harm caused betw
een 
commercial competitors if it is subsumed under intention or gross negligence,
 that 
is, abusive and unjustified conduct. Likewise, the breach of competition laws is 
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wrongful behaviour although I questioned that fault could be presumed from it. 
Fault cannot govern tort liability for antitrust conduct as competitors owe no duty 
of care to one another. Moreover, antitrust conduct is committed with the 
intention to affect the market in general and often with the intention of injuring 
recognisable rivals. 
Lastly, the Chilean law of delict needs to specify its abstract concepts of 
intention, economic harm and abuse of rights, through the elaboration of 
taxonomies of the fact-situations encapsulated in each of these categories. This is, 
I think, a precondition for dealing with new issues successfully. Still, courts 
should also aim at increasing the levels of consistency, justice and certainty 
through the observance of precedents. It would certainly help to this if the 
Supreme Court retained the control over the elements of tort liability. 
j/°-
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CHAPTER VII 
TORT LIABILITY FOR ANTITRUST AND UNFAIR PRACTICES 
Chapter VI suggested that in Chile tortious liability for economic losses based on 
the code delict rules should be enforced congruently with the liberty to compete 
through the requirement of the defendant's intention to harm the claimant or gross 
negligence. Chapter VII focuses on tort liability for damage arising from 
anticompetitive conduct and unfair practices, including interference with business 
and contractual relationships. My main contribution to the current literature is to 
maintain that, for this species of liability to be applied consistently with 
competition, it ought to be deemed rooted in the tortfeasor' s intention to harm the 
claimant or to procure the breach of contract, as the case may be, or in gross 
negligence which is equated to intention in Chilean private law. 
Since even carelessly caused economic harm is a side-effect of legitimate 
commercial competition and rivals owe each other no duty of care, fault and strict 
liability are unsuitable for regimenting business battle. Although competitors 
often injure one another intentionally, this mental element significantly limits the 
principle of culpa. It implies that unfair practices and antitrust conduct undertaken 
against a statutory requirement are abusive. The component of intention identifies 
the wrongful character of the conduct, thereby producing the effect of restricting 
liability similarly to the result attained through the unlawfulness test in the 
English economic torts. Unfair competition law belongs to the realm of private 
law so its concern is to protect individual competitors from per se abusive and 
wrongful acts through preventive and compensatory remedies, including tort 
liability. Unfair practices can only be committed intentionally or grossly 
negligently. Subsequently, I will demonstrate that, just like the English 
competition torts, Chilean tort liability for antitrust conduct is strict liability for 
outcomes (the harm sustained by an identifiable competitor) though grounded in 
intentional anticompetitive behaviour. I will show that the defendant's mental 
element is not a condition for imposing antitrust tort liability as tort actions are 
designed to supplement the public enforcement of competition law by 
compensating for individual haim. The law promotes the bringing of tort lawsuits 
following the assertion of antitrust conduct by the competition authority (the 
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TDLC and the Supreme Court as court of last instance) after the investigation 
conducted by the Fiscalia Nacional Econ6mica (National Economic Prosecutor) 
de motu proprio or at a private party's request. Claimants must overcome the 
burdensome proof of particular damage arising from the antitrust conduct as 
different from the latter's detrimental impact on the market, consumers and 
competitors generally. Yet, it would be erroneous to categorise antitrust tort 
liability as founded on presumed fault or as conduct-based strict liability. 
Although this is not explicitly stated in tort literature, I will argue that the mental 
element is inferred from the fact that antitrust conduct directly harmed a 
recognisable competitor. By the same token, it is unlikely that competitors will be 
prepared to issue tort actions relying on the code delict rules without a previous 
declaration of antitrust conduct, as they would need to prove the latter in the first 
place let alone the defendant's intention or gross negligence. 
Section I introduces antitrust law and unfair competition law as separate 
albeit complementary disciplines. Whereas anticompetitive conduct and delict 
differ in the intention and harm each involves, unfair practices and tort engage the 
same types of intention and damage. Likewise, tort actions complement the public 
enforcement of competition law through compensation for damage flowing from 
antitrust conduct. Conversely, the law tackles unfair practices principally through 
preventive remedies while tort compensation is merely ancillary. Section II 
demon;trates that tortious liability for anticompetitive conduct is underpinned in 
intentional conduct though triggers strict liability for outcomes. It shows the 
improbability that claimants bring tort actions independently of the declaration of 
antitrust conduct by the competition authorities. Section III analyses tort liability 
for unfair competition and its position vis-a-vis the other remedies established by 
the law to handle unfair practices. Section IV is devoted to liability for 
interference with another's contract and business relations, given its great 
potential as an economic tort in Chile. Section V outlines the principal 
conclusions. 
230 
I. Competition law context 
This section contrasts competition law against unfair competition law and 
explains the influence of these differences upon the purposes served by tort 
liability in each area. 
1. Competition freedom and limitations 
In Chile, the liberty to undertake any economic activity without infringing the 
relevant legal norms, national security, the morals and the public order is 
conferred upon persons as of right. 1315 Alongside property, economic freedom 
underpins the "public economic order" set forth in the Constitution.13 16 Economic 
freedom encompasses the liberties to work, to carry out business and to compete. 
The latter involves the liberty to access, to remain in and to leave the market. 
Competitors are allowed to fight for clientele unless they commit unlawful acts, 
whether unfair (for example, attacking the quality of rivals' products/services) or 
antitrust (preventing, restricting or distorting competition). 1317 Right-holders can 
defend their rights through recurso de protecci6n which, as already seen, 13 18 
restores the status qua of the victim threatened, disrupted or deprived of her right 
by the arbitrary and/or illegal act/omission committed by a third party. Likewise, 
the victim can subsequently bring a tort action before the civil court to recover the 
damage arising from that arbitrary and/or illegal conduct the existence of which is 
res iudicata. The case-law on recurso de protecci6n elucidates the gist of 
wrongful conduct. 1319 However, it is for the competition authorities to investigate 
and punish antitrust practices themselves in a separate proceeding. 1320 
The liberty to compete must neither be abusive nor contravene the 
. 1 . 132 1 . . 
economic regu at10ns, morals (mcludmg good faith and good commercial 
1315 Article 19/No.21 CHC. 
1316 , • 
1317 
Guzman (2001) 27ff; Fermando1s (2006) 73; Peffailillo (2006) 87. 
1318 
Font (1987) 180-181; Ruiz-Tagle (2000); Valdes (2006a) passim. 
Above nn.1267ff and accompanying text 
1319 • • 
~.g.,. CA.Santiago'. 8.9.1993'. 2120-1993/LegaIPublishing/20205 (stating that a concerted 
practice. mtended to ?nve the claimant out of the market or threatening her with producing this 
effect violates the claimant's economic freedom) 
1320 C . · S, 4.7.2000, 3079-2007/LegalPubhshing/36890 
1321 T . · 
. hese regulations shall not undermine the essence of competition or make it impracticable: 
article 19/No.26 CHC. 
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customs) and public order. 1322 Morals and public order pervade civil law and limit 
. 
. 1 1323 B th . . k f f 1 pnvate autonomy as society evo ves . o cntena support a mar et o ree y 
negotiated contracts and freely transferred goods but operate ex post, for instance, 
invalidating contracts with illicit object/cause. 1324 Special public-law regulation is 
needed to safeguard competition from the abuse of economic power ex ante, 
imposing positive obligations and quasi-criminal sanctions upon contraveners.
1325 
Thus, the role of private law in the protection of competition is marginal as 
compared with that of administrative law. 
2. Connecting antitrust law with the law against unfair competition 
2.1 Fundamental differences 
;'· 
Antitrust law and unfair competition law are distinct yet complementary areas.
1326 
Competition law is a public-law domain concerned with safeguarding consumers, 
competitors and markets generally against antitrust conduct. Competition law is 
"political": it selects and punishes the offences representing a serious threat to the 
marketplace, thereby permitting (through the de minimis rule) conduct not 
detrimental to the public interest. Antitrust conduct comprises the execution or 
entering into by one or more persons of any deed, act, contract or agreement 
. 
which actually or potentially prevents, restricts or hinders free competition. The 
key acts are cartels (agreements or concerted practices between businesses 
targeted, among others, at fixing sale/purchase prices, limiting production or 
assigning themselves market zones/quotas) and the abuse of a dominant position 
in the relevant market. 1327 
Conversely, unfair competition law 1s a private-law branch whose 
preoccupation is the excess rather than the lack of competition due to acts 
1322 Evans (1986) 318; Guzman (2001) 255 ; Barandiaran (2002) 497ff; Valdes (2006a) 127ff, 231 -
232; Fermandois (2006) 124ff. 
1323 Lira (1944) 260ff, 322. 
1324 Articles 10/1461/1467/1682 CHCC. 
1325 Werner/Nehme (2008) passim. . 
1326 See generally: Valdes (2006a) 88-89; Barros (2006) 1041ff; Gonzalez (2007) 23; Menchaca 
(2007) 32. In Spain: Baylos (1978) 309ff; Menendez (1988) passim; Molina (1993) 51ff; Dfez 
(2001) 12-13; Garcfa (2005a) l lOff; Font/Miranda (2005) passim. A comparative view in: 
VanGerven/Lever/Larouche (2000) 231-232; Markesinis/Unberath (2002) 889. 
1327 Article 3 CHCA. 
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contrary to good faith or good commercial customs. This legal discipline is 
"technical" as it cannot renounce to prevent and punish per se wrongful acts 
which falsify or undermine the equality of opportunities between competitors 
through socially reprobated means, encompassing force and machinations, 
regardless of their repercussions on the market. How~ver, to decide whether the 
loss of clientele or market-share suffered by a business derived from unfair or 
legitimate competition is indeed a difficult question. 
2.2 Interfacing anticompetitive conduct and unfair competitive behaviour 
Antitrust law and the law against unfair competition are intimately interconnected 
and structured around freedom of enterprise.
1328 Thus, the breach of competition 
laws can simultaneously constitute antitrust and unfair conduct. The former 
Chilean Competition Commissions (superseded by the TDLC) sanctioned a wide 
range of unfair practices which were subsumed under antitrust conduct: acts of 
f · 1329 d · · 1330 , · , 1331 
. . 
con us10n, emgrat10n, 1m1tat1on, appropnatlon of another's 
reputation 
1332 
and misleading comparative advertising. 1
333 These tribunals often 
refrained from deciding disputes involving the breach of industrial property 
law.1334 
Today civil courts have vast jurisdiction on unfair competition, 1335 whereas 
the TDLC can only investigate and punish predatory pricing and other unfair 
practices (like commercial disparagement and misleading advertising) provided 
that they are targeted at acquiring, maintaining or increasing a dominant position 
in the relevant market. 
1336 Thus, unfair practices fall within competition law 
depending on their market_ impact alongside the defendant's purpose and market 
power. For example, selling below costs to promote a given product may be 
1328 Font/Miranda (2005) lOff, 39ff. 
1329 CR, 6.10.1992, DecisionNo.381. 
133
° CR, 22.12.1988, DecisionNo.301. 
133 1 CPrCen, 8.8.2003, DecisionNo.1266. 
1332 CPrCen, 12.4.2001, DecisionNo.1153. 
1333 CPrCen, 14.3.1993, DecisionNo.429. 
1334 
CR, 2.5.2001, DecisionNo.598; CR, 3.4.2002, DecisionNo.643. Yet, it was held as unfair the 
registration in Chile of an international trademark to prevent a foreign rival competing with 
its 
trademark unknown in Chile: CPrCen, 12.4.2001, DecisionNo.1153. 
1335 Article 8 of the Unfair Competition Act 2007 ("UCA"). 
1336 
Article 3(c) CHCA. See: TDLC, 24.11.2004, DecisionNo.10; CS, 27.9.2005, 2763-2005; CS, 
30.1.2008, 6155-2007/LegalPublishing/3835 I. 
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anticompetitive if it continues over time and is used to prevent potential or 
eliminate actual competitors. 1337 Likewise, if a civil court finds anticompetitive 
conduct on the occasion of trying unfair competition it must remit the case to the 
National Economic Prosecutor who may request the TDLC to impose a penalty 
inasmuch as the infringement is sufficiently serious.
1338 
Indeed, a single conduct can theoretically be unfair, anticompetitive, 
contrary to consumers' rights and violate competitors' IPRs.
1339 
Furthermore, a 
same unfair practice can be remedied through diverse actions (that is, cessation, 
prohibition, declaration, removal of effects and tort lawsuits), even in separate 
proceedings. 1340 So, there is potential for inconsistent case-law concerning the 
same facts. For instance, one civil court could allow the action for cessation 
against the same conduct that other court validated. Analogously, the TDLC could 
E- f . b . .1 134 1 hold as legitimate an act found un air y a c1v1 court. 
yet, I think that there is nothing strange in the fact that the same conduct 
affects different interests protected through various regulations which pursue their 
own objects as has rightly been pointed out. 1342 Accordingly, there is no genuine 
conflict between the TDLC and civil courts because they are looking at distinct 
aspects of the same behaviour. Admittedly, there is the possibility of clashing 
judgments between civil courts about identical acts and parties although regarding 
• diverse 'remedies. Nonetheless, the defences of !is pendens and res iudicata can 
partly counteract these problems. 
3. Observations 
Anticompetitive conduct and unfair practices are sources of tortious liability. 
However, antitrust conduct is punished for its results whereas unfair practices are 
wrongful in themselves. Consequently, tort law essentially provides compensation 
for individual harm arising from antitrust conduct while it primarily helps to 
1337 CS, 26.5.2005, 4927-2004/LegaJPublishing/32235. 
1338 Article 10 UCA. 
1339 I.e. , infringing the UCA, the CHCA, the Consumer Protection Act (Law 19496/ 1997), the 
Intellectual Property Act (Law 17336/1970) and the Industrial Property Act (Law 19039/1991): 
article 2 UCA. 
1340 Article 5 UCA. 
1341 Menchaca (2007) 34ff. 
1342 Poblete (2007) 120. 
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prevent unfair practices from happening. 1343 Thus, French courts use the law of 
delict to protect the fraternity between competitors, preventing concurrence 
deloyale. In tum, the liberty and equality between competitors is within the remit 
of competition law. 1344 
This difference, I think, also explains that antitrust conduct triggers 
outcome-based strict tort liability, just as happens with the English statutory 
competition torts. Conversely, unfair conduct entails intention-based tort liability, 
analogously to the English economic torts. Tort actions, which redress particular 
victims, aid the public enforcement of competition law, which concentrates on the 
overall impact of anticompetitive conduct. By contrast, unfair competition law 
and tort law protect a common individual interest reflecting their private-law 
nature. 
Finally, both antitrust conduct and unfair practices are prohibited by the 
relevant statutes. However, only antitrust conduct triggers tort liability for breach 
of statute. The finding of antitrust conduct by the competition authority binds the 
civil court, so tort proceedings are confined to proof of damage and causation. 
Conversely, tort liability for unfair practices is, as provided by the UCA, entirely 
governed by the code rules on delict. Thus, the claimant must show damage, 
causation and the defendant's fault, yet I will argue for requiring a mental 
element. 
II. Tort liability for antitrust conduct 
Anticompetitive conduct affects the public interest in competition represented by 
consumers, competitors and markets as such. Tort law merely permits the 
recovery of individual harm sustained by identifiable contenders. 
1. Administrative liability for anticompetitive conduct 
Whether the infringement of competition laws amounts to antitrust conduct is 
decided by the competition authority and the imposition of sanctions must comply 
1343 Baylos (1978) 359; De Ja Vega (2001) 56. 
1344 Le Tourneau ([1991]/2003) passim. 
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with the constitutional principles of legality and culpability; 
1345 
hence the 
prohibition on the legislator from presuming criminal liability; the respect for non 
bis in idem; the presumption of innocence; and the need for proportionality 
between punishment and offence. The competition authority must observe these 
constitutional safeguards since antitrust conduct and its accompanying sanctions 
. . . , 1346 S 
are essentially equivalent to cnmmal m1sdemeanour and pumshment. o, 
whether antitrust conduct is categorised as an administrative contravention or as a 
. 1· . 1 . 1347 quasi-criminal offence 1s a po 1t1ca issue. 
Some authors champion strict liability relying on that article 3 CHCA 
defines antitrust conduct in terms of its object or effect upon the market regardless 
of the defendant's motives. These scholars attempt to detach competition law 
from criminal law in relation to the conduct, sanctions, institutions, proceedings 
and r.emedies each involves. 1348 In my opinion, however, since liability for 
antitrust conduct is basically similar to criminal liability, the gist of which is the 
defendant's blameworthiness, the former cannot be strict either. Moreover, as 
Pena says, strict liability seems inappropriate for regulating a non-risky activity as 
antitrust conduct. 1349 
In fact, the Supreme Court held that the agent's intention to prevent, 
d · 1 to ant1'trust conduct.
1350 This restrict or hinder competition free om 1s centra 
mental s~ate is typically proved indirectly. Thus, in a cartel several persons act in 
concert with the positive intention to bring about the said consequences. Still, the 
fact that the defendants charge similar prices synchronically or coincidently is not 
conclusive of the collusion if there are other plausible causes, such as the 
equivalence between the services rendered by each of them or the existence of 
1 . . . h . . 1 ' k t th d 1351 fierce competition leading into quick y 1m1tatmg t eir nva s mar e me o s. 
Likewise, courts infer the defendant's intention to produce graphic or phonetic 
confusion between the claimant's original merchandise and the defendant's 
1345 Article 19/No.3 CHC. 
1346 Chilean Constitutional Tribunal, 26.8.1996, DecisionNo.244; Cury (1992) 73ft; Valdes: 
(2006a), (2006b) passim. 
1347 Jescheck ( 1981) 30, 81; Tiedemann (1993) 62, 85ft; Maurach (1994) 23ft, 111; Jakobs (1996) 
15ft; Roxin (1997) 72-73. 
1348 Montt (1995) ; Vergara (2006) passim. Vergara has served as National Economic Prosecutor, 
which explains his choice for strict liability. 
1349 Pefia (2000) 235ff. 
135° CS, 4.7.2007, 6236-2006/Legal Publishing/36684. 
1351 CS, 28.12.2006, 3395-2006; CS, 26.10.2005, 3327-2005. 
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replica in order to profit from the claimant's name and reputation, from the 
. 1· . f h 1352 commercia 1sat1on o t e copy by the defendant. Conversely, such intention is 
not found if the claimant had not sold her products in Chile. 1353 This means that 
she was not competing with the defendant. 
What shapes antitrust conduct as intentional is its object or effect 
detrimental to competition. Antitrust conduct is defined by article 3 of the CHCA 
in terms of an object or effect to prevent, restrict or hinder free competition. Since 
the intention relates to the purposes of an action, antitrust conduct is necessarily 
intentional as opposed to negligent. Moreover, pursuant to article 30 CHCA the 
declaration of antitrust conduct by the competition authority is binding upon the 
civil court deciding a subsequent tort case. The conduct, facts and juridical 
categorisation established by the TDLC or the Supreme Court are res iudicata. 1354 
Then, although the intention contained in the antitrust conduct differs from the 
intention to harm a particular competitor, 1355 the former is indisputable evidence 
for the latter in tort litigation. Therefore, the ensuing tort liability is strict for the 
outcome but rooted in intentional conduct. 
2. The difficult case for stand-alone tort actions 
In Chile competitors have not brought tort actions based on the code rules on 
delict independently of the previous declaration of antitrust conduct by the 
competition authority. 1356 
The only reported case decided before article 30 of the CHCA was enacted 
concerned a tort claim grounded on the antitrust conduct asserted by the then 
1352 -CS, 22.12.2005, 4236-2005, LegalPublishing/33494 
1353 CS, 29.4.2008, 6157-2007 /Lega!Publishing/38906. · 
1354 S ' ·1 1 h d · · · 
. 1m1 ~r Y, t e etermmatton of unfatr or antitrust behaviour for criminal effects is indisputable 
evidence m French tort litigation: Whittaker (2008a) 373 
1355 Valdes: (2006a), (2006b) passim; Banfi (2006) 445-446. 
1356 Spa_nish antitrus~ tort l_itigation is also scarce. Proving harm is difficult, litigation is expensive 
and cla1~ants lack mcent1ves such as punitive damages: De la Vega (2001) passim. The current 
Co?1petttton Act (Law 15/2007) allows stand-alone claims to be issued before commercial courts 
which ~a~ suspend proceedings until antitrust conduct being asserted by the National Competition 
Co_m11'.1ss1on. The former Competition Act (article 13.2) banned stand-alone actions thus 
afflrmmg the competition authorities' exclusive jurisdiction on these matters. For som~ this 
preven~ed inconsistencies. with civil courts: Lopez (2002) 55ft; Martfnez (2005) passim. B~t for 
o~ers. 1t. ob_str_ucted the d1rect enforceability of articles 81/82 EC before civil courts, which had 
wide JU~1sd1ct1on _on tort and nullity .. Others interpreted article 13.2 as if it allowed using the 
declara~1on of antitrust conduct _as evidence in civil proceedings or as though the prescription of 
tor~ actions was ~uspended until the competition authority entered its judgment: Creus (1999), 
Pena (2000) passim; De la Vega (2001) 348ft; Ferrandiz (2002) 34ft; Estupifian (2004) 71ff. 
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Competition Commission; and the few (pending appeal) reported cases 
commenced after that provision came into force also involve follow-on 
actions. 1357 Thus, this area will probably develop through follow-on lawsuits as 
claimants only have to show they were harmed by the defendant's antitrust 
conduct definitively affirmed by the TDLC. As said, article 30 of the CHCA 
obliges civil courts deciding tort claims to rely on the conduct, facts and juridical 
categorisation settled by the TDLC, which resembles the abundant Chilean tort 
. . 1 d . . . ff 1358 case-law succeeding the declaration of cnmma or a mmistratlve o ences. 
Although this provision is silent about the defendant's fault, jurists seem to 
understand that fault is presumed from the antitrust conduct, proof being reduced 
to damage and causation. Further support for this rests on the fact that antitrust 
d. 1359 Th . h t tort actions are tried in summary (not protracted) procee mgs. e me oa e 
. . 1360 'th h' h I ·11 d. 1361 case-law adopts this view w1 w 1c w1 isagree. 
FConsequently, there is little likelihood that stand-alone actions will be 
filed. Moreover, civil courts can be strongly persuaded into rejecting tort claims 
based on the same conduct that the competition authority considered as pro-
competitive. 1362 A recent decision was already mentioned, which awarded 
. 1363 
compensation for negligently caused pure economic loss (lucrum cessans). 
However, this case was preceded by a competition investigation where the 
Supreme Court concluded that the defendant had neither perpetrated an unfair 
practice no.r attempted to denigrate the claimant's business but had in good faith 
mistake~ly denounced to third parties that the claimant's product was 
contaminated. 1364 Yet, the claimant has succeeded in tort until now, pending the 
Supreme Court' s decision on cassation.1365 Still, it is noteworthy that the litigants 
are not competitors. Had they been so, the claimant might not have sued the 
defendant. But it is even more problematic that a claimant can be awarded 
compensation for economic harm negligently caused by his rival after the 
1357 See below section 5.1, p .242. 
1358 See above n. 1303 and accompanying text. 
1359 Barros (2006) 963; Valdes (2006a) 281,309. 
1360 See below section 5.2, p.244. 
136 1 See below section 3, pp.239ff. 
1362 Witker (2000) 72-73; Valdes (2006a) passim. 
l363 CA.Concepcion, 30.12.2008, 360-2005 : see above n.1212 and accompanying text. 
1364 CS, 16.6.2005 , 5719-2004. 
1365 CS, 3516-2009. 
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competition authority held the conduct as pro-competitive and notwithstanding 
that commercial contenders owe each other no duty of care. 
3. Justifying and restraining liability 
Harming individual rivals is justified as an inevitable side-effect of exercising the 
liberty to compete which is, by itself, beneficial to consumers and markets. 
Legitimate competition is often aggressive 1366 and Chilean courts seem to know it: 
businesses must overcome competition through commercial strategies and market 
instruments. 1367 
Accordingly, tort liability can only be imposed after balancing the 
claimant's interest against the defendant's freedom to compete. A useful 
restraining factor is unlawfulness, whether it is expressed through nominate torts 
(England), a generic clause proscribing unfair acts (§826 BGB) or the abuse of the 
right to compete.1368 The latter is the Chilean route. As Barros suggests, the abuse 
of rights is represented by the antitrust conduct which exceeds allowable 
. . 1369 Th d b . competition. e ou t is whether the claimant should additionally prove that 
she was intentionally or grossly negligently injured. In Spain, De la Vega 
contended that the anticompetitive conduct declared by the competition authority 
should count as evidence of the defendant's fault, given the proximity between 
wrongfulness and culpability in antitrust harm. He argued that because antitrust 
conduct is normally deliberate, the presumption hinged on objectively wrongful 
conduct. Thus, tort liability becomes strict in outcome. 1370 Similarly, Chilean 
jurists and courts infer the defendant's fault from the antitrust conduct. They 
claim that article 30 CHCA does not require proof of fault or intention, which is 
consistent with the profuse case-law on culpa infraccional. 
I concede that proof in such cases is limited to causation and damage. 
Antitrust conduct was already investigated and asserted by . the competition 
authority. Moreover, the legislator is promoting the bringing of tort actions as an 
aid to the public enforcement of antitrust law, an incentive which might be lost if 
1366 Tune (1974) 93ff. 
1367 CS, 23.8.2004, 2943-2004. 
1368 Pefia (2000) 229ff; Markesinis/Unberath (2002) 889ff; Van Dam (2006) 70. 1369 Barros (2006) 1044ff. 
1370 De la Vega (2001) 200ff. 
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claimants had to prove the defendant's fault or intention to injure on top of the 
complex harm and causation. Nevertheless, simple fault should not be presumed 
from antitrust conduct. Chilean courts and scholars have not fully realised that 
antitrust tort liability can neither be rooted in the bare causation of harm nor in 
negligence. To construe it as "conduct-based strict liability" or as grounded in 
"presumed fault" is to misunderstand the gist of competition, where identifiable 
rivals are unavoidably deprived of clientele and market-share. Conduct-based 
strict liability violates the principle of culpability which governs the quasi-
criminal sanctions imposed by the competition authority and affects the 
subsequent tort litigation. Further, strict liability can only be established expressly 
by statute, which is not the case with article 30 of the CHCA. In tum, to impose 
fault liability is to ignore that accidentally inflicted harm is a side-effect of 
comp;.tition; that rivals owe one another no duty of care; and that the 
anticompetitive conduct on which tort liability rests is intentional, never careless. 
Perhaps in other contexts the defendant's fault can properly be inferred from the 
breach of the relevant statute as the activity in question imposes reciprocal duties 
of care on their participants. But competition is a peculiar occupation, for 
opponents inexorably hurt each another without bearing any duty to abstain from 
acting carelessly. The limit is abusive deeds encapsulated in antitrust behaviour 
which is iq.tentional and shapes the ensuing tort liability. Once the claimant shows 
that she 'was specifically injured by the defendant's antitrust conduct the latter can 
be deemed tantamount to an intentional tort (delict). 
Yet, the interpretation advanced here is not exempt from difficulties. First, 
the intention to harm (dolo) must generally be proved, 1371 while the CHCA 
apparently contains no exception to this rule. Secondly, antitrust conduct targets at 
indeterminate people, whereas civil delict is intended to harm particular victims. 
Nevertheless, these problems are not insurmountable. First, dolo by its nature can 
only be shown indirectly, from the defendant's conduct, and judicial presumptions 
constitute a means of proof. 1372 The primary evidence from which the intention to 
harm (or gross negligence) can be inferred is the antitrust conduct itself. Secondly, 
it is not rare that the antitrust conduct is directed against recognisable competitors, 
137 1 Article 1459 CHCC. Moreover, article 707 CHCC provides for a general presumption of good 
faith, 
1372 
'To presume a fact is to infer it from certain known antecedents or circumstances ' (article 47 
CHCC). Judicial presumptions are regulated in article 1712 CHCC and articles 426/427 CPC 
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as predatory pricing conspicuously illustrates. Any sensible person entering a 
market does an analysis which reveals the competitors and their market position. 
So, competition is normally aimed at affecting known rivals. Moreover, once the 
tort claimant shows that she was injured as a result of the defendant's antitrust 
conduct it seems logical to deduce that the defendant really intended to harm her 
as distinguished from consumers and other competitors at large. In a sense this 
mental element is embodied into the causal link between the defendant's antitrust 
conduct and the claimant's harm. 
Although the argument presented here may not change the result (whatever 
the nature of liability claimants need not prove the defendant's fault or intention) 
it is worth emphasising that, particularly while this is still a novel area in Chile, 
antitrust tort liability hangs on intentional conduct although it is strict in the 
outcome. As Barros recently said, there is no universal prohibition not to injure 
others. Strict liability is exceptional and surely does not govern competitors who 
defeat one another by offering better or cheaper products. 
1373 Additionally, I 
submit, mere fault is not enough either. Intention or serious disregard for 
another's rights is the minimum standard, implicit in antitrust conduct, on which 
the consequent tort liability reposes. 
4. Causation issues 
To succeed claimants must show that their actual market-share, clientele or sales 
and/or their possibilities of further business were lost or diminished (damnum 
emergens and lucrum cessans, respectively) due precisely to the defendant's 
antitrust conduct. The problem is that the claimant's economic loss often arises 
from other causes, such as fashion and the claimant' s own inefficiency, all the 
more if the claim is brought independently of the declar_ation of antitrust 
conduct.
1374 In fact article 30 of the CHCA applies to follow-on tort actions, just 
like s.4 7 A of the Competition Act 1998 provides. 
1373 Barros (2008b) 314, 321ft. 
1374 Pefia (2000) 223ft; De Ja Vega (2001) 65, 277ft; Van Dam (2006) 36. 
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Although the TDLC can evaluate evidence with discretion, 1375 proving 
antitrust conduct and its negative impact is usually troublesome. Thus, TDLC's 
judgments finding cartels have been reversed by the Supreme Court as the facts 
did not unequivocally disclose collusion: there were alternative explanations for 
parallel conduct. 1376 These adversities can doubtlessly permeate into tort 
litigation. As Araya explains, compensable damages must be segregated from the 
overall impact of anticompetitive conduct (for example, the social net cost paid in 
excess by potential/actual purchasers of the monopolised product/service). The 
pitfall is determining with relative certainty which profits victims would have 
made had anticompetitive conduct not happened. 1377 It is the kind of hypothetical 
question set by lucrum cessans. 
5. Early case-law 
,>· 
5.1 Prior to article 30 CHCA 
As far as I have been able to discover, there are no stand-alone cases reported in 
Chile. Possibly the first dispute on liability for anticompetitive harm was 
governed by the former Competition Act which lacked a provision as article 30 
CHCA. The defendants, two Chilean commercial airlines with dominant position 
' in a national route, had been punished by the competition authority for predatory 
pricing (benefiting passengers in the short term with lower fares though leading to 
monopolistic positions in the long run). 1378 The claimants' airline company and its 
partners' natural persons subsequently sued in tort the defendants alleging 
damnum emergens, lucrum cessans and non-pecuniary loss. The defendants were 
in first instance held jointly and severally liable for unlawfully pursuing illicit 
aims (dumping). Moreover, their intention to harm the claimants was inferred 
from the fact of restricting the claimants' participation in the relevant market, 
thereby depriving them of expected benefits. This conduct, its object and effect 
1375 Through the "rules of sound criticism" (article 22 CHCA): i.e., according to the experience, 
logic, scientific knowledge and common sense (CS, 13.5.1971, RDJ/68/1"/l 28), which are deemed 
suitable for an expert tribunal (CS, 10.1.2006, 4332-2005/Legal Publishing/33842). Conversely, 
civil courts must assess proof applying strict procedural rules . 
1376 E.g., CS, 22.1.2007, 5057-2006; CS, 28.1.2008, 4052-2007. 
1377 Araya (2005) passim. 
1378 CR, 31.12.1996, DecisionNo.479. 
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transgressed the honesty and loyalty owed by the defendants to their 
competitor. 1379 This decision was approved by the Court of Appeal 1380 and the 
Supreme Court, 1381 the latter grounding the defendants' joint and several liability 
in their collusion. Since the term "collusion" is not defined by statute, the court 
understood it according to its natural and obvious sense, that is, as an illicit 
agreement that causes harm to another person. 1382 
This case highlights that antitrust tort actions are likely to follow the 
statement of anticompetitive conduct. Concretely, this case took such declaration 
as indisputable evidence, as Chilean courts generally do in respect of culpa 
infraccional. Still, liability was subjected to the defendant's intention to harm the 
claimant. Nonetheless, this mental element was conclusively presumed (iuris et de 
iure) from the predatory pricing. This confirms that antitrust tort liability requires 
intentionally inflicted economic loss although it operates as strict liability for 
outcomes. The case also suggests, however, that such intention may be clearer in 
predatory pricing than in other types of antitrust conduct, even though it was 
noted that the defendants had acted in concert which is close to a cartel. Finally, 
joint tortfeasance (solidarity or responsabilidad solidaria) 1383 was founded on the 
defendants' combination, thereby committing the same wrong, echoing the joint 
tortfeasance present in the tort of simple conspiracy. Precisely, the most 
representative examples of joint tortfeasance in Chile are cartels and combined 
actions perpetrated with the purpose of injuring the claimant. 1384 In general, as in 
criminal law, authors and accomplices are jointly and severally liable if they 
participate in the perpetration of the same delict. Accomplices are equated to the 
authors of delict. 1385 
1379 4thc· ·,c s . · 1v1 ourt antrngo, 22.6.2000, 4831 -97. 
138° CA.Santiago, 14.7.2004, RDJ/101/2•;55_ 
1381 CS, 27.12.2006, 5835-2004. 
1382 Pursuant to the rule on interpretation established in article 20 CHCC. 
1383 Article 2317 CHCC: 'If a delict or quasi-delict has been perpetrated by two or more persons, 
each of them shall be jointly and severally responsible for any harm flowing from the same delict 
or quasi-delict'. This resembles English law: see above n 699 and accompanying text 
1384 E . · · 
. .g., CS, 4.1.2000, FM/494/3148 (holdmg the defendants both criminally liable for concluding 
a simulated sales agreement, thereby depriving the claimant of the real estate he had been awarded 
in a judicial auction, and tortiously liable for the claimant's harm, i.e., the value of the property); 
Barros (2006) 421-422. 
1385 First, article 2316 CHCC excludes as authors those who profit from another's delict 'without 
being accomplices'. Secondly, Article 24 of the Chilean Criminal Code provides that accomplices 
must also pay for damages. Case-law confirms this: CA.Santiago, 2.10.1939, RDJ/39/2•/5. 
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5.2 Under article 30 CHCA 
The two first tort lawsuits issued after article 30 CHCA came into existence have 
been recently decided by the same lower court, pending appeal. Both proceedings 
followed a single antitrust investigation where the Supreme Court sanctioned the 
defendant for predatory pricing. Between 2001 and 2004 the defendant had sold 
fibre-cement sheets at prices artificially below production costs, so attaining a 
dominant position and driving the claimants out of the market. 1386 Relying on 
article 30 CHCA, the civil court presumed the defendant's fault from the said 
antitrust conduct and confined proof to damage and causation. One of the claims 
was rejected for lack of causation: the claimant had sold its own products at lower 
prices than the defendant's. 1387 The other action succeeded. The claimants 
established that they had been solvent before the predatory pricing, that the 
defenc}ant had offered them a high price for acquiring their business after a due 
diligence process, and that as a result of the defendant's conduct their sales had 
deeply fallen, thereby leaving the market and eventually going into liquidation. 
On the basis of the Supreme Court's finding, the civil court concluded that the 
defendant had persistently sold its product below manufacture costs, increasing its 
market-share while the claimants diminished theirs, and that the defendant could 
survive the predatory practice through loans with banks and associated companies 
along wi~, exports turnover. The claimants were awarded the value of their 
business as determined by the defendant in the said due diligence (damnum 
emergens) , the profits they would have made without the antitrust conduct 
considering their former solid position (lucrum cessans), and non-pecuniary 
damage (their commercial discredit vis-a-vis creditors, competitors and clients). 
Interestingly, the court alluded to the defendant's intention to harm the claimants. 
It defined predatory pricing as the sale of products/services below the costs with 
the "purpose" of injuring actual or prospective competitors by expelling them 
from the market or preventing them from entering into it, the defendant acquiring 
or increasing a dominant position. 1388 Again, therefore, predatory pricing presents 
itself as a patent situation in which the intention incorporated into antitrust 
1386 CS, 29.11.2006, 3449-2006/Legal Publishing/35642. 
1387 26thCivil Court Santiago, 23.6.2009, 2191-2007. 
1388 26th Civil Court Santiago, 24.4.2009, 13272-2007. 
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conduct coincides with the intention ingrained in civil delict. Predatory pricing 
undermines competition to the consumers' detriment but often aims at 
recognisable adversaries. 
6. Observations 
It is incorrect to presume the defendant's simple fault from antitrust conduct 
because this is intentional behaviour and rivals owe no duty of care to one 
another. Antitrust tort liability is strict liability for outcome: the claimant only has 
to show that she was injured by the antitrust conduct. Once these facts have been 
established, the court can presume the defendant's intention to harm the claimant. 
Yet, the sophisticated issues of harm and causation will possibly keep litigation 
quite selective. 
III. Tort liability for unfair practices 
This section shows that tort law performs a restricted role in fighting against 
unfair practices in Chile, albeit new legislation can invigorate it. It argues that the 
requirement of intention or gross negligence is particularly appropriate for 
restricting liability derived from unfair practices. 
1. Introduction 
Chile has traditionally handled unfair competitive practices through self-
regulation1389 and norms disseminated in specific statutes. 1390 The UCA was only 
enacted in 2007. This novel legislation makes it worth outlining some foreign 
experiences. Domestic laws are heavily influenced by national traditions and 
1389
_ E.g., the Code on Publicity Ethics 2007 (http://www.achap.cl/achap) binds the members of the 
Chtl~an Association of Advertising Agencies, inter alia, to found comparative advertisement on 
genume, demonstrable and objective information without inducing the public into confusion. 1390 E th h'b ' . 1 
. _.g., e pro 1 1tlon on emp oyees, agents and partners from competing with their employers, 
pnnc1pals and companies, respectively, in the same business executed by the latter (articles 
160/No.2 Chilean Labour Code; articles 331/404 Chilean Commercial Code). It is also forbidden 
to register a~ ~adema~ks a symbol which can induce consumers into error, confusion or deception 
as to the ongm, quality or genre of products, services or businesses, or violate the public order, 
m~rals or good customs (including the principles of fair competition and commercial ethics): 
article 20(f)-(k), Chilean Industrial Property Act (Law 19039/1991). 
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idiosyncrasies, employing procedural and substantive mechanisms to control 
unfair practices without ascribing to a given legal family. Thus, while self-
regulation is pre-eminent in the UK, private law is largely used in France, 
, 1391 Germany and Spam. 
In particular, in France concurrence deloyale (unfair or "disloyal" 
competition) has mainly been punished by case-law through a general tort of 
unfair competition based on the delict rules. French courts have grouped unfair 
practices around acts of confusion, misappropriation and slavish imitation of the 
competitor's product; disparagement; disorganisation within competitors' 
enterprises (such as inducing breach of contracts and violation of trade secrets); 
and market-disruption (for instance, false advertising). 1392 For example, it has 
been declared as unfair competition the imitation by which the defendant enriches 
himself by selling the copied product at a lower price than the claimant's original 
product. 1393 Courts punish the direct or indirect exploitation of the competitor's 
;f"-
goods/prestige/clientele, 1394 including "parasitic competition" where the litigants 
do not compete with each other (there is no confusion) albeit the defendant profits 
from the claimant's reputation/technique/investment. Whereas Kamperman 
proposes a neat distinction between concurrence deloyale (remediable in tort) 
d d . , , ) 1395 rt from concurrence parasitarie (which should be re resse m restitution , cou s 
do not always draw a clear divide.1396 The prospect of paying tort compensation 
can be an effective deterrent to unfair practices, all the more if the defendant 
' 
enriched ' himself from his wrong. 1397 Yet, the remedies are predominantly 
preventive, similar to the English injunctions, targeted at stopping unfair practices 
causing or likely to cause harm to goodwill and loss of profits, 1398 whereas proof 
1391 Wadlow (2004) 64; Henning-Bodewig (2006) 3ff; Mailers/Heinemann (2007) pas~im. . 
1392 Derenberg (1955) passim; Knight (1978) 176ff, 189; Palmer (1992) 303 ; Hennmg-Bodew1g 
(2006) 114. 
1393 Com, 25.11.1986, D.1988.Somm.212, obs.Y.Serra. 
1394 Viney/Jourdain (2006) 415-416. 
1395 Kamperman (1997) 25ff. . . 
1396 E.g. , Com, 18.11.1997, D.1998 .260, n.R.Bout (holding the defen_dant tort1ously habl_e for 
diverting the claimant's customers who, through a system of electromc coupons, au~omat1cally 
obtained a discount for the defendant's product when they purchased the cla1mant/non-
competitor' s product in the same department-store) . 
1397 Tune (1 989) 135-136, 140: . 
1398 E.g., Com, 19.7.1971 , D.1971.691 (prohibiting the defendant from using the same commercial 
name than the claimant's before he commenced to do business in the same location where the 
claimant traded); Com, 28.4.1980, JCP.1982.11.1 9791, n.J.Azema (declaring the claimant's former 
director and the company constituted by him jointly and severally liable to the claimant for 
competing against the latter, and for hiring two of its employees, and banning them from carrying 
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of damage is often complicated by numerous possible causes. 1399 In sum, a 
general tort of unfair competition appears consistent with the recoverability of 
negligently caused pure economic loss in France. 1400 The claimants must show the 
f . d t d d · 1401 un air con uc , amage an causation. However, currently the Cour de 
cassation does not subject the tort action for unfair competition to proof of the 
defendant's intention to harm the claimant 1402 as it formerly did. 1403 Case-law 
sometimes requires a "characterised fault" which is incorporated into the unfair 
practice itself. Yet, this fault is very difficult to distinguish from mere negligence. 
Indeed, Serra maintains that to the extent that simple fault suffices for an act to be 
unfair, courts render the action for unfair competition a more efficient means for 
defending the liberty to compete. Conversely, he criticises the lower court 
decisions which sometimes demand the defendant's intention to injure the 
1 . . d 1404 c aimant m or er to protect freedom to compete. In my view, French case-law 
shows that "characterised fault" is not a uniform standard but actually resembles 
simple fault, which is detrimental to commercial competition. 
In Spain unfair practices have been combated principally through statutory 
remedies and the abuse of rights. Unfair acts actually involve the abuse of the 
right to compete to the detriment of rivals . The abuse of rights (article 7.2 SCC) 
requires either the defendant's intention to harm the victim or the defendant's 
objectively antisocial or abnormal conduct. To recover tort damages the claimant 
must prove the defendant's fault. 1405 Still, as in France and England, the main 
remedies are preventive, like the cessation or removal of the effects arising from 
unfair practices or the publication of the judgment in cases of denigration or false 
advertisement, without need for proving the defendant' s fault. 1406 
out_ bu~iness within ~~rtain territory for certain period) (Azema criticising that this decision 
arb1tranly forbade leg1t1mate commercial activities). · 
:::: Rotondi (l 958) 331; Oilier/Le Gall ( 1981) 102ff, 129; Viney/Jourdain (2001) 18, 77-78. 
Weir (l 997) 56ff; Galand-Carval (2005) 91. 
1401 Whittaker (2008) 362, 380-381. 
1402 E.g., Com, 3.5.2000, D.2001.Somm.131 2 obs.Y.Serra 
1403 ' ' E.g. , Com, 18.4.1958, D.1959.87, n.F.Derrida. 
1404 
See above n. 1402. In France tort liability for unfair practices requires the defendant's bad faith 
rather than the intention to harm the claimant: see above n.11 80, below nn. l 430ff and 
accompanying text. 
14
~ STS • 
, 14.2.1 944, RJ/293; Menendez (1988) passim; Massaguer (2002) 100; Font-
Galan/Miranda (2005) 27ff; Garcia (2005a) 136. 
1406 Mol ina (1993) passim; De la Vega (2001) 60ft. 
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2. TheUCA 
This is the first Chilean systematic legislation on unfa
ir competition, which is 
defined as 'conduct contrary to good faith or good c
ustoms which, through 
. . 
f h k t' 1407 
illegitimate means, aims at d1vertmg customers from an 
agent o t e mar e . 
This definition signals that unfair practices are intenti
onal and illicit conduct. 
Wrongfulness is necessary as competition is norm
ally legitimate however 
08 · 
1409 · b d 
fierce. 14 Thus, the UCA follows the Spamsh statute, 
on its part orrowe 
from the former German Unfair Competition Act (1909).
1410 
Although the UCA protects competitors, consumers 
and any person 
injured in her legitimate interest by unfair practices, 
1411 it primarily defends 
competitors 1412 as evident in the general clause and the e
xamples of per se unfair 
acts c.©ntained in the UCA, which fairly correspond
 to the French classic 
taxonomy and partially match passing-off, malicious fal
sehood and Lumley-tort, 
namely: acts of confusion and deception; acts of denigra
tion; inducing breach of 
. 
. 
1 1413 
contract; misleading comparative advertisement; and ab
use of lega process. 
This technique is valued for furnishing flexibility and l
egal certainty. Yet, it is 
feared that civil courts might misinterpret the general c
lause and treat as unfair 
perfectly legitimate acts, thereby boosting the bringing 
of groundless claims to 
intimidate ,rivals. Moreover, the fact that separate actio
ns concerning the same 
' 
acts can be filed in different civil courts can create incons
istent case-law, although 
f . d d . d
. 1414 
this can be avoided through the defences o lls pen ens an
 res zu zcata. 
The UCA offers a wide range of private-law remedies 
to prevent unfair 
practices and compensate for individual harm.
1415 Any person directly threatened 
or affected in his legitimate interests can claim the cessati
on and/or the prohibition 
of the unfair practice; request the declaration of such con
duct and/or the removal 
1407 Article 3 UCA. 
1408 Menchaca (2007) 38-39; Gonzalez (2007) 19-20. 
1409 Article 3 of the SUCA defines unfair acts as 'those co
ntrary to good faith as an objective rule 
of conduct based on economic competition'. See also: M
assaguer (2002) 100. 
1410 Section 3 of the current German Act against Unfa
ir Competition (UWG/2004) does not 
proscribe acts contra bon~s mores but unfair practice
s capable of producing 'more than an 
insubstantial impact on competition to the detriment 
of competitors, consumers or other market 
participants ' . See also: Garcia (2005a) 121, (2005b) passim. 
1411 Articles 1/2 UCA. 
1412 Gonzalez (2007) 18; Menchaca (2007) 33 . 
1413 Article 4 UCA. 
1414 Gonzalez (2007) 19ff; Menchaca (2007) 37ff; Ortuzar (2007) 55. 
1415 Tapia (2007) passim. 
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of its effects through the publication of the judgment at the defendant's e
xpense; 
and sue for damages in tort. 
1416 The actions for cessation, prohibition and 
declaration serve the prime goals of preventing and elim
inating unfair practices 
before becoming irreparable. 
1417 However, the UCA does not include 
restitutionary remedies. 
1418 It only prevents unjust enrichment prohibiting 
claimants from bringing tort suits if they had already b
een compensated for the 
harm following the same conduct.
1419 The actio in rem verso is usually rejected 
where the claimant avails herself of a specific remedy. S
ome argue for allowing 
victims to choose the remedy that best suits their in
terests, unless they had 
negligently failed to plead opportunely another mor
e appropriate form of 
redress.
1420 Nonetheless, the principle proscribing unjust enrichment can always 
be invoked to support a claim: reaping without sowing is
 a notorious indicator of 
f . d t 1421 M th. . . 1 un air con uc . oreover, 1s prmc1p e seems mo
re appropriate than tort 
liability to tackle "parasitic" competition. 
1422 
3. Initial case-law 
A recent first-instance judgment allowed the actions for the declarat
ion and 
cessation of unfair conduct.
1423 The defendant's petrol station had contracted with 
Shell (the claimant) to sell preferably the latter's lubricants/fuels 
and n~t to 
exhibit/sell third parties' products using Shell's logo. The
 defendant sold products 
of unknown origin employing Shell's trademark/sign, th
is being deemed by the 
court an act 'which unduly takes advantage of anothe
r's reputation, inducing 
confusion between one's own goods . .. and those of ano
ther'. 1424 The defendant, 
the court held, had i?tentionally and illicitly deviate
d Shell's customers by 
offering them products of other distributors as if they we
re Shell's. This was also 
1416 Articles 5/6 UCA. 
1417 Poblete (2007) 100. 
1413 C . 
onversely, article 19.1 of the SUCA allows IPR right
-holders to seek restitution. The great 
advantage over tort is that culpa is immaterial: Fernandez-
Novoa (1997) 93ff. 
1419 Article 6 UCA. 
1420 Pefiailillo ( 1996) 83ff. 
1421 Bar/Drobnig (2004) 214-215. 
1422 K amperman ( 1997) 77. 
1423 l 3lhc· ·1c S . 1v1 ourt ant1ago, 24.4.2009, 5057-2007 (pending appeal). 
1424 A d f. d . . I 4 s e me m art1c e (a) UCA. 
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considered as deceptive conduct inducing consumers into error about the origin of 
h 1425 the products really boug t. 
Another dispute concerned the two major Chilean publishing houses of 
legal texts. Editorial Jurfdica de Chile, which has the legal monopoly on the 
preparation, edition and publication of the "Codes of the Republic of Chile", 
claimed the cessation, prohibition, removal of effects and damages against 
LexisNexis Chile. It alleged that the defendant had edited, marketed and 
commercialised under the name "Codes" diverse digests of laws which are merely 
private compilations, thereby inducing consumers into confusion as to the nature 
of the goods purchased and deviating the claimant's clientele to the defendant. 
The court dismissed the claim as the defendant's digests contained a legend 
informing readers their not being "Codes of the Republic" but private academic 
systematisations of different laws. The court also reasoned that consumers were 
well-informed about legal texts and that the word "Code" usually refers to 
ii"· 
systematisations of bodies of laws rather than "Codes of the Republic" which the 
defendant had anyhow not employed. 1426 The conduct at issue squares with the 
tort of passing-off. The case shows that preventive remedies can be more effective 
than compensation. 
4. Observations 
Tort law 'plays a limited function in deterring and punishing unfair competition as 
compared with alternative legal and extra-legal mechanisms. Tort actions provide 
compensation for individual harm flowing from unfair practices but other 
remedies better prevent these acts from happening. Although a general clause of 
unfair competition contained in a special statute (as the UCA) just formally differs 
from the delict rules enshrined in a civil code, 1427 such legislation can promote the 
enforcement of tort liability against reprehensible business conduct. Perhaps 
litigants and courts will use the general delict principles against unfair practices 
now that a special statute is telling them they can. 
1425 As sanctioned in article 4(b) UCA. 
1426 26thCiviJCourtSantiago, 15.6.2009, 3266-2008 (pending appeal) . 
1427 Kamperman (1997) 69. 
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Eventually, the control of tort liability through a mental element unlike 
simple fault can work even more appropriately here than in relation to antitrust 
conduct. First, as the UCA confirms it, unfair practices are intentional and 
abusive. Secondly, as private-law areas, unfair competition law and tort law 
protect the interests of individual competitors. Thirdly, only exceptionally unfair 
practices affect the public interest forming abuse of dominant position, in which 
case can be punished by the TDLC or the Supreme Court. Apart from this 
situation, however, unfair practices must be proved afresh before a civil court, so 
there is no basis for outcome-based strict liability. 
IV. Liability for interference with prospective or existing contracts 
This section argues that, if Chilean law is to enforce tort liability for interference 
with likely or actual contractual relationships as a specific instance of unfair 
competition, it should follow the more conservative English pattern. Rather than 
requiring the third party's knowledge or bad faith as in France, Chilean law ought 
to recognise liability for inducing breach of contract (subject to the defendant's 
intention to cause the breach) and liability for interfering with contractual 
performance without causing any breach (subject to the defendant's intention to 
harm the claimant or gross negligence). 
1. Introduction 
Chilean jurists have barely discussed liability for interfering with another's 
contract. 
1428 Using French sources, Alessandri championed tort liability for 
knowingly and culpably ·assisting (as accomplice) with the breach of another's 
contract, such as the person who purchases a real estate to stop competition from 
the claimant to whom that property had been leased previously. 14~9 
French courts hold tortiously liable the person who buys a property 
knowing that it had been offered in sale to the claimant whose contractual right 
must be respected by third parties as a social fact, especially if it is publicly 
1428 Alessandri apart, the main exceptions being: Lopez ( 1986) 262ff, ( 1998) 365; Gonzalez ( 1995) 
passim; Barros (2006) passim; Banfi (2007) passim. 
1429 Alessandri (1943) 62-63 . 
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registered. Liability hangs not on the defendant's intention to harm the claimant 
but on the defendant's bad faith. 1430 Accordingly, the defendant is not liable for 
interfering with another's exclusivity contract of which he lacked personal 
knowledge. 1431 Conversely, it has been declared liable the third party who 
knowingly collaborated with a seller in the breach of the latter's obligation not to 
compete with the promisee (buyer) however passive his role in the breach. 1432 Yet, 
the collusion between the defendant and the contract-breaker is not essential for 
they commit different wrongs. So, certain sellers were held severally and jointly 
liable to their buyers for breaking the (spatially and temporarily limited) non-
compete covenant, the court treating this act as unfair competition even though 
there was no complicity between the defendants. 1433 Indeed, it suffices that the 
defendant poses a material or juridical obstacle to performance. As Palmer 
suggests, a mental element more stringent than bad faith, such as the intention to 
cause )he breach of another's contract incorporated into inducement, can best 
balance the liberty to compete against the sanctity of contract. However, bad faith 
at least excludes liability for simple fault. 1434 In fact, as Whittaker indicates, 
commercial certainty would be undermined if outsiders were liable for carelessly 
failing to find out whether the contract-breaker had already contracted with the 
claimant so the subsequent agreement with the contract-breaker infringed the first 
covenant. 1435 
Spaaish law also restrains tortious liability for interference through the 
defendant's knowledge of the contract. To promote business stability and legal 
certainty third parties are presumed to act in good faith: they owe no duty to 
search for contracts alien to them. Liability can thus be imposed upon he who 
prevents performance or facilitates the breach of contract, for example, interfering 
with non-compete covenants or purchasing assets from the contract-breaker who 
had already sold them to the claimant. 1436 
1430 See: Lopez (1986) 262ff; Viney (1995) 367ff, 384; Bar/Drobnig (2004) 212-213 ; above 
n.1180, nn.1402ff and accompanying text. 
1431 Com, 3.10.1968, JCP.1969.II.15964, n.R.Prieur. The defendant's knowledge of the contract 
interfered with is sufficient to form unfair competition: Com, 21.3 .1989, Bull.civ.lV.No.97. 
1432 Com, 13.3.1979, D.1980.1, n.Y.Serra. 
1433 Com, 8.6.1993, Bull.civ.IV.No.228. 
1434 Palmer (1992) 323, 334-335 ; VanGerven/Lever/Larouche (2000) 237-238, 248. 
1435 Whittaker (2008a) 336, 367ff. There is no duty to investigate about third parties ' contracts: 
Leitch v. Leydon [1931] A.C. 90, HL. 
1436 Perez (2005) passim. 
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Chilean case-law is conspicuously missing. I can only mention a dispute 
where the defendant had promised to sell his real estate to the claimant (who paid 
the price beforehand) but finally sold it to third parties who knew this transaction 
implied the breach of the claimant's option. The claimant brought the acci6n 
pauliana1437 to annul the sale and cancel the registration of the property under the 
purchasers' name, alternatively alleging tort damages. The Supreme Court 
allowed the tort action: the defendant had acted unlawfully and negligently in 
knowingly depriving the claimant of the property for which the latter had paid in 
advance even though the claimant failed to show the defendant's dolo. 1438 
This suggests that the purchasers might have been liable if the claimant 
had established that they had carelessly and knowingly bought the real state from 
the defendant. So, Chilean courts are likely to base liability for contract 
interference in simple fault, denying it if the harm is unproven or remote. Yet, as 
Gonzalez proposed, in cases other than those involving the accomplices of 
breaches of contract, courts should, as in Anglo-American and German laws, 
demand the defendant's intention to harm the claimant or recklessness. 1439 
This seems a sound way of balancing the binding force of contract against 
competition freedom. However, Chilean courts should distinguish three different 
situations. First, in inducing breach of contract the defendant must have intended 
to cause the claimant's contract to be broken by the defaulting promiser. 
Secondly, in interference with contract performance without causing breach the 
defendant must have intentionally or grossly negligently injured the claimant. 
Thirdly, the accomplice in the breach of another's contract is jointly and severally 
liable if he intended to harm the claimant or acted with gross negligence. The 
different intention in inducement as compared with the last two cases flows from 
the causal link between the defendant ' s conduct and its effect: the inducer wishes 
and provokes the breach of contract; he who prevents performance seeks and 
causes the claimant's harm. But the different state of mind also implies that 
1431 Th' . . . d 1s action aims to rescm contracts concluded between a debtor and a third party to the 
creditor' s prejudice subject to proof of the claimant's damage and the debtor's and third party' s 
knowledge about the debtor's insolvency (article 2468 CHCC). Their contract cannot be opposed 
to the claimant. Under article 1167 of the Code Napoleon acci6n pauliana serves to declare the 
illegality of agreements designed to break prior contracts: Lauterpacht (1936) 526. See below 
n.1454. 
1438 CS, 26. 1.2000, RDJ/97 /l"/36. 
1439 Gonzalez ( l 995) passim. 
253 
contractual rights enjoy stronger protection than economic interests in business at 
large. 
2. Justifying tort protection of contractual rights 
Although contracts bind their parties exclusively, thus producing relative 
effects, 1440 they constitute a social fact to be respected by anyone who actually or 
presumably knows of them. These "absolute effects" are regulated by the law of 
delict. 1441 Likewise, personal rights (including contractual rights) are protected by 
the right of property recognised in the Constitution and in the CHCC. 1442 It is true 
that real rights (as property itself) 1443 confer upon holders an immediate and 
absolute power over assets, producing erga omnes effects, whereas personal rights 
can only be exercised against those who undertook the correlative obligation. 
Howe~ r, personal rights equally belong to a person's patrimony, so they can be 
transferred and encumbered. The creditor/promisee "owns" her contractual right 
because she is entitled to performance from the debtor/promiser excluding third 
parties, just like the owner of a corporeal thing excludes everybody else. 1444 Thus, 
the notion of "patrimony" sheds light on that obligations are assets within it and 
have value. 
In my view tort liability can reinforce the protection of contractual rights 
' as in America and France. Thus, Palmer suggests, American law safeguards the 
proprietary dimension of contractual rights through the Lumley and interference 
torts, thus filling the gap left by privity of contract. French courts have developed 
the tort of interference to protect the rights (personal or real) created or transferred 
by contract as they form part of a person's patrimony and must not be invaded by 
1440 
'Personal rights or credits are those which can only be claimed from certain persons who, by 
their own deed or the sole mandate of the law, have assumed the correlative obligations' (article 
578 CHCC); 'Every contract legally concluded is a law for the contracting parties and cannot be 
voided but by their mutual consent or for legal causes' (article 1545 CHCC). The latter rule, which 
encloses pacta sunt servanda, is traditionally grounded on private autonomy, following 
Aristotelian corrective justice and Kant ' s idea of reciprocity, i.e., individuals being empowered to 
govern and enforce their relations through the law: Lira (1944) 260ff, (1956) 71; Tapia (2005) 
21 lff. Cf: Pizarro (2004) passim (arguing that article 1545 CHCC is non-partisan, thus compelling 
contracting parties to honour their promises without expressing why). Yet, I do believe in the 
ethical root of private autonomy, appreciable in Domat's work, which directly influenced article 
1134 Code Napoleon, the immediate background of article 1545 CHCC. 
1441 Lopez (1998) 366. 
1442 Article 19/No.24 CHC; articles 565ff/578/583/1437 CHCC. See: Claro (1979) 327. 
1443 Article 582 CHCC. 
1444 Guzman (1995) 141, 145; Jana/Marin (1996) 29ff; Pefiailillo (2006) 21ff. 
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those who know about them. By allowing creditors to recover damages from third 
parties both jurisdictions shield the security in transactions and diminish the risk 
of debtors' insolvency. However, American law limits full compensation to 
Lumley and interference torts whereas compensation in contract is confined to 
foreseeable harm. Thus, promisees have stronger incentive to sue inducers than 
defaulting promisers. Additionally, the disparate measure of damages between 
tort and contract can undermine efficient breach. Conversely, French law offers 
full compensation for deliberate (or grossly negligent) breach of contract and in 
delict, and the third party and the contract-breaker can be held joint tortfeasors. 1445 
Spanish courts also hold the contract-breaker and the accomplice as jointly 
and severally liable even without a rule on solidarity as article 2317 CHCC. 1446 A 
classic case, remarkably similar to Lumley, involved an opera-singer who, after 
breaking an exclusivity covenant with the claimant, agreed to sing for the 
defendant. The latter was aware that this contract put her in breach of the former 
covenant, thereby injuring the claimant. The Tribunal Supremo declared void the 
second contract, forcing the contract-breaker and the defendant to pay 
damages. 1447 French and Spanish regimes show that tort law can help to preserve 
contractual rights making contract-breakers and third parties, typically buyers 
under subsequent sales agreements, liable for conspiring to injure the claimant. .1448 
In Chile, the promisee can sue for breach the defaulting promiser and in 
tort the accomplice. Although technically they are not joint tortfeasors but commit 
separate wrongs, in practice each must answer for all the harm caused to the 
claimant without leaving the latter unjustly enriched. 1449 Even so, promisees have 
not brought tort claims against the accomplices in the breach of their contracts. In 
a recent case, the defencl.ant had unilaterally terminated a construction contract 
preventing the builder/claimant from continuing the works by entrusting them to a 
third party who knew of that agreement. The claimant sought the termination of 
the contract and damages for deliberate breach. The action was rejected: he failed 
to prove the defendant's intention to harm. 1450 As Pizarro noted, a tort claim 
against the accomplice might have succeeded. Moreover, tort can supplement 
1445 p I . a mer (1992) passim. · 
1446 STS, 14.10.1997, RJ/7464; Yzquierdo (2001) 94; Vidal (2006) passim. 
1447 STS, 23.3 .1921 , Col.Leg.No.90, in: Perez (2005) 323ff. 
1448 Palmer ( 1992) 325ff; Perez (2005) passim. 
1449 Barros (2006) 425-426. 
145
° CS/6:5 .2004/LegaIPublishing/27568. 
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b ak . . I t 1451 contractual remedies, particularly if the contract- re er 1s mso ven. 
Additionally, the claimant could have taken advantage of the fact that courts 
award tort compensation for all direct (including unforeseeable) losses even if the 
defendant acted with simple fault as opposed to intention or gross negligence. 
Nevertheless, tort law is not indispensable to protect contractual rights from third 
parties' interference. 
3. Protecting contractual rights 
·, 
1452 Ch'l . t I Leaving aside criminal actions and recurso de protecczon, 1 ean pnva e aw 
offers a range of remedies to safeguard contractual rights, for instance, 
reivindicatio, 1453 actions to rescind contracts with restitutionary effect or acci6n 
pauliana. 1454 Likewise, publicly registered contracts, such as tenancy or sales 
agreements and options to purchase real estates, are deemed known by and 
opposable to third parties. Thus, the claimant/first buyer's right is protected by 
preventing the third party/second purchaser from acquiring the good from the 
contract-breaker or by obliging the third party to make restitution of the assets 
. . . 11455 
acquired in breach of the former contract. Tort action 1s not essentla . 
Further, if the defaulting promisor concludes a contract with a third party 
which is inconsistent with her previous agreement with the promisee, the latter 
can clai~ (as in France) the nullity of the second covenant for illicit object/cause 
145 1 Pizarro: (2005) passim, (2007) 559. 
1452 Recurso de protecci6n has proved useful to protect promisees' contractual rights agai~st illegal 
and/or arbitrary acts of promisors or third parties whereby these rights are threatened or mterfered 
and to prevent pro mi sees from taking justice on their own hands. Yet, it is in ordinary ( c~ntractual 
or tort) proceedings where the substantial issues, including the interpretation of such nghts, are 
discussed: Jana/Marfn (1996) 19ff; Orttizar (2003) 206ff; Tapia (2005) 363ff; Barros (2006) 249-
250. 
1453 Yet, whether credits can be possessed is all dubious. 
1454 See: Peiiailillo (2006) 51 lff, 522-523; above n.1437. 
1455 If a person sells the same thing to different persons through separate contracts, the purchaser 
who commenced (or first started) to possess that good or who had the older title is given priority 
(article 1817 CHCC). Sale contracts entitle purchasers to acquire the asset but property is 
transferred through traditio (the actual or symbolical delivery of the moveable asset or the 
registration of the real estate in the corresponding Registry of Property). Sales agree~en_ts 
concerning things not owned by sellers are valid but their owners can recover such goods w1thm 
the limitation period (article 1815 CHCC); CS, 11.4.2007, 1236-2005/LegalPublishing/36308; 
Alessandri ([1917]/2003) 1/19, II/passim; Peiiailillo (2006) 122. The purchaser of a good must 
respect the tenancy agreement encumbering the asset if the tenancy was formalised by public d~ed 
(and it must be registered in the Registry of Commerce to be opposable to mortgagees): article 
1962 CHCC. 
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(prohibited by the law or contrary to good commercial customs). 1456 English law 
achieves similar results through other means: injunctions preventing the breach of 
the first contract, actions for damages against contract-breakers and tort claims 
against inducers. 1457 
Ultimately, contracting parties should in principle overcome their 
vicissitudes through contractual remedies, the first and most obvious way of 
defending their rights. In Chile, promisees can, inter alia, request precautionary 
· 1458 'f' & measures m urgent cases, spec1 1c per1ormance and damage for breach. 
Theoretically, as in France, specific performance is the paramount remedy without 
requiring the defendant's fault, which is anyhow presumed from the breach, 1459 
save for obligations of means. Specific performance is available as of right for the 
breach of bilateral contracts alongside compensation for damages; 1460 vis-a-vis 
obligations to do and not to do; and whenever the debtor possesses the thing owed 
to the claimant. Defaulting promisors can be forced by courts to perform or allow 
a third party to fulfil at their expense. 146 1 Nevertheless, in practice (as in France) 
specific performance is rarely granted as opposed to damages. This leaves room 
for the efficient-breach. 
4. Limiting liability 
Tort liability is to supplement the contractual gaps, deterring outsiders from 
inducing or participating in the breach of contracts alien to them. A moderate tort 
can be useful if promisors are insolvent and/or promisees averse to the risk of 
revealing confidential information or deteriorating their contractual relationships. 
Consequently, C~ile should follow the English rather than the French 
paradigm. Liability for knowingly interfering with another's contract seems 
excessively broad as opposed to inducing breach of contract which demands the 
defendant's intention to cause the breach. This is now backed by article 4(f) of the 
DCA: the defendant must "seek" to persuade a contracting party into breaking her 
obligations towards the defendant's competitor. Moreover, as Barros indicates, 
1456 Articles 1461/1467 CHCC. 
1457 Lauterpacht (1936) 525-526. 
1458 Articles 290ff CPC. 
1459 Ar . l 
tic e 1547 CHCC; Barros (2006) 986-987, (2008a) 412; Pizarro (2008) 398-399. 1460 Article 1489 CHCC. 
1461 
Articles 1553/1555 CHCC; articles 438/543 CPC. 
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confining liability to inducing breach of contract is consistent with the fact that 
contracts bind their parties exclusively and with competition freedom. It is for 
courts and jurists, he says, to refine the criteria whereby distinguishing fair from 
unfair competition. For instance, interfering with non-compete covenants should 
exceptionally trigger liability; interfering with contracts protecting IPRs 1462 is 
more clearly wrongful if the defendant sought to profit from exclusive 
information for which the claimant paid high sums. 1463 
So, there is need for differentiating which fact-situations involve wrongful 
behaviour. Not every contract interfered with justifies the imposition of liability. 
The contract can be illegal (for example, anticompetitive) or unstable. 1464 To take 
an example, case-law declared the employee liable for seriously breaking her 
employment contract by constituting a commercial company to compete against 
the employer's firm in the same market. 1465 Surely, the third party who induced 
the employee to break the (lawful) non-compete clause could have been held 
tortiously liable to the employer. 
5. Assessing liability for preventing the formation of contracts 
Although Chilean case-law has not overtly discarded liability for impeding 
prospective agreements from being made, a negative response can be inferred 
from the _courts' disinclination to assert pre-contractual liability which is governed 
by tort rules. 1466 Courts are reluctant to hold liable the negotiating party who 
suddenly withdraws from preliminary dealings, thereby injuring the other party 
who expected the projected contract to be concluded. So, it seems even less likely 
that the third party who caused the break-off of negotiations could be tortiously 
liable. 
In Chile, as in various legal systems, contracts come into existence when 
1467 C 1 h . . . f 1 offer and acceptance meet. onsequent y, t e negotiatmg parties can ree y 
1462 IPRs confer a monopoly over intangible goods and a privilege to undertake certain economic 
activity with exclusivity, although free competition can sometimes prevail: Ruiz-Tagle (2001) 
264ff, 328. 
1463 Barros (2006) 995ff. 
1464 As the employment contracts which are terminable at the employee's request by giving 30-
days notice to the employer: article 159(2), Chilean Labour Code. 
1465 CS, 12.6.2003, 1436-2003/LegalPublishing/26435. 
1466 As in France and Spain: Cartwright/Hesselink (2008) 458. 
1467 Articles 97ff, Chilean Commercial Code; CA.Temuco, 5.8.1935, RDJ/34/2"/28. 
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discuss the terms of the envisaged agreement and, as part of the strategy to obtain 
advantages from one another, unilaterally retreat from preliminary dealings. 1468 
Unless the negotiating parties enter into a promise to conclude another contract1469 
they are not bound with each other. 1470 However, the right to break-off 
negotiations can neither be abused nor violate the duty to behave in good faith. 147 1 
Legal scholars concur that this duty applies to the pre-contractual stage: 
negotiating parties must neither contradict their past conduct (which created in the 
other party a reasonable degree of confidence that the contract would be 
concluded) nor withdraw from dealings merely to take advantage of parallel 
negotiations with third parties. In these cases, it is claimed, the defaulting 
negotiating party ought to be tortiously liable if her fault directly harmed the 
claimant who may nonetheless strip the defendant of his illicit gains without 
proving fault. 1472 
In a recent judgment, the defendant was held liable for having acted in bad 
faith by unilaterally and culpably retreating from dealings, thereby injuring the 
claimant who had incurred expenses oriented to the prospective contract. 1473 yet, 
the leading case-law considered that the defendant in good faith exercises her 
right not to contract if she desists from signing the public deed necessary for 
perfecting a sales agreement concerning a real estate (a solemn contract) . . Not 
having the parties concluded any (written) promise to sale but merely verbally 
consented to contract, the defendant cannot be said to have caused the claimant's 
harm (the expenses incurred in the expectation of concluding the proposed 
) 1474 In th agreement . ano er case, the defendant had agreed to sell her real estate to 
the claimant who paid the price ahead and heavily invested in the property. The 
defendant later refused . to sign the public deed, thus preventing the asset from 
being transferred to the claimant. On appeal the defendant was held tortiousl y 
liable for abusing her right to break-off preliminary negotiations even though the 
1468 Alessandri (1940) 156; Leon (1979) 45; Lopez (1998) 261. 
1469 
Promises to conclude another contract must be in writing and comply with other formal 
re~uirements: article 1554 CHCC. 
147 CS, 27.3.1946, RDJ/43/ 1 "/399. 
1471 
'Contracts shall be performed in good faith, thereby binding not only to what is expressed in 
them, but to all things which precisely emanate from the nature of the obligation or that by law or 
custom belong to it' (article 1546 CHCC). 
1472 
Rosende (1979) 59-60, 73ff; Domfnguez/Domfnguez/Domfnguez (l 996) passim; Lopez (l 998) 
l9ff; Barros (1999) passim; Zuloaga (2008) 177-178. 
1473 CA.PMontt, 15.7.2008, 58-2008. 
1474 
CA.Santiago, 25.8.1948, RDJ/46/2"/48, a decision followed in CS, 4.11.1964, RDJ/61/1•/373. 
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claimant had pleaded damages for breach of contract. 1475 The Supreme Court 
quashed this finding for ultra petita: the claimant failed to show any contract with 
the defendant, so he could not be awarded damages for breach of contract; and no 
tort action had been brought. 1476 It is objected that the defendant did act in bad 
f . h "f 1· . 1 1477 a1t , 1 not ma 1c1ous y. 
In an extraordinary case, two corporations held protracted negotiations to 
conclude a sales agreement regarding several forest lands in the South of Chile, 
thus exchanging property titles, relevant studies, drafts of the contract of promise 
to sale and powers of attorney. The very day agreed for signing the contract of 
promise the defendants informed the claimant they had sold the properties to a 
third party who paid a higher sum than the price offered by the claimant. The 
defendants were found liable for suddenly retreating from negotiations, thereby 
abusing their right, as they failed to communicate opportune! y the claimant about 
their parallel dealings with the third party. The claimant was awarded the 
r· 
1478 1 d . d d . b . th expenses incurred. Commentators sa ute the JU gment an its as1s : e 
defendants abused their right not to contract acting in bad faith. 1479 Liability was 
subsequently imposed for the abrupt and unjustified breaking-off of preliminary 
negotiations which harmed the claimant. 1480 Similarly, French case-law declares 
tortiously liable those who abruptly and without legitimate reason retreat from 
lengthy negotiations. This conduct entails the abuse of the right not to contract 
and contradicts the loyalty or good faith which must be observed when 
• 
negotiati~g a contract. The right to withdraw from preliminary dealings forms part 
of the liberty to compete, so it must be exercised abusively to be deemed tortious, 
albeit without need to show the defendant's intention to harm the claimant. 148 1 
Yet, some perceive ambiguity in the use of the abstract notion of abuse of 
rights without specifying what actually renders the exercise of the right not to 
contract abusive and culpable. 1482 Additionally, compensation is limited to 
damnum emergens. The law provides that the party who withdraws her offer 
1475 CA.Talca, 8.11.1999, GJ/257/63. 
1476 CS, 22.11.200 l , GJ/257 /70. 
1477 Zuloaga (2008) 186ff. 
1478 CA.Concepcion, 5.6.1996, 374-93 . 
1479 Dominguez/ Dominguez/ Dominguez (l 996) passim. 
148° CA.Concepcion, 30.6.1999, 1530-96. 
148 1 Com, 7.1.1 997 & 22.4.1997, D. 1998.45, n.P.Chauvel; (1997) RTDCiv 651. See: Dominguez 
(1 998) 187-188. 
1482 Celedon/Silberman (2004) 125ff, 141-142. 
260 
before being accepted by the addressee must pay the latter's expenses. 1483 The 
profits that the disappointed party expected to obtain from the prospective 
contract are implicitly excluded by reason of being hypothetical and for the 
offeror has the right to revoke offers not yet accepted. 1484 It is nevertheless missed 
the compensation for the opportunity costs incurred by claimants as a result of 
discarding better dealings. 1485 Conversely, French courts not only award 
compensation for the costs incurred during the negotiations but are also prepared 
to award the loss of chance and the profits which the claimant could likely have 
obtained from the frustrated contract ( or from the contract broken by the 
defendant's fault). 1486 
The denial of pre-contractual liability in Chile somehow mirrors the 
English general rejection of liability for even malicious breaking-off of 
negotiations (leaving apart deceit, negligent misstatements, contract breach, unjust 
emichment and breach of confidence) which entails pure economic loss. The 
common law recognises the freedom not to contract and questions the principle of 
good faith in view of the antagonism and the uncertainties inherent to the 
bargaining process.1487 This position seems coherent with the fact that the exercise 
of the right to break-off negotiations cannot be unlawful however evil its 
underlying motive. 1488 But since Chilean law acknowledges the abuse of rights 
one would expect a more generous use of tort liability, as in Germany where 
negotiating parties can be tortiously liable for intentionally and immorally 
harming the other party (§826 BGB). An additional problem is the employment of 
abstract concepts as the abuse of rights and good faith without identifying the 
underlying fact-situations. 
If Chilean courts continue rejecting liability between negotiating parties it 
appears logical that they refused making third parties liable for preventing 
contracts from being concluded. Conversely, the enhancement of pre-contractual 
liability through the application of the principle of good faith -and the abuse of 
rights might foster the bringing of tort suits against those who provoke 
1483 Article 100, Chilean Commercial Code. 
1484 
Article 99, Chjlean Commercial Code; Leon (1979) 78; Dominguez/Dominguez/Dominguez 
(l 996) l 79ff; Zuloaga (2008) 223ff. 
1485 Varela (1966) 15. 
1486 E . . 
.g., Com, 2.11.1 993, Bull.c1v.IV.No.380, JCP.1994.1.3773, obs G Vmey 1487 · . . . 
Walford v. Miles [1 992] 2 A.C. 128, HL, 138, Lord Ackner. 
1488 
Cartwright (2007) 66ff; Whittaker (2008b) 87, 91 -92; Cartwright/Hesselink (2008) 45Iff. 
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negotiations to fail. But surely the abuse of rights rooting liability for interference 
with prospective contracts would be based on the defendant's intention to harm 
the claimant or gross negligence. 
6. Observations 
Interference with future or existing contracts can amount to unfair competition 
triggering tortious liability. Although Chilean case-law is virtually non-existent, 
courts should follow the English model in order to weigh the third parties' 
freedom to compete against the claimants' contractual (quasi-proprietary) rights 
or economic expectations in prospective contractual relationships. Thus, tortious 
liability should be reduced to inducing breach of contract (requiring the 
defendant's intention to cause the breach) and to interference with the formation 
or performance of a contract without causing breach (subjected to the defendant's 
intention to harm the claimant or gross negligence since no contractual right at all 
is violated). This signals that contract rights have priority over mere economic 
expectations. A mental element isolates abusive conduct from legitimate 
competition and excludes tortious liability founded on simple fault or bad faith 
(knowledge) which might lead to excesses as well illustrated by French and 
American laws. Eventually, the protection of contractual rights is far from being 
monopoliseo by tort law. Indeed the paucity of Chilean tort actions against 
accomplices in the breach of another's contract indirectly reflects that litigants 
rely on contractual remedies. The principle of pacta sunt servanda and its 
corollary, res inter alios acta, may have much to do with this state of affairs. 
v. Conclusions 
Chilean law safeguards paramount, and often conflicting, values as competition 
freedom, property and contract. I have argued that Chilean courts should attempt 
to balance the competitor's right to be compensated for financial losses arising 
from business rivalry against the wrongdoer's competition freedom. Merely 
suffering harm is insufficient to be deemed a "victim" entitled to recover 
damages. Commercial competition justifies the infliction of harm, even 
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negligently, while intentionally (or grossly negligently) caused economic harm 
reveals abusive and wrongful behaviour beyond allowable competition. 
I showed that, in relation to unfair practices, the principle of culpa ought to 
be qualified through the said mental element to become compatible with freedom 
to compete, as confirmed by the UCA. In particular, I argued that the defendant's 
bad faith along with intention to harm the claimant or to procure the breach of 
another's contract is a sound control device vis-a-vis interference with business 
interests at large or contracts specifically. In tum, negligently or knowingly 
interfering with another's existing or prospective agreement is within legitimate 
competition. 
More contentiously, I have argued that tort liability for anticompetitive 
conduct conclusively declared by the competition authority should be interpreted 
as based on intentional conduct but triggering outcome-based strict liability. The 
fact that article 30 CHCA does not demand proof of the defendant's intention to 
harm the claimant ( or gross negligence) is not an indication and could not mean 
that this regime of liability is rooted in presumed fault, let alone in bare causation 
of harm. Competitors owe no duty of care to one another. And suffering harm, 
even due to another's negligence, is intrinsic to legitimate rivalry. The true reason, 
I think, is that tort actions supplement the public enforcement of competition_ law 
by offering individual competitors compensation for damages without need of 
proving antitrust conduct and the mental element. There is an incentive for 
competitors to bring tort claims once the competition authority conclusively stated 
antitrust conduct. Likewise, claimants are heavily burdened with proof of 
individual harm and causation, so if they had additionally to give evidence of the 
defendant's mental element follow-on actions would be no longer attractive. 
Moreover, although the purpose or effect of antitrust conduct is to harm the 
market, consumers and competitors at large, once the claimant proves that such 
conduct specifically affected her interest it is reasonable · to presume the 
defendant's intention to harm the concrete claimant from the antitrust conduct. 
Indeed, as the still modest Chilean case-law illustrates, the intention to harm the 
particular claimant can more clearly be surmised from predatory pricing which 
typically targets identifiable competitors. Although the practical result may not 
differ from understanding that antitrust tort liability revolves around the 
defendant's fault inferred from antitrust conduct or from conceiving of it as strict 
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liability, I think this argument ignores that carelessly caused economic harm is a 
side-effect of legitimate competition and that applying culpa without any 
qualifications undermines freedom to compete and poses the risk of endless 
liability. 
Finally, I have demonstrated that anticompetitive behaviour and delict 
differ in their mental elements and damage, thus reflecting the contrast between 
(public) competition law and (private) tort law. Conversely, unfair practices and 
torts involve similar kinds of intention and harm since both fall in the private-law 
sphere. Yet, whereas tort compensation is the greatest private-law remedy for 
antitrust harm, thus supplementing the public enforcement of competition law, 
unfair practices are mainly remedied through preventive actions. All the same, tort 
law fulfils a circumscribed role both in antitrust and unfair conduct. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis has evaluated the role played by tort liability in business competition. 
It has focused on the methods and criteria whereby English tort law tackles this 
phenomenon, endeavouring to draw useful lessons for the future judicial and 
academic development of this still incipient field in Chile. It has argued that in 
both jurisdictions tort law is made by courts in response to specific problems. In 
particular, it has claimed that if the law of delict is to regulate business 
competition consistently with the liberty to compete the broad principle of culpa 
should be qualified through the demand of a mental element rather than simple 
fault. This intentional component should not be uniform but reflect the different 
sorts of fact-situations out of which competitors harm each other. The thesis has 
taken the English economic torts as an example of a sound manner of tackling this 
problem-area. 
The thesis fundamentally proposes that tort liability for business 
misconduct ought to express a compromise arrangement between victims' 
proprietary, contractual and economic interests and wrongdoers' freedom to 
compete. It shows that accidentally or intentionally defeating the expectations of 
adversaries is a normal and foreseeable side-effect of lawful competition. It claims 
that the regulation of competition is essentially a matter for regulatory legislation, 
in respect of which tort law should perform a modest function. It argues for 
treating wide-ranging tort liability regimes with scepticism. Neither simple 
negligence nor strict liability is adequate to regulate the conflicting interests of 
commercial competitors who harm each other. Rather, tort liability must be 
moderated in a way that reflects the gist of competition, namely, as the English 
economic torts illustrate, through intention and wrongfulness. 
The thesis suggested that the principle of liability for carelessly or 
intentionally inflicted damage (neminem laedere), which informs the Chilean law 
of delict, should be tempered in commercial competition through the defendant's 
intention to injure the claimant or to cause another person to break her contractual 
obligations to the claimant. At the very least, the defendant should bring about 
these effects through gross negligence, to which Chilean law ascribes the same 
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effects as those stemming from intention. This mental element is implicit in 
abusive conduct beyond allowable competition, which Chilean courts often 
identify with deliberately inflicted harm. Under Chilean (and French) tort law 
wrongful means are not independent of culpa which consists of the infringement 
of the general duty encapsulated in neminem laedere or of a specific statutory 
duty. Accordingly, a state of mind is the device at hand to limit liability 
congruently with the liberty to compete enshrined in the Constitution. Thus, the 
thesis disapproved of liability for simple fault even if courts eventually dismiss 
compensation for lack of causation and/or for uncertainty of damage. This 
technique may work as regards economic harm flowing from physical damage 
suffered by a person other than the claimant, yet it is inappropriate for tackling 
harm between competitors because it erroneously assumes that they would owe a 
duty not to carelessly harm one another. Negligently and/or knowingly injuring 
rivals '\s an unavoidable and foreseeable side-effect of legitimate commercial 
battle which should not trigger liability. 
In 1997 Howarth argued for substituting negligence for the intentional 
torts, stressing that liability ultimately hinges on wrongfulness as the law does not 
mirror morality. A year later, Weir implied that English courts could recognise 
duties of care between competitors and the tort of negligence might displace 
intentional torts such as malicious falsehood. Nonetheless, subsequent case-law, 
• 
notably OBG, confirmed the centrality of intention as a constraint on tort liability 
involving traders. This case-law defined intention in terms altogether analogous to 
morally objectionable conduct, that is, an effect pursued as an end or as means to 
another end. Additionally, it is noteworthy that the difficulty to prove intention 
serves to keep liability confined. Moreover, Law and Economics regards the 
intentionally inflicted harm as an irrational form of competition, thus supporting 
the existence of intentional torts such as those studied in this thesis. In sum, the 
economic torts remain a distinct and valuable part of the spectrum of tort liability. 
The main results arrived through the separate assessment of English and 
Chilean laws can now be recapitulated and contrasted. 
1. English law denies a general principle of tort liability for intentionally or 
carelessly inflicted economic loss. It acknowledges compartmentalised causes of 
action which require a certain intention and generally wrongful means. 
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English courts have approached commercial competition and labour 
competition from substantially different stances. In particular, the Appellate 
Committee of the House of Lords fulfilled a legislative role as regards labour 
competition, enforcing the economic torts against workers and trade unions. This 
development has constantly been counteracted through statutory immunities. 
However, the modem economic torts largely owe their inconsistencies to the 
political pressures which heavily influenced the leading cases. The Allen case 
required wrongful means, thereby extending the Mogul decision concerning 
business to labour competition. Yet, the importance of politics makes it plausible 
to speculate that, even if their Lordships would have chosen the prima facie tort 
theory instead of wrongful means, the claimants would have not succeeded in any 
event. However, the impact of politics is much clearer in the Quinn judgment 
which created the purely intentional tort of simple conspiracy. 
Nevertheless, the thesis concentrated on commercial competition which 
English courts have consistently refrained from constraining since the very early 
Mogul case. Policy and practical reasons have persuaded judges into restricting 
liability to extreme and wrongful conduct, thus leaving to Parliament the 
regulation of commercial strife. Courts have rejected the prima facie tort theory, 
the abuse of rights and a generic unfair competition tort. Courts substitute the tort 
of unlawful means conspiracy for simple conspiracy which is complex to prove 
and easy to justify. They also refuse to impose liability upon third parties for 
preventing the conclusion of future contracts or for interfering with existing 
contracts even where there is no breach or use of wrongful means. English law 
only recognises specific torts whose salient features are intention and above all 
wrongfulness, giving rise to the infringement of the claimant's proprietary, 
contractual or economic interests. Indeed, even the champions of the prima facie 
tort as a means of legal coherence valued wrongful means as a practical 
instrument to control liability, thus avoiding investigating the defendant's motives 
around which justifications revolve. 
Conversely, Chilean (and French) law accepts the abuse-of-rights doctrine 
which is virtually identified with the deliberate infliction of harm. The abuse of 
rights shapes wrongful conduct which negates the justification of damage arising 
from the exercise of a right. Indeed, competitors are entitled to harm each other 
except when they abuse the liberty to compete by acting with intention or gross 
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negligence. Likewise, the fact that wrongfulness is subsumed into culpa is 
relatively immaterial: English, French and Chilean courts must always weigh 
litigants' clashing interests against each other. Therefore, the formal difference 
between the wrongfulness requirement and the abuse of rights ( or the prima facie 
tort) need not yield distinct results. 
2. However, the economic torts are technically inconsistent despite of the 
scholarly -efforts to systematise them. First, the mental element is ambiguous. It 
may mean the intention to harm the claimant (in three-party unlawful-
interference), the intention to procure the breach of contract (in Lumley) or simply 
deliberate conduct (in passing-off). Secondly, the scope of wrongfulness 
fluctuates from tort to tort. It can involve the violation of a proprietary interest in 
goodwill, contractual rights or mere economic expectations in business (the same 
,,._ 
examples applying, inversely). Further, only in the three-party unlawful-
interference tort the wrongful means used by the defendant against a third party, 
thereby harming the claimant, must be independently actionable by the third party 
if she was injured. Likewise, there are contrasting judicial interpretations about 
the ambit of wrongful means in the latter tort, thus disclosing different views on 
the role that the unlawful-interference tort should accomplish in business 
competition. Moreover, it remains debatable whether the critical control device in 
• 
three-party unlawful-interference tort should be a tightly defined intention 
(targeting at harming the claimant as an end) or strictly conceptualised wrongful 
means alongside a wider mental element. The first method excludes the damage 
intended as a means, which can effortlessly be confused with foreseeable and 
inevitable side-effects. Still, too narrow an intention (malice) can overly restrict 
liability: it is hard to prove but easily rebuttable if the defendant injured the 
claimant as a means to another end, normally to advance self-interest. The second 
technique seems preferable because it extends the notion of intention to the results 
sought instrumentally. But it is no solution to the subtleties between intentionally 
caused harm and unintended harm which is a by-product of legitimate 
competition. 
Furthermore, English tort law protects economic interests unevenly. 
Corporeal property is accorded the strongest protection through the torts of 
negligence, subject to proof of damage, and trespass, which (together with 
268 
injunctions) vindicates that right even though the claimant is unharmed. Intangible 
property in goodwill is shielded through passing-off (and accompanying 
injunctive relief), entailing outcome-based strict liability. But non-proprietary 
interests are protected only from third parties' intentional interference, thereby 
making it explicit the lower rank of these rights. Contractual interests are 
defended through the Lumley-tort provided that the inducer intended to cause the 
breach of contract, as an end or as a means to another end. Economic interests in 
business/trade are protected through the three-party unlawful-interference tort 
inasmuch as the defendant intended to harm and did injure the claimant by using 
wrongful means against a third party independently actionable by the latter unless 
she was not injured. 
The pre-eminence of contractual rights over other economic interests in 
business is mirrored in the intentional element and in the width of justifications. 
Proving the intention to cause the breach is easier than showing the intention to 
harm. Likewise, inducing breach of contract is justified to the limited extent that 
the contract affected is illegal or immoral, whereas interference with opponents' 
expectations is generally within legitimate competition. Yet, the different type of 
intention also signals the causal link between the defendant's conduct and its 
effect. Thus, to subject the tort at issue to a different mental element might leave 
the interests at stake unprotected, as if for instance Lumley was further limited 
through requiring the inducer's intention to injure the claimant. Moreover, OBG 
dissociated Lumley from the unlawful-interference tort. Thus, it is improbable that 
both torts will be reunited. Rather, case-law is likely to continue protecting 
property in goodwill more intensely than contractual rights and the latter more 
strongly than pure economic interests. 
3. A cogent explanation for the lesser protection of pure economic interests is that 
the claimant's loss (damnum) does not usually flow from· the defendant's 
wrongful conduct (iniuria) because no proprietary or contractual right of the 
claimant has been violated. This fact questions liability for negligently .caused 
pure economic loss though · it also undermines the three-party unlawful-
interference tort because the only right infringed belongs to a third party rather 
than to the claimant. My argument is that proprietary and contractual rights have 
already been acquired or incorporated into the right-holder's wealth (or 
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"patrimony"). These rights confer upon holders a sphere of exclusivity 
(monopoly) to the exclusion of third parties. Conversely, pure economic interests 
in trade are mere expectations unrelated to a tangible or incorporeal good owned 
by the claimant. Wrongful conduct is patent in the infringement of proprietary or 
contractual rights while it is indefinite in the violation of pure economic interests. 
Hence the imposition of liability under three-party unlawful-interference tort 
hinges on balancing the liberties to compete of claimants and defendants against 
each other. The defendant is liable if he abused his freedom to compete through 
using unlawful means against a third party, intending to injure and causing harm 
to the claimant. 
Nevertheless, I see no conclusive reason justifying this imbalanced 
protection of economic interests. Although pure economic interests do not lie in 
any concrete asset but form mere expectations, they become a real and identifiable 
loss si'.iJfered by the claimant and for which she deserves to be compensated. 
Furthermore, although passing-off and Lumley attack proprietary and contractual 
rights respectively, both torts cause pure economic loss to the victims, just as in 
unlawful-interference. In all these situations the claimant is deprived of a future 
economic advantage which would have reasonably been obtained had the tort not 
been committed. Thus, in order to place the economic interests on a level playing 
field, these three torts should require proof of the corresponding intention: to 
• 
cause the breach of contract (Lumley) or to harm the claimant (in unll;lwful-
interference tort and in passing-off). This might relatively attenuate the 
inconsistency within the economic torts. 
4. All the same, English courts have consistently limited liability to the economic 
harm flowing from wrongful and intentional behaviour. Additionally, the courts' 
traditional reluctance to control business competition will surely affect the 
enforcement of the statutory competition torts regardless of their structural and 
functional differences vis-a-vis the economic torts. The lesson for Chile is the 
moderate ambition of tort law in the commercial arena. To impose liability, the 
claimant's economic interests (in property, contract or trade) must outweigh the 
defendant ' s liberty to compete. Only an intention-based liability fits in this 
scheme. Indeed, one major policy reason advanced in Anglo-American law 
against compensation for carelessly occasioned pure economic loss is the fear of 
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liability becoming unmanageable. Policy argument, a diffuse though effective tool 
to oust simple fault as ground of liability, is explicit in English court decisions but 
concealed behind the notions of fault, causation and harm in French and Chilean 
case-law. Chilean courts should publicly state the policy arguments for restricting 
tort liability in commercial competition through a mental element stricter than 
ordinary negligence. 
Tort law plays a limited function in commercial competition. Tort is not 
designed to circumvent privity of contract. Contracting parties are expected to 
take the initiative and tackle non-compliance through contractual remedies. Thus, 
in England the promisee cannot sue her promisor, who threatened to break the 
agreement, for the tort of intimidation. Similarly, in Chile (and France) the non-
cumul rule prevents promisees from claiming in tort damages flowed from the 
breach of their contract. 
English law confines tort liability for interference with contract and 
business to Lumley and the unlawful-interference tort. Specifically, Lumley is 
limited in several ways. The inducer must knowingly and intentionally cause the 
breach of contract by the promisor to the promisee's prejudice. But the contract 
must be licit and stable. Thus, inducing the breach of an anticompetitive or 
terminable at-will contract is not actionable. The breach should also be serious. 
Finally, Lumley fits only in agreements concerning exclusive goods or services 
which contain negative covenants, such as the obligation not to compete. 
Moreover, the defendant's mere knowledge (bad faith) of the contract or 
business relationship interfered with is unable to constrain liability congruently 
with competition freedom: it is required that the defendant intends to procure the 
breach or to harm the -claimant. Although there cannot be intention without 
knowledge (the defendant's honest belief in not causing breach of contract 
excludes liability) and although knowledge is the first eviqence from which 
intention can be inferred, both are separate concepts. Commercial competitors 
cannot assume liability for interfering with their rivals' contracts or economic 
interests merely because they foresaw doing so as a possible, probable or 
inevitable consequence of their activity. If the harm done to competitors is a side-
effect of competition, and thus is unnecessary for attaining another goal such as 
furthering self-interest, the defendant should not be liable. In order to enforce 
liability without undermining freedom to compete the defendant ought to intend to 
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procure the breach or to injure the claimant, as an end or as a means to another 
end. Yet, I think that the defendant's reckless indifference as to either 
consequence, if this consequence is certain to happen, can be equated to the 
intention to cause such result in order to achieve a further aim: deliberately 
turning "a blind eye" and acting nevertheless ( or, in Chile, acting with gross 
negligence) is similar to intending an outcome as a means to another end. 
Liability for knowingly interfering with contract becomes close to 
negligence or even strict liability which is incompatible with competitive 
freedom. Rivals necessarily injure each other by interfering with their contracts or 
business foreseeing this event as a likely result of their activity. Hence Australian 
and English courts reject a principle (as that advocated in Beaudesert) 1489 of 
liability for the foreseen and unintended damage flowed as an unavoidable result 
of unlawful, intentional and positive acts. Likewise, OBG disapproved of 
Millar 490 which had held the defendant liable for deliberately breaking her 
contract foreseeing that the contractor would breach its own agreement with the 
claimants although the defendant had neither intended to harm the latter nor used 
wrongful means. Furthermore, English tort law does not recognise a principle of 
secondary liability for knowingly assisting in the commission of another's civil 
wrong. Moreover, I think that liability for knowingly causing the breach of 
another's contract without requiring inducement can approximate strict liability . 
• 
Mere bad faith does not really add much to the causal link between the 
defendant's act and its consequence. Take, for instance, Epstein's theory aimed at 
protecting contractual rights as though they were property from outsiders who 
knowingly interfere with them. This conception ends up relying exclusively on the 
causal relationship between interference and breach of contract. Although this 
doctrine is in itself consistent with Epstein' s general theory of strict liability, it 
seems too wide a rule to fit competitive freedom. The expansive French tort of 
interference notoriously shows that a liability rooted in mere knowledge or 
"characterised fault" (as opposed to intention) hinders freedom to compete. 
Thus, Chilean law would better restrain liability for unfair practices, 
including interference with contractual and business relationships, through 
intention or at any rate gross negligence, thereby following the more restrictive 
1489 (1966) 40 A.L.J.R. 211. 
1490 [1994] E.M.L.R. 44. 
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approach symbolised by the English economic torts. To achieve legal certainty, 
consistency and justice, at least in this terrain, undifferentiated categories such as 
culpa should be replaced with specific types of intention illustrative of the factual 
background in which competitors harm one another as well as of the causal link 
between misconduct and damage, namely: the defendant's intention to procure the 
breach of contract in inducement cases or to injure the claimant where contracts 
are prevented from being performed without causing their breach. Precluding the 
conclusion of prospective contracts should not attract liability; except when the 
defendant, acting in concert with the negotiating party who abused her right not to 
contract (by suddenly retreating from the preliminary dealings), intended to injure 
the claimant who is thereby injured. Likewise, the accomplices in the breach of 
another's contract should also act with the intention of harming the claimant or at 
least with gross negligence. 
A state of mind more severe than knowledge and (simple or characterised) 
fault respects competition and contracting parties' autonomy to resolve 
contractual vicissitudes. Indeed, the dearth of Chilean reported tort claims against 
accomplices in breaches of contracts suggests that contracting parties rely on 
contractual remedies before resorting to tort. 
5. English tort law deters and punishes unfair practices through passing-off and 
malicious falsehood. For courts, a comprehensive intentional tort of unfair 
competition has a deleterious impact on defendants' liberty to compete. Courts 
leave to statutes the determination of fair and unfair conduct, and attempt to 
prevent passing-off from being used for anticompetitive purposes. The problem is 
that passing-off is tried in preliminary proceedings, so courts lack time to ponder 
whether the granting of injunctions will inhibit legitimate competition. 
Passing-off is widely employed to restrain unfair practices partly because 
it does not require proof of the defendant's fault or intention. However, the 
defendant can only pass his goods as if they were his rival' s wares deliberately, 
often intending to harm the claimant in her commercial prestige. Passing-off 
entails strict liability for outcomes as it vindicates the proprietary interest m 
goodwill. The superiority of goodwill over the other economic interests is 
mirrored in strict liability and in that the claimant need not prove actual but 
merely · likely harm. Nevertheless, to protect all kinds of economic interests 
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equivalently, passing-off should reqmre proof of the defendant's intention to 
injure the claimant even if this means no more than inferring this intention from 
the defendant' s act. Paradoxically, the same interest in business reputation 
protected through passing-off is also safeguarded through the intention-based tort 
of malicious falsehood. However, the complex proof of the mental element 
renders this tort as frivolous in commercial competition as simple conspiracy is. 
In Chile, a special statute defines unfair practices in a general clause and 
gives various examples, including acts equivalent to passing-off and malicious 
falsehood. Unfair practices are per se wrongful. Thus, the main remedies aim at 
preventing these acts from occurring. The statute also provides for tort actions 
which are subject to the rules on delict enshrined in the civil code. Liability thus 
hinges on the traditional conditions of damage, causation and fault. Yet, the 
intention to harm the claimant or to cause the breach of contract, or at least gross 
neglig~nce, should displace mere fault for competitive freedom to be preserved. 
This suggestion is supported by that statute as it requires unfair practices to 
encompass an intentional element, thus implicitly qualifying neminem laedere. 
The comments made earlier concerning liability for interference with contract or 
business apply here also. 
6. The competition torts only indirectly help to deter and punish anticompetitive 
conduct. ,Competition law protects indeterminate consumers and competitors 
whereas tort law is concerned with known victims. Thus, antitrust conduct is 
relevant to tort to the limited extent that it injures recognisable persons. 
The competition torts are rooted in antitrust conduct conclusively 
established by the competition authority. These torts exist to promote private 
enforcement by releasing claimants from proving antitrust conduct. The 
competition torts merely supplement competition law. Tort litigation is confined 
to the most serious offences prosecuted by the competition authority. 
Consequently, it seems unlikely that stand-alone tort actions will be brought since 
they demand proof of antitrust conduct unless the competition authority did not 
investigate the infringement or found it to be pro-competitive, in which case the 
claim could be framed as an economic tort. 
Antitrust tort liability is composite. It derives from abusive conduct 
targeted at consumers and competitors generally in the relevant market although it 
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usually aims at recognisable victims too. Yet, this is strict liability for the harm 
inflicted to identifiable competitors. The defendant's intention to injure the 
claimant is presumed from the fact that antitrust conduct specifically harmed that 
claimant. However, proving the causal relationship between the defendant's act 
and the claimant's damage is harsh: antitrust conduct generates widespread 
effects. These difficulties reduce the range of prospective claimants to direct 
purchasers and competitors. 
Similarly, in Chile antitrust conduct is prosecuted and punished by the 
competition authority because of its adverse impact upon the market, consumers 
and competitors. Tort actions assist the public enforcement of competition law 
insofar as antitrust conduct also affects individual victims. Antitrust conduct and 
delict involve different types of intention and of damage, thus reflecting the public 
law/private law divide. If the breach of competition law is not worth sanctioning 
tort liability becomes superfluous. Indeed, the fact that antitrust conduct is 
punished because of its inimical consequences determines tort's fundamental 
compensatory role and justifies outcome-based strict liability. 
As with criminal and administrative offences, the infringement of 
competition law is wrongful and culpable. The competition authority's conclusive 
finding of antitrust conduct is res iudicata in subsequent tort proceedings: an 
irrefutable presumption of the defendant ' s fault. Article 30 of the CHCA provides 
that the said judgment shall bind civil courts as to the facts and their legal 
characterisation: The still inchoate Chilean case-law infers fault from antitrust 
conduct, thus limiting the debate to damage and causation. However, I have 
argued that fault liability is inadequate to regiment an activity whose participants 
owe no duty of care to one another. Courts should not presume "negligence" from 
antitrust conduct but should conclude that the defendant intended to harm the 
claimant. Although the object or effect of antitrust conduct is to affect anonymous 
consumers and competitors , as opposed to the intention embedded in delict, once 
the claimant brings evidence that she was specifically injured by that conduct, the 
missing mental element can be taken for granted. The court can logically assume 
that the defendant also sought to harm the claimant as a recognisable competitor. 
This intention is conspicuously blatant in predatory pricing which by definition 
targets identifiable rivals . Although my interpretation may not change the result of 
antitrust tort cases it can influence the reasoning supporting court decisions. In 
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any event, as the incipient case-law already illustrates, the complexity of showing 
that individual harm directly stemmed from antitrust conduct suggests that tort 
litigation will remain exclusive. 
7. The efficient-breach of contract is an obstacle to Lumley in Anglo-American 
contract law because breach of contract is not per se wrongful but an option open 
to defaulting promisors willing to pay damages instead. Likewise, specific 
performance is exceptional; compensation is confined to foreseeable harm even if 
the breach of contract is deliberate; and exemplary damages are foreclosed. 
Nevertheless, neither the fact that contracting parties must protect themselves 
against non-performance nor the efficient-breach is conclusive. Inducing breach 
of contract is unfair competition through which inducers profit from the 
performance owed to and owned by their rivals. Inducement jeopardises the 
public.,interest in contractual stability. This tort is worth sanctioning in its own 
right. Although it requires that the breach of contract follows, Lumley is a 
different wrong which entails intention-based liability. Conversely, breach of 
contract usually triggers strict liability. 
Chilean contract law, analogously to French law, has features which seem 
to go against the efficient-breach and favour tortious liability for knowingly 
interfering with contract: the overarching principles of pacta sunt servanda, good 
faith and .the fact that contracts bind their parties exclusively; the pre-eminence of 
specific performance as contractual remedy; and the enhancement of 
compensation to all direct damage following intentional (or grossly negligent) 
breach of contract. This undermines the efficient-breach under which promisors 
necessarily intend to harm promisees as a means to secure better deals from third 
parties. Thus, the restriction of tort liability through a more rigid mental element 
looks at odds with the law's position to sanction breaches of contract almost 
invariably. Nevertheless, the relationship between contracting parties themselves 
must be dissociated from outsiders who often interfere with their rivals' contracts 
acting legitimately. Likewise, specific performance is in practice very exceptional 
as compared with compensation for damages, thus leaving room to the efficient-
breach which usually originates in third parties exercising their competitive 
liberty. This confirms that tort liability for interference with contract should be 
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narrowed through intention ( or gross negligence) instead of bad faith or simple 
fault. 
8. The economic and competition torts primarily serve compensation. They also 
prevent wrongdoing, specifically unfair practices, through injunctions, notably in 
passing-off. Further, they can fulfil punitive and even restitutionary goals through 
the award of exemplary damages, typically where the defendant intends to injure 
the claimant as a means to self-enrichment. As a private-law sanction, exemplary 
damages should not be precluded just because the defendant was punished for 
committing a criminal or administrative offence. 
Comparably, the Chilean law of delict performs a mainly compensatory 
role alongside a preventive function which is crucial in the domain of unfair 
practices. My main contention here is that the extension of compensation for all 
direct damages flowing from the deliberate (or grossly negligent) breach of 
contract, which is similar to full recovery in deceit, should be applied to torts 
committed with the intention to harm or with extreme carelessness. Tortfeasors 
acting with ordinary fault should only answer for the harm that the reasonable 
person would have foreseen. The increase of compensation conceals a retributive 
goal which, I think, presupposes a more stringent mental element. There is no 
obvious reason for confining this punitive criterion to contract and to non-
pecuniary damage caused in tort. Retribution concerns the defendant's culpability 
rather than the nature of harm and the source from which it stems. Nonetheless, 
exemplary damages will not likely be awarded without a statute allowing them as 
they are customarily associated with criminal punishment and the principle of 
legality. Yet, this attitu.de overlooks the private-law nature of this remedy. 
9. From a wider perspective, the thesis assumed that tort liability in commercial 
competition is an area where Chilean law is less developed than English law. The 
thesis proposed to take the English economic torts as a model in which Chilean 
courts and scholars can find a sensible method of handling the interests of trade 
rivals who injure one another. The thesis has demonstrated that the formal bridge 
between the common law and the civil law is no impediment to comparisons of 
both systems . Nor does it preclude the imitation of techniques through which a 
certain problem can be tackled more adequately than following those routes 
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conventionally associated with one's own legal system. Concretely, Chilean law 
can treat the harm flowing from commercial competition more consistently with 
the liberty to compete if it requires a mental element instead of applying culpa in 
an undifferentiated fashion. Ultimately, the thesis has argued for improving the 
law of delict by emulating a common-law style. The common law can help to re-
interpret a principle as deeply ingrained in the civilian tradition as neminem 
laedere, at any rate when facing the phenomenon studied here, regardless of the 
dissimilar levels of legal, social and economic development separating England 
from Chile. 
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